# Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204–1453

## Crusade, Religion and Trade between Latins, Greeks and Turks

Crusades – Subsidia 5

Edited by
Nikolaos G. Chrissis and Mike Carr

Routledge

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*In memory of Konstantinos Ikonomopoulos*
*(1980–2009)*

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# Contents

**PART IV: THE OTTOMANS' WESTERN 'FRONTIER'**

# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| *BF* | *Byzantinische Forschungen* |
| *BMGS* | *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* |
| *CHoT* | *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Vol. 1, Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453*, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) |
| *DOP* | *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* |
| *EI*$^2$ | *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn (12 vols, Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005) |
| *JMH* | *Journal of Medieval History* |
| Lock, *Franks* | Peter Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500* (London: Longman, 1995) |
| MGH | Monumenta Germaniae Historica |
| *NCMH* | *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. David Abulafia et al. (7 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995–2005) |
| Nicol, *Last Centuries* | Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) |
| *PG* | *Patrologiae cursus completus: series Graeca*, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (161 vols, Paris: Migne, 1857–66) |
| *PL* | *Patrologiae cursus completus: series Latina*, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (221 vols, Paris: Migne, 1844–65) |
| *RHGF* | *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. Martin Bouquet et al. (24 vols, Paris: Victor Palmé, 1738–1904) |
| RIS | Rerum Italicarum Scriptores |
| Setton, *Crusades* | Kenneth M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades* (6 vols, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89) |
| Setton, *Papacy* | Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1572* (4 vols, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976–84) |
| *SM* | *Studi Medievali* |

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**Judith Ryder** (PhD Oxon) is a Research Fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford. She has studied Theology and Byzantine History at St John's College, Oxford. Her monograph *The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones* was published with Brill in 2010. She has worked as a postdoctoral researcher on the *Prosopography of the Byzantine World*, and is now General Editor of the new series of 'Translated Texts for Byzantinists', which launched with its first volume in 2012.

**Teresa Shawcross** (PhD Oxon, FRHistS) teaches Byzantine History at Princeton University. She was previously Assistant Professor in Medieval European and Mediterranean History at Amherst and Mt Holyoke Colleges, and a Research Fellow in History at Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. Her book, *The Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece*, and her other recent publications deal mainly with the political, social and cultural consequences of the fragmentation of the Byzantine Empire after the Fourth Crusade. She is currently completing a monograph on late medieval theories and practices of empire.

# Maps




Map 1 Greece and the Aegean, c. 1214


Map 2 Greece and the Aegean, c. 1328




Map 3 Greece and the Aegean, c. 1400

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# Acknowledgments

The present volume arose out of the conference *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean*, held at the Institute of Historical Research in London on 9 July 2010. We would like to acknowledge our debt to the institutions and learned societies that supported the conference and made this volume possible. Funding and organizational support were provided by: the Department of History at Royal Holloway, University of London; the Institute of Historical Research (IHR); the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (SSCLE); the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies (SPHS); the Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies (SPBS); and the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA). We would also like to thank all the speakers (including Dimitris Kastritsis and Anthony Luttrell, whose papers at the conference could not be included in the present volume as they were due to appear in print elsewhere), as well as all the others who contributed to the programme and running of the conference, namely Susan Edgington, Jonathan Harris, Judith Herrin, Clare Norton, Thomas Smith and Mark Whelan. As regards the volume, we would like to thank George Mastrakoulis for designing the maps, as well as Patrick Cole and all the staff at Ashgate for their hard work in helping prepare this book. Finally, we would like to extend our special thanks and gratitude to Bernard Hamilton who, as president of the SSCLE, warmly embraced and encouraged the project from its early days, and graciously accepted our invitation not only to participate with a paper but also to compose the Conclusions section for this volume.

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# Preface

The papers published in this volume were delivered at a one-day conference held at the University of London's Institute of Historical Research in July 2010. They covered aspects of the interaction between Byzantines, Latins and Turks in the period 1204 to 1453 and examined themes such as crusading, religion and trade. It was a very sunny summer's day and, even with the metal-framed windows of Senate House wide open, the room was decidedly warm. Yet there was no lack of attention among those present. The organizers, Mike Carr and Nikos Chrissis, had come up with the idea of pairing a speaker who was well-known in the field with a younger scholar in three of the four sessions. The format worked very well, providing frequent changes of tone and delivery as well as prompting reflection on how different generations express their research findings. Regardless of how arguments were phrased and presented, however, one theme came out very clearly during the day: that conflict between human societies, whether physical or verbal, is only the tip of an iceberg of interaction, resting on an immense economic, cultural and religious convergence as well as divergence. With the papers now edited, indexed and published in this volume, readers will be able to explore that theme as well as the varied interests, topics and approaches of the authors.

There was one notable absentee at the conference: our colleague Konstantinos Ikonomopoulos, whose research on the Byzantine view of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre would have fitted well into its broad themes. Sadly Konstantinos died in October 2009 without being able to complete his PhD, but some of his findings have been published. His article 'Byzantium and Jerusalem, 813–975: From Indifference to Intervention' can be found in *Papers from the First and Second Postgraduate Forums in Byzantine Studies: Sailing to Byzantium*, ed. Savvas Neocleous (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009), pp. 7–25. The conference and this volume are dedicated to his memory.

Jonathan Harris
Royal Holloway
University of London

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# Introduction

*Nikolaos G. Chrissis and Mike Carr*

One could be excused for feeling hesitant before delving into the world of Greece and the Aegean in the late medieval period. The complexity and fluidity of political circumstances alone can make any examination of the area a daunting task. Following the capture of Constantinople by the army of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, all semblance of political unity from the eastern coast of the Adriatic to the littoral of Asia Minor and the Black Sea disappeared. The Frankish and Venetian conquerors carved up a multitude of dominions out of the Byzantine territories, while no less than three Greek states (not to mention several semi-independent *archontes*) surfaced from the ruins of imperial collapse and claimed the inheritance of Byzantium. This situation was complicated further in the fourteenth century by the appearance of a number of independent Turkish principalities, known as beyliks, on the Byzantine Anatolia frontier. The Turks soon replaced Greek control in the region, with the Ottomans eventually emerging as the dominant power amongst them. Thus, between the disintegration of the Byzantine Empire after 1204 and the consolidation of Ottoman power in the mid-fifteenth century, the area was an incredibly complex mosaic of peoples, religions and polities.

The need for research that cuts across sub-disciplinary boundaries, so often emphasized and widely acknowledged in modern historiography, is even more keenly felt with regard to this world of extreme political and religious fragmentation. Exploring the full range of interactions between Orthodox Greeks, Catholic Latins and Muslim Turks is a challenge for most individual scholars, not only on the basic level of linguistic skills needed to approach the available sources, but even more so on account of the diverse social relations and political and cultural traditions of each one of these groups. This was the stimulus for us to organize the conference on *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean* in the summer of 2010 at the Institute of Historical Research in London, which eventually resulted in the present volume. Our main aim was, and remains, to contribute to a better understanding of the subject by combining the work of specialists in western medieval, Byzantine and Ottoman studies.

* * *

Addressing issues of interaction between different ethnic and religious groups is par for the course for much of the historiography on the eastern Mediterranean in the Middle Ages – or in any other historical period for that matter. Yet, collective efforts dedicated to examining such cross-cultural and inter-religious contacts are

rarer than one might expect for the post-1204 Byzantine East, and certain aspects of contact and conflict in the region have not received due attention.

It has been more than 20 years since the volume *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* was published.[1] It was a seminal work, two contributors and one editor of which actually participated in the *Contact and Conflict* conference. Many of the essays in that volume are classics, still useful (and much used) to this day. Nonetheless, there have been major advances since then, for example, in the thriving field of crusade studies; furthermore, the 1989 volume focused on the interaction between Greeks and Latins without for the most part bringing into the discussion the third element, the Turks, except for a single contribution.[2] A number of volumes on eastern–western interaction in the context of the crusades have come out since, but the majority of them focus mostly on Outremer; when they address the Byzantine East it is usually for the period before and up to the Fourth Crusade. Meanwhile, works that consider western interaction with the Turks usually focus on the period after 1453, largely outside of the context of the crusades.[3] Furthermore, there is a tendency in such collective works for the voice of specialists in the history

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[1] Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (eds), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London: Frank Cass, 1989) [= *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 4/1 (1989)].

[2] Elizabeth Zachariadou, 'Holy War in the Aegean during the Fourteenth Century', in Arbel, Hamilton and Jacoby, *Latins and Greeks*, pp. 212–25. Cf. the focus on the two sides in Martin Hinterberger and Christopher Schabel (eds), *Greeks, Latins and Intellectual History 1204–1500* (Leuven: Peeters, 2011). The recent volume by Judith Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillan (eds), *Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), also focuses on Greek, Latin and Slav perspectives and does not include chapters dedicated to the Muslims, which is for the most part understandable as it deals primarily with the period 1204 to 1261 from a Byzantine point of view.

[3] See, for example, Vladimir Goss (ed.), *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1986), which includes three contributions of Byzantine interest by Runciman, Nicol and Abrahamsy, for the most part examining the pre-1204 period. Similar emphasis on Outremer is given in Conor Kostick (ed.), *The Crusades and the Near East: Cultural Histories* (London: Routledge, 2011). The excellent volume by Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (eds), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), focuses heavily on the period before the thirteenth century, with the exception of contributions on art and the economy by Bouras, Gerstel and Jacoby. For a collection which includes much on cross-cultural contacts during the later period, see David Blanks and Michael Frassetto (eds), *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of the Other* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999); and also the two useful review articles by Eric R. Dursteler, 'On Bazaars and Battlefields: Recent Scholarship on Mediterranean Cultural Contacts', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 15 (2011), pp. 413–34; and Francesca Trivellato, 'Renaissance Italy and the Muslim Mediterranean in Recent Historical Works', *Journal of Modern History*, 82 (2010), pp. 127–55. On intercultural contacts in the context of trade, see also the forthcoming volume: Georg Christ, Stefan Burkhardt, Roberto Zaugg et al.

of the Muslim world not to be heard as much as that of their western medievalist colleagues.[4] The present volume, therefore, is almost unique in bringing together research by medievalists, Byzantinists and Ottomanists in order to explore relations between Greeks, Latins and Turks over the entire period from 1204 to 1453.[5]

The essays presented here explore various factors that defined contact and conflict between the three sides, with a view to highlighting salient themes that run through this period, as well as evaluating some wider changes that occurred over time. The volume lays particular emphasis on the crusades and the way they affected interaction in this area in the late Middle Ages. The reason for this is twofold. Crusade studies have attracted considerable scholarly interest in recent years and the impact of the crusades on Byzantine history up to 1204 has been repeatedly examined in the past.[6] However, there has been little work on the way crusading was implemented in the area from the thirteenth century onwards.[7] As a crusading front, Frankish Greece and the Aegean is relatively unexploited by comparison to other theatres of activity, such as Outremer, Iberia or the Baltic. Secondly, the crusade can provide narrative and thematic cohesion to an otherwise baffling nexus of shifting relations in a region which lacked a clearly identified political centre for over two-and-a-half centuries. Nevertheless, the contributions included here are by no means limited to crusading *per se* but rather use it as a starting point to examine

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(eds), *Union in Separation: Trading Diasporas in the Eastern Mediterranean (1200–1700)* (Heidelberg: Springer, forthcoming 2014).

[4] See, for example, Benjamin Arbel (ed.), *Intercultural Contacts in the Medieval Mediterranean* (London: Frank Cass, 1996) [= *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 10/1–2 (1995)] where, out of 24 contributors, only two are scholars of the Muslim world.

[5] A collective volume with a similar approach came out while the present volume was in the final stages of preparation, confirming that this is indeed a fruitful direction to be followed in studying the region in this era: Jonathan Harris, Catherine Holmes and Eugenia Russell (eds), *Byzantines, Latins, and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1150* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[6] Most extensively in Jonathan Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2003); and Ralph-Johannes Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096–1204*, trans. J.C. Morris and Jean E. Ridings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

[7] This has been the focus of our research: Nikolaos G. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine–Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012); Michael Carr, 'Motivations and Response to Crusades in the Aegean, c. 1300–1350' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2011). Researchers of the later crusades are largely indebted to the works of Norman Housley, who remains the authority on the later crusades in general: Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); idem, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); idem, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); idem, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); idem, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, 1453–1505* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

various aspects of contact, including trade, interfaith relations and geographical exploration.

The present volume, therefore, makes available original research in the form of new interpretations, themes and sources, but at the same time it is also meant to make the history of the region in this period more widely accessible. In particular, this collection of essays aims to familiarize those with an interest in the area (whether Byzantinists, crusade historians or Ottomanists) with the latest advances in the other relative fields. Bearing this in mind, in this volume we have all attempted to explain our findings in terms intelligible to those working outside our particular sub-fields, and to outline the relevant debates in our areas of expertise when appropriate. Similarly, even though this introduction is not meant as a detailed survey of the current state of research on Frankish Greece and the Aegean, we hope that it will provide the reader with a basic bibliographical background to some of the works which we feel are most relevant to this field.[8]

## Historical Outline: Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204–1453

Latin presence in *Romania* (Ρωμανία) was from the outset fragmented. Though the Latin emperor installed in Constantinople was theoretically the overlord of all the former imperial domains, in practice his direct control extended to a rather limited territory on both sides of the Straits and to some of the nearby islands in the northern Aegean. Nominally the heir of the political institutions of Byzantium, it proved difficult for both the Latin emperor and the strongest lords among the Frankish host to shake off their feudal background. Combined with the patchy and piecemeal progress of the conquest, this resulted in the establishment of some practically autonomous Latin 'crusader' states in Greek lands, the most important of which, besides the Latin Empire, were the kingdom of Thessalonica, the duchy of Athens and Thebes, the principality of Achaia and the duchy of the Archipelago (in the Cyclades). Alongside these feudal lordships, there were also several Venetian colonies administered by representatives of the metropolis, while still under the obligation to provide support to the Latin emperor. The most important Venetian possessions were Modon and Coron in the Peloponnese, and Crete which remained in the hands of the *Serenissima* until the seventeenth century.[9]

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[8] Given the introductory nature of this attempt to bring together work from different sub-fields, there is an emphasis on English-language publications, which are more widely accessible for both students and scholars, though we have included some major and indispensable works in other languages. Additional references to notable works on the major relevant topics can be found in the individual chapters.

[9] For the Frankish states, see: Lock, *Franks*; David Jacoby, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece', *NCMH*, vol. 5, pp. 525–42; idem, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale: Les 'Assises de Romanie', sources, application et diffusion* (Paris: Mouton, 1971); Peter Topping, *Studies on Latin Greece, AD 1205–1715* (London:

On the eve of the attack on Constantinople, the Frankish and Venetian crusaders had drawn up a document dividing all the lands of the empire among themselves. A complete conquest was never achieved, however. Three successor Byzantine states were set up at Nicaea in Asia Minor, at Arta in Epiros and at Trebizond on the coast of the Black Sea. Trebizond was soon cut off from most of the developments further west, but Nicaea and Epiros were to play a central role in the affairs of Greece and the Aegean as major rallying points for resistance to the Latins.[10]

With the exception of a brief period under the inspired leadership of the Latin emperor Henry of Hainault (1206–16), the Latins generally found themselves on the defensive. In order to defend the Frankish possessions from the resurgent Greeks, calls for reinforcements were issued to the West. A number of crusades were proclaimed by the papacy, for example, in 1205–1207 to stabilize the recent conquests, in 1222–25 to protect Thessalonica, and in 1235–40 to break the combined pressure of Nicaea and the Bulgarian kingdom on the Latin Empire. However, these efforts met with limited success and any results were evanescent. Latin presence in Greek lands was progressively eroded in the thirteenth century. Theodore of Epiros destroyed the kingdom of Thessalonica in 1224 and for a while seemed likely to reclaim Constantinople as well. Eventually this was accomplished by Nicaea, which became the greatest power in the region from the 1230s onwards. Michael Palaiologos took the ultimate prize of control over the imperial capital in 1261. A new crusade, in 1262–64, was proclaimed by Pope Urban IV to recover Constantinople and to buttress the principality of Achaia, the most important

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Variorum Reprints, 1977); Robert Lee Wolff, *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (London: Variorum, 1976); Antoine Bon, *La Morée franque: recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principaute d'Achaïe (1205–1430)* (2 vols, Paris: Boccard, 1969); Jean Longnon, *L'Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris: Payot, 1949); Filip van Tricht, *The Latin 'Renovatio' of Byzantium: The Empire of Constantinople (1204–1228)*, trans. Peter Longbottom (Leiden: Brill, 2011). For the Venetian presence, see: Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au moyen âge: le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien, XIIe–XVe siècles* (Paris: Boccard, 1959); Frederick C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Donald M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 148–422; John E. Dotson, 'Venice, Genoa and Control of the Seas in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger (eds), *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), pp. 119–36. Immensely useful as a general and detailed work of reference is Setton, *Papacy*.

[10] For the Byzantine successor states, see: Michael Angold, 'Byzantium in Exile', *NCMH*, vol. 5, pp. 543–68; idem, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Alice Gardner, *The Lascarids of Nicaea: The Story of an Empire in Exile* (London: Methuen, 1912); Donald M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957); idem, *The Despotate of Epiros, 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

remaining Frankish state in Greece, but this attempt fared no better than the earlier ones.[11]

A major new power entered the stage in the 1260s, in the person of Charles of Anjou, brother of King Louis IX of France and crowned as king of Sicily as the papal champion against the Hohenstaufen. In 1267 Charles undertook to lead a campaign to restore the Latin Empire, while he was also recognized as the suzerain of Achaia (and in 1278 he gained direct control of the principality after the death of Prince William II). The Angevins represented the greatest threat to Byzantium for the following 15 years. During this period, Charles was locked in a duel with Michael Palaiologos where the two sides pitted their military, diplomatic and financial means against each other. The Byzantine emperor managed to hold back Angevin designs by a variety of manoeuvres, including the agreement with the papacy that led to the Union of the Greek and Roman Churches at the Second Council of Lyon (1274).[12] But the final blow to Charles' ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean came with the uprising of the Sicilian Vespers (1282), which destroyed his power base in Sicily. The war that followed involved French, Spanish and Italian fleets and armies in clashes throughout the Mediterranean for two decades.[13]

It would not be until the early fourteenth century that western claimants to the throne of Constantinople would reappear with the goal of restoring the Latin Empire, but the plans of Charles of Valois and Philip of Taranto came to nothing.[14] Meanwhile, the rise of Turkish power in Anatolia and the loss of the last Latin outposts in Outremer in 1291 would lead to a reorientation of policies and crusading priorities in the Levant.[15] In the process, the enfeebled Byzantine Empire gradually

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[11] Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 1–178.

[12] Jean Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (London: Longman, 1998); Deno J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282: A Study in Late Byzantine–Western Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1979), pp. 113–81.

[13] Steven Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); Antonino Franchi, *I vespri siciliani e le relazioni tra Roma e Bisanzio: studio critico sulle fonti* (Palermo: Facoltà Teologica di Sicilia, 1984); David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, 1200–1500* (London: Longman, 1997); see also idem, 'Charles of Anjou Reassessed', *JMH*, 26.1 (2000), pp. 93–114, for a discussion of the current state of research, with a very extensive bibliography on the revolt and its context.

[14] Erwin Dade, *Versuche zur Wiedererrichtung der lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel im Rahmen der abendländischen Politik, 1261 bis etwa 1310* (Jena: Frommann, 1938), esp. pp. 72–157; Angeliki E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[15] For an overview of crusading activity from the late thirteenth century onwards, see the works of Housley, cited above n. 7, as well as Silvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274–1314* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

came to be seen as an ally, or as a Christian state in need of rescue, rather than as a target for crusading aggression.

The catalyst for this change was the gradual replacement, in the late thirteenth century, of Byzantine and Seljuk control of Anatolia by that of the Turkish beyliks: a patchwork of small dynastic principalities which, by the early fourteenth century, had established themselves across Asia Minor, stretching from the fringes of the Mongol Ilkhanate and Greek Trebizond in the east, to the shores of the Aegean in the west. By the second decade of the fourteenth century the maritime beyliks of the Aegean coast, especially those of Aydin and Menteshe, had begun to threaten Latin and Greek territories in the Aegean and Greece by launching raids into the sea, sometimes in alliance with one another, and at other times in league with the Catalan rulers of Athens or other disparate Christian groups in the region.[16] In these early encounters it was the newly established Knights Hospitallers on Rhodes and the Genoese Zaccaria lords of Chios who most tenaciously defended their territories from Turkish attack, although the Venetians also began to engage in limited military action as their possessions became endangered.[17]

The increasing pressure from the beyliks culminated in Venice taking the initiative against the Turks in 1333, when the Republic, along with other local Christian powers – the Hospitallers, Cyprus and initially Byzantium – together with the papacy and France, formed a naval league to defend the Aegean from Turkish raids. This league, without Byzantine participation in the end, won some important victories over the Turks in 1334, but once it had disbanded later in the

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1991); and Anthony Leopold, *How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2000).

[16] For the Catalans of Athens, see: Kenneth M. Setton, *The Catalan Domination of Athens: 1311–1388* (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948); David Jacoby, 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305–1332): Un nouveau témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello', *SM*, 15.1 (1974), pp. 217–61; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens and the Beginning of Turkish Expansion in the Aegean Area', *SM*, 21.2 (1980), pp. 821–38.

[17] The Hospitallers on Rhodes have been the focus of many studies by Anthony Luttrell, the majority of which have been reprinted in the following volumes: *Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces, 1306–1462* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1992); *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291–1440* (Aldershot: Variorum Reprints, 1982); *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West, 1291–1440: Collected Studies* (Aldershot: Variorum Reprints, 1978). For the Genoese possessions in *Romania*, see the landmark study by Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe – début du XVe siècle)* (2 vols, Rome: École française de Rome, 1978); and also Philip P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island: 1346–1566* (3 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); Geo Pistarino (ed.), *Genovesi d'Oriente* (Genoa: Civico istituto colombiano, 1990); William Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios, 1275–1329', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 31 (1911), pp. 44–55.

year, the Turkish raids resumed. In the following decade, the Turks, in particular those of Aydin, began to launch raids into the Aegean with increasing frequency and penetration, exacting tribute from a number of Christian territories and even threatening Venetian Crete, the most powerful of all Latin possessions. By this point, the severity of the Turkish menace had become well-known in the West, leading Pope Clement VI to proclaim a crusade against the main perpetrator of these raids, Umur Pasha, the lord of Smyrna, in 1343. This crusade managed to capture the port of Smyrna in 1344, leading to the death of Umur in 1348 and the temporary subjugation of Aydin.[18]

However, the Crusade of Smyrna did little to permanently reduce Turkish dominance in the region. In contrast, as the strength of the coastal beyliks began to wane in the latter half of the fourteenth century, one principality began to rise in their place – that initially established within landlocked boundaries in north-western Anatolia by Osman, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty. In 1326, the year of Osman's death, the important city of Bursa was captured from the Byzantines, followed by Nicaea/Iznik in 1331, taken by Osman's son and successor Orkhan. By 1350 the Ottoman war machine had virtually eliminated Byzantine power in Asia Minor and had annexed the coastal beylik of Karasi, providing access to the Aegean and the Sea of Marmara. The next crucial point in the expansion of Ottoman power came in 1354 when an army crossed the Dardanelles and seized the fortress of Gallipoli from the Byzantines, marking the first Turkish foothold in Europe. Under the reign of Murad I the Ottomans continued their expansion into Europe and across Asia Minor, capturing the second city of Byzantium, Thessalonica, in 1387 and, under Sultan Bayezid I, subjugating the Anatolian maritime beyliks of Menteshe and Aydin in 1389–90. Christian armies were raised to challenge the advancing

[18] For the emergence of the Turkish beyliks and their interactions with Latins and Greeks, see the studies of Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin: 1300–1415* (Venice: Istituto ellenico di studi bizantini e postbizantini di Venezia per tutti i paesi del mondo, 1983); and Paul Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'occident: Recherches sur 'La geste d'Umur pacha'* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1957). Also of interest are: Rudi Paul Lindner, 'Anatolia, 1300–1451', *CHoT*, pp. 102–37; Charles E. Bosworth, *The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 213–42; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Ottoman Emirate (1300–1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 11–13 January 1991* (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1993); Paul Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.–15. Jh.* (Istanbul: Universum druckerei, 1934). Specific works on the crusades against the beyliks include: Mike Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna: A Reconsideration', *Crusades*, 13 (forthcoming, 2014); Alain Demurger, 'Le pape Clément VI et l'Orient: ligue ou croisade?', in J. Paviot and J. Verger (eds), *Guerre, pouvoir et noblesse au Moyen Âge, Mélanges en l'honneur de Philippe Contamine* (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2000), pp. 207–14; Angeliki E. Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: The Background to the Anti-Turkish League of 1332–1334', *Speculum*, 45 (1970), pp. 374–92.

Ottoman armies but were routinely defeated, such as the Serbs at Maritsa in 1371 and the crusaders at Nicopolis in 1396 and Varna in 1444.[19]

By the end of the fourteenth century the Ottomans had emerged as the dominant power in the region, and, under Bayezid I, even laid siege to Constantinople itself. After the defeat of Bayezid at Ankara by the Mongol chief Timur in 1402, the pre-eminence of the Ottomans was briefly challenged. Bayezid was imprisoned by Timur and the tributary states of Aydin and Menteshe, along with the other subjugated Anatolian beyliks, were temporarily restored, but within years the Ottomans had re-asserted their control over these territories and once again commenced their expansion under the rule of Mehmed I. By the mid-point of the fifteenth century, large swathes of Greece had come under Ottoman control and many Aegean islands, such as the Genoese colonies of Lesbos and Chios as well as the Venetian duchy of Naxos, became tributary states. The confirmation of Ottoman supremacy in the region came in 1453, when Mehmed II, 'the Conqueror', captured Constantinople, crowning over a century of Ottoman expansion and creating an empire which could rival that of Byzantium in its heyday. Although the language of crusading against the Turks persisted into the early modern period, the Ottoman Empire was gradually integrated into the diplomatic system of European powers, and its control over the Balkans was no longer seriously challenged.[20]

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[19] The establishment and expansion of the Ottoman beylik has received much attention from historians, including the works of Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1938); Cemal Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Rudi Paul Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007). For the later period, see: Dimitris J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300–1481* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990), pp. 22–54.

[20] Jonathan Harris, *The End of Byzantium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Marios Philippides (ed.), *Mehmed II the Conqueror and the Fall of the Franco-Byzantine Levant to the Ottoman Turks: Some Western Views and Testimonies* (Tempe, AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2007). For crusading against the Ottomans, see: David Nicolle, *Nicopolis 1396: The Last Crusade* (Oxford: Osprey, 1999); Jacques Paviot and Martine Chauney-Bouillot (eds), *Nicopolis, 1396–1996: Actes du colloque international, Dijon, 18 octobre 1996* (Dijon: Société des Annales de Bourgogne, 1997) [= *Annales de Bourgogne* 68.3 (1996)]; Colin Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 64–99; idem, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat*; Setton, *Papacy*, vols 2–4; and also Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); James Hankins, 'Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II', *DOP*, 49 (1995), pp. 111–207; for the later period, see Géraud Poumarède,

## Fluidity and Ambiguity: Contact *and* Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean

Helpful as this schematic outline of events might be, however, we should be on our guard against a narrative that paints too neat a picture of events in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, be that one of Byzantine resurgence versus chronic Frankish weakness in the thirteenth century, or the collapse of united Christian resistance in the face of Turkish expansion in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The reality on the ground was anything but neat. First of all, the Nicaean project of resurrecting the Byzantine Empire was never complete. To say nothing of faraway Trebizond, Epiros remained independent and frequently hostile, despite efforts to bring it into the fold through matrimonial alliances or force of arms. In the Peloponnese, the Latin principality of Achaia shrank as the Byzantine despotate of Morea gradually absorbed its territories, but it survived to the fifteenth century and the Byzantine takeover was only completed less than 30 years before the Ottoman conquest. Most of the islands in the Aegean remained under Venetian control; as regards the three largest ones, Negroponte was fought over fiercely, with the Byzantine reconquest by Licario in the 1270s proving ephemeral, until the island eventually fell to the Turks in 1471; Crete remained firmly in Venetian hands down to 1669, although it was rocked by various native rebellions, some of which had links with the government at Nicaea/Constantinople; Rhodes, on the other hand, passed from the control of the semi-independent Gabalas dynasty to Nicaea in the mid-thirteenth century, only to be conquered by the Knights Hospitallers in the early fourteenth century and become the order's base for 200 years, before it was eventually lost to the Ottomans (c. 1307–1522). Meanwhile, the return of the Byzantine government to Constantinople and the concentration on western affairs left the eastern flank exposed. This was exploited not so much by the collapsing Seljuk state, as by nomadic Turcomans who gradually overran most of Asia Minor and formed the Turkish beyliks which eventually emerged on the formerly Byzantine-controlled coast.

Even though it was the Ottomans who captured Constantinople and extinguished Byzantium, their rise was also far from straightforward and their success far from inevitable. For most of the early fourteenth century it was the coastal beyliks of Menteshe and Aydin which wielded the most power in Asia Minor, and for the majority of the period Turkish sea power remained inferior to that of the Italians in the Aegean or of the Hospitallers. Even the Ottoman land armies could be defeated, as was proved by Timur when he brought the mighty Sultan Bayezid to heel in 1402. This is to say nothing of the conflicts between the Ottomans and the other Anatolian beyliks and the internal strife which beset the Ottoman ruling dynasty, especially during the early fifteenth century, which probably more than anything

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*Pour en finir avec la croisade: mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004).

gave the Byzantines something to work with in delaying the eventual conquest of the imperial city.

Furthermore, discussion of political boundaries is by no means the whole story. Alliances and conflicts did not follow strictly confessional or ethnic lines. The coalition that the Nicaean army defeated at Pelagonia in 1259 included the Greek rulers of Epiros and Thessaly, alongside the prince of Achaia and troops sent by Manfred of Sicily.[21] The Genoese allied with Michael Palaiologos against Charles of Anjou, while discontented members of the Byzantine aristocracy offered their support to Charles of Valois against Andronikos II in 1307–10.[22] The Latin lords of Greece fought among themselves, not much more rarely than they did against Greek or Turkish enemies; one need only think about the revolt of the Lombard lords of Thessalonica against Emperor Henry in 1207–1209, or the war that the prince of Achaia fought against the Lombards and Venetians of Negroponte and the duke of Athens in 1256–58.[23] Moreover, the duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, allied with Andronikos III to capture Chios from the Genoese lord Martino Zaccaria in 1329, barely four years before both Sanudo and Andronikos agreed to ally with Venice for the naval league against the Turks.[24] During the Byzantine civil wars of the mid-fourteenth century, things became even more complicated as each side courted local Latin, Serb, Bulgarian and Turkish rulers to further their cause. To give one particularly well-known example, the establishment of the first Ottoman foothold in Europe at Gallipoli in 1354 is largely regarded as a result of the Ottoman alliance with Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos, who had allowed the Turks to cross the Dardanelles to accompany him on campaign in Thrace against John V and his Serbian and Bulgarian allies.[25]

Even harder to describe in black-and-white terms is the everyday life of Greek populations under Latin or Turkish rule. Complex issues of coexistence, loyalties and identity arise. For example, can we really speak of segregation or acculturation between Greeks and Latins? Relevant studies suggest the appearance of elements of a new mixed identity, forged between the conquerors and the conquered, particularly in the areas where Latin control was long-lasting, such as Frankish Achaia and Venetian Crete; most of these studies, however, also warn about the limits of this development.[26] There is evidence of persisting loyalties towards the Byzantine

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[21] Deno J. Geanakoplos, 'Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration: The Battle of Pelagonia, 1259', *DOP*, 7 (1953), pp. 99–141.

[22] Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 212–20, 341–3.

[23] Ernst Gerland, *Geschichte des lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel. I. Geschichte der Kaiser Balduin I. und Heinrich, 1204–1216* (Homburg von der Höhe: Im Selbsverlag des Verfassers, 1905), pp. 161–90; Lock, *Franks*, pp. 90–91.

[24] Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 16–17.

[25] Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 217–61.

[26] See: Sally McKee, *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Aneta Ilieva, *Frankish Morea (1205–1262): Socio-Cultural Interaction between the Franks and the Local Population*

government and – particularly – ecclesiastical hierarchy in 'exile', as well as of indifference or even support towards the newly installed Latin regimes. Such issues were not limited to the populations under foreign rule. The collapse of the imperial order and the dismemberment of the Byzantine state generated an intense anxiety and a crisis of identity even among those Byzantines who remained free from conquest.[27] The radically changed circumstances required not only new ways of action but also new ways of thinking. It is telling that two recent publications start their examination of this period with the question of *what* exactly was Byzantium in the thirteenth century.[28] Parallels can, of course, be drawn on the Latin and Turkish sides; at times the Latin lords in the Aegean embraced Byzantine imperial identity as a marker of legitimacy and, as the Ottoman state began to replace that of Byzantium, the identity of Italian merchant communities in particular became more malleable in order to make coexistence possible under Turkish rule.[29] The Turks for their part also benefitted from a fluidity of relations with both Greeks and Latins, not least in the development of Ottoman economic and administrative institutions.[30]

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(Athens: Historical Publications St. D. Basilopoulos, 1991); Michael S. Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks (1204–1262): A Study of the Greek Population and the Orthodox Church under the Frankish Dominion* (Ioannina: Philosophike Schole Panepistemiou Ioanninon, 1987); Peter Topping, 'Co-existence of Greeks and Latins in Frankish Morea and Venetian Crete', in *XVe Congres international d'études byzantines. I. Histoire* (Athens: [s n.], 1976), pp. 3–23 [= Topping, *Studies in Latin Greece*, no. XI]; David Jacoby, 'The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade', *American Historical Review*, 78 (1973), pp. 873–906.

[27] Gill Page, *Being Byzantine: Greek Identity before the Ottomans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Anthony Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformation of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 317–88.

[28] Charlotte Roueché, 'Introduction: Defining Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204', in Herrin and Saint-Guillan, *Identities and Allegiances*, pp. 1–5, at 3–5; Antony Eastmond, *Art and Identity in Thirteenth-Century Byzantium: Hagia Sophia and the Empire of Trebizond* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. xix–xxi.

[29] Christopher Wright, 'Byzantine Authority and Latin Rule in the Gattilusio Lordships', in Harris, Holmes and Russell, *Byzantines, Latins, and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World*, pp. 247–63; Nicholas Oikonomides, 'The Byzantine Overlord of Genoese Possessions in Romania', in Charalambos Dendrinos et al. (eds), *Porphyrogenita: Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 235–8. Valuable studies for the later period include: Eric R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

[30] See: Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For Byzantine political and socio-economic

## Outline of the Present Volume

This volume consists of four parts, arranged roughly in chronological order, which encompass a variety of topics while maintaining a unity of focus on the factors affecting contact and conflict between Greeks, Latins and Turks.

The first part places Frankish Greece in the wider context of developments in East and West. The essay by Nikolaos Chrissis argues that western involvement in Romania bears close parallels with the other crusade fronts in the thirteenth century, such as the Baltic and the Albigensian Crusades, and that this crusading framework influenced both actions and perceptions between Latins and Greeks in the period. Bernard Hamilton, on the other hand, describes how the Latin conquest of Byzantium opened up new routes for western merchants, diplomats and friars to visit the Crimean Peninsula, the Caucasus and western Asia. As a result, western knowledge of, and familiarity with, the area grew immensely from the thirteenth century onwards.

The second part investigates the manifold and often contradictory ways in which the Byzantines responded to the Latin presence in the East. Teresa Shawcross examines the city of Athens before and after the Latin conquest, making a case about the importance of local interests and regional allegiances in shaping everyday life in a Byzantine province and consequently in affecting the possibilities for accommodation with the new Frankish masters. The growing prosperity of Athens in the late twelfth century and the worship of the Theotokos at the Parthenon, which turned the city into an important pilgrimage destination, initially acted as an incentive for successive conquerors but eventually won over the western settlers (as they had won over the snobbish bishops sent from Constantinople before the conquest) and guaranteed 'a cohesive sense of identity' for the local population. Judith Ryder's chapter looks at a fascinating section of the oration *pro subsidio Latinorum* of Demetrius Kydones, in which the author tries to demonstrate the reliability and valour of the westerners through certain episodes from the history of the crusades, in order to convince his compatriots to accept an alliance with western powers against the Turks. Both essays challenge the view that Byzantines harboured a monolithic resentment towards the West after 1204, and make the point that in the volatile and ever-changing political circumstances of the period, attitudes and perceptions were equally prone to readjustment and re-evaluation.

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relations with the Latins and the Turks in the Palaiologan period, see: John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969); Nicolas Oikonomides, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIIIe–XVe siècles)* (Montreal: Institut d'études médiévales Albert-le-Grand, 1979); Nevra Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and the relevant contributions in Angeliki E. Laiou, *Gender, Society and Economic Life in Byzantium* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1992); and eadem, *Byzantium and the Other: Relations and Exchanges* (Farnham: Ashgate Variorum, 2012).

The third part consists of two closely related essays on fourteenth-century Latin relations with Greeks and Turks in the Aegean. Mike Carr examines the involvement of the Zaccaria lords of Chios in crusading activities against the Turks and argues that, rather than being mutually exclusive, the promotion of commerce in the East and defence of the faith were two complementary facets of their role as they perceived and projected it, that is, as frontline defenders of Christendom. Peter Lock draws from his research on the writings of the Venetian crusade propagandist Marino Sanudo Torsello and discusses how the image of the Greeks and Turks in his work changed over time. As the Turkish threat grew, Sanudo seems to have changed his view of the Greeks, from enemies to potential allies in the East.

In the fourth part, the focus turns to the Ottomans in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, offering a reassessment of their western frontier and reaction to crusading in that area. The chapter by İlker Evrim Binbaş includes an analysis and translation of Ibn al-Jazarī's eyewitness account of the Battle of Nicopolis (1396), which offers a unique – and for the most part neglected – Muslim viewpoint of developments in that crucial moment for the history of the area. The contribution by Rhoads Murphey examines the priorities of Bayezid's foreign policy, arguing that the sultan focused his attention on his eastern flank, effectively withdrawing from engagements in the west and showing little interest in confrontation with Christian powers. The chapter's more general aim is to illuminate the fundamental principles and mechanisms of policy-making in the Ottoman state during the proto-imperial era, which have often been obscured under the influence of later developments and priorities.

One of the unifying themes of the various investigations in this volume, therefore, is that our understanding of intergroup interaction in this region can be enhanced by examinations both on the macro-level, which take in a view of developments in the wider world in East and West (Chrissis, Hamilton, Murphey), and on the micro-level, by focusing on how wider trends can be radically reshaped on account of local factors and regional peculiarities (Shawcross, Carr) or refracted through the lens of individual perceptions at crucial turning points (Ryder, Lock, Binbaş).

In closing this introduction, we would like to note that as scholarship in Byzantine, crusade and Ottoman studies has been progressing in strides in recent years, it remains essential, but progressively more challenging, for scholars to remain conversant with research in the 'sibling' sub-disciplines. A sustained effort needs to be made to combine effectively the knowledge and insights produced in the various overlapping studies dealing with this turbulent period of change in the eastern Mediterranean. The present volume is only a small step; but one step, we hope, in the right direction.

# PART I
# Frankish Greece between East and West

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# 1
# New Frontiers: Frankish Greece and the Development of Crusading in the Early Thirteenth Century

*Nikolaos G. Chrissis*

After the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, several Latin states were set up in Romania. Beside the Latin Empire established at the imperial capital, these states also included the kingdom of Thessalonica, the principality of Achaia, the duchy of Athens and Thebes, the duchy of the Archipelago, as well as several smaller lordships and various Venetian possessions in the Aegean. The Latin conquest is, of course, a famous and well-studied event, and excellent research has been carried out on the Frankish states by scholars such as Jean Longnon, Robert Lee Wolff, David Jacoby and Peter Lock.[1] However, an aspect which has not been scrutinized is that Frankish Greece effectively constituted a crusade frontier. A series of (little-known and even less studied) crusades were proclaimed for the defence of the Frankish states in Greece throughout the thirteenth century, starting as early as 1205 – merely a year after the conquest. A crucial element was that the opponents of these crusades were Christians: the Orthodox Greeks and Bulgarians.[2] The use of holy war against Orthodox Christians constituted a radical 'innovation' of the thirteenth century and a departure from earlier practice.[3]

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[1] For the Fourth Crusade and the conquest of Constantinople, see, for example: Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd edn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Michael Angold, *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context* (Harlow: Longman, 2003). For the Latin states in Romania, see, for example: Jean Longnon, *L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris: Payot, 1949); Robert Lee Wolff, *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (London: Variorum, 1976); Lock, *Franks*; and the numerous contributions by David Jacoby, many of which have been reprinted in several collected volumes, such as: *Société et démographie à Byzance et en Romanie latine* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1975); and *Byzantium, Latin Romania and the Mediterranean* (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 2001); also David Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale: Les 'Assises de Romanie', sources, application et diffusion* (Paris: Mouton, 1971).

[2] Nikolaos G. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine–Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012).

[3] The only possible, but heavily disputed, precedent is the expedition of Bohemond against Byzantium in 1107–1108. I adhere to the view that Bohemond's campaign was certainly *not* a crusade by merit of his attack on the empire; regardless of whether the latter

This was not an isolated case. There was an expansion of crusading activity in various fronts beyond the original aim of the Holy Land, particularly in the thirteenth century. Crusades were proclaimed with growing frequency at all frontiers of Latin Christendom, both external, such as the Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic, and internal, in southern France, Italy and Germany, where heretics and other 'enemies of the Church' appeared to threaten the faith. Pope Innocent III is largely credited with transforming the crusade movement by reorganizing it and widening its application, and by energetically pursuing expeditions in the Holy Land and elsewhere.[4]

The present essay will assess the place of Frankish Greece in this process. It will explore how the evolution of the crusade affected western involvement in Frankish Greece; and, conversely, the role the latter played in the development of crusading at large. It will be argued that, as the crusade was implemented in a wide variety of conflicts, a set of largely similar measures was used in largely dissimilar circumstances. And because crusading came with a specific outlook and preconceived notions regarding the crusaders' task and the nature of their opponents, it could decisively shape the policies in the area and the terms of interaction between the groups on either side of the conflict. By highlighting religious difference in a highly militarized context, the crusade actually contributed in *creating* frontiers, rather than simply being deployed in pre-existent ones.

Norman Housley has examined comparatively the frontiers between the Teutonic Order-State (*Ordensstaat*) and the pagans in the Baltic; the one between Christians and Moors in Spain; and the one between Christian pirates and Turks in sixteenth-century Dalmatia. He has concluded that the vigorous propagation and pursuit of holy war existed simultaneously with established patterns of coexistence, and therefore it is erroneous to see these elements as mutually exclusive. But at the same time he has warned against dismissing the importance of the notions of holy war and religious difference, as they could 'shap[e] thinking and behaviour and at times even dictat[e] response' along these frontiers. In Housley's view, however,

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was a 'diversion' or an approved auxiliary operation, the ultimate objective of the holy war on this occasion was Outremer, not Byzantium. A recent discussion (with an overview of earlier literature) is Brett Edward Whalen, 'God's Will or Not? Bohemond's Campaign against the Byzantine Empire (1105–1108)', in Thomas F. Madden, James L. Naus and Vincent Ryan (eds), *Crusades: Medieval Worlds in Conflict* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 111–25. The use of the crusade against the Orthodox Russians, on the other hand, post-dates the introduction of crusading in Frankish Greece. See, for example: Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 1997), pp. 132–7, 177–98; Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147–1254* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 215–24.

[4] For an overview of the development of crusading, see: Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edn (London: Continuum, 2005); Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 99–121. For Innocent's crusade policy in general, see: Helmut Roscher, *Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1969); Jane Sayers, *Innocent III: Leader of Europe 1198–1216* (London: Longman, 1994), pp. 164–88.

the notion of such a 'frontier' was not formed in Latin Romania before the Ottoman expansion in the fifteenth century.[5] It will be shown here, however, that Frankish Greece was actually such a frontier in the thirteenth century, where the crusade significantly affected actions and perceptions between Latins and Greeks.

The terms 'frontier' and 'frontier society' have been used with little methodological consistency in medieval studies. They have taken various and sometimes antithetical meanings, encompassing notions of military confrontation and territorial expansion; of cultural and intellectual exchange and socio-political coexistence; as well as the notion of 'mental frontier', the existence or construction of a perception of the other side as fundamentally alien.[6] In the present examination, the term 'frontier' refers mostly to a combination of the first and the last meaning: the delimitation of a specific zone of frequent armed conflict, where an irreconcilable sense of religious and cultural otherness between the combatants took shape. There can be no doubt that coexistence and extensive exchange between Latins and Greeks was also a feature of Romania from the thirteenth century onwards;[7] but the intention here is to show the context in which such contact operated. As Housley has shown for other crusade frontiers in his aforementioned work, *convivencia* and religious warfare were not mutually exclusive.

The genesis of crusading in Frankish Greece will be investigated in the following pages, starting with Innocent III but focusing particularly on the pontificate of Honorius III (1216–27), when the characteristics of a fully fledged crusade front emerged more clearly. Comparisons will also be made with other areas where the crusade was implemented, specifically the Baltic and southern France. The close

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[5] Norman Housley, 'Frontier Societies and Crusading in the Late Middle Ages', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 10 (1995), pp. 104–19 at 107–8 and 119 (quotation).

[6] Nora Berend, 'Frontiers', in Helen Nicholson (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in the Crusades* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 148–71. See also the various contributions in: Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay (eds), *Medieval Frontier Societies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); David Abulafia and Nora Berend (eds), *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); and Outi Merisalo (ed.), *Frontiers in the Middle Ages* (Louvain-La-Neuve: Fédération internationale des instituts d'études médiévales, 2006). We should also note the dichotomy between the mostly European notion of frontier as a boundary or barrier, and the North American one, which sees the frontier as a zone of interaction with the 'wilderness', meaning both the struggle with the physical environment and the contact between an organized state and less organized (tribal) groups of people: see, for example, Daniel Power, 'Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe', in Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (eds), *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700* (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1–12.

[7] For Greco-Latin coexistence and symbiosis, see, for example, the works cited in the Introduction, n. 26, as well as Lock, *Franks*, pp. 266–309; Teresa Shawcross, *The Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 187–267; and the contributions in Judith Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillain (eds), *Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

parallels in crusading activity on the three fronts, despite considerably different circumstances on the ground, will demonstrate the importance of the wider context in shaping local responses. It will be shown that interpretations are inadequate without reference to the overall evolution of holy war, as the specific local circumstances cannot fully account for the way conflict and contact in these areas developed.

## Outline of Crusading Activity in Frankish Greece, 1205–25

The crucial first step for the introduction of crusading in Frankish Greece was taken by Innocent III. As early as May 1205 he issued a call to the Christian faithful in France, granting the crusade indulgence to those who would help Emperor Baldwin I stabilize the Latin Empire.[8] Between 1205 and 1207, he also organized preaching and recruitment in the West for a new expedition to Constantinople.[9]

An army, raised in Flanders and elsewhere in France, set out by late 1207 but was defeated by the Greeks of Epiros upon its arrival in Romania. Innocent did not proclaim another crusade for Frankish Greece after that point, on account of pressing preoccupations in the West during this period, such as the struggle for the German throne and the eruption of the crusade against the heretics in southern France. Furthermore, after 1213, Innocent focused his attention and efforts on the Fourth Lateran Council and the plans for a great new crusade for the Holy Land (that is, the Fifth Crusade).[10]

It was left to Innocent's successor, Honorius III, to proceed further with the implementation of crusading in Frankish Greece. Honorius did so on two occasions. In 1217 the newly elected Latin Emperor, Peter of Courtenay, and the papal legate, Cardinal John Colonna, were captured on their way to Constantinople by the Greek ruler of Epiros, Theodore Doukas. Pope Honorius immediately demanded the release of the prisoners and threatened to use the crusade against Theodore. In November 1217 orders were dispatched to the French clergy to preach a crusade aimed at rescuing Emperor Peter and helping the Latin Empire. The project was, however, abandoned as soon as Theodore agreed to release the legate, early in the following year. The pope, in his joy at the release of his legate, seems to have forgotten about the emperor, who died two years later, still in captivity.[11]

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[8] *Die Register Innocenz' III.*, ed. Othmar Hageneder et al. (9 vols so far, Graz: H. Böhlaus Nachf., 1964–) [henceforth *RI*], vol. 8, no. 70 (69).

[9] *RI*, vol. 8, no. 131 (130), vol. 9, nos 45, 195–8 (197–200); Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 20–31.

[10] Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 28–31, 51–3; John C. Moore, *Pope Innocent III (1160/61–1216): 'To Root Up and To Plant'* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 206–52.

[11] *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, ed. Petrus Pressutti (2 vols, Rome: ex typographia Vaticana, 1888–95) [henceforth *PRH*], nos 684–5, 687–91, 859, 1023–4, 1029–31; *Honorii III Romani Pontificis Opera Omnia*, ed. César Auguste Horoy (5 vols, Paris: Imprimerie de la Bibliothèque ecclésiastique, 1879–82), vol. 2, cols 479–82, 528–30, nos 7, 9, 52; Chrissis,

The second crusading effort was much more substantial. The kingdom of Thessalonica had come under sustained attack from the Greeks of Epiros, and as the pressure mounted in the early 1220s, the young king Demetrius, son of Boniface of Montferrat, fled to Italy in search of help. Pope Honorius was quick in trying to provide crusade reinforcements for Thessalonica. A contingent was dispatched in 1222 under Hubert of Biandrate, who had served in the past as regent of the kingdom, while from May 1223 Honorius organized a larger crusade for the relief of the city, under the command of Demetrius' half-brother, Marquis William VI of Montferrat. The crusading force was to act in combination with the armies of the Latin Empire and the principality of Achaia. The expedition was planned for the spring of 1224; however, its departure was postponed as the marquis fell ill, and Thessalonica was captured by the Greeks in December 1224. William and his army set out in the spring of the following year but failed to take back the city. The crusade came to an inglorious end as the marquis and many of his soldiers died in an epidemic of dysentery.[12]

## Actions: Crusade Mechanisms Deployed in Frankish Greece and in Other Fronts

These crusades achieved little in terms of concrete results. However, it is important that the papacy as well as the local Latin secular powers chose crusading as the means to deal with the situation in Frankish Greece. Innocent's crusade calls were in direct response to requests by the Latin Emperors Baldwin and Henry, while Honorius launched the crusade for Thessalonica following King Demetrius' pleas.[13] In order to understand why and how this came about, we need to examine certain aspects of this crusading activity in more detail.

A crusade can be identified by a series of characteristics, which by the thirteenth century had crystallized in a rather fixed and recognizable form. These included:

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*Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 61–8; Donald M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), pp. 50–54; Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 153–7.

[12] *PRH*, nos 4059–60, 4353–5, 4360, 4753–4, 4757–8, 5186, 5189, 5202, 5270, 5277; Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 68–78; Nicol, *Despotate*, pp. 61–4; Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 162–4; Lock, *Franks*, pp. 60–62; Leopoldo Usseglio, *I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente durante i secoli XII e XIII*, ed. Carlo Patrucco (2 vols, Casale Monferrato: [s n.], 1926), vol. 2, pp. 274–8; Jean Longnon, 'La reprise de Salonique par les Grecs en 1224', in *Actes du VIe Congrès international d'études byzantines* (2 vols, Paris: Office des éditions universitaires, 1950–51), vol. 1, pp. 141–6.

[13] *RI*, vol. 7, nos 152–3, vol 8, nos 131–2 (130–31); Rudolf Pokorny, 'Zwei unedierte Briefe aus der Frühzeit des lateinischen Kaiserreichs von Konstantinopel', *Byzantion*, 55 (1985), pp. 180–209; Benjamin Hendrickx, 'Régestes des empereurs Latins de Constantinople (1204–1261/1273)', *Byzantina*, 14 (1988), pp. 7–221, nos 3, 46, 47, 47a, 47b, 52, 59, 123–4; *PRH*, nos 2856, 3854; Nicol, *Despotate*, p. 61.

the papal proclamation (as the papacy was the only authority capable of calling a crusade); the preaching of the cross in various provinces; the grant of remission of sins (indulgences) and other privileges – such as legal immunity and protection of their property – to participants and contributors; the taking of the cross and the crusade vow by the recruits; the raising of funds through specific means such as crusade tithes (taxation on ecclesiastical revenues), donations of the faithful or the redemption of crusade vows (that is, the payment of an appropriate monetary sum in place of personal participation in the campaign). Alongside these practical aspects, equally distinct was the argumentation and rhetoric used to legitimize these expeditions and motivate response to crusade calls, by presenting the war as a sanctified and penitential endeavour, in service to God, the Church and Christendom.[14]

Among the characteristics of a crusade, the granting of indulgences is a particularly crucial marker. Crusading was seen as a penitential activity, a means for the crusader to atone for sin. It is debatable whether, from a theological and canonical point of view, the crusade indulgence initially referred to a remission of sin (more accurately, the temporal punishment for sin) or to a remission of the *penance* imposed by the Church on account of sin. As in many other aspects of crusading, the practice and formulas were only standardized at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). It seems certain, nevertheless, that popular perception, unhindered by theological niceties, followed the wider interpretation, equating the indulgence with a complete cleansing from sin which guaranteed access to heaven. By the end of the twelfth century, a plenary indulgence (full remission of sins) was granted to the participants of crusades to the Holy Land and to those who paid for the expenses of others to fight there.[15] Indulgences had been granted for fighting in other fronts in the twelfth century, for example, against the Moors in Spain and against the pagan Wends in the Baltic. However, not all expeditions merited the plenary indulgence given to crusaders for

[14] For an overview of the mechanisms of crusading, see Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 313–37; see also: Maureen Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre, 1244–1291* (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), esp. pp. 27–48, 53–68.

[15] Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, trans. John Gillingham, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 23–8, 30–36 (and note 15 on pp. 293–5); Nikolaus Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter* (3 vols, Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1922–23; 2nd edn, with a new introduction and bibliography by Thomas Lentes, Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 2000), vol. 1, pp. 134–44 (chapter 5), vol. 2, pp. 19–46 (chapter 13), vol. 3, pp. 166–88; see also Jessalynn Bird, 'Indulgences and Penance', in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia* (4 vols, Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2004), vol. 2, pp. 633–7. From a theological point of view, the indulgence could only refer to the *temporal punishment* for sin, as the eternal punishment, the guilt of sin, was avoided through confession and contrition, by the grace of God alone; the repentant sinner, however, still had to undergo temporal punishment, either in this world or in Purgatory, before his soul was entirely released from the sins committed.

the Holy Land. On a number of occasions participants were given lesser spiritual benefits, for example, an indulgence equivalent to that for a pilgrimage, or plenary indulgence only in the case of death. The nature of the indulgence or the conditions on which it was granted, therefore, are an indication of the theoretical status of an expedition by comparison to the archetypal Holy Land crusades.[16]

In Frankish Greece, Innocent III granted the plenary indulgence to those who would come to support the Latin Empire as early as 1205. In May, only a year after the capture of Constantinople, the pope issued instructions to the French clergy calling the faithful to go and assist Baldwin in stabilizing the conquest. Innocent stated: 'To those who will go to him [Emperor Baldwin] and who will work for the help of the Holy Land, we concede *the same indulgence of sins which the Apostolic See has granted to other crusaders*.'[17] Three months later, the pope reiterated that 'we have enjoined all the Christian faithful, *for the remission of all their sins*, to proceed to Constantinople and work for the help of the Holy Land'.[18]

This was quite striking, considering Innocent's relevant reticence in deploying the full crusade indulgence in other fronts. He never granted the plenary indulgence for the campaigns against the pagans in the Baltic; instead, he seems to have only consented to partial indulgences for that area.[19] It would also be at least two more years before authorizing the plenary indulgence for a crusade against the heretics of southern France. Initially, in 1198, Innocent only granted an indulgence equivalent to a pilgrimage to Rome or Compostela to anyone who would assist the papal legates in the fight against heresy. In 1204 and 1205 the pope did allow a remission of sins 'as for those going overseas for the help of the Holy Land', but this was not a universal crusade indulgence. It was limited to King Philip Augustus and his son; more importantly, there was no preaching, taking of the cross and vows, or recruitment of an army: the secular authorities and particularly the French crown were urged to intervene and assist the clergy in stamping out heresy through proscription and confiscation of the property and lands of unrepentant heretics, if necessary. It was only in 1207 and again, more forcefully, in 1208 (after the murder of the papal legate, Peter of Castelnau) that Innocent authorized a crusade

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[16] See, for example, Rebecca Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198–1245* (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 68–9, 224–5.

[17] *RI*, vol. 8, no. 70 (69), c. 25 May 1205: 'Nos enim hiis, qui accedentes ad ipsum [imperatorem Constantinopolitanum] in Terre sancte subsidium laboraverint, *illam concedimus indulgentiam peccatorum, quam aliis crucesignatis apostolica sedes indulsit*' (my emphasis).

[18] *RI*, vol. 8, no. 131 (130), 16 August 1205: 'universis Christi fidelibus iniunxerimus *in remissionem omnium peccatorum*, ut Constantinopolim accedentes ad Terre Sancte subsidium laborarent' (my emphasis).

[19] Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 94–8, esp. 97; full indulgences had been granted in the Baltic by earlier popes, such as Eugenius III and Celestine III: ibid., pp. 32–3, 72–3.

with the Holy Land indulgence for all participants.[20] By contrast, it was clearly a crusade army which was summoned to head for Constantinople already in 1205. This is obvious, for example, in Innocent's threat to the Bulgarian tsar, Kalojan, that such a force would be making its way towards his lands, and in Bishop Nivelon of Soissons' circular to all the Christian faithful which made mention of the sign of the cross affixed to the shoulders of the recruits for the Latin Empire ('humeris vestris pro Christo crucem affigere').[21]

Innocent seems to have taken this more radical approach in Frankish Greece, because the situation there was closely connected to the affair of the Holy Land. When he first approved of the conquest of Constantinople and gave permission to the participants of the Fourth Crusade to remain and consolidate it, he stipulated that this was temporary and that after a year they should move on to assist Outremer.[22] As was seen earlier, his first crusade calls for the Latin Empire spoke of those 'who would go to Constantinople to work for the help of the Holy Land'.[23] Service in the former was considered as a benefit to the latter. However, soon after 1205 this became little more than rhetoric and the crusaders for Frankish Greece were not really expected to continue to the Holy Land. In April 1206 the pope clarified that service in the empire would mean fulfilment of crusade vows.[24] Nevertheless, the connection with the cause of Outremer had made it easier for crusade mechanisms to be transplanted in Romania in the early stages by Innocent III.

It was mostly left to his successor, Honorius III, to fully establish the status of Frankish Greece as an independent crusade front, on the one hand by expanding the deployment of these mechanisms, and on the other hand by going further in dissociating Romania from the Holy Land. The use of crusading mechanisms by Honorius escalated as circumstances became more pressing for Frankish Greece. This is particularly evident in the granting of indulgences and the commutation of crusade vows (that is, the transfer, from one crusade front to another, of the obligations and rewards arising from the vow). [See Table 1]

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[20] *RI*, vol. 1, nos 94 [21 April 1198], 165 [13 May 1198], vol. 7, nos 77 (76, 77) [31 May 1204], 79 [28 May 1204], 212 [7 February 1205], vol. 10, no. 149 [17 November 1207], vol. 11, no. 25 (26, 27) [c. 10 March 1208]; *Layettes de Trésor des Chartes*, ed. Alexandre Teulet et al. (5 vols, Paris: H. Plon, 1863–1909), vol. 1, pp. 317–19 [28 March 1208]; Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 62–6; Marco Meschini, *Innocenzo III e il* negotium pacis et fidei *in Linguadoca tra il 1198 e il 1215* (Rome: Bardi, 2007), pp. 548–81, esp. 553–9. For an examination of the introduction of crusade 'institutional components' in the Albigensian Crusade, see Raymonde Foreville, 'Innocent III et la croisade des Albigeois', in *Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc au XIIIe siècle*, Cahiers de Fanjeux 4 (Toulouse: É. Privat, 1969), pp. 184–217.

[21] *RI*, vol. 8, no. 130 (129); Pokorny, 'Zwei unedierte Briefe', p. 202.

[22] *RI*, vol. 7, nos 153, 206, vol. 8, no. 64 (63).

[23] *RI*, vol. 8, nos 70 (69), 131 (130). See also below, pp. 33–9, for a discussion of justificatory rhetoric.

[24] *RI*, vol. 9, no. 45.

Table 1 Conditions for indulgences to crusaders in Frankish Greece

| | Crusaders signed for Frankish Greece | Crusaders signed for the Holy Land |
|---|---|---|
| 1217 | Granted (partial?) indulgence ('in remissionem peccaminum') | Prohibited to join |
| 1223–24 | Plenary indulgence 'as for the Holy Land' (probably for 1223; certainly for 1224) ('plenam sicut et transeuntibus in Terram Sanctam veniam') | Can join, but need to fulfil vow in Outremer – plenary indulgence if killed in Romania |
| late 1224–25 | [as above] | Can fulfil their vows in Romania, receiving plenary indulgence (applicable only for those based in Romania) |

In 1217, an indulgence was granted to those who would take the cross against Theodore of Epiros; but it was not specified whether this would be a plenary one. Furthermore, Honorius explicitly prohibited those already enlisted for the forthcoming campaign for the Holy Land (the Fifth Crusade) to change course and go to Greece.[25] Then, during the preparations for William of Montferrat's expedition for Thessalonica in 1223 and 1224, Holy Land crusaders were allowed to join William's army; but only those who died in Romania would receive the plenary indulgence, while the rest would still have to fulfil their vow in Outremer within two years.[26] Things were different for those who took the cross for Thessalonica in the first place. In the bull of May 1223 it was unclear whether they would merit the plenary indulgence – however, judging from other communications at the time, it appears that this was indeed so.[27] But as the papal activity for the crusade intensified, the situation was clarified further: in February 1224, Honorius explicitly stated that those who took the cross for Thessalonica (in contrast to those who were already signed for the Holy Land) would receive the same plenary indulgence 'as for the

[25] *PRH*, no. 859; full text in *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 2, col. 528, no. 52. With regard to the indulgence, the bull simply states 'in remissionem peccaminum'.

[26] *PRH*, no. 4353 (13 May 1223): full text in *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 4, cols 349–50, no. 129; *PRH*, nos 4753–4 (7 February 1224): full text in *Bullarium Hellenicum I: Pope Honorius III's Letters Involving Frankish Greece and Constantinople*, ed. Christopher Schabel and William Duba (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), nos 206–7. I would like to thank Chris Schabel for volunteering proofs of his edition prior to publication.

[27] See *PRH*, no. 4355 (full text in *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 4, col. 350, no. 130): a letter of 13 May 1223 to the nobleman W. of Cotignac, who was granted a plenary indulgence for joining the campaign of William of Montferrat, without any other restrictions or conditions attached.

Holy Land' for participating in the expedition.[28] Finally, in late 1224 and early 1225, after William's departure had been postponed, Honorius stated that local crusaders in Romania who would assist the marquis' crusade would be considered as having fulfilled their vows, and therefore merit the relevant indulgence, even if they had initially taken the cross for the Holy Land.[29]

The changing provisions regarding indulgences and restrictions on participation are illustrative of Honorius' dilemma: namely his wish to procure help for Frankish Greece and his parallel reluctance to harm in any way the affair of the Holy Land. The Fifth Crusade, which had occupied the final years of Innocent's pontificate and the early years of Honorius', was an absolute priority for the papacy. In 1213 the crusades in Spain and in the south of France had been suspended, in order for resources to be channelled to the great expedition for the Holy Land.[30] This situation could not but affect Frankish Greece as well. The capture of Emperor Peter and Cardinal John Colonna in 1217 had coincided with the beginning of the Fifth Crusade. It is evident from Honorius' correspondence that the proclamation of a crusade against Theodore of Epiros was primarily meant as a threat, in order to pressurize him into releasing the captives, but the pope was unwilling to actually divert resources away from the Holy Land. He made parallel efforts to negotiate directly with Theodore and quickly shelved the crusading project once his demands were at least partially met.[31] Eventually, however, Honorius tried to mobilize substantial resources for Frankish Greece in the 1220s, ordering the crusade for Thessalonica to be preached widely in northern Italy and southern France, and procuring funding through taxation of the clergy in Romania and grants from the papal treasury.[32]

On the face of it, Honorius' wider concessions and progressively greater commitment of crusade resources were, no doubt, prompted by the mounting Greek pressure on the Frankish states of Romania. The situation in northern Greece became desperate for the Latins after the affair of Emperor Peter's capture. In 1218 most of Thessaly fell to Epiros, while in 1220–21 Theodore tightened the

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28 *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 206–7.

29 *PRH*, nos 5189, 5270 (full text in *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 227, 231).

30 *PL*, vol. 216, cols 744–5 and 817–22 (*Quia maior*) at 820; Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, pp. 167, 171; Helene Tillmann, *Pope Innocent III*, trans. Walter Sax (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980), pp. 231–2, 236–7; for the Fifth Crusade in general, see James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986).

31 Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 64–8, 79–80.

32 *PRH*, nos 4360, 4753–4, 5186, 5189, 5202, 5270, 5277, 5279; Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 68–77. Orders for the preaching of the 'Montferrat Crusade' for Thessalonica were sent to the Patriarch of Aquileia and the archbishops of Genoa, Lyon, Milan, Ravenna, Pisa, Tarentaise, Arles, Besançon, Embrun and Aix, and all their suffragans; as well as to the bishops of Lucca, Luni, Verona, Parma, Arezzo, Florence, Padua, Vicenza and Le Puy.

noose around Thessalonica by also taking control of Kastoria, Grevena, Berroia and Serres. The first expeditionary force for the relief of Thessalonica had been sent in 1222, but it was only when the siege of the city began, in early 1223, that Honorius called for a full-scale crusade. Then, the main forces of the Latin Empire were defeated by the Greeks of Nicaea at Poimanenon, in Asia Minor, in 1224. This caused the force under Thierry of Walincourt, which had been sent from Constantinople into Macedonia and was besieging Serres, to withdraw. During this withdrawal it suffered a defeat by Theodore of Epiros' army. Thierry's army was supposed to act in conjunction with William of Montferrat's crusade, but the marquis' departure from Italy had been postponed at the last minute due to illness. It was only after these defeats and the expedition's postponement that Honorius granted the permission for a limited commutation of crusade vows from the Holy Land to Romania, as described above. Thessalonica had actually fallen by the time the pope made his last contacts for the crusade, this time calling for the city's recovery rather than for its defence.[33]

But can we interpret Honorius' actions solely by reference to circumstances in Romania? To answer this, it would be useful to compare Frankish Greece with the crusades against heretics in southern France and against pagans in the Baltic.[34] There was considerable activity in all three areas in the thirteenth century, although as crusade fronts they lacked the pedigree of the Holy Land or the Iberian Peninsula. In Greece and the Midi, crusades were only initiated at this point, in the early thirteenth century; in the Baltic, there had been crusade activity since 1147 but, again, it was the thirteenth century when crusading in the area really took off. Besides this superficial similarity, however, the differences between the three fronts were very significant. The enemies in the Baltic were pagan tribes; those in southern France elusive groups of heretics and their alleged patrons; in Greece, the war was against organized Orthodox Christian states. The Albigensian crusades were taking place at the heartlands of Europe, while the other two were in its periphery. The crusaders in Provence and Languedoc differed little from

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[33] Lock, *Franks*, pp. 61–2, 81; Longnon, *L'empire latin*, pp. 161–3; Nicol, *Despotate*, pp. 57–64.

[34] The literature on both the Albigensian and the Baltic crusades is very extensive and constantly growing. See, for example: Michel Roquebert, *L'épopée cathare* (5 vols, Toulouse: Privat, 1970–98); Jonathan Sumption, *The Albigensian Crusade* (London: Faber and Faber, 1978); Walter L. Wakefield, *Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Southern France, 1100–1250* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1974); Michael Costen, *The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Elaine Graham-Leigh, *The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005); Mark Gregory Pegg, *A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); William L. Urban, *The Baltic Crusade* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1975); Christiansen, *Northern Crusades*; Alan V. Murray (ed.), *Crusade and Conversion on the Baltic Frontier, 1150–1500* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*.

the southern French lords they were fighting against; their Byzantine opponents in Romania came from a different world culturally, but at least they shared the religion, even if not the rite; there was even less common ground when it came to the pagans of Livonia and Prussia. The conflicts had also arisen out of different contexts: in the south of France, it was a growing concern with heresy and the challenge it posed to secular and ecclesiastical authorities; in the Baltic, it was a combination of sustained territorial-commercial expansionism and religious conversion; in Romania, it was a mostly accidental and opportunistic conquest. Different powers were involved: the French crown, nobility and clergy in the Albigensian Crusade; Scandinavian kings along with German knights, merchants, bishops and missionaries in the Baltic; western feudal lords, the Italian maritime republics and the kingdom of Hungary in the case of Frankish Greece. It would be reasonable not to expect to find many similarities in the way crusading evolved in these fronts. And yet, there are striking parallels. [See Table 2]

First of all, it was in the pontificate of Honorius III that all three fronts enjoyed an elevation of status that put them on a theoretically equal footing with the crusades in the Holy Land. In 1217 Honorius introduced in the Baltic the plenary indulgence 'as for those who go to Jerusalem', while his predecessor had only granted a limited, vague and apparently partial indulgence ('remissionem peccaminum') to crusaders in the area.[35] In August 1218, Honorius similarly authorized for the Albigensian Crusade the same plenary indulgence as the one for crusaders to the Holy Land – once again replacing the vague 'remissio peccatorum' which he had employed in his pronouncements in the previous two years.[36] In Frankish Greece, as well, the participants in the crusade for Thessalonica, in the early 1220s, were explicitly granted the 'same indulgence as for the Holy Land', instead of the vague reference to 'remissionem peccatorum' made a few years earlier in the call for the liberation of Emperor Peter and Cardinal John.[37]

Honorius, who had shown great competence in handling financial affairs in his time as papal treasurer, also took special care to provide for the funding of these crusades.[38] He was the first one to introduce a crusade tithe on the clergy for

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[35] *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*, ed. Rudolf Philippi et al. (6 vols, Königsberg: Hartungsche Verlagsdruckerei, 1882–2002), vol. 1.1, no. 15 (3 March 1217); Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 138–9, 142–3, 251–2.

[36] *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 3, cols 14–15, no. 9 (13 August 1218) – cf. ibid., vol. 2, cols 118–19 (no. 90, 8 December 1216), 567–9 (no. 89, 30 December 1217), 573–6 (nos 95–6, 3 January 1218); Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 100–102. It should, of course, be kept in mind that Innocent III had already granted the plenary indulgence for the Albigensian Crusade in 1207–1208: see above, at note 20.

[37] *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 4, cols 203–4, no. 228 (27 June 1222); *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 206–7 (7 February 1224; *PRH*, nos 4753–4). Cf. *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 2, col. 528, no. 52 (4 November 1217).

[38] For an overview of Honorius' life and career, see Johannes Clausen, *Papst Honorius III. (1216–1227): Eine Monographie* (Bonn: Hauptmann, 1895).

Frankish Greece (November 1224), while the papal treasury also gave William of Montferrat 15,000 silver marks from the money set aside for the Holy Land.[39] Similarly, the pope assigned to the Albigensian Crusade a considerable part of the money collected in France for the Holy Land (1218), before also authorizing a new twentieth specifically for the effort against the heretics in 1221.[40] Honorius went further than his predecessors in securing funding for the Baltic crusades as well, by granting indulgences to those who contributed financially and by authorizing regular collections in northern church provinces in 1218 and 1224.[41]

The similarities do not stop there. In 1221 there was an attempt to set up a military order, organized on the model of the Templars, to assist the fight against heresy in the south of France: the Order of the Holy Faith of Jesus Christ.[42] Similarly, in July 1222, Honorius authorized the brothers of the Order of the Hospital of St Sampson, in Constantinople, to use weapons and horses 'for the defence of the [Latin] empire, which is constantly harassed by the Greeks' ('pro defensione imperii quod multipliciter infestatur a Grecis'). This is the first and only surviving reference to an explicitly military role for this obscure order which was set up after the Latin conquest.[43] On the Baltic front, the Knights of Dobrzyn were formed around the same time (between 1216 and 1222), in order to protect the missionary activity of Bishop Christian in Prussia, in the example of the Order of the Sword-Brothers of Livonia which had been established a few years earlier, in 1202.[44] None

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[39] *PRH*, nos 4754, 5202, 5186, 5189, 5202; *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, ed. Aloysius L. Tautu (Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), no. 128; *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 4, col. 724, no. 35; *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 207, 228; Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 73–4.

[40] *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 3, cols 24–7 (at 25–6), no. 16; vol. 4, cols 24–5 (no. 28), 51 (no. 62), 117–18 (no.142), 143–9 (nos 169–173), 154 (no. 180); Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 98–100.

[41] *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1.1, no. 15; *Diplomatarium Danicum*, ed. Adam Afzelius et al. (4 series in 34 vols so far, Copenhagen: Munskgaard, 1938–), vol. 1.5, no. 135 [= *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 2, cols 729–30, no. 222]; *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 4, col. 715, no. 26; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 139, 149.

[42] *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 3, col. 844, no. 422 (7 June 1221); Roquebert, *L'épopée cathare*, vol. 3, pp. 193–6; Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 103–4; Alan J. Forey, 'The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians in the Thirteenth Century', *The English Historical Review*, 104 (1989), pp. 1–24, at 5–7.

[43] *PRH*, no. 4088 (15 July 1222) [= *Bullarium Hellenicum*, no. 141]; Dionysis Stathakopoulos, 'Discovering a Military Order of the Crusades: The Hospital of St Sampson of Constantinople', *Viator*, 37 (2006), pp. 255–73, at 257–8, 262, 266. The Order of the Hospital of St Sampson dated back to, at least, 1208 and it survived until the early fourteenth century, when it was absorbed by the Hospitallers who took over its possessions both in Greece and in the West (in Flanders).

[44] Christiansen, *Northern Crusades*, pp. 79–81; Alan Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1991), pp. 32–3, 36–7.

Table 2 Parallels between the crusades in Frankish Greece, the Baltic and southern France under Honorius III

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| • Upgrade to plenary indulgence from a vague, partial one<br>*Baltic*: in 1217, from 'remissio peccaminum' under Innocent III<br>*Albigensian Crusade*: in 1218, from 'remissio peccatorum' in 1216–17<br>*Frankish Greece*: in 1222, from 'remissio peccatorum' in 1217 |
| • Funding introduced and/or expanded, including money initially collected for the Holy Land<br>*Baltic*: 1218 and 1224 (indulgences for financial contributions and regular collections of funds in northern provinces)<br>*Albigensian Crusade*: 1218 (part of the twentieth for the Holy Land to be used against the heretics) and 1221 (new twentieth imposed in France for the Albigensian Crusade)<br>*Frankish Greece*: 1224 (taxation imposed on clergy in Romania; 15,000 marks given to William of Montferrat from the proceeds for the Holy Land) |
| • Establishment of military orders and papal recognition of their military role<br>*Baltic*: Knights of Dobrzyn, c. 1216–22<br>*Albigensian Crusade*: Order of the Holy Faith of Jesus Christ, 1221<br>*Frankish Greece*: Order of the Hospital of St Sampson, 1222 |
| • Priority of the Holy Land crusade<br>Limitations on recruitment for all three fronts in 1217–18<br>Increased efforts in 1221–25 (while no crusade was active in the Holy Land) |

of these local orders made much of an impact: we hear nothing more of the Order of the Holy Faith of Jesus Christ, while the Knights of Dobrzyn were absorbed by the Teutonic Knights; similarly the Order of the Hospital of St Sampson and their belongings were taken over by the Hospitallers in the following century. But it is still significant that a practically identical approach was implemented in all three areas at the same time.

There are also parallels in the timing and scope of expeditions in those fronts with regard to developments in the Holy Land, which clearly took priority over them. Preaching orders for crusades in Frankish Greece, southern France and the Baltic, in 1217 and 1218, all specifically prohibited crusaders already signed for the Holy Land from joining these expeditions. Furthermore, the crusade in the Baltic was suspended in 1220, following pleas for more manpower to become available for the imperilled army of the Fifth Crusade.[45] On the other hand,

[45] *PRH*, no. 859 [= *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 2, col. 528, no. 52]; *PRH*, no. 959; *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 2, cols 573–6, nos 95–6; Rist, *Papacy and*

greater crusade resources were mobilized on these fronts between the collapse of the Fifth Crusade in September 1221 and the projected departure of Frederick II in a new campaign for the Holy Land in June 1225. Preaching and recruitment for Thessalonica were carried out in 1222–25, exactly during this interval for crusading in the Holy Land.[46] As far as the Albigensian Crusade was concerned, those were difficult times for its leader, Amaury de Montfort, who was failing to hold his ground against the resurgent counts of Toulouse and Trencavel. Nevertheless, there was an intensification of efforts to prop up the crusade from late 1221, with the authorization of a general tax on French clergy and calls to the French king to intervene in the south. On the other hand, in 1224, once Frederick confirmed he would depart for the Holy Land, Honorius urged King Louis VIII of France to stop his campaign in the south and come to terms with Count Raymond VII of Toulouse.[47] Finally, in the Baltic the crusade suspension was lifted and the plenary indulgence reissued in 1221 and 1222.[48]

These parallels demonstrate that, as noted earlier, similar measures were adopted in largely dissimilar circumstances. That was because, by the early thirteenth century, the papacy was becoming accustomed to responding to various challenges by deploying the crusade. Innocent did so repeatedly and on an unprecedented scale. Not only did he call two major crusades for the Holy Land, but he also launched campaigns in Spain and the Baltic. He was the first to authorize a large-scale crusade against the heretics in southern France, as well as to call for a crusade against a 'political' enemy of the papacy in the person of Markward of Anweiler, Emperor Henry VI's lieutenant in southern Italy and Sicily.[49] Innocent also convened the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), one of the defining points of his pontificate, which added to this impetus. By regularizing several aspects of crusading, regarding the indulgence, the privileges for crusaders and the terms under which wider groups could participate or contribute to an expedition, the council's provisions effectively created a template which could be more easily and efficiently deployed in various circumstances besides the Holy Land. Innocent's crusade bull for the Fifth Crusade

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*Crusading*, pp. 97–8; *PRH*, nos 389, 2796; *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1.1, no. 15; *Diplomatarium Danicum*, vol. 1.5, no. 142; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 144–9.

[46] Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 69–73, 80.

[47] *PRH*, nos 3625, 3658, 3644, 3774, 3947, 3950, 3965–6, 3969, 4612–15, 4618, 4620–21, 4920; Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 98, 106–7; Roquebert, *L'épopée cathare*, vol. 3, pp. 210–85.

[48] Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 142, 145.

[49] Roscher, *Papst Innocenz III. und die Kreuzzüge*, passim; Elizabeth Kennan, 'Innocent III and the First Political Crusade: A Comment on the Limitations of Papal Power', *Traditio*, 27 (1971), pp. 231–49. The same indulgence 'as for those who cross over to the defence of the eastern land' was granted to those who would fight against Markward in 1199–1202: see, for example, *RI*, vol. 2, no. 202: 'illam concedimus veniam peccatorum quam in defensionem terre orrientalis transfretantibus indulgemus'.

(*Quia Maior*) and the council's decree *Ad Liberandam* have been called 'the foundation charters of the crusade as a coherent institution'.[50] Honorius III not only continued the work of his predecessor, but went further in committing greater resources and upgrading the status of other expeditions, for example, in Frankish Greece and the Baltic.

It was not only the papacy. Many people in the West also shared an outlook that considered crusading as a reasonable – almost instinctive – way of dealing with external or internal enemies. Crusades were often proclaimed in response to requests of local lay and ecclesiastical authorities. This was the case for practically all of Honorius' calls for the Baltic, as his policy in the area was for the most part reactive, responding to petitions by Bishop Christian of Prussia, Bishop Albert of Livonia or local lords.[51] In a similar way, the clergy and nobles involved in the Albigensian crusades 'harassed' the pope to carry on with the war each time the papacy attempted a reconciliation with the count of Toulouse. It was pressure by the locally involved prelates and notables that swayed Innocent III to renew the crusade against Raymond VI (Council of Lavaur, 1213), and the protests of such potentates similarly led Honorius III to overturn the treaty agreed with Raymond VII at the Council of Montpellier (1224).[52] In Romania, it was Emperor Baldwin I and then his brother and successor, Henry, who had advocated a call for crusaders to support the Latin Empire, and the pope had duly obliged.[53]

Whether these requests were motivated by piety, political opportunism or a mixture of ideological and practical considerations is of little consequence for our argument. The point remains that the crusade was their 'weapon of choice', the one they turned to in order to achieve their aims, as they were well acquainted with it through personal experience, family tradition or simply observation. Several of the noblemen involved in these fronts in the thirteenth century came from families with crusading connections or were crusade veterans themselves.[54] Many more were aware of the status and prestige afforded to their crusading peers and could aspire to it too. Churchmen were not far removed from that milieu either. No prelate could ignore the War for the Faith which was waged for Jerusalem. Archbishops

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[50] Christopher Tyerman, *The Invention of the Crusades* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 35.

[51] Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 136, 142, 146–7.

[52] Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 46–54, 92–7.

[53] *RI*, vol. 7, no. 152, vol. 8, no. 132 (131); Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 2–12, 23–7, 35–42.

[54] Of the important lords who settled in Frankish Greece, for example, Emperors Baldwin and Henry, as well as Boniface of Montferrat, came from families with a very active involvement in the affairs of Outremer; Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Hugh of St Pol had already been in the Third Crusade themselves. See: Jean Longnon, *Les compagnons de Villehardouin: recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade* (Geneva: Droz, 1978), pp. 79, 195, 227–8; Jonathan Phillips, *The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople* (London: Pimlico, 2005), pp. 48–50, 82–5.

and bishops were getting more and more accustomed to receiving papal orders to preach the cross. Many members of the clergy were actively involved in the crusading effort, escorting the armies, acting as agents for recruitment and collecting funds, or, for the more distinguished, being appointed as papal legates in the affair. That could also entail mobility between fronts: for example, William of Modena, in the period from the 1220s to the 1240s, served repeatedly as a papal legate in the Baltic, was appointed as an agent for the crusade to the Holy Land and to the Latin Empire, and was also involved in the crusade against the Stedinger heretics in Germany.[55] Experiences, approaches and ideas could thus be transferred from one area to another.

## Perceptions: Crusade Rhetoric for Frankish Greece

The discussion should now turn to the rhetoric and arguments used to promote expeditions in Frankish Greece in order to explore another important aspect of the process by which it was made into an independent crusade front. This involved a loosening of the connection with the Holy Land which would allow Frankish Greece to stand on its own merits as a crusading venture. Furthermore, the evolution of language and argumentation is indicative of, and a contributory factor to, the hardening of attitudes between Latins and Greeks on account of the crusade.

In order to legitimize his crusade calls for the Latin Empire, Innocent had turned to two basic arguments. First, it was claimed that great help would be afforded to the Holy Land if Constantinople remained in Latin hands, as this would keep the road to Jerusalem open. Secondly, it was proposed that these crusades helped heal the Greek Schism, since the Latin conquest had brought the Greek Church back to obedience to Rome.[56] These arguments had initially been invoked by the leaders of the Fourth Crusade to legitimize the capture of Constantinople: both Doge Enrico Dandolo and the newly elected Latin Emperor had recourse to them when contacting the pope.[57] However, after Innocent III adopted them, they became the basis of the justificatory rhetoric for all crusading expeditions in Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century. In his first call for a crusade to be preached in support of the Latin Empire, the pope argued that it

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[55] Gustav A. Donner, *Kardinal Wilhelm von Sabina, Bischof von Modena 1222–1234. Päpstlicher Legat in den nordischen Ländern (…1251)* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1929); Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, pp. 170–76, 188–9, 200–202, 206–8; Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 127, 137; Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, p. 101.

[56] Nikolaos G. Chrissis, 'The City and the Cross: The Image of Constantinople and the Latin Empire in Thirteenth-Century Papal Crusading Rhetoric', *BMGS*, 36 (2012), pp. 20–37, at 22–5.

[57] *RI*, vol. 7, nos 152–3, 202.

was God who had effected the transfer of the empire 'from the schismatics to the Catholics' ('a scismaticis ad catholicos'), 'because through it, the Holy Land can be more effectively assisted' ('cum per illud Terre sancte possit utilius subveniri'); he went on to say that 'after the empire of Constantinople has been strengthened and the Church there has been stabilized in devotion to the Apostolic See' with the help of the crusaders ('Constantinopolitano imperio roborato et in devotione apostolice sedis ibidem ecclesia stabilita'), Emperor Baldwin would be able to take action for the liberation of Jerusalem.[58]

But while the argument that the Holy Land would be helped by the Latin Empire might have sounded convincing in 1204 or 1205, when the expectations created by the astounding news of the capture of the Byzantine capital were running high, things were different by Honorius' time. The Frankish states in Greece, rather than providing any help to the Latins of Outremer, were struggling for their own survival. How much weight could be put on the argument that crusaders going to rescue the Latin Emperor from captivity in 1217 would actually be assisting the cause of the Holy Land? Surely, their services were much more urgently needed in the Fifth Crusade which was getting underway at that same time.

Honorius was aware of the incongruity. Although he did at times invoke the help offered to the Holy Land in his crusade calls for Frankish Greece,[59] he downplayed this argument considerably. He made no mention of it in his orders to the French bishops to preach the cross against Theodore of Epiros in 1217.[60] Honorius' reasoning in this letter is particularly important and merits some discussion. The pope stated that the capture of the legate and the emperor constituted a grave danger for the Latin Empire as well as an affront to the Apostolic See. For this reason, the pope affirmed, he would 'most willingly incite the crusading army [that is, the forces gathered for the Fifth Crusade] for the liberation [of the emperor and the legate], if it were not for the fear that this might offend Jesus Christ, in whose service this army has been prepared'.[61] Therefore, in order to provide help for the captives and the Latin Empire 'without offence to Christ' ('sine Christi offensa'), the pope ordered the bishops to preach a crusade against Theodore but not to allow any of those who had already taken the cross for the Holy Land to join it. Honorius stressed this point in his response

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[58] *RI*, vol. 8, 69 (70), c. 25 May 1205; Innocent had already adopted these arguments in his reply to Baldwin in November 1204: *RI*, vol. 7, no. 153.

[59] See, for example, *PRH*, nos 1490–91, 4353, 4753–4.

[60] *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 2, cols 528–30, no. 52. The summary by Pressutti (*PRH*, no. 859) is misleading: there is no explicit reference to the benefit or damage for the Holy Land in the text of the bull.

[61] Ibid.: 'attendentes et devotionem illius [imperatoris] et Apostolice Sedis iniuriam, cuius legatus detinetur cum ipso, ac periculum quod Latinis existentibus in imperio memorato [Romanie] imminere videtur, quod ad liberationem ipsorum libentissime excitassemus crucesignatorum exercitum, nisi eum, pro cujus est paratus obsequio, timuissemus offendere Jesum Christum'.

to Cardinal Pelagius, two years later, when the papal legate in the Fifth Crusade angrily reproved the pope for diverting much-needed manpower from the Holy Land to the expeditions in southern France and Greece.[62]

What are the implications of this argumentation? By expressing his concern that the use of Holy Land crusaders to defend Constantinople might be offensive to God, Honorius in reality distanced himself from the position of his predecessor (or, indeed, his own rhetoric at other times) that crusading for the Latin Empire was justified as service to the Holy Land. Then, he also revealed what he considered adequate and just causes to call a crusade: namely, the danger to the Latin possessions in Frankish Greece and the offence to the Apostolic See. Those reasons were important enough for the pope to even contemplate diverting the crusade prepared for the Holy Land towards Romania. The pope repeated this point when he warned Theodore that with his actions he had given 'a tangible and just cause for a crusade army to turn against him and his people'.[63] In other words, by dissociating the crusade in Frankish Greece from the Holy Land, Honorius promoted it to a worthwhile cause *per se*.

This is connected to a further, and equally important, development in terms of justificatory and motivational rhetoric. The repeated implementation of the crusade in Frankish Greece brought the enemies of such enterprises into sharper focus. The use of force against them needed legitimization all the more because they were Christians. Recent ideological developments had facilitated the use of holy war against other Christians on the basis that the 'internal enemy' threatened the peace and security of Christendom more than the external one.[64] To reinforce this point and connect it to the affair of the Holy Land – which remained the most creditable objective of crusading – a number of rhetorical themes were invoked: it was asserted that the enemies were 'worse than Saracens'; that they cooperated with the infidels; that they were impeding the cause of the Holy Land; or that they posed a direct threat to the Church. Indeed,

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[62] *RHGF*, vol. 19, pp. 690–91.

[63] *Bullarium Hellenicum*, no. 29 (*PRH*, no. 690): 'dando materiam et iustissimam causam ut ad ulciscendum hoc facinus in ipsum ac suos crucesignatorum exercitus convertatur'. See also *Bullarium Hellenicum*, no. 24 (*PRH*, no. 687): 'Sed videmus evidentem te dare materiam et manifestam causam, ut ad ulciscendum hoc facinus in te ac tuos crucesignatorum exercitus convertatur, et sic ultro te periculis et terram tuam dampnis exponis'.

[64] See: Norman Housley, 'Crusades against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216', in Peter Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), pp. 17–36; Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 72–85, 112–19; Hippolyte Pissard, *La guerre sainte en pays chrétien: essai sur l'origine et le développement de théories canoniques* (Paris: A. Picard, 1912), pp. 1–7; James A. Brundage, 'Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers', in Thomas Patrick Murphy (ed.), *The Holy War* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), pp. 99–140, at 106–9; Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 4–7, 12–14, passim; Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 15–20.

all these arguments were used to justify the crusades against heretics in southern France.[65]

The two basic arguments for crusading in Frankish Greece corresponded to these notions. The statement that Latin possession of Constantinople would be helpful to the Holy Land was based on recriminations that the Byzantines had in the past impeded the crusading cause and had cooperated with the Muslims. There were several occasions in the twelfth century when these arguments were used to advocate an attack on Byzantium.[66] The reference to the schism, on the other hand, pointed to the nature of the Greeks as 'false Christians'; hence, it was useful in addressing any concerns or criticism that the crusade was turned against coreligionists.

However, this point was made only implicitly by Innocent. It was under Honorius, in 1222, that the crusade was for the first time explicitly proclaimed against the Greeks, who were described as enemies of the faith ('inimicos fidei orthodoxae').[67] The emphasis was now on the defence of the Latin possessions from the schismatic Greeks, rather than merely on some vague formulation regarding the benefit of the Holy Land and the return of the Greek Church to obedience. This was particularly clear in papal correspondence regarding the crusade for Thessalonica. Asking the Latin lords of Romania to cooperate with Marquis William of Montferrat and his army, Honorius noted: 'this way the schismatics will be humiliated so that they might not dare again to raise their heels against the Roman Church or the Latins'.[68] The Greeks were portrayed as the enemies of God ('inimici Dei') who would be crushed by the faithful with His assistance.[69] Such language persisted in

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[65] See, for example, Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, pp. 54–62, 67–8, 86–9, 104–5. For example, Honorius' orders to the archbishops of Vienne and Arles to set aside, for the use of the Albigensian Crusade, half of the twentieth collected for the Holy Land started with the statement: 'As heretics are manifestly worse than the Saracens, there should be no less care to resist the former than the affronts of the latter' ('Cum haereticos deteriores esse liqueat Sarracenis, non minori studio eis est quam illorum insultibus obsistendum'): *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 3, cols 29–30 (at 30), no. 29.

[66] See, for example: Jonathan Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades* (London: Hambledon and London, 2003), pp. 90–91, 100, 127–42, 146–51; idem, 'Collusion with the Infidel as a Pretext for Western Military Action against Byzantium (1180–1204)', in Sarah Lambert and Helen Nicholson (eds), *Languages of Love and Hate: Conflict, Communication and Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), pp. 99–117; William M. Daly, 'Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constantinople, 1097–1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal', *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), pp. 43–91.

[67] *PRH*, nos 4059–60 (full text in *Honorii Opera Omnia*, Horoy, vol. 4, cols 203–4, no. 228; *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 135–6).

[68] *PRH*, nos 4754, 4758 (7–8 February 1224; full text in *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 207–9): 'taliter humiliabuntur scismatici Romanie quod de cetero contra Romanam ecclesiam vel Latinos erigere calcaneum non presument'.

[69] *Bullarium Hellenicum*, nos 212 (20 May 1224) and 228 (5 December 1224) [= *Annales ecclesiastici ab anno 1198 usque ad annum 1565*, ed. Odoricus Raynaldus (7 vols, Lucca: Typis Leonardi Venturini, 1738–59), ad ann. 1224, nos 23 and 26].

thirteenth-century crusade calls for Frankish Greece. For example, after the Greek recovery of Constantinople in 1261, Urban IV proclaimed a crusade to reclaim the city, deploring the fact that 'the sword of the schismatics has been drawn against the faithful' in Greece and that Christian religion was embattled by 'the enemies of the orthodox faith'.[70]

The insistence on the schismatic status of the Greeks was a further step in the process of transforming Frankish Greece into a fully fledged crusade frontier. Portraying the enemies in terms that highlighted their – real or perceived – religious otherness was an essential characteristic of crusading. Crusade propaganda could be very efficient in shaping general public perceptions as it made use of the most extensive network of dissemination in the Middle Ages, namely the Church hierarchy from archbishop to bishop to parish priest, aided by the religious orders and particularly the mendicants.[71] Such language, therefore, found fertile ground in an audience that had become accustomed to hearing crusade preachers expound on the enemies of Christendom and depict a number of non-Latin groups in these terms. This development was also related to the progressively more aggressive attitude towards 'otherness' in western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which Robert Moore has described as 'the formation of a persecuting society', as well as to the 'greater desire for strict theological conformity with Roman standards of orthodoxy' in papal dealings with eastern-rite Christians, as noted by Bernard Hamilton.[72]

It is crucial to note here that the view that Greeks were schismatics or that their faith was somehow defective had only infrequently been expressed in the twelfth century. Recent research on western views of Byzantium has confirmed that, striking as they may be, views like those expressed by Odo of Deuil are isolated and unrepresentative cases. However, references to the Greeks as schismatics become commonplace in the thirteenth century.[73] I have argued elsewhere that this

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[70] *Les Registres d'Urbain IV*, ed. Jean Guiraud (5 vols, Paris: Fontemoing, 1892–1958), vol. 2, no. 131 (*Registre Ordinaire*): 'Ecce siquidem in regione illa contra fidelem populum scismaticorum exortus est gladius […] fidei orthodoxe hostilibus […] Christiana religio impugnatur'.

[71] See: Christoph T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Penny J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270* (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1991).

[72] Robert I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (London: Variorum Publications, 1980), p. 315.

[73] See, for example, the recent examinations by: Savvas Neocleous, 'Imaging the Byzantines: Latin Perceptions, Representations and Memory, c. 1095–c. 1230' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2009), for example, at pp. 153, 318–21, 326, 363, 370–71; Marc Carrier, 'L'image des Byzantins et les systèmes de représentation selon les

development is directly linked to the propagation of crusades for the defence of Frankish Greece and the relevant rhetoric and justificatory arguments.[74]

The added emphasis on the schism was also realized on the Byzantine side. The historian George Pachymeres observed that the 'scandal' of the schism stood in the way of an understanding with the papacy and that the Latins 'for the greatest part considered the Greeks as white Saracens'.[75] Efforts were made to pre-empt the danger of western aggression. Starting from the thirteenth century and continuing intermittently for over 200 years, there were numerous negotiations for Church Union, most often initiated by Byzantine emperors.[76] For John III Vatatzes (1221–54) and Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259–82), the main reason for such efforts was obvious: a holy war could hardly be launched against Byzantium if the empire appeared as a proper Catholic power. The danger to which Byzantine diplomacy was responding was real. Innocent III and practically all his successors down to 1282 proclaimed or endorsed crusading action for the defence of the Latin states in Romania, with a brief exception in the 1270s. This was one of the fundamental elements of papal policy in the Greek East in the period. Furthermore, the effort to raise a crusade against the Greeks was at the core of the Latin Empire's contacts with the West, and crusade plans and rhetoric coloured the involvement of several western powers in the area, such as Venice, Manfred of Sicily or Charles of Anjou.[77]

The deployment of the crusade in Frankish Greece, therefore, affected deeply both policies and perceptions. In both these aspects, a new frontier came into being in the thirteenth century. The Byzantine 'schismatics' were added to the list of peoples who defined the external and internal boundaries of Latin Christendom. Already in 1212, Arnaud Amaury, abbot of Cîteaux and papal legate to the Albigensian Crusade, envisaged the Christians waging a war on three sides, against 'schismatics from the east, heretics from the west and Saracens from the south'.[78]

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chroniqueurs occidentaux des croisades, 1096–1261' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Université Paris I, 2006), for example, at pp. 14–15, 410–11, 430–32.

[74] Nikolaos G. Chrissis, 'Tearing Christ's Seamless Tunic: The "Eastern Schism" and Crusades Against the Greeks in the Thirteenth Century'. The paper has been presented on various occasions, including the Late Medieval Seminar Series of the Institute of Historical Research (London, UK) and the Eighth Quadrennial Conference of the SSCLE (Cáceres, Spain); it is due to appear in print in the proceedings of the latter.

[75] George Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, ed. and trans. Albert Failler and Vitalien Laurent (5 vols, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984–2000), vol. 2, p. 471, par V.10: 'προσίστατο γὰρ τὸ σκάνδαλον, καὶ τὸ λευκοὺς Ἀγαρηνοὺς εἶναι Γραικοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις μεῖζον ᾔρετο'.

[76] See Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1979), passim.

[77] Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 262–3, passim.

[78] *RHGF*, vol. 19, pp. 250–54, at 253: 'Benedictus per omnia Dominus Jesus-Christus, qui per suam misericordiam in nostris temporibus, sub felici apostolatu domini Papae Innocentii, de tribus pestilentium hominum et inimicorum ecclesiae sanctae suae, videlicet orientalibus schismaticis, occidentalibus haereticis, meridionalibus Sarracenis, victorias contulit catholicis christianis'.

The connection and comparison between the various religiously defined enemies was also made explicit by Pope Gregory IX (1227–41), in his proclamation of a crusade for the Latin Empire in 1238. The pope asserted that heretics and schismatics are worse than Jews and pagans, 'for while the Jews affixed the Lord to the cross once, heretics crucify him over and over again, wounding Him with their indignities and sins […] Pagans violently punish and slaughter the bodies of Christians. [But the heretics] steal the souls of faithful Christians away from Christ […] while schismatics try to tear asunder the seamless tunic of Jesus Christ […] which signifies the indivisible Church.'[79]

## Conclusion

We can now return to our initial questions and attempt some answers. How did the evolution of crusading affect western involvement in Byzantine lands in this period? Did the expeditions in Romania have, in turn, any impact on the evolution of the crusade at large? After the establishment of Latin states in the aftermath of 1204, both the papacy and the secular leadership of Frankish Greece turned to the crusade as a means to stabilize the conquests. As was shown, Honorius committed progressively greater resources to the campaign for Thessalonica. To an extent this was in response to the growing Greek threat; but this is not the whole picture. The comparison with southern France and the Baltic shows that we need to be aware of the wider context; firstly, as regards the extent of western commitment in Frankish Greece, since resources had to be shared between different fronts. This was evident, for example, when the Fifth Crusade was prioritized over all other campaigns. Secondly, and most importantly, the ideological and practical evolution of crusading did not necessarily correspond to specific local circumstances: Honorius took similar steps in Romania, the Baltic and southern France, even though the local conditions and needs differed considerably.

Many of the similarities arose from the common practices and procedures in the papal curia in dealing with reports of problems from various provinces. This is not without significant implications. For one, it means the pope and the curial administrators saw these fronts, and the measures to be implemented there, as comparable. Secondly, even if this was a 'mechanistic' response, it did bring about real results in affecting actions and perceptions on the ground along similar lines.

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[79] *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, ed. Augustin Theiner (2 vols, Rome: Typis Vaticanis, 1859–60), vol. 1, p. 160: 'Tales namque sunt heretici et scismatici, qui a tanto pastore pasci renuunt, et eius vicario non intendunt, perfidiores Iudeis, et crudeliores paganis. Nam Iudei semel Dominum crucis patibulo affixerunt, heretici vero in membris suis iugiter crucifigunt eundem, opprobriis ipsum et contumeliis lacerantes [...] pagani quoque furebant in puniendis Christianorum corporibus et mactandis. Isti fidelium animas latenter Christo subripiunt et furantur […] Schismatici autem tunicam inconsutilem, Iesu Christi […] ut ipsius ecclesia figurata per tunicam […] una esset, scindere moliuntur'.

Equally important is the fact that not all of the parallels between the three fronts can be put down to papal predilections. The creation of the military orders, for example, seems to have come from local initiatives. The majority of papal crusade calls were issued in response to local petitions and lobbying. This shows that the recourse to crusading and to its more and more familiar mechanisms was not limited to the papacy but included different groups of people across a variety of situations. It was noted earlier that, particularly after the Fourth Lateran Council, a 'template' was created which facilitated the transplantation of the crusade in various areas. This had far-reaching consequences for the interaction of Latin Christendom with other peoples and cultures. For, as this essay has attempted to show, the *mechanisms* of interaction can be as important as the political context and the intellectual climate on the two sides of intercultural contacts.

The crusade was deployed in Frankish Greece and other areas because this was fast becoming a customary reaction of lay and ecclesiastical authorities in a number of conflicts by the early thirteenth century. The legitimization of these expeditions, in turn, necessitated the use of rhetoric and imagery that portrayed the opponents as enemies of the faith, the fighting as 'God's work', and the scene of the conflict as a frontier disputed between Christendom and its enemies. In other words, the crusade was not proclaimed *because* the opponents were deemed to be enemies of the faith; rather, the opponents were designated as enemies of the faith because the crusade was deployed against them. This was part-and-parcel of crusading justificatory rhetoric. Its impact in Frankish Greece is evident in the characterization of Greeks as schismatics which became standard practice in the thirteenth century, whereas it did not enjoy widespread acceptance in the previous period. A parallel can be seen in the relations between Scandinavians and Russians. Although there was a shared sense of belonging in a common Christian community in the twelfth century, the confessional difference became pronounced in the perceptions of each other later in the thirteenth century, when the crusade was introduced in the area of contact between the two.[80]

Conversely, crusading in Frankish Greece was an important episode in the development of the crusade movement, particularly as it coincided with the period of its institutional evolution and expansion. The crusade, or more accurately some proto-crusade measures, had already been deployed against certain Christian rulers who were perceived as a threat to the papacy, for example, Roger of Sicily in 1135 or Markward of Anweiler in 1199.[81] But this was the first case where the crusade was turned against an entire Christian group rather than against specific individuals.

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[80] John H. Lind, 'Consequences of the Baltic Crusades in Target Areas: The Case of Karelia', in Murray, *Crusade and Conversion*, pp. 133–50; for Latin views of the Russians, see also Christoph Schmidt, 'Das Bild der *Rutheni* bei Heinrich von Lettland', *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung*, 44 (1995), pp. 509–20.

[81] Housley, 'Crusades against Christians', pp. 22–3, 27–8; Kennan, 'Innocent III and the First Political Crusade'.

Frankish Greece can be seen as the missing link in the expansion of crusading in the thirteenth century and, in a way, as a testing ground for the more famous expeditions against heretics in southern France. The plenary indulgence was already introduced in Romania by Innocent III in 1205, while it took him two more years to do so in the Albigensian Crusade and he never granted it for the Baltic. It was the connection with the affair of the Holy Land that provided the opportunity for crusade mechanisms to be introduced in Greece early on; but it was the loosening of this association, especially under Honorius III, that turned Frankish Greece into a self-standing crusade front, a 'new frontier' between Latin Christendom and those perceived as its enemies.

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# 2
# The Latin Empire and Western Contacts with Asia

*Bernard Hamilton*

The establishment of the Latin Empire opened the Black Sea to western interests, and in this chapter I will consider the ways in which, during the thirteenth century, western merchants, diplomats and mendicant friars made use of the new opportunities for travel which this provided. Initially these contacts were restricted to the northern shores of the Black Sea, particularly the province of Cherson in the Crimea, which gave access to the south Russian steppes and to the principality of Kiev, and to the ports on the eastern shores which belonged to the Kingdom of Georgia. Western contacts expanded exponentially after the Mongols extended their empire to the west in 1237–42, because this enabled western travellers to enter central Asia for the first time and to journey to northern China.

Although the Komnenian emperors had granted numerous privileges to the Italian maritime communes, these had not extended to the Black Sea ports, possibly because those ports were the main source of food supplies for the capital. This restriction ceased to exist after Constantinople was conquered by the Latins in 1204, but initially neither the Venetians, who were the dominant commercial power in the Latin Empire, nor any of the other western maritime cities showed any great interest in developing Black Sea trade. The most important consequence of this free access to the Black Sea was a political and diplomatic one.

After 1204 it became possible for the western powers to communicate directly with the Orthodox Christian Kingdom of Georgia in the Caucasus, whose western province, Avasguia (Abkhazia), bordered on the Black Sea. The Georgian Church was autonomous under its Catholicus and was in full communion with the Byzantine Church. The papacy considered it part of the Catholic Church, and relations between the two communions were free from doctrinal disputes in the centuries under discussion here.[1] The papacy and the rulers of the Crusader States had, of course, been aware in the twelfth century of the existence and military strength of Georgia, but diplomatic relations with the Georgian crown had to be conducted either through Georgian pilgrims visiting Jerusalem or through the Byzantine court, which acted as intermediary, and neither method was very satisfactory.[2] Innocent

[1] Bernard Hamilton, *The Christian World of the Middle Ages* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2003), pp. 133–7.

[2] Bernard Hamilton, 'Latins and Georgians in the Crusader Kingdom', *Al-Masāq*, 23 (2011), pp. 117–24.

III, when planning a new crusade to recover Jerusalem, thought that an alliance with Georgia would be valuable. The Aiyubid Sultan al-Adil, who ruled the Holy Land, governed an empire which extended from Egypt to Mayyafariqin in northern Mesopotamia. Georgia under Queen Thamar (1184–1212) controlled much of the southern Caucasus and was expanding further south. In 1209 Georgian forces captured Kars, and it was not unrealistic to suppose that the Georgians could launch an attack on Aiyubid Iraq. If that were coordinated with an attack on Egypt by the new crusade which the pope was planning, Aiyubid power would be seriously threatened.[3] Therefore in 1211 the pope opened negotiations for a military alliance against Egypt with the Georgian court, and these were continued by his successors, Honorius III and Gregory IX, with Queen Thamar's successor, Queen Rusudan (1223–45).[4] These negotiations did not lead to the hoped-for joint military action because Georgia suffered a series of devastating attacks from the Mongols in 1220–21 and from the Khwarazm Shah in 1225. When Gregory IX (1227–41) learned of this, he considered raising a crusade in Hungary and among the Christian Cumans in Transylvania to march to the relief of Georgia from the north.[5] Nothing came of this, and in 1236–39 Georgia was again invaded by the Mongols, a campaign which ended with the kingdom becoming a Mongol vassal-state. Queen Rusudan appealed to Gregory IX for help while this war was in progress, but because of his other crusading commitments he was unable to give it. He entrusted his reply to a delegation of eight Dominican friars, who reached Tiflis (T'bilisi) in 1240. The queen allowed them to set up a priory there, and the Mongol overlords, who tolerated all religions, raised no objection to this.[6] Thereafter there was a western presence in Georgia, and the Prior of Tiflis made regular reports to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order about what was happening in the Caucasus.

The Latin rulers of Constantinople showed little interest in the province of Cherson in the Crimea. They do not appear to have made any attempt to incorporate it into their empire. Western merchants, and particularly the dominant Venetians, likewise ignored Cherson until c. 1240.[7] In this, the new Frankish emperors

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[3] Cyril Toumanoff, 'Armenia and Georgia', in J.M. Hussey (ed.), *The Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 4, part I: Byzantium and its Neighbours* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 621–8.

[4] Innocent III, *Regesta, an.* XIV, in *PL*, vol. 216, col. 434; *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, ed. Petrus Pressutti (2 vols, Rome: ex typographia Vaticana, 1888–95), vol. 2, no. 4979.

[5] *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX (1216–1241)*, ed. Aloysius L. Tautu, Pontificia Commissio ad redigendum codicem iuris canonici, Fontes, series III, vol. 2 (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950) , p. 208.

[6] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 338–9; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), pp. 59–60; Jean Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au moyen âge* (Rome: École française de Rome, 1977), p. 55.

[7] See David Jacoby, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece', *NCMH*, vol. 5, p. 541: 'It was only after the consolidation of Mongol rule in southern Russia in 1239–40 that the Latins markedly increased the geographical and financial range of

contrasted strongly with their Byzantine predecessors. Cherson provided access to the Russian principalities, but it was also of great diplomatic importance. The scholar emperor Constantine VII (913–54) began the treatise which he wrote for his son about the government of Byzantium, the *De Administrando Imperio*, with the words: 'It is always greatly to the advantage of the emperor of the Romans to … keep peace with the nation of the Pechenegs … and to send every year to them … a diplomatic agent with presents befitting … to that nation. This nation of the Pechenegs is neighbour to the district of Cherson.'[8] In Constantine's reign the Pechenegs were the dominant power in the south Russian steppes; from them the Byzantine rulers learned about the movements of more distant nomadic peoples, and this helped them to prepare for possible attacks from the north on their Danube frontier. The Byzantines also learned from the Pechenegs something about the peoples living further to the east: the Khazars, the Uzes and the Black Bulgarians. The Latin emperors of Constantinople, who came from western societies in which there was no established tradition of diplomacy, made no use of the potential sources of information about the peoples of the steppes which they could have discovered had they appointed officials to administer Cherson. If they had done so, they might have been able to prepare western Europe for the great Mongol advance towards the west in 1237, and they would certainly have learned more about the peoples of the Russian steppe lands.

Educated opinion in western Europe in the early thirteenth century, represented, for example, by Gervase of Tilbury, who presented his *Otia Imperialia* (which might be translated as *The Emperor's Bedside Book*) to Otto IV in 1215, supposed that Asia was divided by a mountain chain called the Caucasus, which ran from the eastern shores of the Black Sea to a point near Cape Samara on the Outer Ocean in the extreme orient.[9] Western scholars knew that the Caspian Sea existed in northern Asia, although it was widely thought to be an inlet of the Arctic Ocean.[10] It was known from the accounts of the campaigns of Alexander the Great that the provinces of Bactria and Sogdiana, through which the rivers Oxus and Jaxartes flowed, were situated to

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their business in and around the Black Sea. Some of them settled in Soldaia on the southern shore of the Crimea.'

[8] Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, ed. Gyula Moravcsik, trans. Romilly J.H. Jenkins, revised edn, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae: series Washingtonensis, vol. 1 (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1967), ch. 1, p. 49. The Pechenegs are also known as Patzinaks.

[9] The Caucasus was thought to be a continuous chain, although different sections were known by other names. Gervase of Tilbury, *Otia Imperialia*, ed. and trans. S.E. Banks and J.W. Binns (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), Bk II, ch. 5, pp. 224–31.

[10] This view was disseminated by Martianus Capella, *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury*, Bk VI, in *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts*, trans. W.H. Stahl, R. Johnson and E.L. Burge (2 vols, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 248–9.

the east of the Caspian Sea.[11] Solinus (fl. 250 AD), the Roman writer whose work is a strange mixture of geographical fact and fable, and which was widely read in the medieval West, stated that northern Asia, which he called Scythia, was rich in gold and jewels, particularly in emeralds, but that few travellers ventured there because those treasures were guarded by gryphons.[12] Nevertheless, northern Asia to the east of Sogdiana was not totally inaccessible, for it had been known since antiquity that the city and province of the Seres, who produced silk, was situated in northern Asia, near the Outer Ocean. Traders from that land took their merchandise to a market in central Asia, where they were met by Persian merchants who bought the material, and it was through them that silk reached the Syrian ports and became available in the Graeco-Roman world.[13] But although western scholars in the central Middle Ages knew of the existence of this trade from classical authorities, no western person claimed to have travelled on this route.

Before the Mongol invasions, the principalities of Kievan Russia had close links with western Europe, particularly with the Scandinavian kingdoms. Intermarriage between the Rurikid princes and the royal families of Sweden and Denmark was frequent, and political alliances were regularly made between them. There were also regular trade contacts between Russia and the West through the Baltic and the Russian river systems. The Russian princes of Kiev and some of their western visitors travelled to Constantinople by way of the Dneiper and the Black Sea.[14] Nevertheless, western travellers seldom left the rivers to venture into the dangerous lands of the south Russian steppes which were the home of

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[11] Walter of Châtillon, in his epic about Alexander, written c. 1181, related how:

> Still Alexander thirsted in his heart
> For Scythia's realm, and swifter than a leopard
> Advanced his columns to the Tanais
> Whose eddying vastness separates that kingdom
> From Bactria.

*The Alexandreis of Walter of Châtillon. A Twelfth-Century Epic*, trans. David Townsend (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), Bk VIII, lines 414–18, p. 142. For a full survey of medieval western literature about Alexander, see George Cary and D.J.A. Ross, *The Medieval Alexander* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956).

[12] C. Iulius Solinus, *Collectanea Rerum Mirabilium*, ed. Theodore Mommsen (Berlin: Weidmann, 1895), sections 15, 22, p. 86. The Bestiary, written in c. 1220–50, now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, explains that the hind part of a gryphon's body is like that of a lion, while 'its wings and face are like an eagle … If it comes face to face with a man it will attack him'. *Bestiary: Being an English Version of the Bodleian Library Oxford, MS Bodley 764*, trans. Richard Barber (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), p. 38.

[13] For an introduction to the literature about the Silk Road, see Susan Whitfield, *The Silk Road: Trade, Travel, War and Faith* (London: British Library, 2004).

[14] Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus 750–1200* (London: Longman, 1996); John H. Lind, 'Consequences of the Baltic Crusades in Target Areas: The Case of Karelia', and Anti Selart, 'Confessional Conflict and Political Cooperation: Livonia and Russia in the Thirteenth Century', both in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *Crusade and*

warlike peoples such as the Pechenegs and Uzes. Towards the end of the twelfth century, Rabbi Petachia of Ratisbon set out from Prague and travelled by way of Christian Russia to Khazaria and thence through the Caucasus to Baghdad. While not wishing to minimize his courage and enterprise, it should be borne in mind that he may have been helped by the fact that the Khazar nobility had been converted to Judaism, as well as the fact that the Muslim authorities did not object to a Jew from the West travelling in their territories. Neither of these advantages would have been available to Christian travellers, and there was no incentive for them to try to use this route.[15] The first known attempt by a Christian traveller from the West in the Middle Ages to explore unknown northern Asia was made in 1235–37 by a Dominican friar, Julian of Hungary. The Dominican and Franciscan Orders had only recently been established, and their members still shared the zeal which had inspired their founders, to fulfil Christ's command and preach the Gospel to all peoples. Because they were independent of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and directly subject to the pope, the friars were often employed as papal envoys. The Dominican Order was well established in Hungary by the 1230s and conducted missions among the Cumans, a Turkish people who lived partly in Transylvania and partly on the south Russian steppes, and they made many converts.[16] The Hungarians had a folk memory that not all their nation had come to the West in the 890s, but that some had remained in their former homeland, Old Great Hungary. Because they were anxious that their distant kinsmen should learn about the Christian faith, the Dominican province of Hungary sent a mission, led by Friar Julian, to search for them. The folk memory was accurate: a people who spoke a version of Finno-Ugrian lived in the foothills of the Urals, but Friar Julian was unable to reach them.[17] As he travelled eastwards through Kievan Russia in 1237, he found Mongol armies massed on the frontiers of the principality of Riazan and turned back to the West. He wrote a report of his observations for the papal legate in Hungary, including the text of a demand for the submission of King Bela IV to the Mongols given to him by Mongol envoys at the court of Suzdal. King Bela informed his uncle, the Patriarch of Aquileia, about this, and the account must have reached Pope Gregory IX, but both the king and the pope disregarded it. The Mongol presence was a consequence of the order given by the Great Khan Ogedei to his nephew Batu in 1235 to move with his armies against the West, by which Ogedei meant the peoples living east of the Urals.[18]

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*Conversion on the Baltic Frontier 1150–1500* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 135–50, and 151–75 respectively.

15 *Travels of the Rabbi Petachia of Ratisbon*, ed. and trans. Abraham Benisch, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1861).

16 Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient*, pp. 220–33.

17 Denis Sinor, 'Un voyageur du treizième siècle: le Dominicain Julien de Hongroie', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 14 (1952), pp. 589–602.

18 Heinrich Dorrie, 'Drei Texte zur Geschichte der Ungarn und Mongolen. Die Missionsreisen des fr. Iulianus O.P. ins Ural-Gebiet 1234–5 und nach Russland (1237)

Batu advanced further west and in 1237 reached Russia. By 1240 he had subdued all the principalities except Novgorod the Great, and in 1241 he campaigned in Catholic eastern Europe, causing widespread devastation in Poland and Hungary, and crushing a confederate army composed of the nobility of the Holy Roman Empire supported by contingents of the military orders at the Battle of Liegnitz. News of the death of the Great Khan Ogedei in December 1241 was one of the reasons which caused Batu to withdraw his forces to the grasslands of the lower Volga in 1242 to be in readiness for the *kuriltai*, the assembly which would elect the new Great Khan, and his attack on the West came to an end.[19]

In the spring of 1245, on the eve of the Council of Lyons, Pope Innocent IV sent three fact-finding missions to the Mongols. The one which is relevant to this chapter was led by an elderly Franciscan, John of Plano Carpini, and was directed to the Mongols of South Russia, commanded by Batu.[20] John had played an important part in organizing the Franciscan Custodies of central Europe, and this influenced his itinerary. He left the papal court at Lyons and went first to Prague, then to Cracow and finally to Kiev, which was occupied by a Mongol garrison. Their commander gave him an escort to Batu's camp on the lower Volga, and Batu decided to send him to the *kuriltai* which was finally assembling at Karakorum in Mongolia to elect a new Great Khan in the place of Ogedei. Batu supposed that the new Khan would welcome the opportunity which Friar John would afford of learning more about western Europe, a region about which the Mongols still knew very little at that time. Karakorum was almost 3,000 miles away from Batu's camp at Sarai, but John and his Mongol escort covered the distance in 108 days. Once they had crossed the river Ural, John and his suite entered territory which was completely unknown to western Europeans. John wrote a full report of his embassy for the pope, but he did not say much about the topography of the lands through which he travelled because his brief was to collect information about Mongol society, its religious beliefs and its military organization, and that takes up most of his work. He was a native of Tuscany, and was not very impressed by Mongolia: 'In some parts', he wrote, 'the country is extremely mountainous, in others it is flat, but practically the whole of it is composed of very sandy gravel. In some districts there are small woods, but in others it is completely bare of trees … Not one hundredth part of the land is fertile … and there are no towns or cities there with the exception of Caracoron.'[21]

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und der Bericht des Erzbischofs Peter über die Tartaren', *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaft in Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1956, vol. 6, pp. 125–202.

[19] Jackson, *The Mongols and the West*, pp. 58–74.

[20] John of Plano Carpini, *Ystoria Mongalorum*, in Anastasius van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, *Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum saec. XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1929), pp. 27–130. All citations are from this edition. English translation, John of Plano Carpini, *The History of the Mongols*, trans. by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey, in Christopher Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol Mission* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), pp. 3–72.

[21] John of Plano Carpini, *Ystoria Mongalorum*, ch.1, sect. 4, p. 30.

The new Great Khan Guyuk received Friar John, and sent him back to Europe with a letter for the pope, which may have caused some surprise to the curia, since the Great Khan not only required the pope and all the kings of the West to come and do homage to him, but added a theological justification of this. 'Thou [Pope Innocent] sayest that I should become a trembling … Christian, worship God and be an ascetic … How knowest thou that such words as thou speakest are with God's sanction? From the rising of the sun to its setting, all the lands have been made subject to me. Who could do this contrary to the command of God?'[22] The pope did not question the authenticity of this letter, but it exemplified the difficulties inherent in negotiating with the Mongols at this period. The Great Khans, who believed in their God-given right to world dominion, regarded any diplomatic overture as an act of submission.[23]

Friar John had followed what appeared to be the most direct route from western Europe to northern Asia, that which ran through the Russian principalities, but a different route was opened up a few years later and became normative. This is associated with another Franciscan envoy to the Great Khan, William of Rubruck, who was the first western traveller to describe it, but he was not the first western traveller to use it. William was attached to the court of Louis IX of France when he was on crusade in the Levant. William's account of his mission is also a distinguished travel book about central and eastern Asia.[24] When news reached Louis that Sartaq, son of Khan Batu, had become a Christian, William expressed a wish to visit him. The king gave Friar William a letter of congratulation to present to the prince, but would not accredit him as his official envoy. The French king had his reasons for this. When Louis had first reached Cyprus with his crusade in 1248, Eljigidei, the Mongol commander in Persia, had sent envoys to him, hoping to effect a military alliance, because Louis, like the Mongols, was intent on waging war on the Sultan of Egypt. Louis sent back a delegation to the Mongol camp, led by the Dominican Andrew of Longjumeau, who took luxury gifts for the Mongol commander, including a tent chapel hung with embroidered tapestries. The Great Khan Guyuk had died in 1248 and the empire was being administered by his widow, Oghul Qaimish, until his successor was elected. Eljigidei sent Louis' envoys to her court at Emil, near Lake Balkash, but she was not interested in negotiating an alliance but in boosting her own prestige, and she treated Louis' gifts as tribute and sent his envoys back with a letter requiring him to send an annual tribute if he

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[22] The full text of this letter is in Persian. A translation, from which this excerpt is taken, was made by D.A. Maitland Muller and published by Dawson in *The Mongol Mission*, pp. 85–6.

[23] Jackson, *The Mongols and the West*, pp. 65–7, 89–90.

[24] All citations are from the English translation of his work, because it has excellent annotations: *The Mission of William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*, trans. Peter Jackson, with David Morgan, 2nd series, vol. 173 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1990) [henceforth *WR*]. This is based on the Latin text in Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, pp. 164–332.

wished to have peace with the Mongols.[25] It was this experience which led Louis to refuse to accredit Friar William of Rubruck as his ambassador, because he feared that the Mongols would treat that as a recognition by him of his status as a vassal of the Great Khan. Thus, unlike John of Plano Carpini, William had no status when he travelled among the Mongols except that of a Christian friar on a religious mission.

Although the most direct route from Acre to the Mongols of south Russia lay through the Christian Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, whose rulers were vassals of the Great Khans, William went first to Constantinople. Jean Richard has elucidated the reason for this. In his narrative, William records a meeting in the city with Baldwin of Hainault, who was a vassal of the Latin Emperor, Baldwin II, and who, William states, had already visited the Great Khan's court at Karakorum.[26] Richard argues convincingly that Baldwin II had made his submission to the Great Khan in c. 1251–52, and that Baldwin of Hainault had been his envoy. William thus went to Constantinople in order to obtain information about the Mongol Empire and the nature of the itinerary to Karakorum, and so the Latin Empire had a crucial role in the success of his mission. He was honourably received by Baldwin II, who was, in any case, well-disposed towards the mendicant orders.[27] In 1253 William reached the port of Soldaia in the Crimea, which was a lively commercial centre, although at that time there were few western merchants based there.

He duly presented Louis IX's letter to the Mongol Prince Sartaq, who sent him on to the court of his father Batu, at Sarai on the lower Volga, and Batu decided to send William to the court of the Great Khan Möngke at Karakorum. William was interested in what he saw on his journey and described how the Mongols moved across the steppes with their herds, and with their huge felt tents loaded onto ox waggons. 'When I came among them', he wrote, 'I really felt as if I were entering some other world.'[28] The Mongols were equally interested in him. When he stayed in their encampments they asked him whether it was true, as they had been told, that the pope was 500 years old, and they were unable to grasp the concept of the Atlantic Ocean whose further shores were so distant that no one had ever seen them.[29] William was the first European to describe a yak,[30] and although he did not

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[25] John of Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, chs 133–5, 471–3, 490–92, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1874); English trans: René Hague, *John of Joinville, The Life of St Louis* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), pp. 57, 144, 148–9; Jackson, *The Mongols and the West*, pp. 98–9.

[26] *WR*, ch. XXIX, sect. 44, p. 200; Jean Richard, 'À propos de la mission de Baudouin de Hainaut: l'Empire Latin de Constantinople et les Mongols', *Journal des Savants*, 1992, pp. 115–21.

[27] Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient*, pp. 44–7; William of Rubruck, who was doubly welcome as a friend of Louis IX and an envoy to the Mongols, was invited to preach in St Sophia on Palm Sunday 1253: *WR*, ch. 1, sect. 6, pp. 66–7.

[28] *WR*, ch. 1, sect. 14, p. 71.

[29] *WR*, ch. 21, sect. 2, p. 142.

[30] *WR*, ch. 26, sect. 2, p. 158.

visit Tibet, he met people who had done so, and was struck by their accounts of how Tibetans fashioned drinking vessels out of skulls.[31]

William's route took him to the north of the Caspian Sea, then into central Asia to the south of Lake Balkash, and through the Altai Mountains to Karakorum, which he reached on 27 December 1253.[32] Although he did not himself go any further east, he met envoys at the Great Khan's court from Cathay (that is, north China), which he correctly identified with the people 'who were known in ancient times as the Seres. They are the source of the finest silk cloth.'[33] William also met ambassadors from Korea, a kingdom previously unknown to people in western Europe.[34] He also heard about the Siberian tribes who lived to the north of Mongolia, such as the Orengai to the east of Lake Baikal, 'who tie varnished bone under their feet and skate over the frozen snow and ice at a speed that enables them to catch birds and animals'.[35] Among the other visitors to Möngke's court were envoys from the Sultan of Delhi, who brought the Great Khan a gift of 'eight leopards and ten greyhounds which had been trained to sit on a horse's back just like leopards do' when taken on a hunt. When William returned to the West in 1254, he accompanied that delegation for part of the homeward journey.[36]

While he was staying at Karakorum William met some of the first western Europeans to reach Mongolia. They were men and women taken captive by Batu's army during his attack on Poland and Hungary in 1241. Among them was a Frenchwoman called Pascha, or Paquette, from Metz in Lorraine, who had been living in Budapest at the time of the Mongol sack. She and the other captives had presumably been forced to walk from Hungary to the Mongol capital, though all William records of this experience is that she 'told us about the unheard-of destitution she had suffered prior to her arrival in the camp'. But her story had a happy ending: since her arrival in Mongolia she had become a lady-in-waiting to a Christian Mongol princess, and she had married a young Russian carpenter by whom she had three small sons. She invited Friar William and his companions to dinner.[37]

Paquette introduced the friar to William Buchier, a master goldsmith from Paris. He was, William records, legally a slave of the Great Khan's young brother, Arigh Böke, and had presumably been working in some part of central Europe when he

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[31] *WR*, ch. 26, sect. 3, p. 158. This is an accurate but misleading statement. Skulls were fashioned into drinking vessels, but only for ritual use in certain religious ceremonies.

[32] *WR*, ch. 27, sect. 10, p. 170.

[33] *WR*, ch. 26, sect. 8, p. 161.

[34] *WR*, ch. 26, sect. 5, p. 159 and n. 3.

[35] *WR*, ch. 29, sect. 45, p. 201.

[36] *WR*, ch. 36, sect. 3, p. 247 and n. 2.

[37] The earlier life of Paquette has been traced in western sources: *WR*, ch. 29, sect. 2, pp. 182–3. For tribes in the Mongol confederacy converted to Christianity, see below.

was taken captive in the Mongol invasion of 1241–42.[38] He was at work on a great display piece for the Mongol *kuriltai* of spring 1254. This was a great silver tree, with golden leaves and fruits made from jewels. Four Chinese dragons twined around the tree and their mouths were conduits for different kinds of wine. At the foot of the tree were four silver lions, from whose mouths flowed the Mongols' favourite drink, koumiss, fermented mares' milk, and the tree was surmounted by an angel holding a trumpet. Buchier made a gridiron for William of Rubruck, so that he could cook unleavened bread with which to make hosts, marked with the sign of the cross, for use at Mass, and a silver pyx to contain them. Henri Cordier reported that a French traveller who visited the region of Karakorum at the end of the nineteenth century found in the large Buddhist temple at Erdeni Tso a gridiron on which was stamped a Latin Cross, which was almost certainly the implement made by William Buchier in 1254.[39]

There was not only a variety of different peoples at the court of the Great Khan, but also of religions. In addition to the Russian Orthodox and Armenian Christians, who were subjects of the Mongols and with whom Rubruck was familiar, there were also a substantial number of Christians whom he describes as Nestorians. This was the name by which they were normally described by the western Church, but it is a misnomer: they called themselves the Church of the East, and are sometimes, and less controversially, called Chaldean Christians. They had split from the rest of Orthodox Christendom in the fifth century, and initially consisted chiefly of Christians living in the Persian Empire. At their head was the Patriarch of Ctesiphon who had moved his see to Baghdad in the ninth century. During the early Middle Ages the Chaldean Church established missions along the Silk Road connecting Persia with China. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries some of the peoples who later formed part of the Mongol confederacy, notably the Keraits, the Merkits and the Naimans, were converted to this form of Christianity, and although the Great Khans remained shamanists, they and their sons married princesses from the Christian Mongol peoples over whom they ruled.[40] The Chaldean Church thus occupied a powerful position in the Mongol Empire. William of Rubruck had a poor opinion of the Chaldean clergy whom he met, though his relations with them were quite amicable. If he is to be believed, Chaldean bishops very seldom visited the churches of Mongolia, and when they did they ordained all the male members of a priest's family, even those who were minors.[41] This ensured that there was never a shortage of priests to celebrate the sacraments, but although they could be trained

[38] *WR*, ch. 32, sect. 4, p. 223.

[39] *WR*, chs 29, sect. 2, 30, sect. 2–3, pp. 183, 209–10; Leonardo Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher: A French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1946), p. 38.

[40] Christoph Baumer, *The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian Christianity*, trans. M.G. Henry (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). The Church of the East in the Mongol Empire is discussed at pp. 195–234.

[41] *WR*, ch. 26, sect. 11–12, pp. 163–4.

by their fathers in how to perform the liturgy, they received no doctrinal training and by William's standards they were very ignorant. There were, of course, many learned Chaldean clergy in China, Persia and Iraq with whom western churchmen later became acquainted, but William of Rubruck did not meet them. Some of them, of whom the best documented is Raban Sauma, were used by the Mongol Il-Khans of Persia in the later thirteenth century as envoys to the western powers. At the same time, members of the mendicant orders were allowed to work in the Il-Khanate, where they met a wide range of Chaldean clergy.[42]

Another powerful group in Karakorum were the Mahayana Buddhists. Since the mid-eleventh century western people had known something of the life of Gautama the Buddha without realizing that they did. An anonymous western resident in Constantinople had, in 1048, found a hagiographical romance, written in Greek and attributed to St John of Damascus (d. 749), about an ascetic, Prince Ioasaph, and his spiritual director Barlaam.[43] This was, in fact, a version of the life of Prince Gautama, the Buddha, but readers of the Latin text thought that it was a saint's life. Barlaam and Ioasaph developed a cult in the western Church, their feast was observed on 27 November and their story was included by James of Voragine in his *Golden Legend*, a widely read collection of saints' lives.[44] But western people knew nothing about the Buddhist religion, and William of Rubruck was quite unprepared for the presence of Buddhist lamas at the Great Khan's court. The Mahayana form of Buddhism which was practised in Mongolia was very different from the Theravadin Buddhism of Ceylon and south-east Asia, centred on the life and teachings of Gautama. In the Mahayana form of the faith, Gautama is seen as one among many enlightened beings who have deferred their entry to Nirvana in order to help their fellow men, suffering on the wheel of being, to escape from this world of illusion and from the endless round of reincarnation.[45]

On the eve of Pentecost, 30 May 1254, the Great Khan Möngke arranged a public debate between the representatives of the four main religions present in his capital: Mahayana Buddhists, Muslims, Chaldean Christians and Latin Christians. There was a considerable number of western Catholics living there, consisting partly

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[42] See p. 59 below. Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient*, pp. 98–121, 167–94.

[43] *Barlaam and Ioasaph* [attributed to St John Damascene], ed. J.F. Boissonade, trans. G.R. Woodward and H. Mattingly, Introduction by D.M. Lang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); D.M. Lang, 'St Euthymius the Georgian and the Barlaam and Ioasaph Romance', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 17 (1977), pp. 306–23.

[44] Cardinal Baronius (d. 1607), Librarian of the Vatican, added an entry to the Roman Martyrology for 27 November: 'Apud Indos Persis finitimos sanctorum Barlaam et Josaphat, quorum actus mirandos sanctus Joannes Damascenus conscripsit.'

[45] David Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* (Boston: Shambhala, 2002), pp. 44–116, 386–528; Giuseppe Tucci, *The Religions of Tibet*, trans. Geoffrey Samuel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 29–162.

of the captives brought there from central Europe and partly of Cumans who had enlisted in the Mongol armies. The Great Khan and many of the Mongol nobility were shamanists and did not take a direct part in the debate but acted as arbitrators. The Buddhists spoke first. They wished to discuss the creation of the world and the state of the soul after death: the terminology is William's, but the issues he described were central to the Buddhist faith, in that they regarded the phenomenal world as an illusion, but one which was perpetuated by the reincarnation of souls after death. The aim of their religious discipline was to train their adherents to escape from the world of illusion and attain enlightenment, which would enable them at death to enter Nirvana, the state of Otherness. William objected that these topics were matters of secondary importance, and insisted that the debate should begin by considering the nature of God. He was supported by the Chaldean Christians and by the Muslims, for as monotheists, both groups thought this matter self-evident. William appealed to the Mongol arbitrators, and they upheld his objection, because they believed in a high God, Tengri, symbolized by the heavens. The Buddhists, who believed in many gods, all of whom they considered to be ephemeral and, like all men, in need of enlightenment, could only reply that no god was all-powerful. When William's turn came to speak and he asserted that: 'It is not God who created evil, everything which exists is good', the Buddhists were amazed and wrote down this opinion as 'something erroneous and impossible'. Yet because they were outnumbered by the monotheists, they lost the debate. William claims that he was the overall victor as spokesman of the Latin Christians.[46] Judged by his own standards, those governing disputations in terms of syllogistic logic which were dominant at that time in the universities of western Europe, his claim was no doubt true. Nevertheless, his is the only account which we have of this debate, and his opponents, trained to argue in quite different ways, might not have agreed with him about the outcome.

What this debate reveals is that William of Rubruck had no understanding of Mahayana Buddhism. This is not to his discredit. This is one of the most difficult religious systems for an outsider to master, for its adherents have 108 sacred books and there are many different schools of interpretation. It was not until the Jesuit Ippolito Desideri went to Lhasa in 1717, where he lived in a Buddhist monastery, learned classical Tibetan and read the texts, that a true appreciation of this type of Buddhism became available to western people.[47] What was important about William of Rubruck's experience was that it introduced western readers to a new world religion which was concerned with a range of metaphysical speculation and spiritual aims radically different from those with which they were familiar. Moreover, it was the dominant religion in some of the new lands in east Asia with which they had established contact.

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[46] *WR*, ch. 33, sect. 10–22, pp. 230–5; R.W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, revised text (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 47–52.

[47] *An Account of Tibet: The Travels of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia S.J., 1712–1727*, ed. Filippo de Filippi, with an introduction by C. Wessels (London: Routledge, 1932).

William left Karakorum in July 1255 and travelled back to Batu's camp on the lower Volga, but he did not go on to the Crimea. Instead, he moved south, travelling along the western shore of the Caspian Sea to Armenia. His journey took him near the foot of Mount Ararat, where Noah's Ark had come to rest.[48] William discovered that nobody had climbed the mountain to see what was there, and was not entirely satisfied with the explanation given by the local bishop, who 'told me about a monk who was very eager to do so, and how an angel appeared to him and brought him wood from the Ark, telling him to make no further efforts'. William commented: 'To judge by its appearance the mountain is not so high that men could not well climb it.' William then journeyed west to Cilicia, where he took ship for Cyprus. He wanted to go on to Paris to present his report to King Louis, who had returned to France in the previous year, but his religious superiors would not allow him to do so.[49]

The Mongol Empire, through which William of Rubruck had travelled, controlled the Silk Road. This term was used to describe a variety of routes through central Asia which since antiquity had connected north China with Persia. Since the rise of Islam in the seventh century, the western end of this trade route had been in Muslim hands, but the creation of the Mongol Empire made it possible to establish alternative trade routes from the Far East to the Christian world, and the route which terminated at the ports of the Black Sea was particularly important in this regard.

The first recorded western merchants to reach east Asia using the route from the Crimea were the elder Polos, Marco Polo's father Niccolo and his brother Maffeo. They were Venetians who lived in the Latin Empire of Constantinople, and who later moved to Soldaia in the western Crimea to trade with the Mongols. Although theoretically the Mongol Empire remained united under the Great Khan, after the death of Möngke in 1259 it became a federation of virtually independent principalities governed by members of Ghenghis Khan's family. The most important of these were the Khanate of the Golden Horde in southern Russia, the Il-Khanate of Persia, which included Iran and Iraq as far west as the river Euphrates, founded by Hülegu Khan (d. 1265), Möngke's younger brother, and Mongolia and north China ruled directly by the Great Khan Khubilai (1260–94). In 1260 the Polo brothers visited the court of Khan Berke, who had succeeded Khan Batu as commander of the Mongols in southern Russia and had fixed his capital at Serai on the lower Volga.[50] The Polos were trading in jewels, which were of high value but small bulk; they made Khan Berke a present of some of them and he gave them twice their

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[48] Genesis, ch. 8, v.4.

[49] *WR*, chs 37–8, pp. 254–76; his comments on Mount Ararat, pp. 267–8.

[50] *The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East*, trans. Henry Yule, 3rd edn, revised by Henri Cordier (2 vols, London: J. Murray, 1903) [henceforth *Marco Polo*], Bk I, chs 1–2, pp. 2–4. The complex manuscript variants of this text are analysed by J. Critchley, *Marco Polo's Book* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1992).

value by way of thanks. As John Larner comments, 'this was the normal way of doing business with eastern potentates'.[51] The Polo brothers then traded their way further east until they reached Bokhara. While they were staying there, envoys from Hülegu, Il-Khan of Persia, passed through on their way to the court of the new Great Khan, Hülegu's brother Khubilai. The envoys were surprised, it is said, 'because they had never seen Latins in that part of the world'.[52] Khubilai had been elected in 1260, and in 1266 he moved his capital from Karakorum to Khanbaligh (now Beijing), but we are not told where he was living when the Polos reached his court. If he was at Khanbaligh, they may have been the first western Europeans in the Middle Ages to reach Cathay.[53] Khubilai was interested in the West and questioned the Polos closely about its civilization. He sent them back to Europe with a *paiza*, a gold tablet which conferred on them the status of imperial officials, and urged them to return with a large number of 'intelligent men acquainted with the seven arts', which in practice meant university-trained clergy.[54] This account is likely to be true, because Khubilai used foreign administrators to govern the provinces of his empire.[55] Like William of Rubruck on his return journey, the Polos came back to the West by way of Armenia and Cilicia, where they took ship for Acre, which they reached in April 1269.[56]

While the Polos had been in Asia, the Latins had been expelled from Constantinople by the forces of Michael VIII Palaeologus of Nicaea. This did not lead to the exclusion of western merchants from the Black Sea, because Michael VIII had no navy of his own and had allied with Genoa to combat the power of Venice, which had been dominant in the Latin Empire. In 1266, with encouragement from the Mongols who controlled the Crimea, the Genoese founded the city of Caffa there, which became their main trading centre in the Black Sea. The Venetians remained very powerful, and in 1268 Michael VIII made peace with them. They too established a new base to trade with the Mongols: this was at Tana, near the estuary where the Don entered the Sea of Azov. By this time the Mongol Empire extended from northern China to southern Russia, and this made it possible to open up a new trade route between the Far East and western Europe, one which the Mongol rulers and their subjects and the western maritime powers wished to develop. Some of the traffic of the Silk Road, which had traditionally reached Persia, was diverted in this way to the ports of the Crimea. This was not the only trade link between the West

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[51] John Larner, *Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 33.

[52] *Marco Polo*, Bk I, ch. 3, pp. 9–10.

[53] Ibid., Bk I, chs 4–5, p. 11.

[54] Ibid., Bk I, ch. 7, p. 13.

[55] Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 115–52.

[56] *Marco Polo*, Bk I, chs 8–9, pp. 15–19.

and east Asia but it was an important one, and Italian merchants began to make regular use of this route which the elder Polos had pioneered.

The mendicant orders saw an opportunity to penetrate the lands of northern Asia in the company of traders. The brethren could act as chaplains to western trading settlements in Asiatic cities and hope that, from those centres, they might be able to spread the Christian faith in its Latin form among the local populations. It was an axiom in Mongol law, and one which contributed to the stability of Mongol rule, that all religions should be tolerated and treated on terms of parity.[57] Even though many of the Mongol rulers of southern Russia and central Asia became Muslims in the second half of the thirteenth century, they remained tolerant of Christians, provided that they did not seek to make converts among the Muslim population. Jean Richard has pointed out that, although it would have been possible for the mendicants who wished to work in the Mongol Empire in northern Asia and Cathay to travel there from Hungary by way of the Carpathians, as Friar Julian had done, that route was not used, and the Crimea became the normal point of entry to northern Asia in the second half of the thirteenth century. Although there was some Dominican activity there, the Franciscans came to have the dominant role in the missions to central Asia. By the early fourteenth century they had established convents in the towns of the Crimea and at Tana, the Venetian port on the Sea of Azov, at Sarai on the lower Volga, at Sarachaik on the river Ural, at Urgenj on the Oxus and at Almaligh to the east of Lake Balkash.[58] In 1318 Pope John XXII attempted to consolidate this missionary activity by setting up a Catholic hierarchy in western and central Asia, appointing a Catholic bishop at Caffa. Other bishops were later appointed at Tana, Sarai and Almaligh.[59] Franciscan priors and Catholic bishops had to make regular reports to their superiors in western Europe, and in that way knowledge of northern Asia and of political changes which were occurring there became known to a quite wide range of people in the West. Nevertheless, because these reports were written by churchmen, they dealt largely with religious issues – the beliefs of the indigenous peoples and the progress which the missionaries were making among them – and political events were discussed only in so far as they affected the status and stability of the mission churches.[60]

Western merchants needed a different range of information. This was given, not in the work of Marco Polo who, unlike his father and uncle, did not use the route

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[57] David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 40–44, 96–9.

[58] Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient*, pp. 86–98, and the map, 'Les stations missionnaires dans la vicairie de Tartarie Aquilinaire', at p. 303.

[59] Ibid., pp. 156–66.

[60] Because of the distances involved, communications between the mission churches and the West were erratic. The surviving materials for the Franciscan missions have been collected by Girolamo Golubovich, *Biblioteca bio-bibliografico della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente francescano* (5 vols, Quaracchi: Collegio San Bonaventura, 1906–27).

from the Crimea to reach Cathay,[61] but in the work of Francesco Pegolotti. He was a Florentine, employed by the Bardi, the first great banking house in western Europe. He wrote in the first half of the fourteenth century, and although he had travelled in the eastern Mediterranean on the bank's business, he had never been to Asia; but, as he tells us, he had relied on 'the reports of the merchants who have used the road'. His book is known as *La Pratica della Mercatura, A Manual for Merchants*, and is a pragmatic work.[62] He begins by giving an itinerary for the journey from Tana on the Sea of Azov to Khanbaligh in Cathay. He does not give details of the distance between places, since that would only have been of theoretical interest to his readers. Instead, he specifies the time that each main stage will take – for example, it takes 20 days to travel from Sarai to Urgench with a camel train – for that is what any merchant would need to know in order to estimate the cost of a venture and organize the logistics.[63] Pegolotti offers some general advice: 'In the first place you must let your beard grow long and not shave. At Tana you should furnish yourself with a dragoman. And you must not try to save money in the matter of dragomen by taking a bad one instead of a good one. For the additional wages of a good one will not cost you as much as you will save by having him. And besides the dragoman it will be well to take at least two good men servants who are acquainted with the Cumanian tongue [a form of Turkish].'[64] The rest of the book gives a great deal of detailed information about the variety of exchange rates and about the taxes which have to be paid on merchandise in different towns, and also notes the extras, such as fees payable to bath attendants and night watchmen.[65] A large part of the work is devoted to telling the merchant how to assess the quality of unfamiliar goods, such as rhubarb.[66]

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[61] Marco seems to have intended to travel to China by the sea route. In c. 1272 he travelled overland to Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, but was appalled by his first sight of Persian shipping: 'Their ships are wretched affairs, and many of them get lost; for they have no iron fastenings, and are only stitched together with twine made from the husk of the Indian nut.' *Marco Polo*, Bk I, ch. 19, pp. 107–8. He therefore decided to make the difficult overland journey to Cathay through the Pamirs.

[62] The last mention of Pegolotti in the Florentine records occurs in 1347. Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica della Mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans, Medieval Academy of America, Publication 24 (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1936) [henceforth Pegolotti, ed. Evans]. An English translation of parts of this work is: 'Pegolotti's Notices of the Land Route to Cathay', ed. and trans. Sir Henry Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, revised edn by Henri Cordier, 2nd series, vol. 37 (4 vols, London: Hakluyt Society, 1914), vol. 3, pp. 137–71 [henceforth Pegolotti, trans. Yule].

[63] Pegolotti, trans. Yule, pp. 146–50; Pegolotti, ed. Evans, p. 21.

[64] Pegolotti, trans. Yule, pp. 151–2; Pegolotti, ed. Evans, p. 21.

[65] For example, at Erzinjan in Armenia three aspers were payable to the watchmen on leaving the town; at Erzerum the charge for using the public baths was one asper: Pegolotti, trans. Yule, pp. 161–2.

[66] 'Riubarbero si e radice, e vuol essere fresco, e di fuori sia suo colore giallo smoro, e quando l'uomo lo taglia si e dentro la sua pasta in colore rossetto bianco e mischiato di veni bianche': Pegolotti, ed. Evans, p. 377.

The road from the Crimea was not the only route available to western people who wished to reach Cathay. After 1262 the Mongol Il-Khans of Persia were allies of the papacy and of the western powers against their mutual enemy, Mamluk Egypt. The Il-Khans allowed western merchants, missionaries and diplomats to travel freely in their dominions, and this included taking ship from the ports of the Persian Gulf to India and China.[67] By 1279 the whole of China had been brought under Mongol rule by Khubilai Khan, which opened the ports of southern China to western travellers trying to reach the Mongol court.

Embassies from the Persian Il-Khans regularly came to western Europe in the second half of the thirteenth century, seeking to promote joint action against the mutual enemy, the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. In 1286 the Il-Khan Arghun chose as his chief ambassador a Chaldean monk, Rabban Bar-Sauma, Vicar General of the Patriarch of Ctesiphon. Rabban Sauma had been born near Khanbaligh and had become a monk. He went on pilgrimage to the West, intending to visit Jerusalem, but he got no further than Baghdad, where he became a member of the patriarch's court. This is known from his autobiography which includes an account of his embassy to western Europe, which is the earliest account of the West to be written by a Chinese visitor. He stayed in Paris as a guest of Philip IV and greatly admired the newly built Sainte Chapelle. He then went on to Bordeaux in English Gascony, where he met Edward I of England, who had been on crusade before he became king, and he spent the winter in Genoa before going on to keep Holy Week in Rome where a new pope had just been elected. This was Nicholas IV (1288–92), the first Franciscan pope, and Bar-Sauma was cordially received by him before returning to Persia.[68]

It may have been as a result of this meeting that the pope resolved to send a mission to the court of the Great Khan. Nicholas chose as head of this delegation a Franciscan friar, John of Monte Corvino, who had been working in the Il-Khanate of Persia for some years. John, a south Italian by birth, was 44 years old when he set out for China in 1291. He returned to Persia and took ship from Ormuz to India, where he stayed for some months on the Malabar coast. From there he wrote a letter to his order describing the peoples of the Indian sub-continent, their

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[67] Mongol diplomatic overtures to the West began with a letter from the Il-Khan of Persia, Hülegu, to Louis IX of France in 1262: Paul Meyvaert, 'An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France', *Viator*, 11 (1980), pp. 245–59.

[68] *The Monks of Kublai Khan Emperor of China, or The History of the Life and Travels of Rabban Sawma, Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Mongol Khans to the Kings of Europe*, trans. E.A. Wallis Budge (London: Religious Tract Society, 1928); the French translation is said to be fuller: J.B. Chabot, 'Histoire du Patriarche Mar Jabalaha III et du moine Rabban Çauma', *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, 1 (1893), pp. 567–610; 2 (1894), pp. 73–142, 235–304; Morris Rossabi, *Voyager from Xanadu: Rabban Sauma and the First Journey from China to the West* (London: Kodansha International, 1992).

social customs and their religious beliefs.[69] Nothing further was heard of him until 1306 when the Franciscans at Tabriz in Persia received another letter with news of his mission. He does not say whether he had reached Khanbaligh during the lifetime of Khubilai Khan, who died in 1294, but he reports that he was on good terms with the reigning Great Khan, Khubilai's grandson Timur (1294–1307). He reported that he had received a great deal of support from an Italian merchant, Pietro da Lucalongo, who was living in China, and that he had been joined in 1303 by another Franciscan, Arnold of Cologne. John claimed to have baptized 5,000 converts. He had translated the New Testament and the Psalter into Mongolian, and had built two churches in Khanbaligh. He related how he had ransomed a group of boys from slavery, had baptized them and taught them Latin, and had trained them to sing plainsong, so that a full choral liturgy in the Latin rite could be performed in both his churches. His chief problem was the shortage of clergy to minister to the growing Catholic community.[70]

The Franciscans of Tabriz sent this letter to Pope Clement V who took prompt action, consecrating seven Franciscans as bishops and sending them to China to assist John. As we learn from letters sent back to Europe by this group, only three of the bishops survived the long journey, but they consecrated John Archbishop of Khanbaliq, and also set up a second Catholic diocese in the port of Zayton in c. 1313, to serve the substantial colony of western merchants who lived there.

John of Monte Corvino died in c. 1328 at the age of 81.[71] In 1339 a delegation of the Catholic subjects of the Great Khan of Cathay came to Avignon, where the papal court was then living, to inform Pope Benedict XII that all their clergy had died and to ask him to appoint a new archbishop. In response the pope sent a large delegation of Franciscans, led by the Florentine, John of Marignolli, a member of the convent of Sta Croce at Florence, to whom he gave the powers of papal legate.[72]

John and his party sailed in a Genoese ship from Naples at Easter 1339. They took with them the gifts which the pope had sent to the Great Khan, which included a group of war horses. The party travelled by way of Constantinople to the Genoese port of Caffa in the Crimea, and then made their way overland to the court of the Khan of the Golden Horde at Sarai, where they spent the winter.[73] In the spring they

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[69] John of Montecorvino, Letter I, ed. Anastasius van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, pp. 335–8.

[70] John of Montecorvino, Letter II, ed. Anastasius van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, pp. 345–51; English translation by Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, pp. 224–7.

[71] Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient*, pp. 148–52.

[72] John of Marignolli, *Relatio*, ed. Anastasius van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, vol. 1, pp. 524–60; English translation by Sir Henry Yule, 'Marignolli's Recollections of Eastern Travel', in *Cathay and the Way Thither*, revised edn by Henri Cordier, 2nd series, vol. 37 (4 vols, London: Hakluyt Society, 1914), vol. 3, pp. 177–269 [henceforth *Relatio*, Yule].

[73] *Relatio*, Yule, pp. 210–11.

set out for Cathay, but when they reached Almaligh they found that the Catholic bishop and his six Franciscan associates had been killed in the previous year, and that the cathedral had been wrecked. John of Marignolli was not easily discouraged: '[Notwithstanding this]', he later wrote in his memoir, 'we built a church, bought a piece of ground, dug wells, sang Masses and baptized several people.'[74] His party then resumed their journey and, after crossing the Gobi desert, reached Khanbaligh in 1342. The Great Khan welcomed them, and was particularly pleased with the war horses. The Chinese Annals for that year recorded that the emperor was presented with horses from Farang [that is, Europe], one of which was all black, eleven feet six inches long and six feet eight inches tall.[75] John of Marignolli stayed in Cathay for some years, returning to Europe by the sea route to the Persian Gulf and then overland through the Il-Khanate. He then went to Avignon and made his report to Pope Innocent VI.

As the problems which he had encountered at Almaligh show, conditions of travel on the road from the Crimea to Cathay were not always benign for western people. During the fourteenth century Mongol power became fragmented, which led to much local warfare. In 1369 a revolution in China brought the native Ming dynasty to power, which was very hostile to westerners because some of them had been used by the Mongols as administrators.[76] Irrevocable damage was caused to the line of communications which western merchants and the mendicant orders had established from the Crimea to central Asia by the great Mongol general known to English speakers as Tamerlane, an Anglicization of Timur-i-leng, Timur the Lame.[77] He was a minor Mongol prince, not a member of Ghenghis Khan's family, and was born in c. 1336. He created a principality for himself by successful warfare in the lands to the east of the river Oxus, and in 1370 was proclaimed Lord of the Fortunate Conjunction (a reference to his horoscope) at Samarkand, which he made his capital. He wished to restore the Mongol Empire, and met with remarkable, though not total, success. Between 1370 and his death in 1405, he campaigned successfully in western central Asia, northern India, Persia, Iraq, Anatolia, southern Russia and the Caucasus. He died while on an expedition to restore Mongol rule in China, and his death led to the abandonment of that campaign. The restoration of a single state stretching from south Russia to central Asia might have made the use of the route from the Crimea to China easier for western merchants and missionaries than it had been for many years, but Timur was a dedicated Muslim, who had a contempt for Christianity. During his campaigns, Christian churches were destroyed, often in the course of warfare, but were not rebuilt. The Church of the East suffered as a result of this policy, and so did the mission centres established

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74 Ibid., p. 212.

75 Ibid., pp. 213–14, 214, n. 1.

76 Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 132–5.

77 Jackson, *The Mongols and the West*, pp. 235–55; Beatrice F. Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

by the mendicants in the previous century and a half. Among the cities which Timur destroyed were Serai on the lower Volga, the former capital of Khan Batu, and Tana, the Venetian city on the Sea of Azov. Both were Catholic bishoprics, and their destruction disrupted the newly established Catholic hierarchy in the steppe lands of southern Russia and central Asia. Timur, of course, did not wish to damage commercial links with the West, but the destruction which his wars had caused made trade through the Crimea difficult, while after his death his empire soon broke up into warring states, which further disrupted communications.

Nevertheless, in the fifteenth century western merchant communities and convents of the mendicant orders remained in the other cities of the Crimea. This situation continued until the Ottoman Turks gained control of the Black Sea and in 1475 annexed the last western outpost in the Crimea, the Genoese city of Caffa.[78] Thereafter western travellers very seldom tried to use the road from the Crimea to Cathay.

Whereas in 1204 educated people in western Europe had known virtually nothing about northern Asia and had not considered the Crimea to be of any great importance, that changed in the century after 1250 and that change was in part possible because the Latin Empire of Constantinople had opened the Black Sea to western shipping and travellers. By the fifteenth century a detailed knowledge of the northern road to Cathay was available to interested western Europeans, as was a good deal of information about the societies of central and east Asia through which that road system passed. Something was also known about the religious beliefs which underpinned the civilizations of the peoples who lived there. This knowledge was not lost because the road to the east had become unviable after the mid-fourteenth century. Nevertheless, western knowledge of northern Asia remained limited. The huge region of Siberia bounded by the Altai Mountains and Lake Baikal to the south and the Arctic Ocean to the north remained *terra incognita*, and that would continue to be the case until the Russians crossed the Urals in the late sixteenth century.[79]

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[78] Franz Babinger, *Mehmet the Conqueror and his Time*, ed. W.C. Hickman, trans. R. Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 343–5.

[79] *Yermak's Campaign in Siberia: A Selection of Documents Translated from the Russian by Tatiana Minorsky and David Wileman*, ed. Terence Armstrong, 2nd series, vol. 146 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1975).

# PART II
# Byzantine Reactions to the Latins

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# 3
# Golden Athens: Episcopal Wealth and Power in Greece at the Time of the Crusades

*Teresa Shawcross*

'Ἄνδρες ῥωμαῖοι! Roman men! This name in and of itself suffices to recall your ancient valour. You upright men who are born of a great stock and can take pride in your ancestors […]! It is now time to show us your virtue […] for the sake of your faith […] and for the liberty and glory of our race, as well as for the honour and protection of your parents, wives and children.'[1] The patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, Michael IV Autoreianos, penned these words after the diversion of the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople in 1204. Autoreianos, who had taken up residence in Nicaea in Asia Minor, included this rallying cry in a letter that was written in straightforward, easily accessible Greek and intended for wide circulation, perhaps to be read from church pulpits. He exhorted his audience to take up arms, promising remission of their sins to all who died 'fighting for God's people' and 'risking themselves for their country and for the common salvation and liberation of the people'.[2] Similarly, the Archbishop of Ochrid, Demetrius Chomatenos – who, as the leading ecclesiastic in Epiros and Thessaly, enjoyed a practically equivalent prestige and influence there to that of Autoreianos in Asia Minor – declared that to fight was to burn with 'zeal for and fidelity towards the Roman constitution'; it was proof of continued adherence to the cause of the 'Empire of the Romans' or Byzantine Empire.[3] Conversely, not to fight was treason. Those who contemplated surrender merited condemnation as 'pimps' or 'panderers' of their homeland. The New Rome, Constantinople, who, like the noblest and most virtuous of matrons, had formerly presided over her household and nurtured her children with proper gravitas and a sense of decorum,

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[1] Nicolas Oikonomides, 'Cinq actes inédits du patriarche Michel Autôreianos', *Revue des études byzantines*, 25 (1967), pp. 113–45, at 117.

[2] Ibid., p. 119; see: Anthony Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 356; Teresa Shawcross, 'The Lost Generation (c.1204–c.1222): Political Allegiance and Local Interests under the Impact of the Fourth Crusade', in Judith Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillain (eds), *Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 9–45, at 30–33.

[3] *Demetrii Chomateni ponemata diaphora*, ed. Günter Prinzing (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), p. 90.

was degraded into a courtesan, nay a common streetwalker. The remainder of the empire must not be prostituted in the same way.

Such was the uncompromising message disseminated by the refugees who, fleeing the sack of the imperial capital and the invasion of the imperial provinces, regrouped to create in the 'eastern lands of the Romans' and the 'western lands of the Romans' substantial territories where it was claimed the 'ways of freedom' were still practised. In order to keep the spirit of the old regime alive, the refugees established courts and acclaimed emperors while waiting for the opportunity to drive out the western invaders, to whom they referred as 'Roman-haters'. Thus the refugees insisted not only on the ancient glories of the tradition of the Roman Empire, but also on the continuing validity in the contemporary eastern Mediterranean of a political identity that defined itself in terms of its Romanness. The Roman race, they declared, had held sway from Constantinople for hundreds of years and would soon return there. 'Our fatherlands' would be reclaimed. Once again, an emperor from his capital city would watch over all his subjects within a restored empire: 'one shepherd over one flock'.[4]

The highly emotive religious language used in these appeals is striking, as for that matter is the assistance provided by the heads of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in maintaining the notion of the legitimacy of imperial authority. Above all, there was an insistence on the continued divine appointment of a 'holy' (*hagios*) emperor after the loss of the capital. The exhortatory sources produced at the courts of Nicaea and Arta were brimming with compound adjectives (*theoeidestatos*, *entheos*, *theiotatos*, *theoprobletos*, *theopsephistos*, and so on) that, while difficult to translate, referred to the emperor as being 'impelled by God', 'counted by God', 'crowned by God', and

[4] *Nicetae Choniatae historia*, ed. Jan-Louis Van Dieten (2 vols, Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 301, 601; *Nicetae Choniatae orationes et epistulae*, ed. Jan-Louis Van Dieten (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972), pp. 120, 128; and *Demetrii Chomateni ponemata diaphora*, ed. Prinzing, p. 88. For a discussion of the development of 'Roman' identity in the thirteenth century, see, apart from Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium*, pp. 318–88, also: Gill Page, *Being Byzantine: Greek Identity before the Ottomans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 72–107; Paul Magdalino, 'Hellenism and Nationalism in Byzantium', in J. Burke and S. Gauntlett (eds), *Neohellenism* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), pp. 1–29; Paul Magdalino and Ruth Macrides, 'The Fourth Kingdom and the Rhetoric of Hellenism', in Paul Magdalino (ed.), *The Perception of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe* (London: Hambledon Press, 1992), pp. 117–56; Robert Browning, 'The Continuity of Hellenism in the Byzantine World: Appearance or Reality?', in T. Winnifrith and P. Murray (eds), *Greece Old and New* (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 111–28; Spyros Vryonis, 'Recent Scholarship in Continuity and Discontinuity of Culture: Classical Greeks, Byzantines, Modern Greeks', in *The 'Past' in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture* (Malibu: Undena Publications, 1978), pp. 237–56; Michael Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society Under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204–1261)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 29; idem, 'Byzantine "Nationalism" and the Nicaean Empire', *BMGS*, 1 (1975), pp. 49–70; and finally, Cyril Mango, 'Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 28 (1965), pp. 29–43.

to his reign as being 'in the image of God' and 'most Godly'. Indeed, Theodore I Laskaris, or, as he was known to contemporaries, Theodore Komnenos the Doukas, was described as the '*autokrator* crowned by God', or 'empowered by God', and as the '*basileus* saved and protected by God'.[5]

Yet the reinstatement of the Byzantine Empire, although subscribed to by the two most important living clerics of the Orthodox Church, was not universally desired. In the former Byzantine provinces conquered and occupied by the crusaders, the response of regional elites was more ambivalent than Autoreianos, Chomatenos and their respective circles might have hoped. What mattered to these elites was less the empire than the towns in which they themselves lived, the estates from which they derived their wealth, the churches and monasteries at which they worshipped, the religious confraternities and polo (*tzynganion*) teams to which they belonged, and the kinsmen, peers and clients with whom they transacted their ordinary business.[6]

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[5] See, for instance, among countless other examples: V.G. Vasilesvkij, 'Epirotica saeculi XIII', *Vizantiiskii Vremennik*, 3 (1896), p. 286; *Nicetae Choniatae orationes et epistulae*, ed. Van Dieten, p. 121; *Demetrii Chomateni ponemata diaphora*, ed. Prinzing, p. 94, 180; Raymond Loenertz, 'Lettre de Georges Bardanes, Metropolite de Corcyre au patriarche oecumenique Germain II', *Ἐπετηρὶς ἑταιρείας βυζαντινῶν σπουδῶν*, 33 (1964), pp. 109, 111, 112.

[6] Michael Angold, 'Archons and Dynasts: Local Aristocracies and the Cities of the Later Byzantine Empire', in *The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX to XIII Centuries* (Oxford: B.A.R., 1984), pp. 236–53; Leonora Neville, 'Local Provincial Elites in Eleventh-Century Hellas and Peloponnese' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Princeton University, 1998), pp. 59, 62; eadem, *Authority in Byzantine Provincial Society, 950–1100* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 99–164. For the characteristics of Middle Byzantine provincial society, see: Nikolaos G. Svoronos, *Recherches sur le cadastre byzantine et la fiscalité aux XIe et XIIe siècles: Le Cadastre de Thèbes* (Athens: École française d'Athènes, 1959), pp. 11–12, 14–16; Judith Herrin, 'The Ecclesiastical Organisation of Central Greece at the Time of Michael Choniates: New Evidence from the Codex Atheniensis 1371', *Actes du XVe congrès international d'études byzantines* (4 vols, Athens: Association internationale des études byzantines, 1980), vol. 4, pp. 131–7; Michael Angold, 'The Shaping of the Medieval Byzantine City', *BF*, 8 (1985), pp. 1–37; Peregrine Horden, 'The Confraternities of Byzantium', *Studies in Church History (Renaissance and Renewal in Church History)*, 23 (1986), pp. 25–45; J. Nesbitt and J. Wiita, 'A Confraternity of the Comnenian Era', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 68 (1975), pp. 360–84; Günther Prinzing, 'Epiros 1204–1261: Historical Outline – Sources – Prosopography', in Herrin and Saint-Guillain, *Identities and Allegiances*, pp. 81–100; *The Life of Saint Nikon*, ed. D.F. Sullivan (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1987), p. 136; E. Grantsrem, I. Medvedev and D. Papachryssanthou, 'Fragment d'un praktikon de la région d'Athènes (avant 1204)', *Revue des études byzantines*, 34 (1976), p. 33. For attempts by the crusaders to legitimize their conquest and win the support of the indigenous population, see Teresa Shawcross, 'Conquest Legitimized: The Making of a Byzantine Emperor in Crusader Constantinople (1204–1261)', in Jonathan Harris, Catherine Holmes and Eugenia Russell (eds), *Byzantines, Latins and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1150* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 181–220.

Nowhere did this lack of concern with grand imperial ideals hold truer than in 'most renowned and golden Athens'.[7] My subject here is the economic, religious and political landscape of this notable city of the province of Hellas and the Peloponnese before and after the Fourth Crusade. We need to examine the evolving relationship of the imperial provinces to the imperial centre during the period when the former were still within the empire if we are properly to understand the response of a city such as Athens to conquest and occupation by the crusaders. 'Athens, the glory of Hellas, the most famous of cities', was favoured and blessed, according to one author, Michael Synkellos, less because of her location, her climate, or even her ancient past, than because of the bishops appointed to her.[8] Although apparently a city of the 'outside lands' or the 'nethermost regions', she was, in fact, a 'most fortunate metropolis'.[9] Our focus will therefore be on the prominence during the Middle Byzantine period of the metropolitan see as an institution. The role played by a series of bishops, archbishops and metropolitans appointed to the city will be highlighted, as will the interaction of these individuals with central authority. The careers of two of these prelates, Nicholas Hagiotheodorites and Michael Choniates, can be shown to provide valuable insights into the transitional decades of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Choniates in particular was a prolific writer and dedicated correspondent whose surviving works – ranging from sermons, to poems, to letters – number in their current edition almost a thousand pages and afford us the possibility of a reconstruction of the evolving nuances of a community leader's allegiances and aspirations.[10] Moving on to the period after

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[7] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, ed. Spyridon Lampros (2 vols, Athens: Parnassos, 1879–80), vol. 1, p. 95.

[8] *PG*, vol. 4, cols 620–22.

[9] Paul Magdalino, 'Constantinople and the ἔξω χώραι in the Time of Balsamon', in Nicolas Oikonomides (ed.), *Byzantium in the 12th Century: Canon Law, State, and Society* (Athens: Society of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1991; published 1992), pp. 179–98; Shawcross, 'The Lost Generation', p. 12; *PG*, vol. 4, cols 620–22.

[10] The most complete edition remains *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*; a substantial part of the corpus has, however, been reedited in *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, ed. Foteini Kolovou (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001); for the orations and poems, see: A. Rhoby, 'Studien zur Antrittsrede des Michael Choniates in Athen', *Göttinger Beiträge zur byzantinischen und neugriechischen Philologie*, 2 (2002), pp. 83–111; Christopher Livanos, 'Michael Choniates, Poet of Love and Knowledge', *BMGS*, 30 (2006), pp. 103–14. For studies of Choniates, see: I.C. Thallon, *A Medieval Humanist: Michael Akominatos* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923); Georg Stadtmüller, *Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen (ca.1138–ca.1222)* (Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1934); Kenneth M. Setton, 'A Note on Michael Choniates, Archbishop of Athens (1182–1204)', *Speculum*, 21 (1946), pp. 234–6; Michael Angold, *Church and Society in Byzantium under the Comneni, 1081–1261* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 197–212; Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium*, pp. 317–45; and idem, *The Christian Parthenon: Classicism and Pilgrimage in Byzantine Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 145–65.

Athens had passed under crusader domination, we shall end by comparing the trajectory of this city with that of others, looking at the impact of the new regime and assessing the extent to which conquered provincial populations were able to defend their networks, interests, and local way of life.

## The Medieval City as a Sacred Site of Christian Pilgrimage

On the eve of the Fourth Crusade, Athens was a well-appointed and powerful city that both acted as the centre of a regional nexus and laid claim to a reputation extending far beyond the region.[11] Admittedly, when compared to well-watered Boeotia and Euboea, the soil of Attica was notoriously stingy and not particularly suited to the plough. According to popular lore, a farmer could expect to cultivate 'aches and pains' there, not corn.[12] Even so, the twelfth-century Arab geographer al-Idrisi noted that orchards and cultivated gardens surrounded Athens.[13] The climate was temperate and the 'grace of the land' such that, with a little coaxing, the olive, pistachio and citrus trees bore fruit in abundance, as did the vine.[14] Barrels of *retsina* wine that seemed 'to be pressed from resinous pines rather than grapes' and quantities of honey, olive oil and soap were produced.[15] Though the region may not have boasted the raw silk, linen and wool yarn associated with the Morea, or the

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[11] Alan Harvey, *Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 35–80, 198–243. It may be noted that scholars used to be inclined to argue that the economy of Athens collapsed in the late twelfth century, but this assessment is gradually undergoing revision as study of the written sources progresses. For the bibliography on the subject, see: Spyridon Lampros, *Αἱ Ἀθῆναι περὶ τὰ τέλη τοῦ δωδεκάτου αἰῶνος* (Athens: Typographeio tes Philokalias, 1878); Ferdinand Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Athen im Mittelalter* (2 vols, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1889), vol. 1, pp. 167–269; Kenneth M. Setton, 'Athens in the Later Twelfth Century', *Speculum*, 19 (1944), pp. 179–207; Nikolaos B. Tomadakes, 'Ἦσαν βάρβαροι αἱ Ἀθῆναι ἐπὶ Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου;', *Ἐπιστημονικὴ ἐπετηρὶς φιλοσοφικῆς σχολῆς Πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν*, 7 (1956–57), pp. 88–109; Judith Herrin, 'The Collapse of the Byzantine Empire in the Twelfth Century: A Study of a Medieval Economy', *University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, 12 (1970), pp. 188–203; eadem, 'Realities of Byzantine Provincial Government: Hellas and Peloponnesos', *DOP*, 29 (1975), pp. 253–84; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 112–65.

[12] The answer of the farmer to Pisistratus in Aristotle's *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* 16 appears to have become proverbial by the time of Choniates. See *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 103–4.

[13] *Géographie d'Edrisi*, trans. Paul-Amédée Jaubert (2 vols, Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1836), vol. 2, p. 295; N.G. Moschonas, 'Η τοπογραφία της Αθήνας κατά τη βυζαντινή και τη μεταβυζαντινή περίοδο', in *Αρχαιολογία της πόλης των Αθηνών* (Athens: Pneumatiko Kentro Demou Athenaion, 1996), p. 144.

[14] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, p. 12 (Letter 8); Herrin, 'Realities of Byzantine Provincial Government', p. 256.

[15] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 22–3, 112–13, 250–53 (Letters 19, 84, 156).

elaborately woven, embroidered and finished textiles associated with Thebes and Corfu, coastal beds of murex shells harvested by divers and processed by 'shell workers' (*konchylarioi*) supplied the precious purple dye used to tint some of the most luxurious and expensive cloths made anywhere in the empire. Factories did operate in Athens, including some making ceramics.[16] Moreover, the city acted as an entrepôt where goods from the entirety of Hellas and the Peloponnese could be accumulated and exported along long-distance networks of trade.[17] Above all, another type of income went a considerable way to make up for the relative lack of natural resources in the immediate vicinity of the city: copious wealth flowed into the coffers of Athens thanks to its inhabitants' ability to market intangibles and turn a profit from people's piety.

The last may seem surprising, since in late antiquity Athens had suffered increasing isolation and been at odds with the world around it, persisting as a place of pagan religion and learning long after the rest of the empire had espoused Christianity. When this 'most ardently idolatrous of cities' had finally been humbled in the sixth century and its schools of philosophy closed by imperial decree, the event had been greeted with jubilation back in Christian Constantinople, where people had been quick to pronounce that the patroness of the capital, the Mother

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[16] Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando imperio*, ed. Gyula Moravcsik (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1967), p. 256; *Ioannis Tzetzae epistulae*, ed. P.A.M. Leone (Leipzig: Teubner, 1972), pp. 101–3; *The Life of Saint Nikon*, ed. D.F. Sullivan (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1987), p. 118; Benjamin of Tudela, *Itinerary*, ed. M.N. Adler (London: Henry Frowde, 1907), p. 10; *Theophanes Continuatus*, ed. Emmanuel Bekker (Bonn: E. Weber, 1838), pp. 318–19; *Documents sur le régime des terres dans la principauté de Morée au XIVe siècle*, ed. Jean Longnon and Peter Topping (Paris: Mouton, 1969), p. 9; *Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris*, ed. G. Waitz, MGH SS rer. Germ. 46 (Hanover: Hahn, 1912), pp. 53–4. See also: Grantsrem, Medvedev and Papachryssanthou, 'Fragment d'un praktikon', p. 33; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, p. 222 (Letter 135); M. Kazanaki-Lappa, 'Medieval Athens', in Angeliki E. Laiou (ed.), *The Economic History of Byzantium* (3 vols, Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002), vol. 2, pp. 644–5; Angeliki E. Laiou and Cécile Morrisson, *The Byzantine Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 118, 127; David Jacoby, 'Silk in Western Byzantium before the Fourth Crusade', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 84–5 (1991–92), pp. 452–500; idem, 'The Production of Silk Textiles in Latin Greece', in *Τεχνογνωσία στη λατινοκρατούμενη Ελλάδα* (Athens: Politistiko Technologiko Idryma ETBA, 2000), pp. 22–3; Kostis Kourelis, 'Fabrics and Rubble Walls: The Archaeology of Danielis' Gifts', *30th Annual Byzantine Studies Conference, Baltimore, October 30, 2004, BSC Abstracts 30* (2004), pp. 26–8; idem, 'Landmarks of Rural Archaeology: Medieval Settlements in the Northwestern Peloponnese' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2003), pp. 135–42; Teresa Shawcross, *The Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 15–16; Setton, 'Athens in the Later Twelfth Century', p. 195.

[17] M. Pozza and G. Ravegnani, *I trattati con Bisanzio, 992–1198* (Venice: Il Cardo, 1993), p. 55; see Peter Frankopan, 'Byzantine Trade Privileges to Venice in the Eleventh Century: The Chrysobull of 1092', *JMH*, 30 (2004), p. 146.

of God, had destroyed Athens, reducing her to dust.[18] The *Akathist Hymn*, the most substantial of the *kontakia* attributed to the religious poet and hymnographer Romanus the Melode, celebrated the achievement with acclamations to the Virgin Mary:

> Hail, vessel of God's Wisdom!
> Hail, repository of divine Providence!
> Hail, you who reveal the philosophers as unwise!
> […]
> Hail, you who cut through the cant of the Athenians' vain speculations![19]

Later, another poet writing in the capital, John Geometres, would make a comparison of Athens and Constantinople that redounded to the advantage of the latter. Athens, he wrote, was rooted in the earth, whereas the New Rome that was Constantinople

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[18] *Συμβολαὶ εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τοῦ μοναχικοῦ βίου ἐν Ἑλλάδι*, ed. C.A. Papadopoulos (2 vols, Athens: Phoinix, 1935), vol. 2, p. 70.

[19] *Fourteen Early Byzantine Cantica*, ed. C.A. Trypanis (Vienna: H. Böhlaus, 1968), p. 35 (17); and also *Sancti Romani Melodi Cantica: Cantica Genuina*, ed. Paul Maas and C.A. Trypanis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 265 (XXXIII 17); on Romanus the Melode and Constantinople, see Herbert Hunger, 'Romanos Melodos, Dichter, Prediger, Rhetor – Und sein Publikum', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 34 (1984), pp. 15–52; on Romanus the Melode and Athens, see Marco di Branco, 'Atene immaginaria: Il mito di Atene nella letteratura bizantina tra agiografia, teosofia e mirabilia', *Atti della Accademia nazionale dei Lincei*, 402 (2005), pp. 99–100. On the closure of the philosophical schools, see: P. Tannery, 'Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque', *Revue philosophique*, 42 (1896), pp. 266–87; Alan Cameron, 'The Last Days of the Academy at Athens', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, 195 (1969), pp. 7–29; Alison Frantz, 'Pagan Philosophers in Christian Athens', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 119 (1975), pp. 29–38; Johannes Irmscher, 'Paganismus im Justinianischen Reich', *Klio*, 63 (1981), pp. 683–8; J.M. Camp, 'The Philosophical Schools of Roman Athens', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 36 (1989), p. 505; Arja Kariveri, 'The "House of Proclus" on the Southern Slope of the Acropolis: A Contribution', *Papers and Monographs of the Finnish Institute at Athens*, 1 (1994), pp. 115–39; Gunnar Hällström, 'The Closing of the Neoplatonic School in A.D. 529: An Additional Aspect', *Papers and Monographs of the Finnish Institute at Athens*, 1 (1994), pp. 141–65; Paavo Castren, 'Paganism and Christianity in Athens and Vicinity during the Fourth to Sixth Centuries A.D.', in G.P. Brogiolo and B. Ward-Perkins (eds), *The Idea and Ideal of the Town Between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 211–23; Edward Watts, 'Justinian, Malalas, and the End of Athenian Philosophical Teaching in A.D. 529', *Journal of Roman Studies*, 94 (2004), pp. 168–82; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 64–5. On Constantinople and the Virgin Mary, see Averil Cameron, 'The Theotokos in Sixth-Century Constantinople: A City Finds its Symbol', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 29 (1978), pp. 79–108. Finally, on the epithets of the Theotokos in the *Akathist*, see L.M. Peltomaa, 'Epithets of the Theotokos in the Akathistos Hymn', in L. Brubaker and M.B. Cunningham (eds), *The Cult of the Mother of God in Byzantium: Texts and Images* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 109–16.

approached heaven; while the former was left only with 'the tombs of the dead and the ghosts of the wise', the latter possessed 'the faith that is true wisdom'. He imagined Athens as a city subject to Constantinople, personifying her as a handmaiden or slave girl bearing an olive branch to her mistress, before whom she prostrated herself.[20] In fact, by the lifetime of Geometres, Athens was attempting to rival the imperial capital as the city that constituted the abode of the Mother of God and was favoured by her above all others. In 1018, after a momentous battle, the emperor Basil II found himself master of a territory that stretched practically from the Danube to the Euphrates, but instead of holding a triumph in the capital, as his predecessors had been accustomed to do, he rode with all speed several hundred miles south, to Athens, to give thanks to the Mother of God at her shrine there and dedicate 'many beautiful and supremely costly offerings to her', only heading for Constantinople after completing these devotions.[21] By the eleventh century, Athens 'burned with ardour […] for the All Pure Queen and Mother of God'.[22] The magnificent Parthenon of Athens was no longer a hated pagan temple dedicated to the goddess Athena; it had become a Christian church, a cathedral, dedicated to Mary.[23] The building, according to one text, had been transformed 'into a prayer

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[20] *PG*, vol. 106, cols 950–51 (Poems 109–10); Herbert Hunger, 'Athen in Byzanz: Traum und Realität', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 40 (1990), pp. 51–2; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 7–8.

[21] *Ioannis Skylitzae Synopsis Historiarum*, ed. I Thurn (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1973), p. 364; also Herbert Hunger, 'Athen in Byzanz', p. 52; and Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 81–91. A silk tapestry depicting the emperor on a white horse receiving crowns from a pair of female figures that represented the fortunes or *tychae* of cities may have been commissioned to commemorate these victory celebrations held in the two locations; other identifications of the emperor and the cities are, however, also plausible.

[22] The remark is from the *Life of Meletios the Younger* by Theodore Prodromos; see Συμβολαὶ εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τοῦ μοναχικοῦ βίου ἐν Ἑλλάδι, vol. 2, p. 70.

[23] See: F.W. Deichmann, 'Die Basilika im Parthenon', *Mitteilungen des deutschen archaeologisichen Instituts, athenische Abteilung*, 63–4 (1938–39), pp. 127–39; Cyril Mango, 'The Conversion of the Parthenon into a Church: The Tübingen Theosophy', *Δελτίον τῆς χριστιανικῆς ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἑταιρείας*, 18 (1995), pp. 201–3; Robert Ousterhout, '"Bestride the Very Peak of Heaven": The Parthenon after Antiquity', in Jenifer Neils (ed.), *The Parthenon: From Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 293–330. Dates ranging from the late fifth century to the mid-sixth century have been proposed for this conversion; the earliest dated inscription in the Parthenon referring to a bishop of Athens is from 693. The possibility that the church was initially dedicated to Divine Wisdom, and afterwards to the Mother of God, cannot be excluded, but it is based on the evidence provided by a lost inscription and is now impossible to prove; in any case, by the sixth century the Mother of God was already habitually associated with Wisdom (see Margaret Barker, 'Wisdom Imagery and the Mother of God', in Brubaker and Cunningham (eds), *The Cult of the Mother of God in Byzantium*, pp. 91–108). For the Christianization of Athens more generally, see: K. Michel and A. Struck, 'Die mittelbyzantinischen Kirchen Athens', *Mittheilungen des kaiserlich deutschen archaeologischen Instituts, athenische Abtheilung*, 31 (1906), pp. 279–324; Kenneth M. Setton, 'The Archaeology of Medieval

house of our most-glorious Lady, the Mother of God'.[24] In the words of another, it 'had been liberated from the tyranny of the false virgin (*parthenos*)' and turned into the abode of the true, 'eternal Virgin (*Parthenos*) and Mother of God'.[25]

The emperor Basil II went to Athens because the ancient Acropolis there was becoming a major sacred site and place of pilgrimage not just for Greece, or for the Byzantine Empire more generally, but for the whole of Christendom. Among the pilgrims who, like him, worshipped in the church, perhaps as many as 200 left their mark, carving crosses and phrases on the fluted columns next to the entrance to the building.[26] Some inscriptions were poems glorifying the Mother of God in a language reminiscent of Constantinople's *Akathist Hymn*, to whose arrogant triumphalism they may indeed have been intended as a response:

> I here sing these words for Mary –
> "Hail, most blessed living Temple of God!
> Hail, most blessed of heaven and earth!

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Athens', in *Essays in Medieval Life and Thought Presented in Honour of Austin Patterson Evans* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 227–58; Ioannes Travlos, *Πολεοδομικὴ ἐξέλιξις τῶν Ἀθηνῶν: ἀπὸ τῶν προϊστορικῶν χρόνων μέχρι τῶν ἀρχῶν τοῦ 19ου αἰῶνος*, 3rd edn (Athens: Kapon, 2005) and '*Χριστανικαὶ Ἀθῆναι*', in *Θρησκευτικὴ καὶ ἠθικὴ ἐγκυκλοπαίδεια* (12 vols, Athens: Martinos, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 709–58; Alison Frantz, 'From Paganism to Christianity in the Temples of Athens', *DOP*, 19 (1965), pp. 185–205; J.-M. Spieser, 'La christianisation des sanctuaires païens en Grèce', in U. Jantzen (ed.), *Neue Forschungen in griechischen Heiligtümern* (Tübingen: Wasmuth, 1976), pp. 309–20; Kazanaki-Lappa, 'Athens from Antiquity to the Turkish Conquest' and Charalambos Bouras, 'Middle Byzantine Athens: Planning and Architecture', in Charalambos Bouras et al., *Athens from the Classical Period to the Present Day (5th Century B.C. – A.D. 2000)* (New Castle, DE: Oak Knoll Press, 2003), pp. 194–219 and 220–45 respectively. F.W. Deichmann, 'Frühchristliche Kirchen in antiken Heiligtümern', *Jahrbuch des deutschen archäologischen Instituts*, 54 (1939), pp. 105–36 remains the classic study despite its age.

[24] *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. H. Erbse (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1995), pp. 35–6.

[25] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, p. 104.

[26] The Byzantine inscriptions in the Parthenon date from 693 to 1175. A.K. Orlandos and L. Branouses, *Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος* (Athens: Akademia Athenon, 1973); for medieval inscriptions and graffiti on other ancient buildings of the Acropolis and elsewhere in Athens, see: A. Avramea and T. Tanoulas, 'Τὰ χαράγματα τῶν Προπυλαίων', in *Ἑνατο συμπόσιο βυζαντινῆς καὶ μεταβυζαντινῆς ἀρχαιολογίας καὶ τέχνης. Πρόγραμμα: περιλήψεις εἰσηγήσεων καὶ ἀνακοινώσεων* (Athens: Christianike Archaiologike Etaireia, 1989), pp. 21–2; M. Goudas, 'Μεσαιωνικὰ χαράγματα πλοίων ἐπὶ τοῦ Θησείου', *Βυζαντίς*, 2 (1911), pp. 329–57; G. Ladas, 'Βυζαντιναὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Θησείου ἐπιγραφαὶ ἀνέκδοτοι καὶ διορθώσεις εἰς τὰς ἤδη ἐκδεδομένας', *Συλλέκτης*, 1 (1952), pp. 57–8 and plates 23–7. A comparison with other sites reveals that Athens, and the Parthenon in particular, has an unusually large number of dated inscriptions; see K. Mentzou-Meimare, 'Χρονολογημέναι βυζαντιναὶ ἐπιγραφαὶ τοῦ Corpus Inscriptionum Graecorum IV, 2', *Δελτίον τῆς χριστιανικῆς ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἑταιρείας*, 8 (1977–79), pp. 77–132.

Hail, most blessed b<earer> of the heavenly Ear of Corn!
Hail, you who are filled with Grace by the true God!".[27]

Most inscriptions, however, took the form of prayers:

I beg you, only Mother of God
To incline your ear to me as a willing listener
And, in listening, grant me salvation.
You who give to all who desire you
The gift of a clear view of the Eternal Light,
Grant me my prayer, O most holy one,
And protect and save your suppliant.[28]

People prayed for themselves, their families and their communities. More often than not, the entreaties were of a general nature, though at times very specific requests were recorded, such as for happiness in love, or revenge for adultery.[29] The invocations addressed the Virgin Mary in her capacity as the mistress of Athens or *Despoina Athenon* (for example, 'Lady of Athens, help your servant Vassilo and her children').[30] Of the pilgrims who did not originate within the city itself and its immediate vicinity, there were those who came from the wider province of Hellas and the Peloponnese. They included: John Mamonas, a nobleman from Monemvasia; Germanos, the bishop of Diauleia; and Luke, who belonged to a family of island refugees that had settled near Thebes. For such visitors, the shrine of the Virgin Mary acted as the equivalent of that of St Demetrius in Thessalonica for the inhabitants of Macedonia and Thrace, or that of the Archangel Michael in Chonai for the inhabitants of northern Asia Minor.[31] Others, such as John Syleotes

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[27] Orlandos and Branouses, *Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος*, pp. 146–7 (no. 183); see also pp. 148–9 (no. 185).

[28] Ibid., p. 82 (no. 89). The poem has an acrostic spelling out 'John'.

[29] Ibid., pp. 5, 29 (nos 9, 41).

[30] Ibid., pp. *18–19 and 8 (no. 16). The invocations take the following forms: 'Mother of God, help …'; 'Lady, Mother of God …'; 'Lady, Holy Mother of God …'; 'Most Holy Mother of God …'; 'Only Mother of God …'; 'Lady, Most Holy Virgin, Immaculate and Most Praised One …'; 'Vessel of God, Lady, Protector of the faithful …'; 'Vessel of God, Lady, Succourer of those without hope, Consoler, Protector and Aid …'.

[31] Ibid., pp. 9, 30, 124–5 (nos 17, 42, 160–61); *The Life and Miracles of Saint Luke of Steiris*, ed. C.L. Connor and W.R. Connor (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1994), pp. 18–19; di Branco, 'Atene immaginaria', p. 84; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 96–7. For the importance of pilgrimage in the Byzantine world, particularly to Chonai and Thessalonica, see: Ewald Kislinger, 'Sightseeing in the Byzantine Empire', in N.G. Moschonas (ed.), *Η Επικοινωνία στο Βυζάντιο* (Athens: KBE/EIE, 1993), pp. 457–68; A. Mentzos, *Το προσκύνημα του Αγίου Δημητρίου Θεσσαλονίκης στα βυζαντινά χρόνια* (Athens: Vanias, 1994); Cyril Mango, 'The Pilgrim's Motivation', in *Akten des XII. internationalen Kongresses für christliche Archäologie* (3 vols, Münster: Aschendorffsche

and Fantinus of Calabria, crossed the sea from Asia Minor and Magna Grecia. Still others, such as a certain Saewulf, came all the way from England. Some travellers may even have been Arab speakers from the caliphates of the Fatimids and the Abbasids.[32]

What drew these pilgrims to Athens? The pilgrims who arrived in late summer would have had the chance to participate in the grand religious and commercial celebration or *panegyris* most probably held around the feast of the Dormition of the Virgin: they may, for instance, have spent the eve of the feast exploring the fair, or attending the service and all-night vigil, or indeed both.[33] At other times of the year, there were the feast days of more minor saints to celebrate, such as those of St Martinianus, St Leonidas and possibly St Menas, whose cults Athens seems to have purloined respectively from Caesarea, Corinth and Cotyraion, and claimed as her own.[34] But, whatever the season of their visit, no pilgrim could leave the city without first climbing the Acropolis and visiting the Parthenon, or rather the cathedral housed there. Accounts have survived of the marvels to be beheld. The ancient temple had undergone a series of alterations to make the building suitable for Christian worship so that, although it retained its basic footprint, ancillary structures had been built up against it, while the main door had been moved to the western side, reversing the original orientation. The space had been divided into an exonarthex, a narthex and a three-aisled nave, to the east of which a sanctuary and, later, two flanking side-chapels were added. Most importantly, the church had acquired a raised altar, while

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Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 1–9, and Charalampos Bakirtzis, 'Le culte de saint Démétrius', in ibid., vol. 2, pp. 58–68; J.C. Skedros, *Saint Demetrios of Thessaloniki. Civic Patron and Divine Protector, 4th–7th Centuries CE* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1999); Michel Kaplan, 'Les saints en pèlerinage à l'époque mésobyzantine', *DOP*, 56 (2002), pp. 109–27; Clive Foss, 'Pilgrimage in Medieval Asia Minor', *DOP*, 56 (2002), pp. 129–51.

[32] Orlandos and Branouses, Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος, p. 9 (no 17); *La vita di San Fantino il Giovan*, ed. E. Follieri (Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1993), pp. 438–43; *Peregrinationes tres: Saewulf, John of Würzburg, Theodericus*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout: Brepols, 1994), p. 60; G.A. Soterios, 'Ἀραβικὰ λείψανα ἐν Ἀθήναις κατὰ τοὺς βυζαντινοὺς χρόνους', *Πρακτικὰ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας Ἀθηνῶν*, 4 (1929), pp. 266–73. See: di Branco, 'Atene immaginaria', pp. 80–81; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 101–2, 108–9; Panayiotis Yannopoulos, 'La Grèce dans la *Vie* de S. Fantin', *Byzantion*, 65 (1995), pp. 479–81. For those pilgrims travelling a considerable distance, Athens may have been one stop among many in an extended itinerary of pilgrimage.

[33] Athanasios Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae* (St Petersburg: Top. V.F. Kirshbauma, 1913), p. 95; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 133–45; on Byzantine festivals, see Spyridon Vryonis, 'The Panêgyris of the Byzantine Saint: A Study in the Nature of a Medieval Institution, Its Origins and Fate', in *Byzantine Institutions, Society and Culture* (New Rochelle: Artistide D. Caratzas, 1994), pp. 251–92.

[34] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 150–56, 343–4; di Branco, 'Atene immaginaria', pp. 78–80, 82–84; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 168–73; F. Halkin, 'Saint Léonide et ses septs compagnes martyrs à Corinthe', *Ἐπετηρὶς ἑταιρείας βυζαντινῶν σπουδῶν*, 23 (1953), pp. 217–23.

other items – an ambo, a baptistery and a bishop's throne – had been installed that were required for the performance of the sacraments and liturgy.[35] The exonarthex and narthex had received a series of murals – painted directly onto the marble – that included scenes referring to the Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Last Judgement, but also abounded in representations of the Virgin Mary, such as that showing Mary enthroned with the Christ Child on her lap flanked by two angels. Dominating the entire decorative programme was a large apse mosaic of Mary. Although the mosaic cannot be reconstructed with certainty, it is thought to have depicted Mary with the Christ Child either to the side of her cradled in one of her arms or, more likely, in a central medallion resting between her outstretched arms.[36]

All this, however, was merely the setting for a miracle for which the shrine was famous. The miracle in question, alluded to in numerous contemporary

[35] Windows were punched into the walls; some of the reliefs on the pediments had been defaced, others preserved, perhaps because they were reinterpreted as depictions of the Annunciation and other episodes from the life of the Mother of God. M. Korres, 'Σύντομη επισκόπηση της ιστορίας και των οικοδομικών περιπετειών του Παρθενώνος έως και την Παλαιοχριστιανική εποχή', in *Μελέτη ἀποκαταστάσεως τοῦ Παρθενῶνος: Study for the Restoration of the Parthenon* (7 vols, Athens: Ypourgeio Politismou, 1983), pp. 131–49, and 'Συμβολή στη μελέτη του χριστιανικού Παρθενώνος', in *Πέμπτο συμπόσιο βυζαντινής και μεταβυζαντινής αρχαιολογίας και τέχνης: πρόγραμμα και περιλήψεις ανακοινώσεων* (Athens: Christianike Archaiologike Etaireia, 1985), pp. 36–8; also, Deichmann, 'Die Basilika im Parthenon', pp. 127–39. Much of the evidence regarding the Parthenon as a church was destroyed in the nineteenth century, as early archaeologists removed medieval material in order to expose the classical site; see R.A. McNeal, 'Archaeology and the Destruction of the Later Athenian Acropolis', *Antiquity*, 65 (1991), pp. 49–63. However, it has been possible to reconstruct many of the details, including the fact that the bishop's throne was moved.

[36] The wall paintings are no longer extant, but for sketches, photographs and descriptions of some of them, see: The Marquis of Bute, 'Some Christian Monuments of Athens', *The Scottish Review*, 6 (1885), pp. 95–8; A. Xyngopoulos, 'Παρθενῶνος βυζαντιναὶ τοιχογραφίαι', *Ἀρχαιολογικὴ ἐφημερίς* (1920), pp. 36–53; Anthony Cutler, 'The Christian Wall Paintings in the Parthenon', *Δελτίον της χριστιανικής αρχαιολογικής εταιρείας*, 17 (1993–94), pp. 171–80. For the lost apse mosaic in the Parthenon, see Setton, 'Athens in the Later Twelfth Century', p. 200; for surviving apse mosaics of the Theotokos to which one might compare it, see Robin Cormack, 'The Mother of God in Apse Mosaics', in M. Vassilaki (ed.), *Mother of God: Representations of the Virgin in Byzantine Art* (Milan: Skira, 2000), pp. 91–105. The apse mosaic may have displayed unique features characteristic of an iconographic type that first appeared in the city and was then disseminated more widely; see: Vitalien Laurent, *Le corpus des sceaux de l'empire byzantin* (5 vols, Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1963–81), vol. 5, pp. 451–5 (nos 605, 607); Michel and Struck, 'Die mittelbyzantinischen Kirchen Athens', p. 320; C. Angelidi and T. Papamastorakis, 'Picturing the Spiritual Protector: From Blachernitissa to Hodegetria', in Maria Vassilaki (ed.), *Images of the Mother of God: Perceptions of the Theotokos in Byzantium* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 209–23; Werner Seibt, 'Die Darstellung der Theotokos auf byzantinischen Bleisiegeln, besonders im 11. Jahrhundert', *Studies in Byzantine Sigillography*, 1 (1987), pp. 35–56; B. Kiilerich, 'Making Sense of the Spolia in the Little Metropolis in Athens', *Arte medievale*, 4 (2005), pp. 95–114, at 108.

accounts, was not linked to any holy relics or images. Rather, it was identified with a 'divine light' that was considered to be a symbol of the 'Light of the World', Christ, the Incarnation of divine Wisdom and of the Word born of the Virgin Mary. The miraculous light was referred to as a 'light everlasting, ever-burning and unquenchable' that 'fell from heaven to flash forth' and now 'pours down onto us without cease' and shines at 'this church' or 'gate of heaven'. It was described as the 'perpetually shining torch of the eternal Virgin and Mother of God' that, held up 'on this peak', the Acropolis, illuminated not only 'the city and the district of Attica, but the whole earth'. Visitors to Athens were invited to 'enter the divine palace of the Mother of God' in order to observe for themselves the 'perfectly pure' burning of 'holy fire' that is 'not dimmed by day nor interrupted by night' and that 'burns without wood and without the sun'; then, having witnessed it and purified their mind and soul through the sight, to depart 'truly happy and blessed in all ways'.[37] The fire was said to be contained in a 'lamp that was always lit but never ran out'.[38] We appear to be dealing with a physical object at the shrine, a lamp of some sort, regarding which there was a claim that it burned without fuel and therefore never needed to be refilled.[39] Whatever the precise nature of the receptacle for the 'holy fire', it is clear that pilgrims were thoroughly impressed with what they saw. So much so that, on returning to their homelands, they established foundations dedicated

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[37] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 104–5, 148–9; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, p. 13 (Letter 8); *Georges et Démétrios Tornikes: Lettres et discours*, ed. Jean Darrouzès (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherché scientifique, 1970), p. 118 (Letter 6); *Eustathii metropolitae Thessalonicensis opuscula*, ed. Peter Wirth (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2000), pp. 11–12 (Oration 1). The language, it may be noted, echoes that used by Proclus of Constantinople in his homilies to describe the Incarnation. That it was the miraculous lamp, rather than an image of Mary, which constituted the main draw for visitors seems likely since pilgrimages undertaken in order to visit specific icons do not appear to have been usual until the Palaeologan period; see Annemarie Weyl Carr, 'Icons and the Object of Pilgrimage in Middle Byzantine Constantinople', *DOP*, 56 (2002), pp. 75–92. In any case, the image in the Parthenon of the Virgin Mary that was attributed to St Luke may have been a relatively late addition to the shrine as it is first referred to in a fourteenth-century source.

[38] *Peregrinationes tres*, 60; see also Léon Le Grand, 'Relation du pèlerinage à Jérusalem de Nicolas de Martoni, notaire italien (1394–1395)', *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 3 (1895), pp. 566–699, at 650–52.

[39] Support for such an interpretation comes from the tradition of an inextinguishable flame associated with the cult of the goddess Athena; it is possible that this flame was rededicated to the Virgin Mary, with the lamp being moved into the Parthenon from the Erechtheium, where it had been attested in antiquity. Certainly, Guido da Pisa, a twelfth-century Italian author, comments that a 'sacred and inextinguishable light' had, since the time of the legendary king of Athens, Jason, been located on the Acropolis, but was now under the protection of the Virgin Mary and 'bore witness to the true God'. See *Itineraria Romana*, ed. J. Schnetz (5 vols, Stuttgart: Teubner, 1990), vol. 2, p. 136.

to the 'Mother of God of Athens' (*Meter Theou e Athenaïs* or *e Atheniotissa*).[40] Churches and monasteries in the name of 'the One who is honoured in Athens' existed in Caria, Trebizond and Georgia, and also possibly in Egypt and Sicily; at least one such foundation was even built in the imperial capital itself.[41]

## The Role of the Bishop

The promotion of Athens as a destination for Christians may be attributed in large part to the appointment to the city of a series of capable prelates. These prelates – whose rank was raised in the eighth century from bishop to archbishop and again in the tenth century from archbishop to metropolitan – were portrayed in formal murals and informal graffiti, and commemorated in inscriptions on the walls and columns of the cathedral (for example, 'On Sunday, the nineteenth day of the month of October of the seventh indiction, the most holy Andrew our bishop died, in the year from creation 6202 [= 693]').[42] During their period of office, these men appear to have been enterprising individuals who took pains to ensure their diocese prospered and their cathedral lacked for nothing. In the ninth or tenth century, one archbishop, whose name is not known, funded the addition to the complex on the Acropolis of a large marble basin or *phiale* for Holy Water, above which a verse inscription was carved declaring that the donor had sought by means of 'this humble work' to beautify the church the Virgin Mary had entrusted to his care.[43] Of particular

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[40] Laurent, *Le corpus des sceaux*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 451–3; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, p. 137.

[41] Michel and Struck, 'Die mittelbyzantinischen Kirchen Athens', pp. 319–20; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, pp. 137–44. For specific churches and monasteries with a probable connection to Athens, see: Raymond Janin, *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins* (Paris: Institut français d'études byzantines, 1975), pp. 228–9, 274–6; *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana*, ed. Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller (6 vols, Vienna: C. Gerold, 1860–90), vol. 6, pp. 121–2, 477–8; *La version brève des relations historiques de Georges Pachymérès*, ed. Albert Failler (3 vols, Paris: IFEB, Institut français d'études byzantines, 2002), vol. 2, p. 68; Odysseas Lampsides, 'Συμβολὴ εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀθηναίων μοναχῶν ἱδρυτῶν τῆς μονῆς Σουμελά', *Τὰ ἀθηναϊκά*, 2 (1956), pp. 1–10; Anthony Bryer and David Winfield, *The Byzantine Monuments and Topography of the Pontos* (2 vols, Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1985), pp. 254–5, 335–39; Otto Meinardus, 'The Panagia of Soumela: Tradition and History', *Orientalia suecana*, 19–20 (1970–71), pp. 63–80; Vassilios Kidonopoulos, *Bauten in Konstantinopel, 1204–1328* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994), pp. 67–8.

[42] Orlandos and Branouses, *Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος*, pp. *33–4, *37, and 21–2 (no. 34). In one mural, a series of busts of bishops surrounded a larger image of the Virgin Mary. A graffito scratched onto one of the columns depicted a bishop or other member of the cathedral clergy dressed in vestments and carrying a large cross.

[43] D.I. Pallas, 'Ἡ φιάλη τοῦ χριστιανικοῦ Παρθενῶνος', *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 10 (1932–34), pp. 185–98.

note are the achievements of two late twelfth-century and early thirteenth-century metropolitans, Nicholas Hagiotheodorites and Michael Choniates, both of whom had been students of the bishop of Thessalonica, Eustathius, the most learned teacher of their era, and could claim as their siblings three important imperial officials, the *mesazon* John Hagiotheodorites (previously *praitor*), the *logothetes tou dromou* Michael Hagiotheodorites (also *epi tou kanikleiou* and *orphanotrophos*) and the *megas logothetes* Nicetas Choniates (previously *logothetes tou genikou* and *epi ton kriseon*), as well as family ties with other officials and courtiers, such as the *megas logothetes* John Belissariotes and the general Michael Palaiologos.[44] The first of these metropolitans, Nicholas Hagiotheodorites, resided in Athens for some 15 years from c. 1160 until his death in 1175.[45] The funeral elegies composed for him paid tribute to a cleric who had adorned the 'holy church of Virgin' through the acquisition of gleaming communion vessels manufactured out of precious metal. The 'improvements' he made to the Acropolis, together with his successful persuasion of imperial tax collectors to lighten the burden of Athens, were said to have 'raised up the city'.[46]

Hagiotheodorites's immediate successor, Michael Choniates, was a native of Chonai in Asia Minor (and a protégé of the bishop there) who had been sent to Constantinople as a boy to further his education. Until his appointment as metropolitan of Athens, he had pursued a career in the patriarchate. Friends and family congratulated him on hearing the news of his appointment, but they also stated they were sorry to see him leaving for such a 'far-off corner of the empire'.[47] Primed in this way as to the expectations of his peers before setting out for his see, it was only natural that Choniates, on arrival there, should begin by lamenting his exile from the bright lights of the capital.[48] He commented bitterly on his intellectual isolation and loneliness:

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[44] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 46, 49, 66; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, Letter 53; Paul Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 130–31, 254–7; Alexander Kazhdan, 'Brat'ja Ayofeodority pri dvore Manuila Komnina', *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta*, 9 (1966), 85–94; J. Dräseke, 'Eustathius und Michael Akominatos', *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 24 (1913), pp. 484–502; also <http://db.pbw kcl.ac.uk/id/person/159659>; <http://db.pbw kcl.ac.uk/id/person/154685>; <http://db.pbw kcl.ac.uk/id/person/161285>; <http://db.pbw kcl.ac.uk/id/person/120305>; <http://db.pbw.kcl.ac.uk/id/person/107823> [last consulted 24 July 2012].

[45] Orlandos and Branouses, Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος, pp. 36–7 (no. 48).

[46] Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, p. 160.

[47] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 17–19 (Letter 13); *Nicetae Choniatae historia*, p. 58.

[48] *Robert de Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Jean Dufournet (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004), p. 170 (81); for comments, see Jonathan Harris, *Constantinople: Capital of Byzantium* (London and New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), pp. 108–27.

> Truly I am not a happy pastor […] tending my miserable little flock as I do in this city […] When I sit on this rock [the Acropolis] and sing, I sing to myself for no-one answers except the echo, which responds most brilliantly to my pastoral tunes.

He found himself, he claimed, in danger of turning into a boorish ignoramus. Provincial life was a waste of his talents and did not suit him in the slightest. For a man of his training and expertise, to be reduced to living like a peasant was the worst fate imaginable. 'It would now appear to have become the lot of bishops to wear themselves out with agriculture as if they were the coarsest of manual labourers', he told a friend, adding that Athens was so 'poor and mean' that one could scarcely find a hand-cart there, let alone a horse. Even death would be preferable and come as a relief, provided of course that he could die 'where it is good to die, not here', but back in the capital where he had spent many contented years 'labouring in letters'.[49]

However, despite these initial rumblings of complaint to the old bosom companions of his youth, Choniates did not wallow interminably in self-pity, for he was at bottom a pragmatic and ambitious man. Looking back on his life in a private letter composed shortly before his death in 1222, he would himself admit that his behaviour after his appointment as metropolitan had been that of an individual who had thrown himself completely into the hurly-burly of worldly affairs.[50] While feelings of anguished homesickness may well have been genuine at first, and though he may have continued for a time after his arrival in Athens to see himself as an outsider, Choniates soon set about establishing a new network for himself. Once installed in his see, he sent for his kin to join him, contracting advantageous marriage alliances for them within the locality. Among the matches he instigated was that of his nephew with the daughter of an eminent family from Euboea, the Verivoïdes.[51] He also acted as confessor to many members of the region's aristocracy, and became the godfather and foster parent of their children.[52] It was a question of survival, for Choniates needed friends, allies and clients if he were not to be ruthlessly eliminated by the local

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[49] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 158–9, and vol. 2, pp. 397–8; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, p. 58 (Letter 43); Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, p. 246; Livanos, 'Michael Choniates', pp. 103–14.

[50] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, p. 257 (Letter 161); see also: *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 7–23; Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos*, pp. 336–9. In fact, he had been aware from early on of his drive and ambition, and already as a young man had written a tongue-in-cheek apologia entitled *To Those Who Accuse Me of Not Wanting To Exhibit*, in which the attractions of the public sphere are insisted upon. In that apologia, he did assert that he himself was a retiring fellow, but this was probably meant to be understood as modesty on his part.

[51] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 258–60 (Letters 162 and 163).

[52] Ibid., pp. 11–12 (Letter 8).

aristocracy, as happened to his colleagues, the bishops of Nauplion and Corinth, of whom one was imprisoned and the other blinded and executed by the lord of Argos.[53] The opposition a bishop might expect to face is apparent from a letter by George Tornikes, the holder of the metropolis of Ephesus, who complained that he was beset in his see by men who are 'wilder than the local panthers', 'craftier than foxes' and well-practised in 'malice'. Tornikes had sent the complaint to a predecessor of Choniates in Athens, with the implication that the recipient of the letter would have both knowledge of and sympathy for the difficulties he was encountering in Ephesus.[54]

More judicious in his conduct than Tornikes, Choniates was able, within five years of his appointment, to start referring to 'my Athens' with obvious pride. He extolled the virtues of the 'honey-sweetened Hymettus', the 'calm waters of Piraeus', and of 'this Acropolis on which I now sit'. Above all, he praised the patroness whom the Athenians claimed as their own, as well as the cathedral, his cathedral, that was her shrine:

> The city boasts a protector in the Queen of all, the Virgin and Mother of God, whose holy palace here, while it may have its feet planted on the ancient Acropolis, touches heaven with its head or, rather, is itself the gate of heaven.

Thus, increasingly integrated into local society, Choniates, instead of continuing to present himself as the most unfortunate of men, sent to the mouth 'of Hell', felt secure enough to exult in his surroundings, declaring that, as the incumbent bishop of the 'divine and supercelestial Parthenon', he trod on 'the edge of heaven itself'.[55]

This did not mean that the metropolitan bishop cut the ties that connected him to his former life in the imperial capital. On the contrary, Choniates took advantage of his earlier contacts in order to ensure that the resources of Athens were not siphoned off by Constantinople, but stayed in Athens. Like his predecessor Hagiotheodorites, he sought to secure advantages for his see, going so far as to arrange for a delicately worded petition to reach the emperor through the offices of friends, in which he hinted at extortion and other abuses by tax collectors and pleaded for better treatment in the future.[56] On occasions when more forthright criticism served his purpose better, he could be extremely scathing, blasting the 'delicate residents of the capital' for their habit of sitting comfortably in their

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[53] Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 206.

[54] *Georges et Dèmètrios Tornikés, Lettres et discours*, ed. J. Darrouzès (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1970), p. 153 (Letter 21).

[55] *Nicetae Choniatae historia*, p. 58; *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, p. 256; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 12, 17–19, 85 (Letters 8, 13, 63); and, for comments, Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium*, pp. 148, 322.

[56] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 307–11; Gerasimos G. Dendrinos, 'To Ὑπομνηστικὸν του Μιχαήλ Χωνιάτη: εισαγωγή, νεοελληνική απόδοση, σχόλια', *Βυζαντινός δόμος*, 5–6 (1991–92), pp. 189–207; Angold, *Church and Society*, pp. 204–5.

homes and of shutting themselves behind their fortifications, wilfully oblivious to the suffering of others. 'What do you lack?', he asked them. 'The fertile fields of corn in Thrace and Macedonia and Thessaly feed you; Euboea, Cos, Chios and Rhodes provide you with wine. In Thebes and Corinth, fingers weave garments for you. All the rivers of riches flow to the city of Constantine as real rivers to the sea.' He accused Constantinople of bleeding the provinces dry by gathering to itself all the wealth of the other cities.[57] Gradually, the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the cathedral and its estates from the mid-eleventh century appears to have been extended to the entire 'Athenian fiscal district', which included the walled city, and probably also the burg and the wider hinterland. Within the limits of that district, neither the imperial governor of Hellas and the Peloponnese nor any of his representatives could collect taxes or impose corvées.[58] Moreover, the governor did not possess legal jurisdiction over the district, and his very entry into the city on any pretext whatsoever was expressly forbidden; only the authority of the bishop held sway there. As a result of these concessions made by the central administration, Athens possessed a significant degree of autonomy during the late twelfth century, with its privileges and exemptions being recorded in a chrysobull signed by the emperor's own hand.[59]

By claiming to represent the local community in acts of effective mediation with the capital, Choniates acquired a monopoly over that community and enhanced his own status within it. The interventions he made with the machinery of central authority, invariably presented as being on behalf of downtrodden and destitute provincial citizens and thus invoking a language of social justice and pastoral care, may conceivably have served the interests of the urban or rural population as a whole, but they also served those of the episcopate itself. This is apparent from his petition to the emperor, for while the document claimed to represent the views of the entire community of Athens, in actuality it evinced a concern to discredit those who might rival or undermine the bishop, be they secular administrators or landowners.[60] The position of metropolitan brought with it extensive duties and responsibilities, which Choniates carried out assiduously, but it also brought opportunities. The inevitable charges of venality and embezzlement that arose were countered with the argument that the accretion by the cathedral and its clergy of material riches honoured not them, but rather the Virgin Mary. This is how the metropolitan set out matters at the beginning of his *Verses to the Mother of God*, a poem in which he addressed his patroness, drawing attention to the devotion with which he served her:

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[57] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 69–70 (Letter 50).

[58] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 307–11

[59] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 308–9; Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 145.

[60] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 308–11; Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 205.

By desire and through labour I added much
To your domain, all pure one, and to your flock:
I beautified your temple, my first concern,
And now bring costly furnishings and vessels;
I add fields, procure new possessions,
Flocks, herds, every species of animal;
I restore churches that have collapsed with time,
And build other new churches, all who see bear witness;
I increase your clergy, lighten taxes,
Or, rather, I tear them up from the root …[61]

Certainly, by the early thirteenth century, there was a great deal that Choniates could brag about. The administration of the metropolitan was well organized, and he had a substantial staff to assist him whose most important offices were – apart from that of personal secretary or *grammatikos* – those of *oikonomos*, *sakellarios*, *skevophylax*, *chartophylax* and *protekdikos*, and whose more junior ones included those of *hypomnematographos* and *referendarios*.[62] At least ten and perhaps as many as thirteen suffragan sees were included in the archdiocese whose reach extended beyond Attica to central Greece and to the Saronic and Cycladic islands: Euripus, Dauleia, Coroneia, Andros, Horeos, Skyros, Carystus, Porthmos, Aulona, Syra, Boudonitsa, Megara and the bishopric of Kea and Thermia.[63] The metropolitan supervised hundreds of parish priests and church officials. He had some 21 monasteries and convents under his control, among them several large foundations. In all likelihood he collected, as other bishops did, the *kanonikon*, a sort of tithe paid in cash and in kind by lay communities (and extended to the clergy and to some monasteries), as well as judicial fines, and also voluntary gifts and donations.[64] His archdiocese's property, which included not only irrigated fields, fishponds, orchards and vegetable gardens, but also mills, slaughterhouses and bathhouses, extended to dozens of villages. The great fair, held in Athens annually in the name of the Virgin Mary, produced revenues that must have been substantial, as only two or at most three other fairs within the empire were of similar size. A description of one of these, that of Thessalonica, has survived, which states that there were countless 'merchants' booths

[61] Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, p. 246; for the charges of embezzlement, see *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 229–33 (Letter 156).

[62] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, p. 310; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 11–13, 27–32, 62–3, 96–7, 114, 197–8, 229–33, 234–5, 250–55, 256–7 (Letters 8, 21, 23, 46, 71, 86, 118, 132, 141, 142, 144, 156, 157, 158, 160), 313–14, 318; Herrin, 'Realities of Byzantine Provincial Government', pp. 261–2; also, Orlandos and Branouses, *Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος*, pp. *34–5.

[63] Herrin, 'The Ecclesiastical Organisation of Central Greece', pp. 132–5; *PG*, vol. 215, cols 1559–62; Johannes Koder, 'Der Schutzbrief des Papstes Innozenz III. für die Kirche Athens', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 26 (1977), p. 138.

[64] Angold, *Church and Society*, pp. 144–6.

facing each other and set up in parallel rows', while 'at various points at an angle to these rows, other booths were also set up'; a teeming throng of diverse nationalities gathered to haggle over the wares for sale, which came from Macedonia and Thrace, from the Black Sea, from central and southern Greece, from Italy, Phoenicia, Egypt, Spain, and even from beyond 'the Pillars of Hercules'.[65] Further revenues would have been derived by Choniates from commercial activities associated with other saints' days, as well as from the ordinary farmers' and craftsmen's markets in the city and in settlements across Attica.[66] So rich was Choniates' see, indeed, that, when celebrating the liturgy, he held gold vessels aloft in a church decorated with a mosaic of gold tesserae, while a golden sculpture of a dove floated overhead. Thus, medieval Athens under the watchful eye of its prelates could claim to have truly come to deserve its epithet of 'golden'.[67]

Athens was a city, as a member of Choniates' own family proudly declared, whose 'most famous temple and heavenly chamber and Parthenon of the Mother of God' possessed a 'most powerful clergy' that enjoyed 'all good worldly and religious things'.[68] As for the metropolitan himself, he possessed the means, as his correspondence reveals, to grace his table, if he so chose, with fine wines and rare foodstuffs such as caviar and exotic rices, to dress in furs, and to illuminate his evenings with wax tapers. It is possible – although the story is more likely to reflect slanderous gossip – that the prelate kept a mistress and had children with her, for one source written shortly after his death mentions the existence of an Athenian girl called Constantina who was said to be 'the daughter of the archbishop'. Whether or not Choniates resisted the temptations of the flesh, he did assemble for his work, but also intellectual pleasure, a fine library that included tomes of Galen, Hippocrates, Aristotle, Plato, Homer and Thucydides. He had enough leisure at his disposal from his immediate pastoral and administrative chores to write both a theological commentary, *On the Book of Revelations*, and a riddle in verse, *On the*

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65 *Pseudo-Luciano: Timarione*, ed. R. Romano (Naples: Università di Napoli, Cattedra di filologia bizantina, 1974), pp. 53–60.

66 *PL*, vol. 215, cols 1559–62; Koder, 'Der Schutzbrief des Papstes', pp. 136–41; Jean Longnon, 'L'Organisation de l'église d'Athènes par Innocent III', in *Mémorial Louis Petit: Mélanges d'histoire et d'archéologie* (Paris: Institut français d'études byzantines, 1948), pp. 336–46; Stelios Mouzakis, 'Σημειώσεις για τα τοπωνύμια της Αττικής τα αναφερόμενα στη βούλλα του Πάπα Ιννοκεντίου Γ', *Βυζαντινός δόμος*, 8–9 (1998), pp. 137–41.

67 Setton, 'Athens in the Later Twelfth Century', p. 200; Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, p. 160; *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, p. 325; for the suspension above the altar of gold, silver gilt or silver liturgical objects that were used to store the eucharist and were in the shape of doves, see Henri Leclerq, 'Colombe eucharistique', in Fernand Cabrol and Henri Leclerq (eds), *Dictionnaire d'archeologie chrétienne et liturgie* (15 vols, Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1907–53), vol. 3, pt 2, cols 2198–2234; pictures of surviving examples can be seen at <http://www metmuseum.org/Collections/search-the-collections/170006046> [accessed 11 July 2012], and in *Enamels of Limoges, 1100–1350*, ed. E. Taburet-Delahaye (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1995), pp. 318–19.

68 Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae*, p. 241.

*Unicorn*. It also appears that he either updated the episcopal *Annals of Athens*, or commissioned their updating and copying.[69]

Thus, privy to the lessons learned concerning the promotion of their pilgrim shrines and cities by the mentors of his youth, the bishops of Chonai and Thessalonica, Choniates seems to have sought to apply similar strategies to his own see. There is no doubt that his erstwhile teachers considered themselves outdone, with the metropolitan of Thessalonica, for instance, conceding that his flock and church could not be considered superior in any way to that of his counterpart further to the south.[70]

## Developments after the Fourth Crusade

If, during his mature years, Choniates ushered the cult of the Mother of God to its apogee in Athens and became the envy of the other bishops of the empire, he was also to live long enough to see everything for which he and his predecessors had striven come under threat. The army of the Fourth Crusade first consolidated its hold on the imperial capital and then, in the following months and years, turned its attention to the imperial provinces. The troubadours who accompanied the troops during their advance across the empire crowed that no conqueror had ever been as successful:

> Never did Alexander lead so honourable
> An expedition, nor Charlemagne
> Nor yet King Louis, nor the valiant Sir Aimeric
> Nor Roland with his warriors.
> They could not conquer so many people,
> An empire so endowed with power
> As that which has become ours, where our word is law;
> For we have created emperors,
> Dukes and kings …[71]

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[69] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτης*, pp. 122, 157–60, 168, 192, 200, 207, 243, 250–52, 273, 284–6 (Letters 93, 103, 109, 115, 120, 127, 150, 155, 156, 173, 179); *Matthaei Parisiensis chronica majora*, ed. H.R. Luard (7 vols, London: Longman & Co., 1872–83), vol. 5, pp. 286–7; *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 2, p. 393; Dendrinos, 'Τὸ Ὑπομνηστικὸν', p. 93; Spyridon Lampros, 'Περὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Μητροπολίτου Ἀθηνῶν Ἀκομινάτου', *Ἀθήναιον*, 6 (1877–78), pp. 354–67; Vitalien Laurent, 'La Liste épiscopale de la métropole d'Athenes', in *Mémorial Louis Petit*, p. 276; Herrin, 'Realities of Byzantine Provincial Government', p. 263; Angold, *Church and Society,* p. 197.

[70] Paul Magdalino, 'Eustathius and Thessalonica', in C.N. Constantinides, N.M. Panagiotakes, E. Jeffreys and A.D. Angelou (eds), *Φιλέλλην: Studies in Honour of Robert Browning* (Venice: Istituto ellenico di studi bizantini e postbizantini di Venezia, 1996), p. 230.

[71] *The Poems of the Troubadour Raimbaut de Vacqueiras*, ed. Joseph Linskill (The Hague: Mouton, 1964), p. 244.

Westerners such as Baldwin of Flanders and Otton de la Roche gradually replaced the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople and the Byzantine governor in Hellas and the Peloponnese. As mighty city after city surrendered or was sacked, including Thebes, immediately to the north, Choniates found himself about to confront the worst crisis of his career, and indeed in all probability the worst crisis any Athenian prelate had ever faced. He knew the prosperity of the archdiocese of Athens made it an inevitable target, and that the shrine of the Virgin Mary could easily become a shrine to be fought over. Even as the crusaders advanced on his city, therefore, the metropolitan exerted himself to put in place a series of expedient counter-measures that would reduce the threat that the invaders posed.

The nature of his efforts can be divined from the contents of his correspondence. In letters addressed to Theodore Laskaris, Michael Angelos (known to contemporaries as Michael Doukas) and the other refugees who had congregated in Asia Minor and Epiros with the avowed aim of wresting Constantinople from the crusaders and re-establishing the Byzantine Empire, he presented himself as a steadfast opponent of the 'Italian tyranny', which he described as 'rapacious', 'ruinous', 'most bitter' and 'hateful'. 'Alas, we are excessively supplied with misfortune', he lamented, 'tyrannized over by those of another race and subject to the fate, as it were, of slaves.'[72] When addressing others, however, he acknowledged the necessity of collaborating with crusader rule, telling one man, the Abbot of the Monastery of Kaisariane, that he was right 'to serve fully your present lords and carry out what they deem agreeable'.[73] Given the difficult circumstances, Choniates was willing to negotiate with the invaders in order to ensure the endurance of his archdiocese and his cathedral, as well as the integrity of his flock. Without completely breaking with those who claimed to represent traditional authority in Asia Minor, and in Epiros and Thessaly, he looked westwards, seeking the protection of Pope Innocent III and his legate Cardinal Benedict of Santa Susanna, and engaging in discussions with the Catholic Church about the possibility of retaining his position as metropolitan. In 1205, he travelled to Thessalonica to meet with representatives of the papacy, and in 1214, he dispatched his private secretary to Constantinople for the same purpose.[74]

In the event, there were too many stumbling blocks in the way of these negotiations and no satisfactory agreement could be reached. Sectarianism

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[72] *Nicetae Choniatae historia*, vol. 1, pp. 601–10; *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 121–2, 133–43, 161–2, 216–19, 221, 226–7, 255–6, 262–4, 270 (Letters 93, 100, 104, 132, 134, 139, 159, 165 and 171).

[73] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 121, 248–52 (Letter 156); and, for comments, Photeine Kolovou, *Μιχαήλ Χωνιάτης: Συμβολή στη μελέτη του βίου και του έργου του – το corpus των επιστολών* (Athens: Akademia Athenon, 1999), pp. 19, 98–9, and Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 208.

[74] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 250–52, 256–7, 270–71 (Letters 156, 160 and 171). His parishioners accused him of embezzling church funds to fund the first of these journeys.

reared its head. The Greek Orthodox metropolitan was ousted from his cathedral and banished from his city. The rejection by the Athenians of 'worldly science' for 'divine Wisdom', and the conversion of the 'temple of Athena' to the 'throne of the Mother of God' would not be forgotten by the city's new masters, while thanks would still continue to be given for the grace that God had bestowed on Athens by preventing its 'glory' from going 'into shadow'.[75] But others had become custodians of the miracle of light and administrators of the see's generous revenues. Steps taken in the aftermath of the conquest ensured that the church plate and other treasure housed in the Parthenon were not spirited away as spoils of war.[76] Bernard, a French cleric, was appointed bishop of Athens, initially with the same suffragan sees as his Greek predecessor, although within a decade his jurisdiction was altered to cover even more of central Greece.[77] The westerners who claimed the shrine for their own paid their respects in the 'church called that of Our Lady', emblazoned its walls with their heraldry and, at their deaths, left behind on its columns records of their names in their own language (for example, 'In 1412 the presbyter Nicholas, deacon of Athens, ended his days on the second day of March. May his soul rest in peace. Amen.')[78] They constructed a bell tower on the western side of the cathedral and erected fortifications that included a new gateway and a keep; the latter, rising some 80 feet above the ground, was the tallest building on the Acropolis and could be seen from as far as Acrocorinth in the Peloponnese.[79] They may also have composed or updated a *Guide to the Marvels of Athens* for pilgrims and other visitors that reflected the changes made to the shrine.[80] Certainly, pilgrims continued to come in droves, one of whom, Niccolò da Martoni from Capua, wrote an admiring description of the 'beautiful church', declaring it was unimaginable that such a massive and finely decorated edifice could have been built by human hands. He praised the miraculous lamp. He also mentioned the presence in a side chapel of an image of the Virgin Mary ascribed to the hand of St Luke – perhaps an icon that had been recently acquired by the cathedral, or was being more prominently displayed by it. Most notably, he commented on the lengthy Christian history of the

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[75] *PL*, vol. 215, col. 1559; Longnon, 'L'Organisation de l'église d'Athènes', p. 338.

[76] *PL*, vol. 215, col. 1550; Longnon, 'L'Organisation de l'église d'Athènes', p. 337.

[77] *PL*, vol. 215, cols 1031, 1130; Longnon, 'L'Organisation de l'église d'Athènes', pp. 336–7.

[78] Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire de l'empereur Henri de Constantinople*, ed. Jean Longnon (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1948), p. 115 (§ 681); Orlandos and Branouses, *Τὰ χαράγματα τοῦ Παρθενῶνος*, p. 178 (no. 224); see also pp. 177, 179–80 (nos 223, 225, 226); McNeal, 'Archaeology and the Destruction', pp. 61–2.

[79] McNeal, 'Archaeology and the Destruction', p. 53.

[80] The date of this text is uncertain. See: Silvio G. Mercati, 'Noterella sulla tradizione manoscritta dei Mirabilia urbis Athenarum', *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant* (3 vols, Vatican City: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1964), pp. 77–84; di Branco, 'Atene immaginaria', pp. 101–26 (includes an edition and translation of two versions).

site, mentioning the existence on the column drums of pious inscriptions that he had been told dated from the era of St Paul and of St Dionysius the Areopagite.[81]

The prize the crusaders had won in Greece by the sword, and which different groups of westerners – French, Catalans and Aragonese, and Italians – subsequently held into the fifteenth century, overawed European politicians, thinkers and artists alike. A man as eminent as Peter IV, King of Aragon, enthused in 1380 that the Acropolis was 'the most precious ornament that exists in the world, the like of which all the Christian kings now living could hardly hope to build', while his queen Sibylla wrote to ask for a token or relic from the cathedral in the Parthenon. In 1423, an Italian by the name of Niccolò Machiavelli, who was an ancestor of the eponymous author of *The Prince*, wrote a letter while visiting the Acropolis in which he remarked that it was impossible to dream of 'a more beautiful place than this'.[82] Across Europe, but especially in Burgundy and the Low Countries, holy relics from Greece were in great demand while images of Mary 'in the Greek style' that imitated the portrait supposedly painted by St Luke were repeatedly reproduced in panel paintings, and eventually, woodcuts.[83] Thus, the cult of the 'Μήτηρ Θεοῦ ἡ Ἀθηναΐς' or 'Μήτηρ Θεοῦ ἡ Ἀθηνιώτισσα' (Mother of God of Athens) survived the crusader conquest, indeed continued to flourish, but in the process acquired a revised character as the cult of 'Santa Maria di Athene' or 'Setina' (Holy Mary of Athens), and marketed itself predominantly to a western audience.[84]

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[81] Le Grand, 'Relation du pèlerinage à Jerusalem', p. 651; see also W. Judeich, 'Athen im Jahre 1395: Nach der Beschreibung des Niccolò da Martoni', *Mittheilungen des kaiserlich deutschen archaeologischen Instituts, athenische Abtheilung*, 22 (1897), pp. 423–38, at p. 428.

[82] *Diplomatari de l'Orient Catala*, ed. A. Rubió i Lluch (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1947), p. 491 (no. 154); *Elogio de la Acrópolis de Atenas, VI centenario, 1380–1980*, ed. Federico Udina Martorell (Barcelona: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, 1980), p. 49; Jean A.C. Buchon, *Nouvelles recherches historiques sur la principauté de Morée et ses hautes baronnies (Investigation des archives et bibliothèques de Toscane, Naples, Sicile, Malte, Corfou). Seconde époque: Affaiblissement et décadence de l'an 1333 à l'an 1470* (Paris: J. Renouard, 1845), p. 279 (no. 68); Moschonas, 'Η τοπογραφία της Αθήνας', p. 154. It should be noted that Peter of Aragon and Sibylla were nominal overlords of Attica, while Niccolò Machiavelli had links with the Acciauioli, a Florentine family that ruled Athens.

[83] Jacques Paviot, *Les Ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l'Orient (fin XIVe siècle–XVe siècle)* (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2001), pp. 40–51; Kenneth M. Setton, 'Saint George's Head', *Speculum*, 48 (1973), pp. 1–12; M. Bacci, 'The Legacy of the Hodegetria: Holy Icons and Legends Between East and West', in Vassilaki (ed.), *Images of the Mother of God*, pp. 321–36; M.W. Ainsworth, '"À la façon grèce": The Encounter of Northern Renaissance Artists with Byzantine Icons', in Helen C. Evans (ed.), *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1557)* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2004), pp. 545–93. It should be noted, however, that the model need not have been the specific icon in Athens, for other icons attributed to St Luke existed in the eastern Mediterranean.

[84] Laurent, 'Le corpus des sceaux', pp. 451–5 (nos 605, 607); Kazanaki-Lappa, 'Athens from Antiquity to the Turkish Conquest', p. 218; Buchon, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, pp. 254, 278. The word 'Setines' is a corruption of 'τὰς Ἀθήνας').

Against the background of these developments, the elderly, displaced Michael Choniates seems at first to cut a sorry figure as, forced into exile, he travelled first to Euripus, Aulis and Carystus, then to the windswept and barren island of Kea off the coast of Attica, before ending up – having had a debilitating stroke and suffering badly from rheumatoid arthritis – at the Monastery of John the Forerunner at Thermopylae.[85] Yet, paradoxically, it is to this period of apparent humiliation and powerlessness towards the end of Choniates' life that we should credit his greatest achievement. The deposed metropolitan argued that it was his religious convictions and his rejection of unsound tenets that had led to his eviction from his cathedral and his city. He declared, moreover, that the light shining forth from the Parthenon had been polluted. At this 'dark hour', he wrote, it was his duty to do his utmost to hold aloft the light or flame of religious orthodoxy.[86] While he could have accepted invitations to go to the courts of either Nicaea or Arta, and perhaps concluded his days there in relative comfort and ease, he chose not to do so.[87] Instead, from little Kea he doggedly persisted – aided by Theodore of Euripus, Euthemius Tornikes, Manuel Verivöes, Nicholas Pistophilos and a few other clerics – in maintaining the existence of the Greek Orthodox archdiocese of Athens and its suffragan sees in parallel to the Latin one. He encouraged the parish clergy, whom the crusaders had largely left unmolested, to bring their grievances to him, and he expended considerable energy on the ordination of deacons and priests, and the distribution of benefices. The results exceeded all expectations, and he described himself as inundated by requests for grants of monastic and ecclesiastical livings (*charistikata kai klerikata*), as well as of offices (*offikia*). The decisions he made included the appointment of a new abbot at the Monastery of St George on Makre, and of a new presbyter at the Monastery of the Holy Confessors. He also continued to offer religious guidance to laymen, and maintained contact with Greek aristocratic families such as the Makremvolites, the Kalokairoi, the Doxapatrides and the Tychomyroi. He invested in the education of the younger generation, running a small theological school whose students he provided with board and lodging. He promised the young men, and indeed tried to secure for them, access to 'the best tutor in Greece'.[88] These efforts meant that institutions and beliefs that were recognizably Greek Orthodox endured and even thrived in the region.

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[85] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp.157–60, 190–92, 250–52, 262–4 (Letters 103, 115, 156, 165); B. Katsarou, 'Η "κατά τῆν Ἑλλάδα" βυζαντινὴ μονὴ τοῦ Προδρόμου, τελευταῖος σταθμὸς τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτη', *Βυζαντιακά*, 1 (1981), pp. 99–137.

[86] *Michaelis Choniatae epistulae*, pp. 169–71 (Letter 110).

[87] Ibid., pp. 122–7, 208–11, 222–3, 262–4, 284–6 (Letters 94, 129, 136, 165, 179), for correspondence addressed to Theodore Doukas and Theodore Laskaris, and offers of posts from them.

[88] Ibid., pp. 162, 184–90, 193–5, 202–4, 207–8, 211–13, 222, 236–8, 240–41, 243–9, 269–70, 282 (Letters 105, 113, 114, 116, 122, 123, 128, 130, 135, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 152, 154, 170, 176); see Angold, *Church and Society*, pp. 209–10.

## Conclusions

What does this case study allow us to conclude about the wealth and power possessed prior to the Fourth Crusade by the incumbents of episcopal offices within the Byzantine Empire? According to Christian teaching, it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Yet in 'golden Athens' a simulacrum of the 'gate of Heaven' could be found. Here, at the cathedral, religious piety and material wealth were indissolubly linked.[89] A shrine was established that attracted devout Christians from the Byzantine Empire, the Mediterranean and even from the Black Sea and the Atlantic, because it boasted in the Virgin Mary a patroness whose access to the divine manifested itself through a miraculous lamp that gave off light without needing or spending fuel. This promotion of the 'Mother of God of Athens' as a vessel of the Godhead and a celebrated granter of prayers and intercessor led in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to an important pilgrimage trade that contributed revenues from pious donations and associated commercial activities. Similar developments were associated during the same period with the shrines of St Demetrius in Thessalonica and the Archangel Michael in Chonai. Responsible for these developments were enterprising and capable prelates who acquired the leverage by which to extend their office's authority and enlarge their see's portfolio of assets, and, in the process, created for their cathedral and their city a role as regional economic hubs. Graphic illustration of this rise in episcopal power from the eleventh century can be found in the widespread appearance from that date of iconographic programmes in church decorations, with a focus increasingly on representations of a line of bishops officiating at the liturgy and performing the Eucharist – representations that proclaimed the bishop's central position in society by highlighting the fact that he, through consecrating the bread and wine, and thus rendering Christ present, acted as an intermediary between the Godhead and mankind.[90]

These bishops were, even if not born in Constantinople, generally educated there in the patriarchal school. They were trained in their youth to compose and perform speeches in honour of the emperor and the patriarch, and were appointed by the capital to their posts. Such men might have been expected to be the agents of empire. Yet, as has been shown in the case of Michael Choniates, and as was also true of his teacher Eustathius of Thessalonica, as well as other counterparts such as Theophylact of Ochrid, once they found themselves installed in the very provinces they had earlier been trained to look down upon snobbishly,[91] their

[89] For the relationship between religion and wealth prior to this period, see Peter Brown, *Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350–550 AD* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

[90] Christopher Walter, *Art and Ritual of the Byzantine Church* (Birmingham Byzantine Series) (London: Variorum, 1982), pp. 4, 237–49.

[91] Paul Magdalino, 'Byzantine Snobbery', in Michael Angold (ed.), *The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX to XIII Centuries* (Oxford: B.A.R., 1984), pp. 58–78; Margaret Mullett,

relationship with the central regime invariably transformed itself into a complex – and even uneasy – one. The bishops may have sometimes complained about their new surroundings and remembered their life in the capital with nostalgia, particularly at the beginning of their appointments. As Theophylact wrote in a letter to a friend: 'I used to bemoan my fate and call it malignant and unhappy since it brought me to this extremity.' But as he declared to another correspondent: 'I suffered and I stayed.'[92] It was for their life and work in the provinces that these bishops were appreciated and remembered by contemporaries. As Theophylact's successor Hephaistos stated about him: 'His native land was Euboea, his life letters, his office divine, his grave Bulgaria.' In this pithy evaluation, Constantinople simply did not figure, despite the fact that Theophylact had had an illustrious career there as the tutor of the young son and heir of the emperor Michael VII, Constantine Doukas, for whom he had even written a mirror of princes.[93]

The shift of loyalties away from the capital was particularly acute during the rule of the imperial dynasties of the late Komnenoi and early Angeloi. Rather than take up arms and rebel outright, as did secular lords such as Theodore Mangaphas in Philadelphia or Leo Sgouros in Nauplion, bishops sought to obtain a degree of autonomy for their cities in legal and fiscal affairs by astute political lobbying.[94] In the case of Athens, the exemptions and other immunities claimed by Nicholas Hagiotheodorites, Michael Choniates and perhaps also by their predecessors ensured that, by the late twelfth century, it was the metropolitan rather than the imperial governor who enjoyed primary authority over the region's inhabitants. Although the privileges of Athens may have been among the most substantial issued to any city of the Byzantine Empire in this period, other settlements under episcopal control within the western imperial provinces enjoyed concessions from the capital that were similar in nature, as is attested by a document, dating from 1163, that the imperial administration issued to the episcopal see of Stagi

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'Originality in the Byzantine Letter: The Case of Exile', in Antony R. Littlewood (ed.), *Originality in Byzantine Literature, Art and Music: A Collection of Essays* (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1995), pp. 39–58.

92 *Théophylacte d'Achrida. Discours, Traités, Poésies*, ed. Paul Gautier (Thessalonica: Association de Recherches Byzantines, 1980), pp. 317, 383; Margaret Mullett, 'Originality in the Byzantine Letter', p. 47.

93 Paul Gautier, 'L'épiscopat de Théophylacte Héphaistos, archevêque de Bulgarie', *Revue des études byzantines*, 21 (1963), p. 170; Margaret Mullett, 'Originality in the Byzantine Letter', p. 47.

94 Magdalino, 'Constantinople and the ἔξω χώραι in the Time of Balsamon'; Angold, *Church and Society*, pp. 139–72 and 179–96; Jean-Claude Cheynet, *Pouvoir et Contestations à Byzance (963–1210)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1990), pp. 454–8; idem, 'Philadelphie, un quart de siècle de dissidence, 1182–1206', in *Philadelphie et autres études* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984), pp. 39–54; Foteini Vlachopoulou, *Λέων Σγουρός: Ο βίος και η πολιτεία του βυζαντινού άρχοντα της βορειοανατολικής Πελοποννήσου στις αρχές του 13ου αιώνα* (Thessalonica: Erodotos, 2002).

in Thessaly.[95] These concessions can be argued to have anticipated the 'liberties' (*eleutheriai*) to which, by the mid-fourteenth century, 18 or so other settlements in the former western provinces would lay claim during the rapid evolution of their mode of government towards one that was more characteristic of independent city-states.[96]

Byzantine bishops do not appear to have had qualms over the fact that their actions deprived central government of significant revenues. Already in the eleventh century the metropolitan of Thessalonica, who had managed to amass a treasure for his see of almost a ton of pure gold, did not hesitate to refuse an imperial request for a loan (or, to be more accurate, a subvention that was almost certainly never to be returned) to help meet military costs. The prelate deflected the demands made on his see by declaring that it had fallen on hard times and therefore possessed a gold reserve that he set at less than two per cent its actual level. His impoverished church could not, he explained, raise more than a few miserable pounds of gold, and to deprive it of these pounds and thus of the bare necessities required to honour the cult of the local saint would be an act of terrible impiety punishable by the withdrawal of divine favour.[97] To such arguments, exasperated emperors could respond, as indeed they increasingly did in the course of the twelfth century, by seeking to transport a relic or other cultic object (such as the cover of the tomb of St Demetrius) from its original setting to the capital and even to the imperial palace. These attempts to divest a provincial city of a portion of its religious aura were rarely successful, however, in a society where the bishops guarding that aura had their own people and often their close relatives at all levels of the imperial administration, from local tax collectors to

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[95] C. Astruc, 'Un document inédit de 1163 sur l'évêché théssalien de Stagi, Paris Suppl. gr. 1371', *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 83 (1959), pp. 206–46.

[96] Teresa Shawcross, 'Encounters Before the Renaissance: Byzantine and Italian Political Thought Concerning the Rise of Cities', in Marina Brownlee and Dimitri Gondicas (eds), *Renaissance Encounters: Greek East and Latin West* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 57–93; Alexander Kazhdan, 'The Italian and Late Byzantine City', *DOP*, 49 (1995), pp. 1–22; G.I. Brătianu, *Privilèges et franchises municipals dans l'Empire byzantin* (Paris: P. Geuthner and Bucarest: Ed. Cultura nationala, 1936), pp. 101–35; G.I. Theocharides, *Μία διαθήκη καὶ μία δίκη βυζαντινή* (Thessalonica: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1962); Costas Kyrris, 'The Social Status of the Archontes of Phanari in Thessaly (1342)', *Ἑλληνικὰ*, 18 (1964), pp. 73–8; Ljubomir Maksimović, *The Byzantine Provincial Administration under the Palaeologoi* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1988), pp. 248–67; Haris Kalligas, *Byzantine Monemvasia: The Sources* (Monemvasia: Akroneon, 1990), pp. 101–34; idem, *Monemvasia: A Byzantine City-State* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 33–8; Evelyne Patlagean, 'L'Immunité des Thessaloniciens', in *Εὐψυχία, Mélanges offerts à Hélène Ahrweiler* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), pp. 591–601; Demetrios Kyritses, 'The Common Chrysobulls of Cities and the Notion of Property in Late Byzantium', *Σύμμεικτα*, 13 (1999), pp. 229–43.

[97] Angold, *Church and Society*, p. 143; Michael Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c.300–1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 240.

prominent palatine officials.[98] Certainly, by the late twelfth century, bishops were more interested in seeing their city – and therefore also their episcopal see – prosper than in whether their actions left the empire weaker and more vulnerable to external attack. They were only apt to change their minds in this regard, as did both Eustathius of Thessalonica and Michael Choniates, after personal experience of an attack that resulted in their city's conquest and their own eviction.[99]

The Fourth Crusade initially seemed to offer provincial cities such as Athens an opportunity to shake off the imperial yoke once and for all. Some provincial lay magnates, such as Theodore Vranas who belonged to the foremost family of Adrianople in Thrace, allied themselves with the incomers in return for lordship over a city or region.[100] The cleric Michael Choniates may have entertained similar hopes with regard to Attica when he undertook negotiations with the papacy on behalf of himself and his flock. However, the shrine of the Mother of God in the Parthenon and the archdiocese of Athens possessed too many attractions for the invaders to leave them in another's hands. These invaders set up their own ecclesiastical and secular hierarchies, and sought to secure for themselves the revenues from the pilgrims, as well as from the agricultural, industrial and commercial activities of Greece. Yet, despite this foreign dominion, a Greek Orthodox Church continued to function in a manner that was decisive for the maintenance of a cohesive sense of identity by the local population. Thanks to the conduct of men like the exiled Athenian bishop, the way of life that had been typical of the provinces of Hellas and Peloponnese before 1204 remained remarkably intact after that date. Indeed, within a few decades of the invasion, the crusaders were themselves becoming increasingly assimilated into the indigenous culture they encountered. They began to attend services where the Eucharist was celebrated in accordance with the Greek rite, and to make donations to Greek Orthodox churches and monasteries. The suzerain lord of Attica, for instance, Guillaume de Villehardouin, confirmed in his last will and testament earlier privileges he had granted to 'the monasteries of the Franks and likewise those of the Romans' in acknowledgment of the monks' intercession on behalf of Christendom; he also bequeathed additional sums for prayers for his immortal soul.[101] So pronounced was

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[98] Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Pilgrimage to Thessalonike: The Tomb of St Demetrios', *DOP*, 56 (2002), p. 186, n. 78. See also: Margaret Mullett, 'Patronage in action', in *Church and People in Byzantium*, ed. R. Morris (Birmingham: Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, 1990), pp. 125–90.

[99] Angold, *Church and Society*, pp. 179–96. Michael Choniates was evicted by the conquerors after lengthy negotiations, while Eustathius of Thessalonica was forced to flee in the immediate aftermath of the conquest by his own flock, who accused him of dereliction of duty.

[100] *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante vom Neunten biz zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, ed. Gottlieb Lukas Friedrich Tafel and Georg Martin Thomas (2 vols, Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856), vol. 2, p. 18.

[101] *The Chronicle of Morea*, ed. John Schmitt (London: Methuen, 1904), v. 7778.

this trend that the descendants of the western settlers persistently ignored blustering threats from the papacy regarding the dispatch of an inquisition to investigate their 'heresies'. By the end of the fourteenth century, they went so far in their support of the Greek Orthodox Church as to reinstate a Greek Orthodox metropolitan on the Acropolis of Athens, once more entrusting to that prelate authority not merely over the cathedral, the Parthenon, but also over the entire city and its population.[102]

The society that Michael Choniates laboured so hard to preserve intact after the Fourth Crusade would remember him with gratitude and even devotion, commemorating him as a local saint and martyr. Once the crusaders had taken over Athens, Choniates, as in earlier periods of his life, had turned to verse for consolation. Composing a poem in which he addressed the Mother of God, he bewailed his exile from her city and her holy temple, and humbly expressed the wish that she would provide him with another church and refuge.[103] Was that wish granted? A portrait labelled as that of the 'most holy archbishop Michael of Athens' stands today in a chapel at Kalyvia Kouvara in Attica. The archbishop is depicted next to the altar where he presides over the Eucharist, holding a book open on the pages of which a doxology to 'our most blessed Lady and Mother of God' can be made out.[104] Although a mere mortal, in the fresco in this humble country chapel,

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[102] Buchon, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, p. 254; Karl Hopf, *Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit* (2 vols, Leipzig: [s n.], 1867–68; reprint New York: B. Franklin, 1960), vol. 1, p. 406; F. Ehrle, *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte* (7 vols, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1886), vol. 2, pp. 335 ff.; Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Athen im Mittelalter*, vol. 2, pp. 226–7; Lock, *Franks*, p. 131. The restoration was not, however, final and the metropolitan eventually had to vacate the Parthenon again – shortly before the new masters of Athens, the Ottomans, converted it into a mosque – and establish himself elsewhere. At that point, marble fragments were taken from the ancient and medieval revetments on the Acropolis and immured as talismans into the sides of the new Orthodox cathedral. This new cathedral, meant to remind the beholder in miniature of the Christian Parthenon and of the sacred aura associated with that shrine, was called the 'little metropolis' and dedicated to the Mother of God 'who is swift of hearing' and 'who liberates'. See Kiilerich, 'Making Sense of the Spolia', pp. 95–114; but for alternative dates and interpretations, see: Paul Steiner, 'Antike Skulpturen an der Panagia Gorgoepikoos zu Athen', *Mittheilungen des kaiserlich deutschen archaeologischen Instituts, athenische Abtheilung*, 21 (1906), pp. 325–41; Henry Maguire, 'The Cage of Crosses: Ancient and Medieval Sculptures on the "Little Metropolis" in Athens', in *Θυμίαμα στη μνήμη της Λασκαρίνας Μπούρα* (2 vols, Athens: Benaki Museum, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 169–72.

[103] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 2, pp. 392–3.

[104] Another fresco of Michael Choniates also survives in a chapel at Penteli. A. Orlandos, 'Ἡ προσωπογραφία Μιχαὴλ τοῦ Χωνιάτου', *Ἐπετηρὶς ἑταιρείας βυζαντινῶν σπουδῶν*, 21 (1951), pp. 210–14; Doula Mourike, 'Οἱ βυζαντινὲς τοιχογραφίες τῶν παρεκκλησίων τῆς σπηλιᾶς τῆς Πεντέλης', *Δελτίον τῆς χριστιανικῆς ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἑταιρείας*, 7 (1973–74), pp. 79–115; Nafsika Coumbaraki-Pansélinou, 'Hagios Petros Kalyvion Kouvara Attikes', *Δελτίον τῆς χριστιανικῆς ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἑταιρείας*, 4 (1987–88), pp. 173–88; eadem, *Saint-Pierre de Kalyvia-Kouvara et la chapelle de la Vierge de Mérenta: Deux monuments du XIIIe siècle en Attique* (Thessalonica: Kentron Byzantinon Ereunon, 1976); Sophia Kalopissi-Verti,

Michael Choniates – like his patroness, the 'light-receiving and light-giving' Virgin Mary, in the apse mosaic of the cathedral on the Acropolis – was united with the miraculous light of divine Wisdom for which Athens was famous. At least that was how his former flock understood matters, for they had him drawn with a golden nimbus around his head, signifying his canonization, and referred to him in his funeral elegy by the turn of phrase associated with Christ, the fruit of Mary's womb, as the 'light of the world'.[105]

*Dedicatory Inscriptions and Donor Portraits in Thirteenth-Century Churches of Greece* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992), p. 61; Monika Hirschbichler, 'Monuments of a Syncretic Society: Wall Painting in the Latin Lordship of Athens, Greece (1204–1311)' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Maryland, 2005), pp. 62–3, 70–76.

[105] *Μιχαὴλ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα*, vol. 1, pp. 105, 148–9; J. Hoeck and R.-J. Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, Abt von Casole: Beiträge zur Geschichte der ost-westlichen Beziehungen unter Innozenz III. und Friedrich II.* (Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag, 1965), p. 176; Kaldellis, *The Christian Parthenon*, p. 165.

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# 4
# Demetrius Kydones' 'History of the Crusades': Reality or Rhetoric?

*Judith Ryder*

The title of this chapter is somewhat misleading: amongst the writings of Demetrius Kydones, an undeservedly little-known Late Byzantine figure,[1] there is no such thing as a 'History of the Crusades'. However, there are short passages in one of Kydones' works which give a fascinating insight into the concept of the crusades through the eyes of a fourteenth-century Byzantine; and Kydones himself is of great importance in terms of East–West relations in the fourteenth century, which gives this account a particular poignancy and relevance. This, then, is the rationale behind this chapter as a contribution to the overall theme of the volume of essays here collected. Brief though the passages to be discussed are, they are well worth highlighting, not necessarily to draw firm conclusions, but in order to enable this unusual witness to be incorporated into wider narratives of fourteenth-century crusade and more general eastern Mediterranean developments, in what was a crucial period in the history of the region.

An introduction to the person and text concerned is undoubtedly called for, given the relative obscurity of both. Kydones was one of the most important Byzantine political figures in the second half of the fourteenth century. He entered political

[1] The sole published English monograph on Kydones is Judith R. Ryder, *The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones: A Study of Fourteenth-Century Byzantine Politics, Religion and Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2010). More strictly biographical material can be found in the introduction to Franz Tinnefeld's five-volume German translation of Kydones' letters: Franz Tinnefeld, *Demetrius Kydones*. *Briefe, Vol. I, 1* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1981), pp. 4–52; also Raymond Joseph Loenertz, 'Démétrius Cydonès, 1: De la naissance à l'année 1373', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 36 (1970), pp. 47–72; and idem, 'Démétrius Cydonès, II: de 1373 à 1375', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 37 (1971), pp. 5–39. In English, articles by Frances Kianka cover different areas of Kydones' activities: see her articles 'The Apology of Demetrius Cydones: A Fourteenth Century Autobiographical Source', *Byzantine Studies*, 7 (1980), pp. 57–71; 'Demetrius Cydones and Thomas Aquinas', *Byzantion* 52 (1982), pp. 264–86; 'The Letters of Demetrios Kydones to Empress Helena Kantakouzena Palaiologina', *DOP*, 46 (1992), pp. 155–64; 'Byzantine-Papal Diplomacy: The Role of Demetrius Cydones', *The International History Review*, 7 (1985), pp. 175–213; 'Demetrius Kydones and Italy', *DOP*, 49 (1995), pp. 99–110. See also her thesis, Frances Kianka, 'Demetrius Cydones (c. 1324–c. 1397): Intellectual and Diplomatic Relations between Byzantium and the West in the Fourteenth Century' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Fordham University, 1981).

life as a young man, in the 1340s, under the patronage of John VI Kantakouzenos.[2] When John VI was forced to abdicate in favour of the young John V Palaiologos,[3] Kydones was soon reinstated as one of John V's main political advisors. In this role, Kydones played a leading part in negotiations carried out in the late 1350s and through the 1360s between Byzantium and western powers.[4] In 1369, John V went to Rome to swear allegiance to the pope, as part of these negotiations. Kydones was at his side, and it was Kydones who translated into Greek the creed used at the ceremony.[5] This was the culmination of a decade or so in which Byzantium, following the establishment of the first Ottoman settlement in Europe in 1354, and subsequent rapid Ottoman expansion on European soil,[6] saw rapprochement with the West as a potentially highly effective response. Kydones' interest in western matters, however, was not purely political: even before 1354, he had been developing an interest in Latin theology, particularly Aquinas, and this led to translations of western material into Greek, bringing an awareness of Latin ideas and development of Greek thought which were to have a considerable legacy.[7] In the early 1370s, Byzantine affairs experienced a rapid downturn vis-à-vis the Ottomans, in a climate in which, whatever the enthusiasm, circumstances were not such as to allow for significant western intervention. Byzantium was forced to accommodate Ottoman demands.[8] For a brief period, Kydones, the leading proponent of the pro-western approach, was in disfavour and, indeed, in semi-exile; but his reputation carried him through, and he continued to exercise considerable influence. Kydones, then, is a figure of great importance in fourteenth-century Byzantine history, both for the

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[2] On Kantakouzenos, see esp. Donald MacGillivray Nicol, *The Reluctant Emperor: A Biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and Monk* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[3] The fact that in Byzantine history John VI comes *before* John V is indicative of some of the difficulties of the Byzantine political situation at the time: Kantakouzenos' dates are usually given as 1341–54, but both the beginning (until 1347) and end (after 1352) of his reign were marked by civil war, and in any case Kantakouzenos was theoretically reigning as protector of the young John V – whose dates are usually given as 1354–91. For general background to the period, see Nicol, *Last Centuries*, chapters 12–13.

[4] The seminal work on this subject is Oskar Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome: Vingt ans de travail pour l'union des églises et pour la défense de l'empire d'Orient, 1355–75* (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, 1930; reprinted London: Variorum Reprints, 1972).

[5] Loenertz, 'Démétrius Cydonès, 1', pp. 65–7.

[6] For this and other aspects of the reign of John V, see Nicol, *Last Centuries*, chapter 14.

[7] See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, chapter 1, passim, for Kydones' intellectual interests. The full extent of Kydones' legacy, and that of circles influenced by him, is still an area much deserving fuller attention. The impact of Thomism in Late Byzantium, a movement which he clearly spearheaded, is the subject of the *Thomas De Aquino Byzantinus* project (see <www.rhul.ac.uk/Hellenic-Institute/Research/Thomas htm>).

[8] See Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 274–7.

role he played at the time and for his writings, which are, as Ostrogorsky noted, 'among the most important historical sources for the age of the Palaeologi'.[9]

One of these sources is Kydones' speech *Pro subsidio Latinorum*, in which the passages I have dubbed 'Kydones' "history of the crusades"' are to be found. This speech was written in 1366. At this point in time, the emperor, John V Palaiologos, was experiencing problems at the hands of the Bulgarians. As part of the Byzantine drive to rapprochement with 'western' powers, John V had undertaken a mission to the court of Hungary, where he hoped to gain military support for the Byzantines against the Ottomans.[10] Hungary's power and geographical position was to make it increasingly a key player in the region, as the Ottomans expanded in the Balkans. Relations between Byzantium and Bulgaria were at a low ebb: the two had very recently been at war.[11] John's mission to Hungary was unsuccessful, and on the return journey the Bulgarians blocked his passage; whether they actually took him prisoner is an open question, although the episode is normally described as such. But help was on the way, from a remarkable direction: Amadeo VI of Savoy, John V's cousin,[12] was sailing to Byzantium with a small crusading force. This force scored a notable victory when it retook Gallipoli from the Ottomans, in August 1366.[13] It was Gallipoli that the Ottomans had taken possession of in 1354, following an earthquake, thus gaining a European bridgehead from which to proceed to further conquests. Kydones' *Pro subsidio Latinorum* reflects the situation just after the retaking of Gallipoli by Amadeo. It addresses a very direct and simple question: should the Byzantines welcome Amadeo and his Latin force and accept their support? The question might be simple at one level, but Kydones' speech indicates, as will become clear – and as one would expect for the time and place – complex reactions to a complex situation. Equally clearly, however, the Byzantines *did* decide to welcome Amadeo: he arrived in Constantinople in September, and in October sailed up the Black Sea coast to confront the Bulgarians and bring John V home, a successful operation which had John V back in Constantinople in April 1367, and provided the impetus eventually for John's trip to the West in 1369.

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[9] George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (London, 1980; reprinted Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 473. An inventory of Kydones' writings can be found in Tinnefeld, *Briefe I, 1*, pp. 62–72. Ryder, *Career and Writings*, pp. 42–8, gives a brief introduction to Kydones' datable writings to c. 1373.

[10] On this episode, see Joseph Gill, 'John V Palaeologus at the Court of Louis I of Hungary (1366)', in Joseph Gill, *Collected Studies. Church Union: Rome and Byzantium 1204–1453* (London: Variorum, 1979), pp. 32–8.

[11] Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 262–3.

[12] John's father, Andronikos III, had married Anne of Savoy. On Amadeo, see Eugene L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeo VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

[13] Nicol, *Last Centuries*, p. 265.

So the *Pro subsidio Latinorum* is an absolutely fascinating text in terms of both context and content. It is currently only available in Greek, in the nineteenth-century edition of the *Patrologia Graeca*,[14] where it runs to 24 columns, making it a fairly extensive treatment of the situation, given the narrow focus. It looks at a whole range of aspects of the situation, in a clearly rhetorical manner; it is unashamedly designed to argue a particular case. Amongst other things, it gives a potted but vague history of losses suffered by the Byzantines at the hands of the Turks.[15] In answer to those who think that the Byzantines should confine themselves to Orthodox allies, it gives another potted history of relations between Bulgaria, Serbia, Byzantium and the Turks, emphasizing the negative aspects (not something difficult to do in the 1360s, given the recent territorial conflicts between Byzantium and its Orthodox neighbours),[16] but also emphasizing the parlous state of both Serbia and Bulgaria at the time – again, not something difficult to do in the 1360s.[17] But by far the greatest part of the speech is given over to discussing the pros and cons of accepting western aid – and it *does* discuss the cons, not just the pros, despite being heavily weighted in favour of the western allies; within this discussion lies the part of the speech referred to here as Kydones' 'history of the crusades': his account of how the Latins have helped Byzantium in the past, and how they have been active in the eastern Mediterranean and beyond, and therefore should be turned to as reliable allies in the present crisis.

Before continuing, however, a number of aspects of this speech and of Kydones' general approach should be emphasized, because they have a direct bearing on Kydones' selection and presentation of material.

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[14] *PG*, vol. 154, cols 961–1008.

[15] See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, p. 58.

[16] See ibid., pp. 63–7. In the 1340s and 50s, Serbia had been going through a marked expansionist phase, under the leadership of Stephen Dušan. This included schism between Serbia and Byzantium (see ibid., pp. 243–5, with references). Byzantium, weakened by civil wars, was an easy target, and Dušan exploited this situation, becoming involved in the civil wars to his own benefit. References in Nicol, *Last Centuries*, to Stephen Dušan give a fair picture of how predatory Serbia was towards Byzantium in these years. George Christos Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium during the Reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331–55) and his Successors* (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Library and Collection, 1984), gives a study of the background and detail of Serbia under Dušan, as well as discussion of the collapse of Dušan's initiatives following his death. The situation vis-à-vis Bulgaria, closer geographically to Constantinople, is less well documented and examined, although it is clear that under Ivan Alexander (1331–71) Bulgaria was also attempting a certain amount of expansion, like Serbia endeavouring to exploit Byzantium's internal weaknesses (see, for example, Nicol, *Last Centuries*, p. 188). Even during the civil war of 1321–28, Bulgaria had attempted to make use of the situation to expand into Byzantine territories (see ibid., pp. 168–9), and under Ivan Alexander there were frequent returns to conflict, as in the early to mid-1360s, as mentioned above.

[17] Serbia in particular had imploded following the death of Stephen Dušan in 1355, while Bulgaria was experiencing similar difficulties, not least due to internal divisions and to threats from Hungary. See esp. Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium*.

With regard to the speech itself, it is not only carefully constructed to argue a particular case, but the argument is also carefully constructed around certain questions. These could be called Kydones' 'criteria for the selection of allies'. These criteria are given early in the speech. They are: that allies should share the same faith as the Byzantines; that they should have close cultural connections with the Byzantines, such as compatible military and administrative traditions; that they must be superior to the 'barbarians' – that is, have the military capability to defeat them; that they should have had previous experience of fighting the 'barbarians'; that they should be reliable and able to stay the course; and that they should have the funds to support the enterprise.[18]

In line with this, Kydones' objections to the Serbs and Bulgarians, for example, are largely connected in his speech with their lack of reliability and the fact that they lack military and financial capacity, even were they reliable. Their shared faith is mentioned, but it is pointed out that this has not previously made them noticeably well-disposed towards the Byzantines.[19] Kydones' own political background would have given him considerable awareness of this.

Kydones' presentation of the Latins, on the other hand, is correspondingly designed to demonstrate that they in fact fulfil all his criteria, and more besides. Thus his speech includes a section dealing with the foundation of Constantinople from Rome and with the strong traditions uniting the two, including imperial succession and the senate, as well as religious institutions: the Latins have compatible traditions, closely related to those of the Byzantines, thus fulfilling the second of Kydones' criteria.[20]

This approach to 'criteria' also shapes how Kydones presents his 'crusading history', which is designed to demonstrate that the Latins' strength, reliability, wealth and motivation mean that they fulfil all his criteria. What is not therefore to be expected is a comprehensive account: Kydones' material is there to illustrate a point, rather than being a history from which conclusions are developed. It also follows that perhaps not too much should be read into Kydones' failure to mention what we might see as essential markers in crusade history: this does not necessarily mean that he was ignoring them *or* that he thought he could erase them from the minds of his audience, merely that they were not part of his particular argument. Negative aspects, moreover – deep suspicions of the Latins – are, as mentioned above, discussed at length later in his speech;[21] this supports the idea that the reasons for inclusion of certain information at certain stages have more to do with the development of the argument than with deliberate deselection or ignoring of material. Having said all this, what Kydones *does* include in his

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[18] *PG*, vol. 154, col. 969B–D. On this, see Ryder, *Career and Writings*, p. 63.

[19] *PG*, vol. 154, cols 972–6. On recent conflict between Byzantium and Serbia and Bulgaria, see above, note 16.

[20] *PG*, vol. 154, cols 977D–980C. See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, p. 72.

[21] *PG*, vol. 154, cols 988–93. See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, pp. 75–8.

'history of the crusades' is still enough to be interesting and informative, and to raise a range of questions.

With regard to Kydones' overall preoccupations, moreover, the key concept which underlies his policy at all stages, and which therefore also emerges clearly in his treatment of the crusades, is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the question of Byzantine freedom. The Turks represent, for him, unequivocally the greatest threat to this freedom. The Byzantines, Kydones is clear, cannot survive alone in the face of this; without allies, they will inevitably become subject to the Turks. Alliance with the Latins is necessary for the sake of Byzantine freedom; it is the only way in fact of preserving that freedom, and therefore to be desired, even leaving aside any more positive reasons there might be for pursuing good relations – and Kydones certainly believes more positive reasons exist, as many aspects of his life and works indicate. But Kydones is also aware that some of his contemporaries fear that alliance with the Latins will itself bring servitude. In answer to this, long before Notaras came up with his (alleged) slogan about it being preferable for the turban of the Turk to reign in Constantinople rather than the western 'mitre',[22] Kydones came up with the bottom-line argument that if the Byzantines could not escape servitude, it would be better to be subject to the Latins.[23] But he does not believe servitude will result from alliance with the Latins. Kydones' emphasis on Byzantine freedom is crucial to how he presents the Latins and therefore how he presents crusading history.

To turn to the text itself in more detail, Kydones' 'crusading history' can be broken down into two sections, which are in fact separated slightly in the speech. The first seems to be mainly directed at presenting the specifically pro-Byzantine activities of the Latins, pro-Byzantine at least in terms of geographical proximity and therefore immediately evident impact. The second has a less specifically Byzantine-orientated emphasis, looking more at the Latins' activities across the wider eastern Mediterranean area and even beyond. In both sections, however, Kydones' 'criteria' crop up time and time again, in different guises and with different degrees of emphasis, shaping the whole presentation.

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[22] A phrase found in the work of the historian Doukas: see *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, by Doukas: An Annotated Translation of 'Historia Turco-Byzantina'*, trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), p. 210, with note 259. This phrase has been much abused, and Notaras' history is itself complex and highly interesting. It bears mention that the phrase appears in a section of Doukas which also mentions Kydones and Aquinas. Notaras and members of his family came to a bloody end at the hands of Mehmed the Conqueror immediately after the fall of Constantinople, the details of which differ in the accounts of the time: see Jonathan Harris, *The End of Byzantium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 213–16. This tragic irony, and the many questions surrounding Notaras' role and actual allegiances, are rarely addressed when this phrase is quoted, although Harris has done much to rectify this.

[23] 'Εἰ τοίνυν δεήσει τούτοις (sc. the Turks) δουλεύειν, διὰ τί μὴ πρὸ τούτων ἐκείνοις (sc. the Latins); εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι δήπουθεν ἐλεύθερον εἶναι, τό γε τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κουφοτέραν ἀποφαίνει τὴν συμφοράν': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 997D.

The first part of the first section is rather vague, referring to the more distant past: Kydones speaks of westerners who pursued the 'barbarians' as far as Syria and Palestine and left 10,000 dead on the plain by the Orontes.[24] This is evidently a general reference to the very beginning of the crusades. Kydones' version is heavily 'spun': the undertaking is on 'our' behalf, with cities that the Byzantines had lost being restored to them, the westerners handing their gains over to the Byzantines. Kydones also describes the westerners as restoring freedom and faith (*eleutheria* and *eusebeia*) to the Greeks of Asia.[25]

This is an interesting perspective: certainly there was an element in the First Crusade geared towards Byzantine restoration, with pro-Byzantine rhetoric and territorial gains going to the Byzantines;[26] but it hardly characterizes the general direction of the crusade, particularly as relations soured after the siege of Antioch. The presentation is clearly directed primarily to supporting a number of Kydones' key themes and criteria. It describes the purity of the Latins' motivation – something he will return to in far greater depth later on. By going back to the First Crusade, to what feels like something of an idealized mythical golden age, it emphasizes both the Latins' lengthy experience of fighting the 'barbarians' and the efficacy of their intervention: they succeeded in restoring Byzantine cities.

This emphasis on the restoration of cities is also a strong theme across Kydones' writings: for him it is a key expression of Byzantine survival, and the ability to achieve it is a marker of legitimacy. Thus Kydones describes elsewhere supporting Kantakouzenos in the earlier civil war because, he says, he regarded Kantakouzenos as the best able to restore Byzantine cities;[27] and the Bulgarians and Serbs are slated for their preoccupation with capturing Byzantine cities (often deceitfully and

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[24] 'οἱ μέχρι Συρίας καὶ Παλαιστήνης ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοὺς βαρβάρους διώκοντες, καὶ δέκα μὲν μυριάσι νεκρῶν τὸ περὶ τὸν Ὠρόντην πεδίον καλύψαντες, ἡμῖν δὲ προῖκ' ἀποδεδωκότες, ἃς ἀφῃρήμεθα πόλεις· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πόνους αὐτῶν ποιησάμενοι, τὰ δ' ἆθλα τοῖς ἡμετέροις δεδωκότες καρποῦσθαι': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 980C–D.

[25] 'τὴν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν εὐσεβείαν, πᾶσι τοῖς τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκοῦσιν Ἕλλησιν [...] κατάγοντες [...] οὐδὲ χάριν αὐτοῖς τῆς εὐεργεσίας εἰδότων': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 980D.

[26] The initial calls to crusade made by Urban II were phrased as a response to calls from Alexios I Komnenos for help for the Byzantines against the 'pagans'; see, for example, Christopher J. Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 61–2. An agreement was reached between the crusaders and the Byzantines whereby the crusaders promised to restore all territories which had previously belonged to the empire. This agreement held notably in the case of Nicaea, taken by the crusaders in 1097, and given into Byzantine control, along with other territories in the area (see ibid., pp. 120–22). It failed spectacularly in the case of Antioch, however, when western leaders saw the failure of the Byzantine army to come to the aid of the beleaguered westerners as a failure of the Byzantines to keep to their side of the agreement, thus relieving the crusaders of their obligations (ibid., pp. 147–8).

[27] In his *First Oration to John Kantakuzenos*, text in Raymond Joseph Loenertz, *Demetrius Cydones, Correspondance, I* (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1956), pp. 1–10, here at p. 4, ll. 35–7.

when the Byzantines are hard-pressed)[28] – the exact opposite of restoring them. So the Latins, by restoring cities, are doing exactly what is required; restoration of Byzantine possessions is here a marker of the behaviour of credible allies.

Moreover, this passage also introduces a connection between the Latins and restoration of Byzantine freedom specifically in Asia Minor, tying in with Kydones' preoccupation with freedom and with the Turks as the greatest threat to freedom. The question of faith, moreover, is also immediately introduced: Kydones presents the Latins not as undermining the Orthodox faith (*eusebeia*, as in note 25 above), but restoring it, in contrast to tendencies to see the Latins as posing the greatest threat to orthodoxy. This ties in with Kydones' big themes of the essential unity of Catholic and Orthodox Christendom, which I have discussed at length elsewhere.[29] Kydones sees 'Catholic' and 'Orthodox' worlds as two parts of the same whole, with disagreements between them, bitter as they may be, as disputes between fellow citizens, not between natural enemies.

Thus although there is little detail in this opening section of Kydones' presentation of the crusades, there is a huge accumulation of themes, directed at Kydones' current purposes. Kydones wants his audience to perceive the West as motivated by concern for the Byzantines and for Christendom, as altruistic, and as successful.

The next reference in Kydones' account is much more specific, and jumps a long way forward, to after the Fourth Crusade, into relatively recent history. The reference is to 800 men who fought alongside an – unnamed – emperor, and died, again for the freedom of the Byzantines.[30] The way Kydones phrases this suggests either that he is drawing on a tradition of the heroism, even martyrdom, of these men or that he is perhaps trying to create, or, more probably, broaden the appeal of, such a tradition. The reference seems to be to the battle of Antioch on the Maeander in 1211, a crucial stage in the setting up and survival of the Byzantine Empire of Nicaea in Asia Minor, during the Latin occupation of Constantinople.[31] Kydones

[28] *PG*, vol. 154, col. 973C–D.

[29] See esp. Judith R. Ryder, 'Byzantium and the West in the 1360s: The Kydones Version', in Jonathan Harris, Catherine Holmes and Eugenia Russell (eds), *Byzantines, Latins, and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1150* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 345–66.

[30] 'τοὺς ὀκτακοσίους ἐκείνους, οἳ βασιλεῖ τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων προσθέμενοι [...] αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀπέθανον, ἀθάνατον ἐξ ὧν προείλοντο δόξαν κτησάμενοι· ἡμᾶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ μὴ δουλεύειν αἰσχρῶς [...] ἀπήλλαξαν [...] ὡς εἰ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τότ' ἐκείνοι τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀντέστησαν, οὐδ' ἂν ἦν ὑπὲρ ὅτου νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι': *PG*, vol. 154, cols 980D–981A.

[31] As recounted by Akropolites. See *George Akropolites: The History*, trans. Ruth Macrides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 129–32. I am grateful to Professor Teresa Shawcross for her help in identifying this reference. An important point to note here is that this battle was crucial in establishing Byzantine territory in Asia Minor, against the Turks. Macrides' footnotes mention western sources in which this large number of western soldiers is commented upon: a moot point would be whether Kydones is drawing upon Latin or Greek traditions, or both.

comments that it was these men who made the difference between Byzantine freedom and Byzantine servitude; if it were not for them, there would now be nothing to discuss – Byzantine freedom would have been lost at that point.

After this, Kydones gets much more contemporary. He specifically refers to the crusade of Smyrna of the 1340s (when an allied Latin fleet took control of the port of Smyrna from the famous emir Umur and destroyed his navy);[32] describing the westerners' efforts and the gains thereby to the Byzantines, Kydones speaks particularly of the negative impact that the hostile fleet from Smyrna had been having on the Byzantines, and thereby the huge advantages to the Byzantines from the removal of that threat, thanks to the westerners. He mentions the death of Umur, from whom, 'while living, no evil was unexpected'.[33] He lays great emphasis on the extent of the foreigners' effort and investment in this enterprise, contrasting it with the extent of the Byzantines' gains thereby, despite their inactivity.[34] Here, of course, although the contrast is not specifically enunciated, a moral can be drawn in terms of Kydones' overall preference for western alliance and deep-seated fear of the consequences of Turkish expansion. Not only were the Byzantines not involved in the crusade of Smyrna, but Kydones' own early patron, Kantakouzenos, was closely allied with the Turkish ruler of Smyrna.[35] At the time, moreover, Kantakouzenos, in the throes of the Byzantine civil war of the 1340s, had been pursuing extremely difficult negotiations with the Serbs.[36] A starker demonstration of the alternatives on offer to the Byzantines could not be asked for.

Further details follow. Kydones mentions specifically the naval engagement off Imbros of April 1347.[37] He repeatedly insists that the westerners involved acted to benefit the Byzantines. Without mentioning further specifics, he carries on, giving the impression of widespread western activity in the eastern Mediterranean, on behalf of the enslaved Byzantines. He speaks of attacks on pirate ships off the Peloponnese, in Thessaly, around Athos, in the Hellespont and all the islands.[38] In each case, he emphasizes that the westerners are continually victorious. The reference to the Peloponnese is probably a reference to the battle off Megara, the

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[32] *PG*, vol. 154, col. 981A–B. On Smyrna, see Deno John Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades, 1251–1354', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 3, pp. 27–68, at pp. 59–61.

[33] 'οὗ ζῶντος, οὐδὲν τῶν κακῶν ἀνέλπιστον ἦν': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 981A.

[34] 'Κἀκείνων μὲν οἱ κίνδυνοι καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα· ἡμῖν δὲ καθημένοις τὰ ἐντεῦθεν προσγίνεται κέρδη': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 981B.

[35] Nicol, *Reluctant Emperor*, pp. 35–8, 66–8, 72–4.

[36] Ibid., pp. 64–8.

[37] *PG*, vol. 154, col. 982C. This was a significant engagement between a Turkish fleet and a force made up mainly of Hospitaller galleys. Around a hundred Turkish vessels were apparently destroyed (Kydones mentions 120). See Anthony Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306–1421', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 3, pp. 278–313, at p. 295.

[38] 'καὶ σιωπῶ τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ληστρικὰ πλοῖα, καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων τοῦς αὐτόθι διαφθαρέντας, καὶ πάλιν τὰ πρὸς Θετταλίᾳ, καὶ ἱερῷ ὄρει, καὶ Ἑλλησπόντῳ, καὶ πάσαις νήσοις': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 982C–D.

date of which is rather uncertain but probably between 1359 and 1364;[39] and the reference to the Hellespont may refer to Peter Thomas' raid on Lampsakos, and associated activities, probably in 1359.[40] Kydones is emphatic about the scope of these activities: almost every day, he says, news is to be heard of a new action of the westerners against the 'barbarians'.[41]

This is the end of the section in which Kydones seems to be dealing principally with the more specifically Byzantine-orientated aspects of western involvement in the eastern Mediterranean. As has been seen, this section has already touched upon many of Kydones' preoccupations and criteria, albeit in an undeveloped form: the Latins' promotion of the faith, role in protecting Byzantine freedom, long-standing enmity for the Turks, and efficacy.

Before going on to his second passage about Latin military activities, Kydones takes some time to emphasize further the reliability of the Latins, in this case the inflexibility of their enmity towards the 'barbarians': they are firmly set against the 'barbarians', in such a way that they will not, for example, make treaties with them; this enmity is, as it were, part of their heritage.[42] That this line of argument is designed to answer one of Kydones' 'criteria' is quite clear. The next 'criterion' dealt with in depth is the question of necessary funds. Kydones uses an interesting illustration here: to equip one fighting ship requires as much money as to fortify

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[39] The dating of this engagement is imprecise, with dates being suggested from 1357 to 1364 (see Peter Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 3, pp. 104–40, at p. 135). Various accounts exist of the battle, in which, again, a significant number of Turkish vessels were destroyed (35 are mentioned in the Aragonese *Chronicle of the Morea*), this time, interestingly, apparently by a combined fleet of Byzantines, Venetians and Hospitallers. See Kenneth M. Setton, 'The Catalans in Greece, 1311–1380', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 3, p. 204, with note 130.

[40] Peter Thomas' campaign is a rather nebulous affair, derived from the narrative found in his *Life*, written by the crusading propagandist Philippe de Mezières: *Life of Saint Peter Thomas by Philippe de Mezières*, ed. Joachim Smet (Rome: Institutum Carmelitanum, 1954). There has been some scepticism as to the veracity of the account, given its presence in a hagiographical report and lack of external corroboration. However, it is unlikely that the account is entirely without foundation, although it no doubt contains exaggerations. According to the report, a fleet, led by Peter Thomas and made up of Hospitallers, Venetians, Genoese, English, Greeks and *aliorum Christianorum*, attacked Lampsakos, a strategic point opposite Gallipoli on the Dardanelles, and thus a very reasonable target at the time. From its place in the narrative, it is likely this raid took place between May and December 1359. De Mezières also mentions that the fleet visited Constantinople before embarking on the attack. See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, p. 182.

[41] 'Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἔχουσί τι λέγειν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πεπραγμένον': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 981 D.

[42] 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄνωθεν τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μίσους ἀρξάμενοι, δεῦρ᾽ ἀεὶ διαγεγόνασιν, οὐδέ ποτε μνησθέντες σπονδῶν· ὡς τοῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐνταῦθα μόνον εὔκλειαν οἶσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἔχον ἐπαγγελίαν [...] ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους (sc. βαρβάρους) μάχην μετὰ τῆς φύσεως δεξαμένους, οὕτω τὴν ἐκείνων ἀπώλειαν ἥδιστον νομίζειν κερδῶν': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 984A.

a town, and yet the Latins are capable of putting together sizeable fleets, and providing the manpower for them.[43] Thus they fulfil another criterion.

Kydones then continues to emphasize the fulfilment of his criteria by the Latins by looking in more depth at their motivation; and it is here that he brings in his second set of 'crusading' material, designed to demonstrate that the Latins are primarily motivated by concern for the faith. Of particular note, perhaps, in his rhetoric is the way in which he describes the enmity between the westerners and the 'barbarians' as something inherited (as in note 42). He speaks of the westerners as being spurred to action by seeing the faith (*eusebeia*, again) in danger, and motivated to deliver it from the violence of the impious.[44] They fight 'against those who blaspheme Christ, who subject his (sc. Christ's) divine laws to their own lawlessness, and who place those called by him in such extremities that they are not permitted to live unless they extol this destruction'.[45] Kydones then makes specific reference to the following: Latin activities in Libya and Carthage[46] which have held the 'barbarians' back; the crusade of Alexandria of 1365; expeditions in Asia which have forced the enemy to come to terms; an atmosphere of fear created in the Hellespont and the Propontis; and intervention beyond the Caucacus. For Kydones, this is all proof that the Latins are motivated by concern for the faith, and are merciful towards the pious.[47] It is also notably short on detail: apart from what is presumably a reference to Louis IX's second crusade (1270) in the mention of Libya and Carthage, and the very prominent attack on Alexandria, the references are extremely vague; specific identification of events is not possible.

These, then, constitute the references in Kydones' speech to what can be termed 'crusading history'. As mentioned at the beginning, to call them Kydones' 'history of the crusades' is rather an exaggeration. However, they are nonetheless rather interesting, and raise a fair number of questions, many of which would require considerable expertise to develop. It may be that crusading experts reading this

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[43] *PG*, vol. 154, col. 984B.

[44] 'ὁρῶντες […] τὴν εὐσέβειαν κινδυνεύουσαν [...] ἐν τοῦτο σκοποῦντες, ὅπως τὴν ἁγιωτάτην θρησκείαν τῆς τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὕβρεως ἐξαρπάσωσι': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 984C–D.

[45] 'τοῖς τὸν Χριστὸν βλασφημοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου θείοις νόμοις τὴν παρ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀντιτάττουσιν ἀνομίαν, καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένοις τοσαύτας περιτιθείσιν ἀνάγκας, ὡς οὐκ ἐνὸν ἄλλως ζῆν, ἂν μή τις ἐκείνην ἐπαινῇ τὴν φθορὰν': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 984D.

[46] Presumably this is a reference to the second crusade of Louis IX, although this was by no means a notable success. See Harry W. Hazard, 'Moslem North Africa, 1049–1394', in Setton, *Crusades*, pp. 474–6.

[47] 'Οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς Λιβύῃ μὲν καὶ Καρχηδόνι πολλαῖς τριήρεσι καὶ πεζῇ δυνάμει τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων ὕβριν ἀνείργοντες. Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ ἐπιστρατεύσαντες, τὴν ἐκείνων μητρόπολιν πυρὸς καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ἐρειπίων ἐμπλήσαντες· Ἀσίαν δ' οὕτω πλήξαντες, ὥστ' ἀγαπᾷν εἰ μή τι προσπάθοι· τοὺς δ' ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ Προποντίδι καὶ πρὸς μόνην τὴν ἀκοὴν τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως ἀναγκάζοντες φρίττειν. Ἄλλων δέ τινων ὑπὲρ τὸν Καύκασον μαινομένων [...] οὗτοι τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐκείνοις ἐπιπεσόντες, τὴν ἐκείνων ἔσβεσαν ἀλογίαν': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 984D.

essay can make useful connections between Kydones' speech and other events and sources, which might well influence how Kydones' presentation is read and used.

From my perspective, however, one area which Kydones' approach particularly highlights is the question of how much what we think of as standard Byzantine attitudes may be subject to flexibility, change and variation. The stereotypical view of Late Byzantine history and attitudes, particularly in relation to the West (and this view constantly reoccurs in different shapes and forms in secondary material and is therefore difficult to escape) is that they are overwhelmingly shaped by the legacy of 1204 and of the Latin Empire. In many ways, of course, this is undoubtedly true: these were developments of massive importance. However, what is less clear is how ideas and interpretations of events evolved over time, how different strands of interpretation intertwined and coexisted, how priorities changed. Kydones' writings often offer a valuable insight into some alternatives to the stereotypical readings and their place in Byzantine developments; and this is particularly the case with his 'crusading history'.

In the first place, as has been seen, most of Kydones' presentation of Latin involvement in the eastern Mediterranean is contemporary, from the 1340s onwards. This is in sharp contrast to the schematic nature of his presentation of earlier Latin involvement in the East. This suggests that the role in his speech of the earlier references in building up his argument should perhaps be interpreted in a rather different way to the role of the later events. The few references to earlier events seem to be deliberately positioned to counteract the problems posed by 1204. The First Crusade is presented as a kind of mythical golden age of goodwill, cooperation and success. The second reference, to the battle of Antioch on the Maeander, so soon after 1204, and specifically to do with the continued survival of the Byzantine successor state which then went on to retake Constantinople, seems to be making a point of the continuing Latin involvement in and concern with the survival of the empire in Asia Minor in the face of the Turks. The question was raised earlier of the extent to which Kydones here may be drawing on, embellishing or even creating myth. The message is clear, however: before contemporary times, the image Kydones wants his audience to have of the Latins is of magnanimous, heroic and determined fellow Christians. It is a very different image from the one we are accustomed to emphasize, drawn largely from Choniates' response to the Fourth Crusade, of Byzantine reactions to the Latins as the inveterate, heretical, sacrilegious enemies of the empire, an image which is often supposed to have dictated the standard Byzantine public response to the West thereafter.

This being the case, perhaps the most interesting thing is that Kydones does not labour the point at all; he is making a point, but he does not seem to be arguing it too determinedly. One might imagine that he could have put together a much more convincing dossier demonstrating positive historical dealings between Latins and Byzantines of various hues. But he does not do so. Instead, the sharp contrast between his vague early references and the detail and precision of his contemporary references suggests not only that *he* is primarily focused on the latter,

on the contemporary situation, but indeed that that is what his audience, both pro- and anti-Latin, is focused on. In other words, the legacy of 1204 has paled into insignificance in the face of present dangers.

This is, moreover, supported elsewhere, in a passage in another of Kydones' speeches, concerning the fall of Gallipoli in 1354. In his *Oratio de non reddenda Callipoli*, Kydones gives a very interesting short account of the effects of the loss of Gallipoli, territorial and psychological; this, like the section on crusading history, is very worth flagging up, since it is a rare contemporary description of the developments of these years, and indicates both that 1354 did indeed mark a crucial turning point in the history of the region, and that in some sense Byzantium was understood to be tributary to the Ottomans already in the mid-1350s (usually the date given for this development is in the 1370s).[48] Kydones' account is very strongly worded. He describes the earthquake of 1354 as having 'overturned everything'. The Chersonese and the cities of Thrace fell, within a year 'we' were paying tribute, and Constantinople was cut off by land. And these events were regarded as heralding the fall of Constantinople, leading many to take ship and flee.[49] Were this passage recorded in a later history, we might well regard it as later interpolation, cobbled together out of later events. But Kydones' speech is not a later history; it is not a history at all – it is dated to the early 1370s, and it is addressing an audience which would presumably have been aware of events of the mid-1350s. Therefore the idea that what happened in 1354 constituted an extremely radical shake-up, with considerable immediate practical impact on the population, is quite convincing.

In terms of Byzantine attitudes, moreover, it should be borne in mind that the 1354 earthquake itself came after years of civil war. There are contemporary Venetian accounts, for 1354/55, which support the idea that the Byzantine population was profoundly shocked by events, disillusioned with its own leaders, and despondent about their own survival.[50] The conditions which obtained, and the practical *and* ideological approaches which were at all credible, were far distant from the conditions which had obtained in the early decades of the century. Only the most fantasy-prone could have been unaware of this. Ecclesiastical affairs, particularly given the Palamite controversy from the 1330s onwards and how that and other ecclesiastical matters interacted with the political situation, were also

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[48] See, for example, J.M. Hussey (ed.), *The Cambridge Medieval History. Vol. IV, Part 1: Byzantium and its Neighbours* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 371; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, p. 275.

[49] 'Τοῦ γὰρ περὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον καὶ τὴν Προποντίδα συμβάντος σεισμοῦ ὅς πάντα ἀνέτρεψε, καὶ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο τοῖς βαρβάροις προδεδωκότος, ἥ τε Χερρόνησος πᾶσα τούτοις ἐδούλευσε, καὶ τὰς ἐν Θράκῃ πόλεις δι' ἑαυτῶν ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ πρὶν ἔτος ἐξήκειν, φόρους τε ἡμᾶς ἐπράξαντο, καὶ τὴν πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἔτεμον γῆν [...] Κἂν τις [...] αἰτίαν τὴν Καλλίπολιν καὶ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀπώλειαν εἶναι φῇ, οὐδένα ἂν ἔχοι τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα': *PG*, vol. 154, col. 1012D.

[50] See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, pp. 206–7.

deeply affected.[51] Byzantine affairs had experienced considerable disruption in the 1340s and 1350s, and in particular in 1354, and these would have been the primary focus of contemporary Byzantines, not at all the events of 1204. Had things been different, the Byzantines might have had the luxury of dwelling on the iniquities of 1204; but they did not have that luxury.

Let us return, however, to the more specific question of Kydones' presentation of crusading history. It is, as has been mentioned, very much focused on contemporary events. Of these, the crusade of Smyrna is probably both the most prominent episode and the one for which the most historical detail survives, and what was said earlier about the unvoiced contrast between what the Latins were doing at Smyrna and what the Byzantine rulers were doing at the same time during the civil war illustrates neatly some of the differences between the pre-1354 period and the period after. One might suspect that Kydones' motives in making this his principal reference to pre-1354 'crusades', other than the very earliest references, could have to do with this very fact: that the Byzantines *should* have realized the changed situation, should have realized that 1354 was inevitable; but instead, they were still helping to bring about their own ruin. Moreover, the contrast Kydones makes, in describing Smyrna, between Latin effort and Byzantine gain could be seen as reinforcing the point that, even before the Byzantines' eyes were opened to the situation, the Latins were already there in the eastern Mediterranean, acting on their behalf in fighting their enemies, the enemies of the faith. This lays the foundation for the next set of references, which together give a strong impression of an explosion of Latin activity in the eastern Mediterranean in the following decades. This activity had been most spectacularly evidenced immediately prior to Kydones' speech, in the crusade of Alexandria, an enterprise in which some of his acquaintances were personally involved;[52] and, closer to home and much more significant for the Byzantines, in the retaking of Gallipoli by Amadeo of Savoy.

This brings us to the question of the scale and impact of events in the eastern Mediterranean in the 1350s and 1360s. Kydones undoubtedly presents Latin activity as widespread and effective; and it is undoubtedly the case that there was a reasonable amount of activity. But how significant was it? Could Kydones' audience have treated his 'spin', his building-up of events, as credible? The question of whether Kydones' 'history of the crusades' is more rhetoric or more reality can operate on many different levels, and, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is little intention here to come to firm conclusions on that score. There is no doubt that the speech is very rhetorically shaped, but it is very difficult to assess

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[51] See ibid., chapter 6.

[52] Most notably, an extremely interesting character by the name of John Laskaris Kalopheros. On Kalopheros, see Ambrosius K. Eszer, *Das abenteuerliche Leben des Johannes Laskaris Kalopheros: Forschungen zur Geschichte der ost-westlichen Beziehungen im 14. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1969).

the extent to which the rhetoric reflects reality as it would have been understood by Kydones' contemporaries.

What can be said about this side of things, however, is that how we interpret Kydones' material has a very definite bearing on how we interpret the Byzantine situation much more widely. There is a strand running through material from Late Byzantium which argues, in dialogue with western interlocutors, that the Byzantine populace would be convinced and much more inclined to support positive relations with the West if the West provided more practical help. I suspect that this strand may have at times deliberately *over-emphasized* Byzantine *opposition* to the West in order to boost this argument – to make the emotional blackmail involved stronger. This is a minority opinion; but elements of it are, I think, seen even as early as Barlaam's negotiations with the West.[53] Post-1354, in the turmoil and confusion after the civil wars and Serbian, Bulgarian and Ottoman incursions, the picture was increasingly fragmented and complex; and in these conditions, even small signs of positive Latin involvement which could help alleviate the Byzantine situation may well have had considerable impact. Such intervention, and a corresponding thaw in relations, seems to have been happening in the 1350s and 1360s, as reflected in Kydones' writings and policies. From the Byzantine perspective, for the 'reality' behind Kydones' account in the *Pro subsidio Latinorum* to have been significant only requires what Kydones is describing to have been a relatively minor intervention.

Whether, however, the 'reality' behind Kydones' 'rhetoric' implies something of larger significance in terms of wider developments is something I am not in a position to develop much further. At one point I attempted to match subjects mentioned in Kydones' speeches with more objective aspects of regional developments in the 1350s and 1360s – looking at, for example, what was (or was not) known about the naval capabilities of different groups at the time, and accounts of contemporary military enterprises (numbers and types of troops, what constituted effective strategy, and so on). My main interest was trying to evaluate the impact, say, that just a few western ships arriving in Constantinople would have had in the 1360s, and given that my own arguments, as discussed above, only required a minimum of activity, and that propagandist impact was at least as relevant as practical impact, wider questions were not essential. This was just as well: it seems very difficult to unearth solid information about the specifics of military engagements in the eastern Mediterranean in the 1350s and 1360s. More work in this area would be extremely useful, but at present I am unable to venture much general comment as to the wider context.

This chapter concludes, therefore, by raising these wider questions rather than answering them. Kydones, as Ostrogorsky has pointed out, is an essential source for Byzantine history of his period. His *Pro subsidio Latinorum* gives a fascinating insight into some rather unexpected events, ideas and possibilities. In particular, it presents attitudes one would not expect of Byzantines. Kydones' writings are

[53] See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, pp. 175–6.

worthy of considerable attention precisely because of this: by coming to grips with them, giving them their status as historical sources alongside other contemporary material, a much richer and more detailed picture could be developed of the decades of change in the eastern Mediterranean to which they bear witness. It is my hope that readers will be able to draw comparisons on the basis of this essay which will lead to the further development of such a picture.

# PART III
# Latins between Greeks and Turks in the Fourteenth Century

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# 5
# Trade or Crusade? The Zaccaria of Chios and Crusades against the Turks

*Mike Carr*

In the fourteenth century the merchants and colonists of the great Italian maritime republics of Venice and Genoa formed the Latin-Christian frontier in the eastern Mediterranean. Prominent amongst these were the Genoese Zaccaria family who ruled the Aegean island of Chios from c. 1305 to 1329. The years of their rule coincided with the dramatic rise in power of the Turkish maritime principalities, or beyliks, situated along the Anatolian-Aegean seaboard who, after the turn of the fourteenth century, began to make increasingly threatening incursions into Latin and Greek territories in the region. The position which the Zaccaria occupied in the Aegean thus became an inherently contradictory one; on the one hand, it was in their interests to be regarded in the West as the defenders of the faith against the Turks, but on the other, they required a degree of peaceful contact with some Muslim groups in order to maintain their own commercial interests in the East. In this sense, the rule of the Zaccaria on Chios provides the historian with an intriguing insight into the contrasting spiritual and commercial priorities of a medieval merchant family operating on the fringes of Latin Christendom, in a region hotly contested by Greeks, Turks and Latins alike.

Perhaps because of the complex and seemingly contradictory motivations of Aegean merchant families such as the Zaccaria, historians have seldom explored their fluid attitudes towards cross-cultural contact and conflict. In the historiography of the crusades, for example, the motives of Italian merchants more widely have either been restricted to stereotypical labels of greed and cynicism, or largely overlooked in more recent years as a necessary focus of crusading history.[1] Even

[1] See, for example, the views expressed by Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1938), pp. 114–16; Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (3 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951–54), vol. 3, pp. 351–2, 365; Eugene H. Byrne, 'Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century', *American Historical Review*, 25 (1919–20), pp. 191–219, at p. 193; Gary M. Anderson et al., 'An Economic Interpretation of the Medieval Crusades', *Journal of European Economic History*, 21 (1992), pp. 339–63. A small number of works, focusing on different geographical areas and chronological periods, have, however, provided an alternative to these views, for example: Rasa Mažeika, 'Of Cabbages and Knights: Trade and Trade Treaties with the Infidel on the Northern Frontier, 1200–1390', *JMH*, 20 (1994), pp. 63–76; Silvia Schein, 'From "milites Christi" to "mali Christiani": The Italian Communes in Western Historical Literature',

specialist studies on the later crusades have focused little on the considerations of the Aegean merchant families, despite giving far more attention to the maritime republics.[2] More attention has been given to the Zaccaria and others by historians of medieval commerce in the Mediterranean, most notably Robert Lopez,[3] Michel Balard,[4] Ludwig Gatto[5] and William Miller,[6] but these works focus predominantly on trade, meaning that the question of what drove merchants to participate in crusades against the infidel has been overlooked. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to bridge both sides of the historiographical spectrum, by providing a study of the Zaccaria which focuses on their role as both merchants *and* crusaders. In doing so it is hoped that a more nuanced appreciation of what motivated the actions of the Zaccaria in the Aegean can be ascertained.

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The Zaccaria family came to international prominence during the mid- to late thirteenth century, when the brothers Benedetto I and Manuel formed ties with the Byzantine imperial family. This began in c. 1264 when Benedetto I was sent as an ambassador to the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos.[7] He

in Gabriella Airaldi and Benjamin Z. Kedar (eds), *I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di Gerusalemme/The Italian Communes in the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Genoa: Istituto di Medievistica, 1986), pp. 680–89; Jonathan Riley-Smith, 'Government in Latin Syria and the Commercial Privileges of Foreign Merchants', in Derek Baker (ed.), *Relations Between East and West in the Middle Ages* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), pp. 109–32; Christopher Marshall, 'The Crusading Motivations of the Italian City Republics in the Latin East, 1095–1104', in Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (eds), *The Experience of Crusading* (2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 60–79; David Abulafia, 'Trade and Crusade, 1050–1250', in Michael Goodich, Sophia Menache and Sylvia Schein (eds), *Cross Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 1–20; Donald E. Queller and Gerald W. Day, 'Some Arguments in Defense of the Venetians on the Fourth Crusade', *American Historical Review*, 81 (1976), pp. 717–37.

[2] For example, Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin: 1300–1415* (Venice: Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1983); Setton, *Papacy*, esp. vol. 1, pp. 163–223; Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

[3] Robert Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante* (Milan: G. Principato, 1933; reprinted with introduction by Michel Balard, Genoa: [publisher not known], 1996); Robert Lopez, 'Familiari, procuratori e dipendenti di Benedetto Zaccaria', in *Miscellanea di Storia Ligure in onore di Giorgio Falco* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962), pp. 209–49.

[4] Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise, XIIe – début du XVe siècle* (2 vols, Rome: École française de Rome, 1978).

[5] Ludwig Gatto, 'Per la storia di Martino Zaccaria, signore di Chio', *Bullettino dell'Archivio Paleografico Italiano*, n.s., 2–3, part 1 (1956–57), pp. 325–45.

[6] William Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios, 1275–1329', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 31 (1911), pp. 44–55.

[7] *Annales Januenses: 1249–1269*, ed. Georg Heinrich Pertz, MGH SS (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Avlici Hahniani, 1825), vol. 18, p. 249; Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', p. 43, n. 6.

made a good impression on the emperor who, a few years later, granted both him and Manuel control over the towns of Old and New Phokaia, situated on the Asia Minor coast, some 50 to 60 kilometres north-west of the gulf of Smyrna, and gave them imperial permission to mine alum in the mountains nearby.[8] This was a generous concession as alum was an extremely valuable commodity, being the most effective fabric mordant (fixative for dyes) known at the time and thus vital for the textile industry.[9] According to the trading manual of Francesco Pegolotti, Phokaia alum was amongst the best available and the mines were the most productive of the time.[10] The Genoese had managed to accrue great wealth from the alum trade of Konya during the mid-thirteenth century and the Zaccaria brothers were able to gain much prosperity from the export of this product to western Europe in the same way.[11] The brothers set about extracting the chemical

[8] George Pachymeres, *De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis Libri tredecim*, ed. I. Bekker (2 vols, Bonn: Impensis Ed. Weber, 1835), vol. 1, pp. 419–20 (bk 5); Robert Lopez and Irving W. Raymond (eds), *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), pp. 127–8. The site was granted sometime between 1267 and 1275: Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 83, n. 28. The alum mines lie on the hill of Şaphanedağ, about two kilometres inland from New Phokaia (Yeni Foça), which is around twelve kilometres northeast of Old Phokaia (Foça). I owe special thanks to Dr Mümtaz Çolak for showing me around Şaphanedağ in 2010. For more information on the mines, see Mümtaz Çolak, Maurice Picon et al., 'Les régions productrices d'alun en Turquie aux époques antique, médiévale et modern: gisements, produits et transports', in Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (eds), *L'alun de Méditerranée: colloque international, Naples, 4–6 juin 2003–Lipari, 7–8 juin 2003* (Naples: Centre Jean Bérard, 2005), pp. 59–68. See also İsmet Özgenç, 'Economic Geology of Şaphanedağ (Foça – Izmir) Alunite Deposit', *Bulletin of the Geological Congress of Turkey*, 7 (1992), pp. 64–9.

[9] Alum also had a number of other uses; for more information, see: Charles S. Singer, *The Earliest Chemical Industry: An Essay in the Historical Relations of Economics and Technology Illustrated from the Alum Trade* (London: Folio Society, 1948), pp. xvii–xviii; Robert Lopez, 'Majorcans and Genoese on the North Sea Route in the Thirteenth Century', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 29 (1951), pp. 1167–70; Anthony A.M. Bryer, 'The Question of the Byzantine Mines in the Pontos: Chalybian Iron, Chaldian Silver, Koloneian Alum and the Mummy of Cheriana', *Anatolian Studies*, 32 (1982), pp. 133–50, at pp. 146–7.

[10] Phokaia alum was apparently the second best, after that of Karahissar (Koloneia). It was mined at around 14,000 *cantara* a year, which equates to roughly 800 metric tons per year: Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica Della Mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1936; reprinted New York: Kraus, 1970), pp. 367–70; Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, pp. 353–5; Bryer, 'Byzantine Mines in the Pontos', p. 148. For a summary on how alum was refined, taken from contemporary accounts, see Singer, *Earliest Chemical Industry*, pp. 92–4.

[11] William of Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*, trans. Peter Jackson (London: Hakluyt Society, 1990), p. 273. The Asia Minor alum trade became more important after 1291 when the papal economic embargo on trade with Egypt, where alum was also mined, was strengthened: David Jacoby, 'Creta e Venezia nel contesto economico del Mediterraneo orientale sino

in great quantities and, according to the chronicle of the Catalan mercenary Ramon Muntaner, by 1305 they had some 3,000 Greek miners working for them.[12] Archival records provide evidence of the family exporting sizeable quantities of alum from Phokaia to northern Europe in 1268,[13] 1278[14] and 1298.[15]

During this time, the Zaccaria brothers also became renowned for their daring maritime exploits against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt. In 1288 Benedetto I was instrumental in helping evacuate the citizens of Tripoli to Cyprus, before its capture a year later,[16] and in 1293 Manuel was placed in charge of a fleet by Pope Nicholas IV, which raided the Egyptian port of Alexandria, as well as Candelore (Alanya) on the southern coast of Asia Minor.[17] Their accomplishments reached a zenith in the early fourteenth century, when the brothers were granted the island of Chios for a period of ten years by the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos.[18] The

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alla meta del Quattrocento', in Gherardo Ortalli (ed.), *Venezia e Creta: atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Iraklion-Chanià, 30 settembre – 5 ottobre 1997* (Venice: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 1998), pp. 95–9; David Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XI$^{e}$–XV$^{e}$ siècles', in Borgard, Brun and Picon (eds), *L'alun de Méditerranée*, pp. 219–67, at p. 241.

[12] Muntaner had dealings with Tedisio Zaccaria, the governor of Phokaia and nephew of Benedetto I and Manuel, so was presumably well informed: *The Catalan Expedition to the East: From the Chronicle of Ramon Muntaner*, trans. Robert Hughes (Barcelona: Barcino, 2006), pp. 127–8; cf. Pachymeres, *De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis*, vol. 1, pp. 419–20 (bk 5).

[13] This is a letter from Benedetto I Zaccaria instructing Daniele de Mari to sell 201 sacks of alum and 1 *pondus* of mastic: Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, pp. 219–20.

[14] *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont d'après les archives notariales génoises aux XIII et XIV siècles*, ed. Renée Doehaerd (3 vols, Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1941), vol. 3, nos 1356–7; Lopez, 'Majorcans and Genoese', p. 1176.

[15] *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes*, vol. 3, no. 1530. Full translation in Eric Briys and Didier Joos de ter Beerst, 'The Zaccaria Deal: Contract and Options to Fund a Genoese Shipment of Alum to Bruges in 1298', *Helsinki XIV International Economic History Congress* (August 2006), pp. 76–8.

[16] Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', p. 44. For more on this, see Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria*, pp. 131–60.

[17] Jean Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Egypte (fin XIII$^{e}$–début XIV$^{e}$ siècle', *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (1984), pp. 120–34, at p. 123; Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274–1314* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 77–8.

[18] The exact date at which the Zaccaria became lords of Chios is extremely hard to determine, as the sources provide conflicting information. Elizabeth Zachariadou has argued against the traditional date of 1304 by highlighting the inconsistencies in the account of John Kantakouzenos relating to the ambiguous durations of the lease renewals for the island and subsequent calculations by historians. See, for example: Paul Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'occident: Recherches sur 'La geste d'Umur Pacha'* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1957), pp. 51–2, n. 5; Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, vol. 1, p. 120; John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*, ed. Ludwig

island was important for three main reasons. Firstly, it lay at the crossroads of the shipping routes running from Constantinople and the Black Sea in the north to Syria and Alexandria in the south, by way of Rhodes and Famagusta.[19] Secondly, Chios was close to the Phokaias, meaning that it could provide maritime protection to the colonies and act as an important repository for alum, which could be held on the island until ferried to northern Europe.[20] Thirdly, the island was extremely rich and fertile; it provided an abundance of wine and other agricultural produce, the most important of which was mastic gum, a product derived from trees native to Chios and extremely popular in the East.[21] According to the influential Venetian merchant and crusade theorist Marino Sanudo, great quantities of mastic were exported to the Mamluk sultanate in these years.[22] From archival documents we also know that it

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Schopen and Barthold Georg Niebuhr (3 vols, Bonn: Impensis Ed. Weber, 1828–32), vol. 1, pp. 370–71 (bk 2, ch. 10). Instead, Zachariadou suggests that the date should be placed somewhere after July 1305, the date given by George Pachymeres for an (inconclusive) embassy sent by Manuel Zaccaria to Andronikos II asking for control of Chios, and before November 1309, the date at which we know the family were exporting mastic from the island: Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 8, n. 24. If Benedetto was the first ruler of the island, as Zachariadou claims, then this date can be further refined by using the account of Ramon Muntaner. According to him, Benedetto I died before Tedisio Zaccaria's capture of Phokaia, in c. 1307. If Muntaner is correct, then Benedetto, perhaps as co-ruler with Manuel, would have come into control of the island sometime after July 1305 and before 1307: Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East*, p. 126.

[19] Michel Balard, 'Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans (1300–1400)', in Jonathan Shepard (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire: c. 500–1492* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 850.

[20] Edwin S. Hunt, *A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200–1550* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 183.

[21] The *Pistacia Lentiscus* tree, which produces mastic, is native to the Mediterranean, but only produces gum when grown on Chios. For more on mastic production, see: Christos Belles, *Mastiha Island*, trans. Calliopi Sachtouri (Chios: G.N. Merousis, 2007), pp. 29–95, 245–83; John Perikos, *The Chios Gum Mastic* (Athens: J. Perikos, 1993), pp. 13–21. Because whoever ruled Chios had a natural monopoly on mastic production, it was sold at the highest possible rate: Robert Lopez, *Storia delle colonie Genovesi nel Mediterraneo*, reprinted with introduction by Michel Balard (Genoa: Marietti, 1996), pp. 222–3. Various travel writers mention Chios as the place of mastic production, for example: Ludolph of Sudheim, *Description of the Holy Land, and of the Way Thither*, trans. Aubrey Stewart, Library of the Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, 12 (London: Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, 1895), p. 29; William of Boldensele, 'Des Edelherrn Wilhelm von Boldensele Reise nach dem gelobten Lande', in Carl Ludwig Grotefend (ed.), *Die Edelherren von Boldensele oder Boldensen* (Hannover: Hahn'sche Hofbuchh, 1855), p. 32.

[22] Marino Sanudo Torsello, 'Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis', in Jacques Bongars (ed.), *Gesta Die per Francos* (2 vols, Hannover: Typis Wechelianis, apud heredes Ioan. Aubrii, 1661; reprinted Jerusalem: Massada Press, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 24–5; *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross: Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, trans. Peter Lock (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 53.

was listed as one of the items held by the Zaccaria in Genoa for export to France in 1268 and was exchanged for cloth with a merchant on Rhodes in 1309.[23]

The joint rule of Chios founded by the brothers Manuel and Benedetto I Zaccaria ended in 1307 with the death of the latter. After this point, control of the island appears to have been divided between two members of the family, being passed down from father to son on the side of Benedetto I. The exact details of each succession to the island remain unclear, although an outline can be provided here. From 1307 the island passed to Benedetto I's son, Palaeologo Zaccaria,[24] who continued to rule with his uncle Manuel until the latter's death in 1309/10.[25] The co-rulership of the island was then shared between Palaeologo and Benedetto II, his first-born son, until the death of Palaeologo in 1314. After this point, joint rule was assumed by Benedetto II and his younger brother Martino. These brothers remained co-rulers until the early 1320s when Martino forced his brother from power and began to rule the island alone; this lasted until the capture of Chios by the Byzantines in 1329.[26]

Despite the lack of notarial documents relating to Chios in the early fourteenth century, the island appears to have achieved greatest prosperity under the joint rulership of Martino and Benedetto II.[27] Some indication of this can be found in the high level of coinage issued by the brothers.[28] Similarly, the granting of canonries

[23] Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, pp. 219–20 (1268); *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes*, vol. 3, no. 1675 (1309).

[24] It has been claimed that Benedetto married the sister of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos in 1275, and that Palaeologo was his son through this marriage, reflected in his name. The sources, however, do not support this point: Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 51, n. 3.

[25] Following the death of Manuel, the Phokaias seem to have passed to the stewardship of Andreolo Cattaneo della Volta and his family, partly through his marriage to Palaeologo's sister Eliana. It is likely that the Cattaneo still owed fealty to the Zaccaria on Chios: Andreas Mazarakis, 'A Martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria (1307–1310)', trans. Marion J. Tzamali, *Nomismatika Chronika*, 18 (1999), pp. 111–18, at pp. 116–17. The Cattaneo della Volta family were shipping alum to Bruges in their own name in 1311: *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes*, vol. 3, no. 1723; Marie-Louise Heers, 'Les Génois et le commerce de l'alun à la fin du Moyen Age', *Revue d'histoire economique et sociale*, 32 (1954), pp. 31–53; Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island: 1346–1566* (3 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), vol. 1, p. 57.

[26] The best treatment of the complicated genealogy of the Zaccaria family is given by Mazarakis, 'A Martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria', pp. 111–18.

[27] Records of the trade in mastic during the first Genoese occupation of the island are, for example, extremely rare: Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, vol. 1, p. 120.

[28] Gustave Schlumberger, *Numismatique de l'orient Latin* (2 vols, Paris: E. Leroux, 1878), vol. 2, pp. 413–15; Andreas Mazarakis, 'The Chios Mint During the Rule of the Zaccaria Family (1304–1329)', *Nomismatika Chronika*, 11 (1992), pp. 43–52, at pp. 43–6, 51; Domenico Promis, *La Zecca di Scio durante il dominio dei Genovesi* (Turin: Stamp. Reale, 1865), pp. 34–6; David M. Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford*, 2nd edn (London: Royal Numismatic Society and Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, 1995), pp. 290–91.

in England in May 1317 to three sons of Palaeologo Zaccaria – Anthony, Aufredo and John[29] – might provide evidence of a growth in the Zaccaria's trade to north-western Europe during this time, most probably from the increased shipment of alum to the cloth manufacturers of England and Flanders.[30] Already in these early years, Martino was also beginning to make efforts to distance himself from his legitimate overlord, the Byzantine emperor, by forming stronger links to the Latin powers of the region. In 1317, for example, he extended the Zaccaria domain into the Frankish lands of Achaia by purchasing the district of Chalandritsa situated in the hinterland of Patras in the Peloponnese.[31] In the same year, a contemporary also commented on a strong Genoese fort, held in part by the Zaccaria, on the Turkish mainland, which could have been the fortress of Phokaia or even the harbour fortress of Smyrna itself.[32]

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[29] The entries refer to the sons of *Palyalogus Catharia*: Vatican City, Archivio segreto [henceforth ASV], Reg. Aven. 7, fols 39v–40v, 99v–100v; ASV Reg. Vat. 66, fol. 141, ep. 3543; fol. 141v, ep. 3544; fol. 175v, ep. 3654; summaries in *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters (1198–1513)*, ed. William H. Bliss et al. (19 vols, London and Dublin: HMSO, 1893–1998, in progress), vol. 2, nos 156–7, 159; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII (1316–1334): analyses d'après les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. Guillaume Mollat, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome (16 vols, Paris: Fontemoing, 1904–47), vol. 1, nos 3441–2, 3444. The canonries were Ripon, Lichfield and Hereford. See also Jonathan Harris, 'Edward II, Andronicus II and Giles of Argenteim: A Neglected Episode in Anglo-Byzantine Relations', in Charalambos Dendrinos, Jonathan Harris, Eirene Harvalia-Crook and Judith Herrin (eds), *Porphyrogenita: Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 81.

[30] The textile industry of northern Europe certainly relied on alum exports from the east at this time; see: Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 4–6; Edmund B. Fryde, 'The English Cloth Industry and the Trade with the Mediterranean: c. 1370 – c. 1480', in Fryde, *Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance* (London: Hambledon Press, 1983), pp. 346–8 (no. XV).

[31] John Ferrandez of Heredia, *Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea: Compilado por comandamiento de Don Fray Johan Ferrandez de Heredia maestro del Hospital de s. Johan de Jerusalem: Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles* (Osnabruck: Zeller, 1885; reprinted 1968), p. 137; Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', p. 48; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 53. Martino bought the fief of Chalandritsa from Aimon of Rans: Peter Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 3, pp. 104–40, at pp. 119–20; Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, *Les Ghisi: Dynastes vénitiens dans l'Archipel, 1207–1390* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1975), p. 108.

[32] William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, ed. and trans. Giles Constable (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2012), pp. 65–7. Phokaia was held for the Zaccaria by the Cattaneo della Volta family, which may explain why William refers to a fortress held in part by the Zaccaria and in part by 'some other Genoese'. Our knowledge of the Genoese territories on the Turkish mainland remains patchy, but it seems that Martino was the lord of the fortress at Smyrna at least from 1326 until 1329: Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 8; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 53–4.

Although the establishment of the Zaccaria on Chios increased the family's economic prospects, it also brought them into direct conflict with the Turkish beyliks of the western Anatolian coast. Amongst the most aggressive of these was that of Aydin, founded by Mehmed Beg, which occupied the lands stretching from Ephesos in the south to Smyrna in the north – those which lay closest to the Phokaias and Chios. In the first decade of the century the Greek historian George Pachymeres stated that the Zaccaria had managed to maintain their possession of the Phokaia region, and also of the area of Adramyttion further north, because of their military daring.[33] A similar account was given by the crusade theorist William of Adam who, writing in c. 1317, noted that the Turks did not 'dare to live on or even visit' parts of the coast around Smyrna because the lords of Chios did not allow them to settle there.[34] Moreover, according to William, in that year the Zaccaria had captured over 18 Turkish pirate ships and launched an attack on their lands in Anatolia with 'great glory and triumph', laying waste to many estates and freeing Christian captives.[35] After this time the clashes between the two sides escalated and Martino Zaccaria, in particular, began to receive significant recognition in the West for his exploits against the Turks. The most explicit demonstration of this can be found in the summer of 1319 when a squadron of galleys under his command, in alliance with those of the Hospitallers of Rhodes, inflicted a crushing defeat on a sizeable fleet from Aydin off the coast of Chios. Fortunately for us, two extremely detailed accounts of this battle survive in letters written by the Hospitallers to Pope John XXII, which provide an unusually descriptive account of a Turkish–Christian naval conflict in the Aegean.[36]

The accounts claim that the Hospitallers had received reports of the preparation of a fleet of 32 vessels at the harbour of Ephesos in June, which was to be used for

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[33] Pachymeres, *De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis*, vol. 2, p. 558 (bk 12).

[34] William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 65.

[35] Ibid., p. 53. For the dating of William's work, see ibid., p. 2; Anthony Leopold, *How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 39.

[36] The letters are written by the Hospitallers Gerard of Pins and Albert of Schwarzburg. Full texts in: Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', pp. 337–8 (Pins); Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 1310–1421* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1913; reprinted London: Variorum Reprints, 1974), pp. 365–7 (Schwarzburg); summaries in *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, vol. 2, nos 8374 (Pins), 10269 (Schwarzburg). The letter of Gerard of Pins has been incorrectly dated to 1318, meaning that some authors have also incorrectly dated this battle to 1318, or have assumed that two battles took place, one in 1318 and one in 1319. Some clarity has been provided by: Anthony T. Luttrell, 'Cos after 1306', in Luttrell, *Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306: Rhodes and the West* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 401–4, at p. 404, n. 30; and Mike Carr, 'Motivations and Response to Crusades in the Aegean, c. 1300–1350' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 2011), pp. 88–90.

an attack on Chios and the neighbouring islands.[37] In response, the Hospitallers constructed a fleet of 24 vessels, under the command of the Grand Preceptor Albert III of Schwarzburg, and arranged to rendez-vous with Martino Zaccaria and his fleet of one galley and six to eight other vessels at Chios.[38] This combined fleet anchored at the island for ten days where it awaited news on the movements of the Turkish fleet, before hearing on the morning of 23 July that the Turks had set sail from Ephesos. The Hospitaller-Zaccaria fleet put to sea soon after and sighted the Turks in the waters off Chios around the time of Vespers.[39] At this point, an unexpected reinforcement of eleven galleys arrived from Genoa and joined the Christian force before they 'bravely proceeded in battle line against the Turks and attacked them immediately'.[40] According to one account, the battle was 'hard and cruel', but the Christian galleys gained the upper hand after the first engagement.[41] In the end, the Turkish armada was heavily defeated, with the more conservative of the Hospitaller reports claiming that around 2,000 Turks were killed or wounded and 20 ships lost, with twelve escaping in the night.[42]

Various other accounts of this battle seem to have circulated in western Europe and in the East after this time. One brief and probably contemporary version, found in an anonymous Cypriot source, dates the battle to 1319 and tallies with the letters in claiming that a fleet belonging to the Knights of Rhodes defeated a Turkish fleet off Chios, leaving 3,000 Turks dead or wounded.[43] The Florentine Giovanni Villani also describes the battle in his chronicle, but he provides a far more confused version of events, dated to the year 1320. According to him, a Turkish admiral, with a fleet of over 80 galleys and other vessels, went to attack the island of Rhodes but was intercepted by a Hospitaller force of four galleys and 20 smaller ships accompanied by six Genoese galleys who were returning from Armenia. The Christians defeated the Turks at sea and, after capturing a large part of their fleet and sinking the rest,

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[37] 'ad destruendam insulam Syi [...] et subsequenter alias insulas Romanie': Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 337. The Hospitallers later estimated that the Turkish fleet at Ephesos numbered ten galleys and 19 other vessels of 68 oarsmen each, carrying 2,600 men: Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, p. 365.

[38] 'una sua galea et VI vel VIII barcis et lignis': Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, p. 366.

[39] Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, pp. 365–6; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 338.

[40] Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, p. 366; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 338.

[41] Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 338.

[42] Ibid., p. 338. The other account gives the slightly more exaggerated figure of 3,000 Turks killed or captured and only 400 escaping in six small vessels: Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, p. 366.

[43] This is the chronicle known as 'Amadi', which is probably an Italian version of a fourteenth-century French source: *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. René de Mas Latrie (2 vols, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891–93), vol. 1, p. 400; *The Trial of the Templars in Cyprus*, trans. and ed. Anne Gilmour-Bryson (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 2.

went to a small island, possibly Telos, where they killed or enslaved around 5,000 to 10,000 Turks established there.[44] The numbers of the fleet given by Villani are very similar to the battle of 1319 – the Hospitallers had four galleys and 20 smaller vessels allied with six Genoese galleys.[45] As in 1319, they were far outnumbered by the Turkish forces, which consisted of 80 galleys and other vessels.[46] Elizabeth Zachariadou suggests that this was a separate incident from the battle of 1319 and was instead fought against the Turks of Menteshe, who occupied the territories to the south of Aydin, nearer Rhodes.[47] This may have been the case, as some instances in Villani's account certainly differ from the battle of 1319, but the similarities, such as in the numbers of vessels involved, suggest that Villani may have been recounting the same event, but had mistakenly dated the battle to 1320.[48] A Latin version of the travels of Ludolf of Sudheim, who visited the East between 1336 and 1341, also provides details of another battle involving the Zaccaria. He describes an encounter where the Hospitallers were defeated by a Turkish fleet of 50 vessels and pursued onto the island of Kos (*Lango*). Here the Knights managed to alert Martino Zaccaria (*Nycolao de Sya*) who sailed to their rescue, killing 6,260 Turks on his arrival at the island (with an English woman killing over 1,000 of them!)[49] Sudheim provides no date for this battle and his highly unreliable account could be

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[44] Giovanni Villani, *Nuova cronica*, ed. Giuseppe Porta (3 vols, Parma: Guanda, 1990–91), vol. 2, p. 323 (bk 10, ch. 120). The number of Turks killed is given as 10,000 in the Muratori edition: *Florentini Historia Universalis*, ed. Ludovico Antonio Muratori, RIS 13 (Milan: ex typographia Societatis Palatinae, 1728), col. 501.

[45] 'il comandator di Rodi con IIII galee e con XX piccioli legni, e coll'aiuto di VI galee de' Genovesi': Villani, *Nuova cronica*, vol. 2, p. 323 (bk 10, ch. 120).

[46] 'LXXX tra galee e altri legni': ibid.

[47] Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 14, n. 55; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Holy War in the Aegean during the Fourteenth Century', in Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (eds), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 215, n. 21.

[48] This view has been adopted by Anthony T. Luttrell, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West, 1291–1440: Collected Studies* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 'Corrigenda et addenda', p. 288. The battle is also reported in the *Annales Ecclesiastici*, where Villani is the source, and dated to 1322. The author mentions that the island was attacked by the Turks throughout these times and that historians are in disagreement about the date of this battle, suggesting that perhaps only one battle occurred: *Annales Ecclesiastici*, ed. Cesare Baronio et al. (37 vols, Paris: Ex Typis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1608–1883), vol. 24, p. 187. Wittek has dated the battle to 1320/21: Paul Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.–15. Jh.* (Istanbul: Zaman Kitaphanesi, 1934), pp. 65–6. The battle is also mentioned by a number of authors who accept Villani's date of 1320: Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, p. 79, n. 1; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 330, n. 4.

[49] Ludolph of Sudheim, 'De itinere Terre Sancte', ed. G.A. Neumann, *Archives de l'Orient Latin* (2 vols, Paris: E. Leroux, 1881–84), vol. 2, pp. 305–77, at p. 333.

a confused version of the original battle of 1319, although it is possible that he is describing a different encounter altogether.

The various garbled and misdated reports of this battle and perhaps others, along with the earlier accounts of George Pachymeres and William of Adam, certainly suggest that the Zaccaria were engaged in extensive military action against the Anatolian beyliks on both land and sea at this time, and that news of their victories were being circulated in the West. Traditionally the Venetians have been credited with taking the fight to the Turks in the fourteenth century, but in these early years this was clearly not the case.[50] The geographical position of Chios, as well as Rhodes, both of which lie within eyesight of the Turkish coast, provide a reason for why these islands, and not those of the Venetians who occupied the territories towards the west of the Aegean, came under more sustained attack from the Turks in the second decade of the fourteenth century. Moreover, by 1319 the Aydin Turks had clearly gained sufficient maritime capabilities and manpower to seriously consider the conquest of Chios and the other eastern Aegean islands, meaning that the Latins of these regions were now crucial for the protection of these Christian territories.

Pope John XXII clearly understood the importance of the Zaccaria in the defence of the faith in the Aegean and granted them a series of spiritual and material privileges to further facilitate their role in this regard. These privileges took the form of trade licences and indulgences, both of which were awarded in response to petitions made by the Zaccaria at the curia, the information of which survives in summaries preserved in the responding papal letters granting the privileges.[51] These letters thus provide us with an important glimpse of the negotiations between a merchant family and the papacy over the seemingly irreconcilable facets of Latin existence in the eastern Mediterranean – the defence of the faith and the necessity of commercial contact with the infidel.

In the first papal letter, dated 5 March 1320, the pope granted the Zaccaria 'by special favour' unrestricted permission to ship the unique Chiote product of mastic to Alexandria and Egypt, specifically so that they could use the proceeds

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[50] See, for example: Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens and the Beginning of Turkish Expansion in the Aegean Area', *SM*, 21.2 (1980), pp. 821–38, at pp. 822–3; Norman Housley, 'Angevin Naples and the Defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the Naval League of 1334', *Byzantion*, 51 (1981), pp. 548–56, at p. 550.

[51] Unfortunately the register of petitions, the *Registra Supplicationum*, does not exist before the pontificate of Clement VI (1342–52): Leonard E. Boyle, *A Survey of the Vatican Archives and of its Medieval Holdings* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1972), pp. 150–51; Patrick N.R. Zutshi, 'The Personal Role of the Pope in the Production of Papal Letters in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', in Walter Pohl and Paul A. Herold (eds), *Vom Nutzen des Schreibens: soziales Gedächtnis, Herrschaft und Besitz im Mittelalter* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2002), pp. 225–7.

to continue to maintain an army [*militia*] on Chios for defence against the Turks.[52] This concession was granted in response to an original petition in which the Zaccaria had claimed that the civil war in Genoa was preventing them from selling mastic to Christian merchants, thus reducing their revenue and preventing them from maintaining an army on Chios for defence against the Turks.[53] The licence was renewed for four years in 1322 and again for three years in 1325.[54] In the second letter, the pope granted Martino Zaccaria and his followers a three-year indulgence in the case of death in combat against the Turks, or of wounds received thereafter on Chios, the surrounding islands and the Turkish mainland. This had been made in response to a petition from Martino which stressed the importance of Chios in defending the region from continuous attacks, and the plight of many who were dying as a result of the conflict.[55] These indulgences were renewed in 1325.[56] Interestingly, William of Adam, who was in Avignon writing his treatise during the election of John XXII in 1316, also recommended that the Zaccaria be granted indulgences for their efforts against the Turks. His feelings may have echoed common sentiment at the papal court at the time and no doubt made the chance of a petition from the Zaccaria being successfully heard at the curia even more likely.[57]

The grants of these privileges, and the petitions made to secure them, are of particular importance because they can provide us with an insight into how the Zaccaria portrayed their actions in the eastern Mediterranean to the papacy. Two features are instantly noticeable in both documents: the continuous references to the threat which the Turks were posing to the Latins in the region at the time, and the vital role which the Zaccaria were playing in defending the Latins of the

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[52] The pope also permitted the brothers to carry back on the same ships any merchandise they wished on their return from Mamluk lands. Full text in Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, pp. 367–8; summary in *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, vol. 3, no. 11081. For more on this licence, see Mike Carr, 'Papal Trade Licences, Italian Merchants and the Changing Perceptions of the Mamluks and Turkish *Beyliks* in the Fourteenth Century', in Georg Christ, Stefan Burkhardt, Roberto Zaugg et al. (eds), *Union in Separation – Trading Diasporas in the Eastern Mediterranean (1200–1700)* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014) [forthcoming].

[53] Their concern seems to have been justified as we know that the existing papal economic embargo on trade with Mamluk Egypt had restricted illicit transport of mastic to Alexandria, as was the case in 1318 when a shipment of the product had been seized off Cyprus by the galleys of the Lusignan kings: Peter W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades: 1191–1374* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 150.

[54] The first renewal was issued on 25 June 1322: ASV Reg. Aven. 17, fols 242–242v; ASV Reg. Vat. 73, ep. 1071. The second renewal was issued on 29 January 1325: ASV Reg. Aven. 23, fol. 143; ASV Reg. Vat. 79, ep. 1449.

[55] The letter is dated 20 February 1323. Full text in Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', pp. 344–5; summary in *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, vol. 4, no. 16977.

[56] ASV Reg. Aven. 22, fol. 450v; ASV Reg. Vat. 78, ep. 882.

[57] William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 21.

Aegean from their attacks. By highlighting both points, the family were consciously portraying their actions in the East as being motivated by a need to defend the faith in the region, and the fact that both petitions were probably made after the battle of 1319 indicates that the family may have been willing to utilize their military achievements against the Turks in order to curry favour at the papal curia. In the grant of indulgences, in particular, the petitioners placed great emphasis on the numerous victories won by the Zaccaria over the Turks and of the fact that the family were paying for the employment of various soldiers from their own funds, who were being used to hold back the Turkish advances. The couching of their deeds in the language of the crusade was evidently a successful measure as the pope approved both requests, demonstrating that the economic and spiritual well-being of the Zaccaria was now regarded by both sides as being intrinsically compatible with the defence of the faith. The documents therefore provide a rare and important example of how the actions of a merchant family operating in the eastern Mediterranean could be intertwined with papal ideology.

We have seen that the papacy was willing to support the Zaccaria in spiritual and economic terms, but gauging the effectiveness of these privileges is far harder to determine. The amount of extra revenue the mastic licence generated, for example, is extremely difficult to calculate as very few records of shipments exist for the period in question, especially to Mamluk lands.[58] Nevertheless, various different sources provide glimpses of the wealth and prosperity of Chios and the Zaccaria in these years, which could plausibly have been a result of the papal privileges. Firstly, the trading concession must have been regarded as being effective by both the Zaccaria and the papacy, as it was renewed for four years in 1322 and for a further three years in 1325.[59] Secondly, the high quality of gold and silver coinage struck on the island at this point reflects a high level of economic prosperity, which, according to David Metcalf, was a direct result of the steady inflow of Byzantine and Italian money from the sale of mastic.[60] This seems plausible as the contemporary Turkish *Manaqeb al-'arefin* stated that in the late 1320s the Turks under Umur of Aydin had carried away 'more mastic than can be described' when they subjugated Chios (*Saqez Adasi*).[61] In addition to this, we must also consider the

[58] For instance, we know that a merchant traded mastic in Savona in 1327, but this is a rare example: *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont: d'après les archives notariales génoises (1320–1400)*, ed. Léone Liagre-de Sturler (2 vols, Brussels: Ravenstein, 1969), vol. 1, no. 46.

[59] See above, n. 54. As a comparative example, the mastic trade brought significant wealth to the Genoese Mahona of Chios in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: see Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, pp. 125, 268, 305.

[60] Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East*, pp. 289–90. See also: Giuseppe Lunardi, *Le monete delle colonie Genovesi* (Genoa: Società ligure di storia patria, 1980), pp. 179–88; Mazarakis, 'Chios Mint During the Rule of the Zaccaria Family', p. 51.

[61] Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki, *The Feats of the Knowers of God (Manaqeb al-'arefin)*, trans. John O'Kane (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 665.

fact that the brothers were still gaining significant funds from the shipment of alum to the West which was boosting the economy of the island. As with mastic, records giving precise details of the alum trade at this time are scarce, but it is known that in 1322 and 1323 consignments were exported to Southampton and Pisa, which may well have been shipped from the Phokaias via Chios.[62] Further confirmation of the growing wealth of the family comes from the account of John Kantakouzenos who claimed that by the late 1320s the income of Martino Zaccaria had reached 120,000 *hyperpyra* per year, which it has been estimated equates to roughly one-fifth of the annual Byzantine imperial revenue under the reign of Andronikos III.[63]

The numerous treatises written by the crusade theorists during the first decades of the fourteenth century provide details on the military capabilities of the Zaccaria and therefore also act as another good indication of their economic prosperity. According to William of Adam, the Turks were afraid to approach within twelve miles of Chios because of the Zaccaria, who 'keep ready at all times at their own cost and expense almost a thousand foot-soldiers, a hundred horsemen, and two well-prepared and fully-armed galleys, with which they inflict serious and deadly hostilities and attacks on the neighbouring Saracen Turks'.[64] In another crusade treatise, the *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*, written in 1331–32, the anonymous author commented on the modified galleys used by Martino Zaccaria in his fight against the Turks; these vessels were surrounded with defensive walls, protected by large towers, and armed with ballistas of different types.[65] Moreover, the Greek historian Nikephoros Gregoras claimed that by the late 1320s Martino Zaccaria had become so powerful that he had forced several of the Anatolian beyliks to pay him tribute.[66] The ability of Martino to afford such an army at his

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[62] In 1322 alum was mentioned as one of the chief commodities confiscated from two Genoese dromonds which put into Southampton: Alwyn A. Ruddock, *Italian Merchants and Shipping in Medieval Southampton: 1270–1600* (Southampton: University College, 1951), pp. 81, 142–3. Pegolotti mentioned that rock alum was sold at Pisa in 1323: Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica Della Mercatura*, p. 208.

[63] Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum*, vol. 1, pp. 371, 379–80 (bk 2, ch. 10, 12); Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 53; Geo Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', *SM*, 10 (1969), pp. 3–68, at p. 15; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, p. 61; Belles, *Mastiha Island*, pp. 75–6.

[64] William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 49–51.

[65] 'Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum', in *Recueil des historiens des croisades: documents arméniens* (2 vols, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1869–1906), vol. 2, p. 457. See also C. Raymond Beazley, 'Directorium ad Faciendum Passagium Transmarinum II', *The American Historical Review*, 13.1 (1907), pp. 66–115, at p. 75. The identification of the author of the *Directorium* remains unknown; the similarities between the work and the *De Modo Sarracenos Extirpandi* have led many to suggest that William of Adam was the author, but this explanation is unconvincing. Full discussion in: Leopold, *How to Recover the Holy Land*, pp. 2–3, 43–4; William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 5–8.

[66] Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, ed. Ludwig Schopen and Immanuel Bekker (3 vols, Bonn: Weber, 1829–55), vol. 1, p. 438; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, p. 60; Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', p. 15; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 9.

own expense was certainly a reflection of the prosperity of Chios during his reign, and it can be presumed that the benefits of the papal trade licence played a part in enabling him to maintain this force for over a decade.

There can be no doubt that the Zaccaria brothers, especially Martino, also benefited from the heroic reputation which their exploits against the Turks gave rise to in the West. As we have seen, by the 1320s Martino's fame had spread across Europe, thanks to reports of his naval victories over the Turks. Praise for their exploits also came from the crusade theorists, in particular William of Adam, who stated that 'no man, woman, dog, cat, or any living creature has remained on any island close to the Turks without the resistance of the strength and power of the said [Zaccaria] lords'.[67] Moreover, the author of the *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*, who claimed to have been present during some of the Zaccaria battles in the East, lauded Martino as an 'industrious, valiant and faithful man' who had achieved 'many victories and triumphs over the Turks'.[68] Another example of the high regard in which the family were held is provided by the prominent Venetian crusade theorist Marino Sanudo, who named Martino Zaccaria as a key player in his provisional anti-Turkish fleet sometime in the early 1320s.[69] By this time, the Genoese of Chios were clearly considered by many in Europe, as well as in the East, as the 'defensive shield of their other Christian neighbours' against the expanding Anatolian beyliks.[70]

Martino Zaccaria seems to have used his increasing power and reputation to cement his place as the principal Latin ruler in the Aegean. He did this by forming stronger links with the Frankish lords of Greece and carving out his own dynasty in the area. We have seen that by 1320 he was the lord of Chios and of Chalandritsa in the Morea, and he was also the legitimate overlord of the Cattaneo della Volta in the Phokaias and possibly had control over the harbour fortress of Smyrna. Sometime before 1325 he also came into control of Damalâ, on the eastern tip of the Argolid in the Morea, and of Veligosti, just south of the centre of the Morea, both of which he acquired through marriage to Jacqueline de la Roche.[71] In addition to this, Martino's eldest son, Bartolommeo Zaccaria, became marquis of Boudonitza

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[67] William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 53; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 329; Lemerle, *L'émirat Aydin*, pp. 53–4.

[68] 'Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum', pp. 457–8.

[69] Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis', vol. 2, pp. 30–31 (marginal note); Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 62–3.

[70] William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 53.

[71] 'Nobilis Martini Zacharie de Castro Domini Insulae Chii, et Castorum Calanuse et Damale': *Saggio di codice diplomatico: Formato sulle antiche scritture dell'archivio di stato di Napoli*, ed. Camillo Minieri Riccio (2 vols and 1 supplement in 2 parts, Naples: R. Rinaldi e G. Sellitto, 1878–83), supplement, part II, pp. 75–7 (no. 60). See also: Anthony T. Luttrell, 'The Latins of Argos and Nauplia: 1311–1394', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, 34 (1966), pp. 34–55, at 52, n. 128; Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', p. 15; Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', p. 120; Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', p. 48.

in 1327 and was later appointed lord of Damalâ by his father.[72] These lordships, although of relatively minor significance individually, took on more importance when combined under one ruler. The acquisitions must have improved Martino's standing amongst the nobility of East and West, as, in May 1325, Philip of Taranto, the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople and brother of the king of Naples, and his wife Catherine of Valois, a cousin of the king of France, bestowed upon him the grand title of King and Despot of Asia Minor. In doing so, they promised to grant Martino the islands of Chios (which he already governed), Marmara, Oenoussai (*Fenosia*), Tenedos, Lesbos, Samos, Icaria and Kos, in return for his assistance in conquering the Byzantine Empire (Martino promised to provide Philip or his successors with 500 knights and six galleys a year for the campaign).[73] Although this granting of titles was a somewhat hollow gesture, as Philip did not possess the territories to bestow them in the first place, the decision of Philip and his wife, with their strong links to the French and Angevin royal families, to trust their dynastic ambitions to Martino Zaccaria demonstrates how powerful he had become in the Aegean and how widely his reputation had spread.

At the same time as forming ties with the nobility of Frankish Greece, Martino also took overt steps to free himself from Byzantine suzerainty and exclude his brother Benedetto II from the co-rulership of Chios. He made clear attempts to extend his realm beyond the emperor's patrimony in Chios by issuing coinage bearing his name alone in Damalâ, which bore no reference to imperial sovereignty.[74]

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[72] Bartolommeo died in c. 1334 and was succeeded by his younger brother, Centurione: Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 325. Bartolommeo received half of Boudonitza in 1312 when he married the daughter of Maria, the Marchioness of Boudonitza: W. Miller, *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), p. 250. See also *Le deliberazioni del Consiglio dei Rogati (Senato): Serie 'mixtorum'*, ed. Roberto Cessi and Paolo Sambin (2 vols, Venice: A Spese della deputazione, 1960), vol. 1, bk 12, nos 38, 40, 194, 202.

[73] The full text of this document is published in *Saggio di codice diplomatico*, vol. 2, no. 60, pp. 75–7. Minieri Riccio gives the date as 1315, but *MCCCXV* does not agree with *Octave Indictionis*; the date should read 1325 instead. A discussion of the correct dating for the document is provided in: Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', p. 48, n. 27; Luttrell, 'The Latins of Argos and Nauplia', p. 52, n. 128. Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', p. 326, and Loenertz, *Les Ghisi*, p. 108, have adopted the incorrect dating of this document. As well as the fact that 1315 and the eighth indiction do not tally, it makes far more sense for Martino Zaccaria to have been made Despot of Asia Minor in 1325, when the Angevin expedition to Morea was underway and Martino had gained a reputation for himself, than in 1315, when he had only become co-ruler of Chios a year earlier, and was not yet renowned for his exploits in the Aegean. For more on this in general, see: Angeliki E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 318–19; Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', p. 120; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, p. 59; Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', p. 16.

[74] They read 'M.ZACHARIE' on the obverse, and 'CIVITAS SYI' on the reverse: Promis, *La Zecca di Scio*, p. 37; Schlumberger, *Numismatique de l'orient Latin*, vol. 2, p. 326.

He also minted a new currency, bearing only his name in Chios, thus scrapping the dual-name coinage he had shared with his brother before.[75] By 1322, the papacy had also begun to recognize him as the sole ruler of Chios; the letter renewing the mastic licence in 1322, for example, was addressed only to Martino Zaccaria, and not alongside Benedetto as was the case in the original document of 1320. The grants of indulgences in 1323 and 1325 were similarly addressed solely to Martino.[76] Eventually Martino attempted to force his brother to renounce his co-governance of Chios in return for an annuity of 6,000 gold coins from the revenue of the island, although afterwards he seems to have reneged on this agreement.[77] From this point the discord between the two brothers grew worse and by 1328 it was so great that Pope John XXII wrote letters urging the brothers to settle their differences for the good of the island.[78]

Martino Zaccaria may have been exacting tribute from some of the Turks in the latter 1320s, but this does not mean to say that he was at peace with all of them. In the years immediately preceding the loss of Chios in 1329, cracks in Martino Zaccaria's Aegean empire were beginning to show. From around 1326 Umur, the son of Mehmed of Aydin and ruler of Smyrna, besieged the Genoese castle in the harbour of Smyrna, which he took in 1328/29.[79] In 1327 Umur also launched naval attacks on the Zaccaria lands in the Morea, primarily Damalâ, probably in an effort to draw military resources away from the conflict in Smyrna.[80] Martino was obviously weakened from the concerted attacks of Umur, and although he had the resources to begin the construction of a castle in Chios Town, he was unable to resist the arrival of an army, under the command of the

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[75] Variants of 'M.Z.S.IMPATOR' (Martinus Zaccarie servus imperatoris): Schlumberger, *Numismatique de l'orient Latin*, vol. 2, pp. 326, 415–6; Mazarakis, 'A Martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria', p. 117; Mazarakis, 'Chios Mint During the Rule of the Zaccaria Family', pp. 46–9, 52; Promis, *La Zecca di Scio*, pp. 36–7. See also Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, pp. 59–60; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 53.

[76] Mazarakis, 'A Martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria', p. 117.

[77] Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum*, vol. 1, pp. 374–5 (bk 2, ch. 10); Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, pp. 60–63; cf. Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', p. 49.

[78] Dated 15 August and 17 September 1328: ASV Reg. Vat. 115, fols 93r–v.

[79] The upper fortress of Smyrna, Palaion-Kastron, was taken by Mehmed beg, father of Umur, in 1317. The castle in the harbour remained in Genoese hands until before the Byzantine expedition to Chios in September 1329: Halil Inalcik, 'The Rise of the Turkish Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades', *BF*, 9 (1985), pp. 179–217, at p. 189, n. 37; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 16; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 54–6. Ibn Battuta visited Smyrna in 1333 and reported that it was mostly in ruins. This was probably a result of Umur's siege of the port and citadel a few years before: Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, trans. H.A.R. Gibb et al. (5 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1958–2000), vol. 2, p. 445.

[80] Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', pp. 831–2.

Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III, which took the island in September 1329.[81] According to Kantakouzenos, Martino would have been torn to pieces by the native Greek population if he had not been taken to Constantinople, where he was imprisoned until 1337.[82] Considering the wealth of Chios and Martino's growing independence, it is not surprising that Andronikos III wished to seize the island from the Genoese. Martino's construction of the castle at Chios Town, which was in breach of the terms of the imperial grant to him, and his willingness to side with Philip of Taranto, the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople, were open provocations towards the Greeks. The attacks by Umur of Aydin thus provided the emperor with the ideal opportunity for an assault on the island.

The loss of Smyrna and Chios within such a short amount of time somewhat contradicts the strong image of Martino Zaccaria as portrayed in the western sources, perhaps calling into question the effectiveness of the papal favours granted to him. If the Greek and Turkish sources are analysed closely, however, some explanations for why Martino's dominion collapsed so quickly can be formulated. Firstly, it is likely, as stated by the *Düstūrnāme* of the Turkish poet Enveri, that Martino deliberately withdrew his forces from the citadel of Smyrna, before it fell to the forces of Aydin.[83] This was done either in an effort to bolster the army on Chios, as suggested by Lemerle, or because Martino had reached an agreement with Umur.[84] Secondly, it is clear from the account of John Kantakouzenos that

[81] The event is described in detail by John Kantakouzenos, who was at the time the *Megas Domestikos* of Andronikos III, and claims to have accompanied the imperial troops during the attack on Chios: Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum*, vol. 1, pp. 370–88 (bk 2, chs 10–12); see also: Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 1, p. 438; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, pp. 60–65; Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, vol. 1, pp. 121–2; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', pp. 334–6; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 56–7; Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', pp. 17–18; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 176–7. Afterwards, the Genoese at Phokaia had been forced to recognize the suzerainty of Andronikos III: Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 16–17. Martino may have also attracted the enmity of certain Latin nobles in the Aegean, such as Niccolò Sanudo, the Duke of Naxos, who apparently joined his galleys with those of Andronikos III: Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', p. 834.

[82] Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum*, vol. 1, p. 378 (bk 2, ch. 11); Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 57. Leon Kalothetos, a friend of Kantakouzenos, became the new governor of Chios.

[83] Enveri, *Le destān d'Umūr Pacha (Düstūrnāme-i Enverī)*, trans. Irene Mélikoff-Sayar (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954), p. 51, verses 139–44.

[84] Lemerle has suggested that the fortress of Smyrna was impregnable and otherwise would have remained in Genoese hands: Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 57. Inalcik uses a passage from the contemporary *Manaqeb al-'arefin* of Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki to argue that Martino had sought Umur's protection: Inalcik, 'The Rise of the Turkish Maritime Principalities', pp. 190–91. However, it seems that the source is mistaken in claiming that Umur had conquered Chios before the arrival of Andronikos III: Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki, *The Feats of the Knowers of God (Manaqeb al-'arefin)*, p. 665. Umur probably attacked the island after the Byzantine recapture in 1329. In this assault Umur's forces were repelled by the Greeks, but he and his brothers still managed to gain much booty: Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 59–61. Ibn Battuta was sold a Greek slave girl by Umur, who was

Chios fell to the treachery of Benedetto II more than any military weakness on behalf of his brother. According to Kantakouzenos, who was apparently an eye-witness to events, once the imperial forces had disembarked and approached Chios Town, Benedetto, who was in command of one of the fortresses, handed it over to the emperor. Martino duly surrendered in the face of overwhelming opposition.[85] This account seems plausible and tallies with what is known about the fractured relationship between the two brothers. The fact that Martino had initially refused to surrender to Andronikos III also suggests that he had significant forces to protect the island and was confident of victory over the Greeks. However, it is likely that manpower shortages prevented him from being able to adequately extend his protection to his other possessions in the region, which was probably the case at Smyrna. Thus Pope John XXII's call for men to aid the Zaccaria against the Turks in exchange for indulgences would seem to be a necessary but ultimately unsuccessful measure. More than anything, it was Martino's neglect of his brother, coupled with the appearance of two highly competent generals in Andronikos III and Umur of Aydin, which caused the ultimate collapse of the Zaccaria dominion in the Aegean.[86]

Although the Zaccaria rule of Chios ultimately proved to be short-lived, it was nevertheless an extremely colourful and eventful episode in the history of the medieval Aegean. Moreover, it provides an important insight into how a merchant family operating in this highly fragmented frontier zone could try and balance the need for secure trade in the East with the papal ideal of military resistance against the Turks. It was precisely the growth of the Zaccaria mercantile empire and the acquisition of possessions in the Aegean and foothold in the alum trade that resulted in their mercantile activities becoming fused with the defence of the faith against Turkish incursions. After Martino Zaccaria, in alliance with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, had won significant victories over the Turks, Pope John XXII granted the Zaccaria trade licences – allowing them to export mastic to the Mamluk sultanate – and indulgences for fighting the Turks. The trade licences are of the utmost importance for our understanding of the ideology and motivations of a merchant family on the fringes of Christendom as they demonstrate that the concepts of trade

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probably captured from Chios at the time of Umur's attack: Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, vol. 2, p. 446.

[85] Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum*, vol. 1, pp. 375–9 (bk 2, ch. 11); Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, pp. 62–8. The betrayal of Benedetto is corroborated by the continuator of Jacob of Voragine: *Iacopo da Varagine e la sua Cronaca di Genova dalle origini al MCCXCVII*, ed. Giovanni Monleone, Fonti per la storia d'Italia, 84 (3 vols, Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1941), vol. 1, p. 485.

[86] After the conquest of Chios by imperial forces, Benedetto II Zaccaria refused Andronikos' offer to govern the island. He later fell out with the emperor and attempted to retake the island by force. This failed and Benedetto died shortly after. For these events, see: Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum*, vol. 1, pp. 379–88 (bk 2, ch. 12); Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, vol. 1, pp. 66–8; Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios', pp. 49–50.

and crusade could be consciously blended together in the thinking of the curia and the merchants operating in the East, in contradiction to the traditional view that these traders somehow abused the crusade to achieve their own commercial ends; for we have seen how the Zaccaria couched the defence of their trade routes in the language of the defence of the faith, and how the pope granted commercial privileges, alongside spiritual rewards, to facilitate their anti-Turkish activities. However, the support that Martino Zaccaria received from the papacy and the West was a double-edged sword. In gaining praise from the crusade theorists and agreeing to assist Philip of Taranto in his crusade ambitions, Martino incurred the wrath of Umur of Aydin and Andronikos III. Ironically it was his zealous prosecution of the crusading ideal – which brought him fame and favour in the West – that ultimately caused his downfall and the loss of the Zaccaria domain. The Zaccaria control of Chios, therefore, demonstrates that, although merchant families could survive in the region and prosper against the Turks with papal support, there were limits to this. The alienation of both Greeks and Turks was evidently too great to bear.

# 6
# Sanudo, Turks, Greeks and Latins in the Early Fourteenth Century

*Peter Lock*

This essay will examine cultural perceptions and judgements in the fourteenth-century Aegean as recorded in the writings of the Venetian patrician Marino Sanudo Torsello. It is based upon his two major works: *Liber Secretorum fidelium crucis* (1307–21),[1] hereafter the *Secreta*, and *Istoria del regno di Romania* (c. 1326–33), hereafter *History*,[2] and his letters or fragments of letters which have survived from the years 1323 to 1337.[3] I will not discuss the so-called *Fragmentum*, a very short document that describes specific events and conditions in Constantinople in 1261 and does not touch upon the themes of this essay.[4]

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[1] Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, in Jacques Bongars (ed.), *Gesta Dei Per Francos, sive orientalium expeditionem et regni Francorum Hierosolymitani historia* (2 vols, Hannover: Typis Wechelianis, apud heredes Ioan. Aubrii, 1611; reprinted Jerusalem, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 1–281. The lecture on which this chapter is based was delivered before the publication of my translation of the *Secreta* and some of the details of Sanudo's life that appear below may also be found in the introduction to this work. See Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross: Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, trans. Peter Lock (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

[2] This history, originally written in Latin, survives only in an Italian translation dating from the eighteenth century. It is printed in Carl Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1873), pp. 99–170 and most recently with a modern Greek translation in *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο: Ιστορία της Ρωμανίας*, ed. and trans. Eutychia Papadopolou (Athens: IBE/EIE, 2000).

[3] Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 286–316; Friedrich Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo den Aelteren', *Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 7 (1855), pp. 753–819; Ch. De la Roncière and L. Dorez, 'Lettres inédites et mémoires de Marino Sanudo l'Ancien (1334–1337)', *Bibliothèque de L'École des Chartes*, 56 (1893), pp. 34–6, 38–9, 43–4; Aldo Cerlini, 'Nuove lettere di Marino Sanudo il Vecchio', *La Bibliofilia, Rivista di storia del libro e delle arti grafiche di bibliografia ed erudizione*, 42 (1940), pp. 348–59. All the letters have been translated into English in Sherman Roddy, 'The Correspondence of Marino Sanudo Torsello' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1971).

[4] For the text of the *Fragmentum*, see Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, pp. 171–4. For discussion, see Robert Lee Wolff, 'Hopf's So-called "Fragmentum" of Marino Sanudo Torsello', in *The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume* (New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1953), pp. 1–10, reprinted as Essay X in Wolff, *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (London: Variorum, 1976).

All that is known about Marino Sanudo Torsello as an individual comes from these sources. He was one of five sons of Marco Sanudo (c. 1241–c. 1318x1323), patrician of Venice. He always described himself as 'Marinus Sanuto dictus Torsellus', a surname, which he tells us, he received from his father Marco.[5] The name seems not to have been confined to Marino's immediate family but to have been used by the Sanudi living in the wards of San Paolo and Castello. Its meaning has provoked much speculation but remains obscure.[6]

His year of birth, let alone the exact date, is not known, having been variously given between 1260 and 1279.[7] Most modern writers follow the standard biographical study of Arturo Magnacavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio e il sue progetto di Crociata*, and accept c. 1270 as his year of birth.[8] His year of death is generally taken to be 1343. This is based upon the date of his will which was drawn up by the notary Pietro of Santa Maria Formosa on 9 March 1343 and witnessed by two priests from his parish of Sanseverino.[9] Presumably he felt his end to be near.

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[5] At the beginning of the *Istoria del regno di Romania*: see Marino Sanudo, *Istoria del regno di Romania*, in Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 99.

[6] See discussion in Frank Frankfort, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello: A Social Biography' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1974), pp. 54–71.

[7] Kunstmann, 'Studien', Letter 2 (p. 698); Joseph Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en orient au XIVe siècle* (2 vols, Paris: Thorin, 1886), vol. 1, p. 32. Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1938), p. 116, follows Magnacavallo and gives the year 1270, but later in his *Crusade, Commerce and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 98, he opted for 1274. Atiya's biographical account in the 1938 volume has many errors and must be used with caution. Giacomo Zabarella, *Historia della gente Livia Romana e Padovana* (Padua: Giacomo Cadorin, detto Bolzetta, 1669), p. 73, gives the year as 1277. More recently A. Cocci has suggested c. 1279 in 'Le Projet de blocus naval dans le *Liber secretorum fidelium crucis* (1321c) de Marino Sanudo il Vechio (1279c.–1343)', in Hakem Akkari (ed.), *La Méditerranée medieval: Perceptions et representations* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002), p. 171.

[8] Arturo Magnacavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio e il sue progetto di Crociata* (Bergamo: Istituto italiano d'arti grafiche, 1901), p. 22, where the various dates are discussed; A. Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: The Background to the Anti-Turkish League of 1332–1334', *Speculum*, 45 (1970), pp. 374–92; Joshua Prawer, introduction to the reprint of *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis* (Toronto: Prelum Academicum Universitatis Torontonensis, 1972), pp. v–xvii; Christopher J. Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the Lost Crusade: Lobbying in the Fourteenth Century', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, 32 (1982), pp. 57–73; Evelyn Edson, 'Reviving the Crusade: Sanudo's Schemes and Vesconti's Maps', in Rosamond Allen (ed.), *Eastward Bound, Travel and Travellers 1050–1550* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 131–55.

[9] See Magnacavallo, *Marin Sanudo*, pp. 150–54, and further discussion in Frankfort, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello: A Social Biography', pp. 130–31 and Appendix B (pp. 274–8) for the text of the will in translation.

His last known surviving letter was written between October 1336 and March 1337 and was addressed to the Lord William count of Hainault.[10]

In the *Secreta* he tells us that he was the son of the Lord Marco Sanudo of the Parish of Saint Severino in Rivo Alto Venice. From his letters and his will we know that he was married twice and had four sons. He lived in his father's house and took over from him in 1318 when he had some sort of financial independence. He is often called a 'merchant',[11] but although he was a merchant of Venice in the broadest sense, he was from a patrician family and never described himself as such.

He also tells us that he delights in the honour of his house and in his family, which was one of the oldest and most prominent in Venice, providing, on a fairly regular basis, members of the Senate and the Great Council but interestingly no members of the Signoria, and after the eleventh century no doges. On occasion in his *History* and in his letters he mentions his family's involvement in Romania, either as dukes of Naxos after the Fourth Crusade or as Venetian bailies in Negroponte.[12] Sanudo further tells us that he had no official involvement with states or rulers, other than his relatives on Naxos, and that his writings were undertaken purely from interest and for the honour of God and the Roman Church. He refers to his travels and seems particularly proud of his voyage to Bruges in 1317, which he mentions twice in the *Secreta*.[13] Of his other travels he records: 'I have passed over the sea five times in Cyprus, Alexandria, Armenia, and indeed in Rhodes', and a little later 'indeed in Romania I spent the greater part of my time, wherefore the condition and state [of that region], especially the principality of Achaia, I can claim to know well'.[14] In his *History* he tells us that he spent time in Negroponte and Naxos, where he had opportunities to meet some of the principal figures in late-thirteenth century Aegean history.[15] Some of their anecdotes he incorporates in his *History*. Given his intense interest in Jerusalem as the place where Christ trod the earth and its significance in the Last Judgement, it is perhaps surprising that he does not seem to have visited the city. The span of his life is not securely known, but is generally given and accepted as c. 1270x1274 to c. 1343.[16] This means that his longevity

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[10] Printed in Roncière and Dorez, 'Lettres inédites', pp. 43–4 and translated in Roddy, 'Correspondence', Letter 42, pp. 307–9. William I Count of Hainault, as well as Avesnes and Holland, (1286–7 June 1337).

[11] See Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 123.

[12] Marino Sanudo, *Istoria del regno di Romania*, in Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 100.

[13] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 72; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 124.

[14] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 2–3; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 23.

[15] Marino Sanudo, *Istoria del regno di Romania*, in Hopf , *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, pp. 99–101. For background information, see Lock, *Franks*, pp. 92–130.

[16] Edson, 'Reviving the Crusade', p. 132.

matches that of the longest lived amongst his correspondents and was much longer than the majority of them.

He was well educated, well travelled, and well connected. In the introductory material to the *Secreta* he tells of the hard work and sleepless nights that the researching and writing of the work cost him.[17] He read extensively and this is reflected in the quality of his Latin, which was exact in expression and grammatically precise.[18] He uses Late Latin words as appropriate, especially for shipping and naval equipment. Although he denied having any expertise in shipping and naval warfare, he does seem to have kept himself up-to-date with galley experiments in the Venetian arsenal in 1315. In the 1320s and 1330s he used his connections to keep himself informed of the deployment of Venetian galleys in the Adriatic and the Aegean.[19] He was exceptionally well read for a layman. He quotes from a number of biblical texts, especially the Psalms, the Prophets, both greater and lesser, the Gospels and the Pauline epistles. He cites some of Bede's scriptural studies and Augustine, plus a number of classical writers, often but not exclusively culled from Jacques de Beauvais and John of Salisbury. He mined William of Tyre, the *Eracles*, Jacques of Vitry and Villehardouin. *The History* of William of Tyre was particularly important to him and he virtually paraphrased it in the compilation of Book III of the *Secreta*. We have no idea what copies of these texts he used, or where and how he gained access to them. He tells us that he wrote, or revised, portions of the *Secreta* in Rome (after 1304), in Venice, in Glarenza and in Bruges. Did he have his own box of books or did he use the libraries of patrons?[20]

What then does he tell us in his works and letters about the relationships of Greeks, Latins and Turks in Latin Romania? Sadly it is much less than is usually thought, even in the *History* which purports to deal with the Morea. The letters are contemporary reports on the 1320s and, in so far as they deal with Romania, focus on central Greece, especially Negroponte (Euboea), the Catalans and the Turks. There is virtually nothing on the military orders in Romania as a whole or on Rhodes in particular. It is not even clear if the Hospitallers were expected to contribute galleys to Sanudo's plan.

Physically the *Secreta* is a large text, consisting of 280 pages in the Bongars edition of 1611, or nearly 17,000 lines of Latin. The book is about the recovery and protection of Jerusalem, so there is not so much here about Romania. When

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[17] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 8; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 28.

[18] See Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 6–8.

[19] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 304, or Roddy, 'Correspondence', Letter 14, pp. 155–6 (1326, to Almerico Chaluz, archbishop of Ravenna); Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 57; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 102.

[20] Little is known on this interesting topic. For some discussion of the availability of books in fourteenth-century Greece, see the short anecdotal notice in Kenneth M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens 1311–1388*, 2nd edn (London: Variorum, 1975), p. 221.

Romania does crop up, the dominant theme is that the Greeks are schismatics and on occasion heretics.[21] Albanians, although noted in Venetian reports as a well-established threat to Negroponte by 1348, do not get a single mention as a new and potent danger.[22] The Turks crop up frequently as a threat to the islands of Romania and to Armenia, although they are seldom clearly distinguished from the Saracens or Agarene peoples who were regarded as acting at the behest of the Mamluks of Egypt. Only once, in a letter of 1330, are they described as 'the worst Saracens',[23] an indicator of his conviction that the Turks were the main threat to the stability of Romania.

The *Secreta* provides a programme to revive crusading, to recover Jerusalem by attacking Egypt, and first to weaken the latter by a trade embargo. Much of it was a rationalization of what had been going on in the thirteenth century and in Sanudo's own time. While the Fourth Crusaders had adopted Egypt as their goal and failed to arrive, both John of Brienne and Louis IX had actually campaigned there. Philip V of France, one of the dedicatees of the *Secreta*, had tried unsuccessfully both to help Armenia and to impose a trade embargo on Mamluk ports.[24] What Sanudo provides that is new is detailed logistics and budgets, profiles of skills and leadership qualities that will prevent the shortcomings of previous crusades, together with detailed background information – geographical, historical, political and economic; indeed, a veritable crusade handbook.

The planks of Sanudo's scheme were three: to protect Armenia, to prevent trade with the Muslims – by propaganda, decree and naval patrols – and to recover Jerusalem and hold it secure. If all else failed, and this was not really a serious

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[21] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 32; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 64.

[22] Lock, *Franks*, p. 109. However, his letters show his appreciation of the Albanian presence as early as 1330: see Roddy, 'Correspondence', Letter 18, pp. 174–5 (1327, to Ingramo, archbishop of Capua).

[23] Roddy, 'Correspondence', Letter 30, p. 255 (10 April 1330, to Bertrand, bishop of Ostia).

[24] See: John Law, 'The Italian North', in *NCMH*, vol. 6, p. 468; Christopher J. Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the Assemblies of 1319–20 and the Crusade', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 57 (1984), pp. 15–34; Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 20–23. For general discussion of the policy of embargo, see: E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Cocci, 'Le Projet de blocus naval', pp. 171–88; David Jacoby, 'The Supply of War Materials to Egypt in the Crusader Period', *Jerusalem Studies in Arabia and Islam*, 25 (2001), pp. 102–32; Jean Richard, 'La royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Egypte (fin XIIIe–début XIVe siècle)', *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (1984), pp. 120–34. See in particular: Stefan Stantchev, 'Embargo: The Origin of an Idea and the Implications of a Policy in Europe and the Mediterranean, ca. 1100–ca. 1500', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Michigan, 2009), pp. 25–319; idem, 'The Medieval Origins of Embargo as a Policy Tool', *History of Political Thought*, 33.3 (2012), pp. 373–99.

option for Sanudo, the security of Armenia, which was essential to protect Romania and Cyprus from the Turks, would be maintained. Underpinning it all was faith in God and the efficacy of prayer and belief. Right belief, and therefore the right brand of Christianity, was important.

Sanudo divides his world into the West and the East, as proper nouns with capital letters.[25] Adherence to an acceptable form of Christianity was an important part of this division. The Greeks clearly belong to the West. In the *Secreta*, Sanudo labelled them 'schismatics' and sectaries, in which they were followed by the King of Serbia. It is not entirely clear whether he regarded Bosnia, where they were all schismatics, as part of the West. Lithuania, which was pagan, was definitely not.[26] The Greeks, then, were made distinct from the other areas of the West where Christians were in control. As well as the label of schismatic, all the well-worn put-downs of the Greeks were employed, from the lavish care they take of their beards to their behaviour. They are deformed by various errors, especially their rejection of the *filioque* clause, which receives elaborate attention. They are false and cunning like foxes, inclined to thefts and bribes, and become traitors for a small price. All these traits they share with the *Suriani*, or Arabic-speaking Christians. It is, then, not surprising that the Greeks were not seen as suitable recruits for the new crusade, in which right belief was essential.[27]

Whatever supposed characteristics of the Greeks he might re-use or recycle in reviewing the crusades of the late twelfth century, the conquest of Constantinople was not part of his plan. He simply noted the crusade of 1204 as a positive outcome brought about by perseverance and Venetian naval ability. Prince Edward of England's proposal to capture Constantinople in 1271 is simply noted in passing without further comment.[28]

In Book II of the *Secreta* Sanudo discussed the personnel for his proposed crusade and advanced a number of desirable personal qualities for the various commanders. Ultimately, however, he ruled out a multinational expedition in favour of one dominated by the Venetians. Not only did they have all the qualities based upon their proven naval prowess, a long involvement in the crusade movement, plus the added, if rather odd, advantage of the similarity of the Egyptian coast with that of the shoreline around Venice, but they also had a number of personal and behavioural qualities that distinguished them from the north Europeans.[29]

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[25] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 15, 45; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 40, 84 amongst others.

[26] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 32; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 64.

[27] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 182; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 288–9.

[28] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 72–3; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 124, 126.

[29] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 51–3; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 94–7.

The only other group seriously considered for participation were the sailors of Germany.[30] Sanudo rated them highly, especially for their cooperation with the Venetians in that very successful expedition which we know as the Fourth Crusade. Their main drawback was that they were loud, and ate and drank too much. Sanudo does not rule out the Greeks specifically from participating. They were just not considered at all for possible recruitment into the ranks of the new crusade and were presumably not expected to participate.

Schismatics they might be but certainly not heretics in a religious sense; so where do the Greeks as heretics come in? The trade embargo was central to Sanudo's plan for the new crusade. It was not a new idea, going back to the late tenth century in local Venetian terms and more generally to the Third Lateran Council of 1179, reinforced in 1215; but what was new here was that it would be publicized in all churches in harbour towns, would be policed and would be followed up by inquisitors or inspectors. It was to be enforced by a stop-and-search policy carried out by a fleet of ten galleys and also by a system of denunciation that relied upon neighbours in home ports and merchants in foreign ports.[31] Sanudo was aware of the difficulties: the weather, limited sailing time, the large area to be patrolled, not just off the port of Alexandria, and the potential difficulties that honest Christian merchants would experience in arresting black cargoes in Mamluk ports. The embargo applied to all Christian powers. Sanudo must have been aware of the involvement of the Venetians here. They, however, got scant attention. For him it was the areas where Christians lived in close proximity to the Saracens – that is, Armenia, Spain and North Africa, and in particular Romania and its islands – that were of prime importance in the commercial relations of Christians and Muslims.[32]

Sanudo incorporated all the marginal notes from his first version of the *Secreta* in the main text of the second version. However, he created two new marginal notes in the second version, both of which concerned Latin Romania. The first is in the context of Sanudo's large crusade plan and is addressed to the captain of the naval forces that will both patrol the seas and later take part in the first landings in Egypt. Essentially it is a list of the reliable Latin rulers in the Aegean who have some sort of monetary resource or naval capability:

> The Captain to whom the armament shall be entrusted may reject these [chosen vessels] and will want to use a substantial number of galleys and sailors, such as he can easily procure from the rulers mentioned below. For he will have one from the Zaccharia of Genoa who rule on the island of Chios close to the Turks.

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[30] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 72; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 124.

[31] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 27–31; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 56–64.

[32] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 32; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 64.

> A second from the Venetians that is the lord Guglielmo Sanudo[33] and others from the house of Ghisi. A third from the Patriarch of Constantinople and his clergy and from the lords and vassals of the island of Negroponte, who will come together if they are commanded, and the condition will not be worse than that of the foresaid. A sixth galley will be equipped by the Archbishop of Crete with the help of his clergy and other nobles living on the islands round about, let alone the feudatories and other Cretans, if they will be commanded by letters granting them a licence for the usual indulgence for their efforts. From the illustrious King of Cyprus and the Prelates and nobles of that island, it is reasonable to believe that four galleys will be willingly equipped. For without being asked they have fitted out many more than four galleys. Nor should the former expect to be expressly thanked for this work, since it contributes to the utility and progress of them all. For as a result they will be more secure from Turkish raids and the inroads of other Saracens, and they can be protected from the society of Catalans and other evil doers. These ten galleys should each have 250 men, for which nothing will be spent straightway by the Camera of the Roman Church, for that fleet will be kept in being all the time by the foresaid persons. The Captain of this apostolic gathering can order these ships in the same way as the other galleys under his command. Finally the King of Cyprus, the Hospital and the others mentioned above from the parts of Romania, because this is a great and evident matter in progress, can for some time assist your Holiness' Captain with other galleys, cavalry and foot soldiers. Moreover many armed merchant galleys can be found in those parts, which can be useful for finding trade at the appropriate place and time, and especially when they are joined with the aforesaid galleys.[34]

The second note recounts the violence done to the consort of the Emperor Robert of Constantinople. It is, I think, the only source of this outrage but Sanudo confused Robert with his predecessor, the Emperor Henry.[35] Although it is not relevant to our present topic, this mistake is often taken to show that Sanudo knew little of events in the Latin Empire itself.

It is the Latins of Romania and the isles who are threatened by the Turks, not the Greeks. Although Sanudo did not say so specifically, there is some suggestion that he thought that the problem applied particularly to Cyprus.[36] The Greeks import spices from the nearby Turks, plus other banned goods, and pass them on for export to the West, presumably mostly by means of the annual Venetian *flotta*, but this

[33] Duke of the Archipelago, 1303–23; see Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 480.

[34] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 31; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, pp. 62–3.

[35] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 73; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 127. See Wolff, 'Hopf's So-called "Fragmentum"', pp. 149–59.

[36] Marino Sanudo, *Liber Secretorum*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei Per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 32; Lock, trans., *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful*, p. 65.

Venetian complicity is passed over in silence and not explored at all. Nonetheless, Sanudo considered that those engaged in this trade should be treated as heretics since they imperil the souls of their neighbours. The profits and wealth that they gain lure others to follow their example, to the damnation of their souls. It is because of the spiritual corruption and harm that they cause that they deserve to be treated as heretics, and imprisoned in secret. If they are captured on the seas, they are to be held captive for life, but it is not clear where or how. Sentence of excommunication was to be used as a disincentive to rulers or townships that might turn a blind eye to the trade in their midst. An integral part of the process was to be two inquisitors, who really do not get the attention that they deserve. They are mentioned in the threats but not otherwise elaborated upon. They seem to be involved in denunciation in home ports, where they are to respect the anonymity of those making denunciations of black market traders. An incentive for informers was a third of the property of the illicit traders, on their conviction. The detail is lacking. Nor is it clear if they were to function just in Romania or more widely. This was a central point in Sanudo's argument and petition to John XXII. There was no inquisition in Romania. The Greeks were not heretics because of their religion; but because of commercial temptation, geographical proximity to the Saracens and their dispositions, they might be subsumed in a constructive heresy.

This is really all that Sanudo has to offer on schismatics and heretics specifically in Romania. It all comes in the *Secreta*, which is one of a number of crusading plans of the early fourteenth century and whose focus is the liberation of Jerusalem. Of course he has a large section on the Greeks and many other religious groups in Syria and Palestine in the historical part of his treatise that forms Book III, but this is primarily copied from Jacques of Vitry and William of Tyre, with no new insights or information, especially evident in his treatment of the *Suriani* whom he continued, like his sources, to lump with the *Graeci* and to regard as a sect rather than as a linguistic grouping.[37] Sanudo never followed the practice of Greek and Latin writers on the Fourth Crusade in referring to each other as 'dogs'. This mutual insult of uncleanliness clearly stung the writers of the early thirteenth century but seems to have died with them and not to have carried over into the fourteenth century. When Sanudo came to write his *History* a decade after the *Secreta*, he made not one single mention of the Greeks as schismatics. Times had changed and he had moved on from crusade publicist to an historian in his own right.

He wrote his second book, the *Istoria del regno di Romania* (*History*), in the first half of 1328, since he mentioned Charles, duke of Calabria,[38] who died on 11 November of that year, as the lord of Florence. There were some additions in 1332 or 1333, since he refers obliquely to the family troubles and death of Michael

[37] Christopher MacEvitt, *The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 102.

[38] Charles of Calabria (1298–1328), son of Robert of Naples; his uncle was Philip of Taranto. He was created duke on his father's accession in 1309.

VIII's son, Andronicus II, who was deposed by his grandson and abdicated in 1328, dying in 1332.[39] In this work Sanudo is surprisingly silent about the religion of the Greeks. It receives but two mentions in the 71 pages of the Hopf edition in *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*. He deals with the period from the late 1250s down to about 1300 and most of it is about Charles of Anjou, the Sicilian Vespers and Italy rather than the Morea. The Greeks are just one of the competing elements for dominance in Romania. They want to remove the Latins, they rebel, they raid, they dupe, and they capture strong points or lose them. They are prepared to use the services of Turks, as indeed are the Franks. There is no mention of the threat to Romania from the Turks that figured so persistently in the *Secreta*. In fact, none of this attracts adverse comment or moral judgement. It is just a fact. The terms schismatic or heretic are not used at all. There are only two specific references to the religion of the Greeks, both in the context of the Council of Lyons, 1274. The first occurs in an anecdote about a certain 'Miser Castruccio, now lord of Pistoia and Lucca' and presumably a forebear of that famous fourteenth-century despot, Castruccio Castracani.[40] Miser Castruccio served Michael Palaiologos, quarrelled with him, and sought refuge with the Turks. Back again in Byzantine service sometime in the early 1270s, we are told that: 'Once back in the empire he was now a careful man of great knowledge and tried in every way possible to obtain the grace and favour of the Roman Church. Indeed he had beaten, wounded and killed many Orthodox priests and prelates, while many others were convinced by him to take part in the Council of Lyons.' He presumably had the backing of Michael Palaiologos here too, and it is this emperor who earns a very upbeat appraisal from Sanudo as the man who accepted the *filioque* clause and tried 'with much effort to drive the Greek people to the obedience of God's Church, into the right faith and the teaching of the Apostles from which it had deviated for a long time. However, I think that once the Roman Empire was transferred from the Greeks to the Germans there was no more love between Greeks and Latins.'[41] He concludes that no other emperor had done so much for the good of Christianity, that 'our Lord was on his side and that anyone could take him as a good example in doing good'.[42] This assessment had not appeared in the pages of the *Secreta*. Unsurprisingly, the Roman Church is clearly the true Church for Sanudo, but in the *History* the Greeks are not

[39] Born Nicaea, 25 March 1259. He was married twice: first to Anna of Hungary and second to Yolande/Irene of Montfort. His son Michael IX died in 1320. He was deposed by his grandson Andronicus III Palaiologos in 1328 and died as a monk in Constantinople on 23 February 1332. See A.E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[40] Marino Sanudo, *Istoria del regno di Romania*, in Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 135; Louis Green, *Castruccio Castracani* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), says nothing about this Miser Castruccio or Constantinople.

[41] Marino Sanudo, *Istoria del regno di Romania*, in Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 136.

[42] Ibid., p. 137.

schismatics or heretics, but at worst mistaken and obdurate. Events in the decade since the presentation of the *Secreta* to Pope John XXII in September 1321 had led to a change of emphasis. The crusade as outlined in the *Secreta* was still the grand solution but the Greeks were now viewed as part of that solution, associates rather than schismatics.

Finally, there are the 42 surviving letters which, nearly four decades ago, Angeliki Laiou used to gauge the climate of opinion among western and Byzantine rulers leading to the anti-Turkish league of 1332–34, and which Christopher Tyerman used to show Sanudo as a crusade lobbyist and would-be crusade consultant.[43] In this chapter, however, I will be much more specific and selective. The letters show the anxiety of a man with commercial and family links in the Aegean at a time when a growing Catalan and Turkish presence posed a threat to stability. His crusade project remained prominent in his letters at least down to the death of Pope John XXII in December 1334. The five surviving letters or fragments from 1334 to March 1337 for the first time do not refer or allude to the crusade project in any way. Broadly speaking, the letters up to 1334 are concerned with aid to Armenia, which became even more pressing after the destruction of the sea-fortress at Lajazzo[44] in 1322 and the apparent slipping of the kingdom under Mamluk overlordship thereafter. The unity of the Greek and Roman Churches was the foundation for the destruction of the enemies of Christianity. It was this change in emphasis that was reflected in the *History*. However, the naval patrols recommended in the *Secreta* remained the prime means of waging this war.

In 1323 he wrote to Jerome, bishop of Caffa (1318–24) – apparently hoping that he would show the letter to the Byzantine Emperor – that:

> It is held that to travel through the emperor's lands or to acquire it is unnecessary. On the contrary sailing directly to the lands subject to the sultan of Babylon is urged. There are those who oppose this policy [...] However I oppose them [...] let us assume that we might possess the greater part of the imperial territory. However, we would not possess the people's heart in obedience to the Roman Church. For example we can see this clearly in the case of the islands of Cyprus and Crete, the principality of the Morea, the island of Negroponte and the other islands and lands ruled by the French. Although the faithful of the Roman Church hold dominion, the people are not obedient to it; perhaps on certain occasions they appear to speak as if they were faithful to the church, nevertheless they are not so in heart. This is generally known.[45]

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[43] Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks', pp. 374–92; Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the Lost Crusade', pp. 57–73.

[44] Modern Ayas, Adana; ancient Aegeae; French Layas; Italian La Giaza, Laiazzo; medieval Ajazzo, Lajazzo. It changed hands many times (eight?) in the fourteenth century, passing to the Mamluks in 1347.

[45] Roddy, 'Correspondence', Letter 3, pp. 116–20 (1323, to Brother Jerome, bishop of Caffa).

His solution was to win over the emperor and the patriarch to Church Union and then their subjects would follow suit: a selective learning from the past here.

He devoted much attention to the activities of the Catalans and the Turks. In 1325 he wrote to Ingramo, archbishop of Capua, that Robert of Naples[46] should go to the Holy Land. This would lead to the ending of Turkish raids on the Morea and the Aegean islands. In the same letter he referred to the Catalan acquisitions in Thessaly and the appearance of Albanian raiders in the same area. He feared that the Aegean islands would be lost to the Turks and Negroponte to the Catalans. Two years later, in March 1327, writing to Ingramo again, he still feared that Negroponte might be lost, resulting in irreparable damage to western interests in the Aegean, while Robert of Naples was preoccupied with the doings of Louis the Bavarian.[47] In that letter he mentioned a proposed trip to Romania and a second, longer letter to Ingramo. This latter letter of the same year is perhaps the best known and most frequently cited of Sanudo's letters today. In 1974 it permitted David Jacoby to relocate and rename the famed battle of the Cephissus to Halmyros.[48]

In the letter he tells us that the Albanians in Thessaly were divided into three groups: those who acted independently, those who acted with the Greeks and those who acted with the Catalans. In Sanudo's opinion, the Catalan preoccupation with the first two groups had saved Negroponte. He goes on to explain that the island of Negroponte was impoverished because, although the lords there entered Greek service at high pay, they had lost their lands in the Duchy of Athens. Knights were in short supply, for women held the fiefs, their men having died, whilst John of Gravina's progress through Morea in early 1326 had added to their financial burdens.[49] The Catalans should not be underestimated. His information came from personal experience, personal communication from the Venetian baili in Negroponte, Marco Gradenigo (in office 1327–29), and from news from the galleys returning to Venice from the Aegean. He insists that there are many who deny or ignore the imminent danger, but he knows for certain that the greatest perils threaten.

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[46] Robert II of Naples (r. 1309–43), son of Charles II and elder brother of Philip of Taranto and John of Gravina.

[47] Louis of Bavaria (1282–1347), crowned King of Italy in Milan in January 1327, and crowned Louis IV, Holy Roman Emperor, in Rome in January 1328 by the aged senator Sciarra Colonna.

[48] David Jacoby, 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305–1332): un nouveau témoinage de Marino Sanudo Torsello', *SM*, 15 (1974), pp. 217–61, reprinted as Essay V in Jacoby, *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siècle* (London: Variorum Reprints,1979).

[49] John of Gravina (1294–1336), son of Charles II and younger brother of Robert II. He was Count of Gravina (1315–36), Duke of Durazzo (1332–36) and ruler of Albania. His trip to Greece was financed by the Acciaiuoli. See Lock, *Franks*, pp. 128–9.

In 1327 he warned Robert II of Naples, through Archbishop Ingramo, that the greatest danger was not from Louis the Bavarian in Milan but from the peril of Negroponte:

> The reason is this: our lord king ought to know the Catalans well, how much they are like galls. Wherever they place themselves, they cannot be extracted except by death. Your eminences are well acquainted how they came to Sicily. Afterwards they were given Sardinia so that they would leave Sicily. They hold Sardinia, Sicily, and the Duchy of Athens together with a good part of Thessaly.
>
> Are they contented? Certainly not. Rather they daily seek the way and means to bore in. As a result war will come to the land and Negroponte will be possessed. If they gain Negroponte the other islands of Romania will not be able to resist falling into their hands. Danger has also threatened the island of Crete for a long time, and even Morea, which the Greeks and Latins hold, would come into their hands. I am certain that they are not yet contented; such is their nature.
>
> You should be aware that if the Catalans hold Negroponte, which is not yet so, they would have available many Turks from Turkey, a great multitude of horsemen, infantry, and sailors […] When the Duke of Athens and Count of Brienne waged war with the aforesaid company near Halmyros I was there, a captain of seamen for Venice and for the baillie of Negroponte, and I saw fully eighteen thousand horsemen of Turkopoles and Morati with the Catalans. Although each and every race remained by itself and ruled itself; nevertheless the Catalans ruled over all. However, after the Catalans had killed the Count, defeated his army, and entered into the duchy, they sent that host into Thessaly and then afterwards they departed. Finally, a large part of them were destroyed because they quarrelled among themselves. Later I learned that the Turks very much desired to return to the Catalan company.
>
> Certainly if the Turks of Asia Minor had not been engaged in so many contests on the sea and their people had not suffered as much injury as they have, their ships would have come up to the mouth of the Adriatic Sea.[50]

He returned to this theme on 10 April 1330 in a very long letter written in Venice to the Apostolic Legate Bernard, bishop of Ostia, in which he neatly summarized Angevin military involvement in Greece from 1306 to 1326. All of it has been disastrous, impoverishing those involved as protagonists and causing much material damage to both the Morea and Epiros. Rather a better course might have been followed: the Church could have had the land and the people under its jurisdiction

[50] Roddy, 'Correspondence', Letter 18, pp. 177–8 (1327, to Ingramo, archbishop of Capua).

by the mediation of Michael and the patriarch (John II Bekkos) who ruled at that time. People who follow the Greek rite are to be found from Georgia to the Adriatic coast. With hindsight he seems to perceive a way forward and to suggest that some compromise might be made with the Greeks, and that this failure has been a lost opportunity, but he does not spell it out in any way that might involve compromise by the Latin Church. In this letter, as in others from the 1320s, he is convinced that the Catalans are allied with the Turks and that any Turkish attacks on Catalan possessions are a feint to deceive western observers. By 1330, the threat to Romania is now almost totally from the Turks:

> not only have they acquired almost all of Asia Minor but also they charge across the sea with their well-armed ships, destroying the islands of Romania and entering the lands of the mainland. They destroy and annihilate, totally, not sparing any because of sex or age. They have killed the old and taken the young into captivity. They have sold them for slaves. So in short, if God, and the Supreme Pontiff, does not give assistance, all those lands and the islands of Romania will be destroyed.[51]

The 42 surviving letters of Sanudo are a rich source of material on Latin Greece in the 1320s and provide the background for Sanudo's change in outlook towards the Greek Orthodox Christians evident in the *Istoria del regno di Romania*. Not surprisingly in a writer who could see the weaknesses in the trade routes and markets of the Sultan, Sanudo was no mean historical geographer and, in his last assessment of the Greeks, went some way to approaching and appreciating the potential of Christian minorities within the Muslim lands. In this same letter he wrote:

> Let not the people who follow the Greek rite seem small to anyone. Although the empire holds little territory now, having lost almost the land they had, nevertheless Greeks inhabit very many eastern lands. The land of Asia Minor is large, much larger than all of Spain. On three sides it is bounded by sea. Tartars from the east who rule large parts of it still call it Romania.[52]

His letters enjoyed a vogue in the early 1970s and went a long way to support a model linking the Catalans with the rise of the Ottoman Turks. Sanudo was not always right, of course. Negroponte remained in western hands for another 170 years; the Union of Churches never came and a western trade embargo was not required to damage trade through Mamluk lands. His two books are perhaps a little thin on Latin Greece, in the same measure as his letters bristle with personal experiences and personal concerns for that region. He was a writer of extensive knowledge and deep convictions. His texts, especially the *Secreta*, are full of

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51 Ibid., Letter 30, p. 255 (10 April 1330, to Bertrand, bishop of Ostia).

52 Ibid., Letter 30, p. 252.

information on medieval commercial, geographical, nautical and political life, and I would commend its perusal to any medievalist.

To conclude, contact and conflict are part of human experience and as such run through Sanudo's writings. In this chapter, the focus has been on Latin Romania and in this context a process of definition and refocusing had taken place between the appearance of the final version of the *Secreta* in 1321 and the completion of the *History* around 1333. The enemy might still be that broad and amorphous grouping of Saracens, Agarenes and subjects of the Sultan of Egypt, but within that group Sanudo focused specifically on the Turks. In alliance with the Catalans, they posed a mounting and serious threat to Latin Greece and the Aegean islands, and Sanudo wished to draw attention to that threat. The first victims would not just be Latin lords but the majority population, the Greek Orthodox Christians. The Greek as schismatic was something of a theme running through the *Secreta*, but one that was dropped entirely in the *History*. In the *Secreta*, Sanudo had seen the Greeks as posing a threat to Christendom because of their religion and especially because of their close commercial contacts with the subjects of the Sultan in Cyprus and in the Aegean islands. As a result of the Turkish threat Sanudo hoped that, following the reunification of Christianity, the Greeks too might join the defence of Christendom. Sanudo never discussed how this fundamental condition was to be achieved. Indeed, it too remained as difficult to bring about as his innovative crusading project was to finance. Sanudo was aware that contact and conflict between peoples in the Aegean had undergone a change during the 1320s, but his optimism that a solution could be found remained undiminished.

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# PART IV
# The Ottomans' Western 'Frontier'

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# 7
# A Damascene Eyewitness to the Battle of Nicopolis: Shams al-Dīn Ibn al-Jazarī (d. 833/1429)*

*İlker Evrim Binbaş*

The Battle of Nicopolis in 1396 was the last significant attempt by the Christian powers of Europe to stop the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. The campaign was launched at a critical juncture for Bayezid I, as he had been engaged in the siege of Constantinople since 1394.[1] A crusader attack meant for him the diversion of his forces from the siege to the defence of his territories. This is exactly what he did. He abandoned the siege and faced the crusader army in Nicopolis, the modern Nikopol in northern Bulgaria. The disastrous defeat of the crusader army at Nicopolis had far-reaching consequences for the Ottomans. Bayezid I established a hegemony in the Balkans which continued until the twentieth century, and used the Karamanid hostilities before the battle as a pretext to expand his territories into Anatolia.[2]

The dearth of early Ottoman sources severely hinders our understanding of the Battle of Nicopolis. The earliest Ottoman historical narrative, Ahmedî's *Tevârih-i mulûk-i Âl-i Osman*, was completed around 1410, more than a decade

* I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Judith Pfeiffer for reading this chapter and providing valuable feedback on it, and to Geert Jan van Gelder for kindly offering numerous revisions and improvements on the Arabic translations which are found in the second part of the chapter. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.

1 There is no monograph-length study devoted to Bayezid I and his reign. For an overview, see the following: Mükrimin Halil Yınanç, 'Bayezid I', *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (15 vols, Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944), vol. 2, pp. 375–6; Halil İnalcık, 'Bāyazīd I', in *EI*$^2$, pp. 1117–19; idem, *Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları (1302–1481)* (Istanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2010), pp. 109–17.

2 In this chapter I will refer to the incident as the Battle of Nicopolis instead of the Crusade of Nicopolis, since the latter term would include the phase of propagation dating back to the 1380s. The literature on the subject from the perspective of European powers is vast and diverse. See: Aziz Suryal Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London: Methuen, 1934); Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar, 1274–1580* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 75–9; David Nicolle, *Nicopolis 1396: The Last Crusade* (Oxford: Osprey History, 1999).

after the event, and completely ignores the Battle of Nicopolis.[3] Şükrullah, who completed his chronicle *Bahjat al-tavārīkh* in 1459, gives only a sketchy account of the battle.[4] By then, however, Ottoman historiography was already engaged in the ideological dilemmas of Mehmed II's empire-building project, and Bayezid I, the Battle of Nicopolis and his subsequent defeat at the Battle of Ankara represented for them the vanity of (past) self-aggrandizement.[5] According to the Ottoman historians writing after the conquest of Constantinople, Bayezid I was a great ruler, but he made the mistake of centralizing authority and interfering in the affairs of the other interest groups, such as the ulama (religious scholars). His vanity, ambition and use of unchecked authority could – with hindsight – only be stopped by another higher authority, that is, Timur, who disastrously defeated the Ottoman army in 1402 at the Battle of Ankara and humiliated Bayezid I afterwards.[6]

Ibn al-Jazarī, a Shāfi'ī scholar from Damascus, is the only exception to the situation discussed above. He studied and produced works on many different subjects during his long career, but the field in which he excelled most is Qur'ān recitation (*qirā'at*), and he is still known as one of the greatest authorities in Islamic history in this field.[7] He was present in the Ottoman camp during the Battle of Nicopolis and in two of his works, entitled *Jāmi' al-asānīd* (*Compendium of the Chain of Authorities*) and the *Dhāt al-shifā' fī sīrat al-Muṣṭafā wa al-khulafā'*

[3] Ahmedî, 'Tevârih-i mulûk-i Âl-i Osman', in [Nihal] Atsız (ed.), *Osmanlı Tarihleri I*, (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1925–47), pp. 21–22; English translation = Kemal Sılay, 'Aḥmedī's History of the Ottoman Dynasty', *Journal of Turkish Studies,* 16 (1992), pp. 142–3.

[4] Shukrullāh, *Bahjat al-tavārīkh* = 'Der Abschnitt über die Osmanen in Šükrullah's persischer Universalgeschichte', ed. T. Seif, *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, 2 (1923–26), p. 98.

[5] Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 151–4. For a brilliant analysis of these rivalries as represented in the post-conquest historical and quasi-historical sources, see Stéphane Yerasimos, *La fondation de Constantinople et de Sainte-Sophie dans les traditions turques: lègendes d'Empire* (Paris: Institut Francais d'Etudes Anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 1990).

[6] Feridun Emecen, 'İlk Osmanlı Kroniklerinde Timur İmajı', in *Prof. Dr. İsmail Aka Armağanı* (Izmir: Beta Basım Yayın İzmir, 1999), pp. 27–36; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, 'Sultan Meḥmed the Conqueror: The Conquest and the Centralization of Power in the Ottoman Empire', in İlker Evrim Binbaş and Nurten Kılıç Schubel (eds), *Horizons of the World: Festschrift for İsenbike Togan* (Istanbul: Ithaki, 2011), pp. 359–77.

[7] So far, the most detailed modern studies on Ibn al-Jazarī's life are the following: Ali Osman Yüksel, *İbn Cezerî ve Tayyibetü'n-neşr* (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı, 1996), pp. 147–238; Tayyar Altıkulaç, 'İbnü'l-Cezerî', in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye diyanet vakfi, 1999), vol. 20, pp. 551–7; Aḥmad Pākatchī, 'Ibn Jazarī', in *Dā'irat al-ma'ārif-i buzurg-i Islāmī* (Tehran: Markaz-i Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, 1374 H.sh./1995–96), vol. 3, pp. 231–4. Admittedly, none of these studies on Ibn al-Jazarī's life is satisfactory. They all include textual and historical inaccuracies. This is partially because of the inconsistencies found in our sources. I will attempt to present an account that is as accurate as possible here but, needless to say, a critical study on Ibn al-Jazarī's life is still to be written.

*al-khamsa* (*Essence of the Restoration about the Life of* [the Prophet] *Muṣṭafā and the Five Caliphs*), he included a short account of the battle.[8] The *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd* came down to us in a single manuscript, and other than to a few scholars in Turkey, the manuscript and its contents are virtually unknown.[9] Mükrimin Halil Yınanç appears to have been aware of the *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd* when writing his article on Bayezid I, but he does not provide any specific reference other than Ibn al-Jazarī's name.[10] In his article Yınanç picks up only the 'factual' information, such as that Bayezid I's army was much smaller than the 200,000-strong crusader army. Among Turkish scholars, Ali Osman Yüksel also made extensive use of the manuscript in his study on Ibn al-Jazarī. Although he was mainly interested in Ibn al-Jazarī's place in the science of Qur'ānic recitation, he also discussed the references to the Battle of Nicopolis in the *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd*.[11]

Unlike the *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd*, however, the importance of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* for studying the Battle of Nicopolis has long been appreciated by scholars.[12] Carl Brockelmann provided a concise description of the work in his monumental *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* and emphasized its importance for determining the precise date of the Battle of Nicopolis. Brockelmann's short notice was first picked up by Johannes H. Mordtmann in 1923 and then Friedrich Giese in 1928 in their discussions on the date of the battle. It appears as though neither scholar had access to an original manuscript, as they limited their references to Brockelmann's short description. Zeki Velidi Togan, in his book on historical methodology published in 1950, listed the *Dhāt al-shifā'* among the histories of the

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[8] Besides these two accounts which I will discuss in more detail below, Ibn al-Jazarī also briefly refers to the Ottoman conquest of Bilecik in 699/1299–1300 in his *Mukhtaṣar Ta'rīkh al-Islam*, which is an abridgement of the Mamluk historian al-Dhahabī's multi-volume Islamic history entitled *Ta'rīkh al-Islām*. See: Mükrimin Halil Yınanç, *Düsturname-i Enverî. Medhal* (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1930), p. 87; idem, 'Ertuğrul Gazi', *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (15 vols, Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1948), vol. 4, p. 336; Rudi P. Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), p. 88.

[9] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd*. Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Darülmesnevi 11. For further information on this manuscript, see the next part of this chapter.

[10] Yınanç, 'Bayezid I', pp. 375–6.

[11] Yüksel, *İbn Cezerî ve Tayyibetü'n-neşr*, pp. 165–7.

[12] The *Dhāt al-shifā'* was recently published, together with a later Ottoman commentary on it. See Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥasan al-Ālānī al-Kurdī (d. 1189/1775–76), *Kitāb raf‘ al-khafā sharḥ Dhāt al-shifā'*, ed. Ḥamdī 'Abd al-Majīd al-Salafī and Ṣābir Muḥammad Sa‘d Allāh al-Zībārī (2 vols, Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-'Arabīyah, 1987). Al-Kurdī's commentary is an interesting piece of Ottoman scholarship, but I will by and large ignore his commentary in order to keep the focus of my essay on the *Dhāt al-shifā'* per se. I also consulted the following two manuscripts of the *Dhāt al-shifā'*: Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Laleli 2040 and Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Lala Ismail 375. These manuscripts were copied in 940/1533–34 and 1199/1784–85 respectively. Unless otherwise noted, all my references are to the published edition.

Ottoman Empire, without being too specific about its contents.[13] To the best of my knowledge, it was Aziz Suryal Atiya who first made proper use of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* in order to determine the date of the battle accurately and to argue that Bayezid I was not the first Ottoman ruler to adopt the title *sulṭān*.[14] Atiya was more interested in the factual information that he could extract from the *Dhāt al-shifā'* than the work itself. He describes Ibn al-Jazarī's account as 'interesting, but historically meagre'.[15] After Atiya, no historian of the crusades has shown any sustained interest in the *Dhāt al-shifā'*. David Nicolle, the author of *Nicopolis 1396*, a semi-popular textbook on the subject, simply mentions Ibn al-Jazarī's presence in Bayezid I's retinue and says that he completed his '*History of the Prophet and Caliphs*' three days after the battle.[16]

After Yınanç's contribution, interest in the *Dhāt al-shifā'* abated in scholarship on Islamic and Ottoman history as well. This is despite the fact that the *Dhāt al-shifā'* constitutes a rare eyewitness account of an important event in early Ottoman history. In the following pages, I will first provide a short account of Ibn al-Jazarī's life and intellectual endeavours, and provide an English translation of the sections relevant to the Battle of Nicopolis in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* and the *Dhāt al-shifā'*. Finally I will argue that Ibn al-Jazarī's overall intellectual travails and his interactions with other intellectuals should be taken into account in order to achieve a proper understanding of the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* and the *Dhāt al-shifā'*.

## The Author: Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Jazarī

We are relatively well informed about Ibn al-Jazarī's life thanks to lengthy autobiographical notes included in two of his works, *Jāmi' al-asānīd* and the *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, which is a biographical dictionary of the prominent reciters of the Qur'ān. Various Mamluk and Timurid chronicles also include extensive

[13] Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 2nd edn (2 vols and 3 suppl. vols, Leiden: Brill, 1937–42), vol. 2, p. 203; suppl. vol. 2, p. 275; J.H. Mordtmann, 'Die erste Eroberung von Athen durch die Türken zu Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts', *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 4 (1923), p. 349; F. Giese, 'Türkische und abendländische Berichte zur Geschichte Sultan Bajezids I', *Ephemerides Orientales. Oriental Book List of Otto Harrassowitz Leipzig*, 34 (1928), p. 7; Z.V. Togan, *Tarihde Usul* (Istanbul: İbrahim Horoz Basımevi, 1950), p. 223. Franz Babinger does not refer to the *Dhāt al-shifā'* in *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1927). This is most probably because of the fact that Ibn al-Jazarī wrote his work for a Timurid prince, Pīr-Muḥammad b. 'Umar-Shaykh in Shīrāz, not for an Ottoman ruler. Giese's article is a bibliographic rarity, and I would like to thank Mehmetcan Akpınar of Tübingen University for sending me a copy of this article.

[14] Atiya, *The Battle of Nicopolis*, pp. 150, 160. See also idem, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1938), p. 450.

[15] Atiya, *The Battle of Nicopolis*, p. 202.

[16] Nicolle, *Nicopolis 1396*, p. 79.

references to Ibn al-Jazarī and his scholarly and administrative activities. Ibn al-Jazarī was born in Damascus on 25 Ramaḍān 751/26 November 1350. He received his early education both in his native town and in Cairo. He had already memorized the Qur'ān when he was thirteen, and performed the pilgrimage in 768/1366–67, together with his merchant father. Except for a single stint in Alexandria before 1372–73, he regularly commuted between Damascus and Cairo in order to further his education in the following eight years. From Cairo he returned to Damascus in Sha'bān 770/March–April 1368, but did not stay very long in his hometown and returned to Cairo in Rabī' I 771/October–November 1369. He received his certificates (*ijāza*) for issuing juristic ruling (*fatwā*) in 774/1372–73, 778/1376–77 and 785/1383–84 from such prominent scholars as Ibn Kathīr, Shaykh Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Qazvīnī and Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar b. Rislān al-Bulqīnī respectively.[17] He was finally appointed as the Shāfi'ī judge of Damascus in 793/1390–91 by the Mamluk sultan Barqūq (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99). However, his appointment to this position appears to have been a short-lived one, as he was again dismissed almost immediately. This was probably due to allegations of financial or administrative misconduct related with The Manṣūrī Trust (*waqf*) in Cairo.[18] On 28 Ramaḍān 793/29 August 1391 the Mālikī judge of Cairo ruled against him in a case concerning this endowment. In the next few years, Ibn al-Jazarī went back and forth between Cairo and Damascus, and in 797/1394–95 he finally settled in Damascus.[19]

At the beginning of Jumādā I in 798, that is, some time in mid-February 1396, Ibn al-Jazarī suddenly escaped to Bursa, to the court of Bāyezīd I, after his properties in Cairo were confiscated by Barqūq. Unfortunately, the details of this curious affair remain rather vague in our sources. The *Jāmi' al-asānīd* and

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[17] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fols 12a–16a; Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya fī ṭabaqāt al-qurrā'*, ed. G. Bergstraesser and Otto Pretzl (2 vols, Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'ādah, 1933–37), vol. 2, pp. 247–9.

[18] This is the large *madrasa* and hospital endowment of the sultan al-Manṣūr Qalawun (d. 689/1290) who ruled the Mamluk sultanate between 1279 and 1290. See Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Islamic Architecture in Cairo – An Introduction* (Leiden: Brill, 1989), pp. 95–100.

[19] Not surprisingly, we do not find the references to his troubles with Barqūq's administration in his autobiographical notes. Instead, we need to rely on other contemporary Mamluk sources. See: Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh Ibn al-Furāt*, ed. Qusṭantīn Zurayq (9 vols, Beirut: American University of Beirut Publications, 1936), vol. 9, pp. 260–61; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, *Ta'rīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, ed. 'Adnān Darwīsh (4 vols, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 379, 382–3. Both chroniclers suggest that Barqūq removed Ibn al-Jazarī and reappointed Sharaf al-Dīn Mas'ūd as the Shāfi'ī judge of Damascus after getting paid 400,000 *dirham*s. It should be noted that this was not the only controversy in which Ibn al-Jazarī was involved during his career. He also had a long-running dispute with Ibn Ḥusbānī since Ramaḍān 787/October–November 1385. According to Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ibn Ḥusbānī was accused of mis-spending 300,000 [*dirham*] which belonged to the Jāmi' al-Tawba trust in Damascus. Ibn al-Jazarī ruled against Ibn Ḥusbānī, which marked the beginning of a long-running dispute between the two figures. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, *Ta'rīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, pp. 159,163, 284.

the *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, our chief primary sources on the details of Ibn al-Jazarī's biography, are almost silent on this issue, but short references in contemporary Mamluk chronicles shed light on the circumstances surrounding Ibn-Jazarī's flight to Anatolia. In the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, Ibn al-Jazarī simply says that he escaped to the Ottoman lands because of 'various tribulations' in Egypt. He also alludes to the fact that Bayezid I invited him to Bursa. Hence, Ibn al-Jazarī sailed to Antioch via Alexandria.[20] Ibn al-Jazarī's silence can be understood better when we look at other contemporary sources, as they provide a less than flattering depiction of Ibn al-Jazarī. Indeed, Mamluk chronicles depict events in a rather embarrassing light for Ibn al-Jazarī. A certain Mamluk *amīr* by the name of Quṭlubak al-'Alā'ī (d. 806/1403), who was in the retinue of Barqūq's *atabeg* Aitamish, was Ibn al-Jazarī's patron.[21] When Amīr Quṭlubak returned to Cairo from Damascus, Ibn al-Jazarī followed him and, through the connections of his patron, entered the court circles of sultan Barqūq. This must have been sometime around 779/1377–78, when he was given the position of the *tawqī' al-dast*, that is, a scribe of the royal council.[22] In 797/1394–95, Amīr Quṭlubak returned to Damascus and Ibn al-Jazarī followed him. In Damascus, Ibn al-Jazarī was accused of embezzlement of trust funds by Quṭlubak, who had just been appointed as *ustādār*, or the chief of staff at Barqūq's court. The problem was resolved at a meeting attended by Ibn al-Jazarī and other judges in Damascus. However, after this interrogation, Amīr Quṭlubak ordered the confiscation of Ibn al-Jazarī's properties in Cairo. Therefore, it is highly probable that the financial irregularities in which Ibn al-Jazarī was purportedly involved had implications for the sultan's finances as well. Feeling insecure about his life, Ibn al-Jazarī first escaped to Alexandria in 798/1395–96, and then sailed to Antioch (or

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[20] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fols 16a–17a.

[21] For Quṭlubak, see al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw' al-lāmi'a li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsi'a* (12 vols, Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1353–55/1934–36), vol. 6, p. 224. See also Şehabeddin Tekindağ, *Berkuk Devrinde Memlûk Sultanlığı* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1961), pp. 103–4. In the Mamluk Sultanate the *ustādār* or *ustād al-dār* was the person who was in charge of the day-to-day activites at the court, as well as managing the sultan's personal expenditures. Towards the end of the fourteenth century, especially during the reign of Barqūq, the *ustādār* evolved into being an immensely powerful position. See: Fatih Yahya Ayaz, *Türk Memlükler Döneminde Saray Ağalığı Üstâdârlık (1250–1382)* (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı, 2008), esp. pp. 174–80; idem, *Memlükler Döneminde Vezirlik 1250–1517* (Istanbul: İSAM, 2009), p. 72; Amalia Levanoni, 'Ustādār', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 10, p. 925.

[22] Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw'*, vol. 9, p. 256. Barqūq was known to open the doors of his court to all kinds of intellectuals, including various radical or free-thinking figures. For further discussion on these figures, see İlker Evrim Binbaş, 'Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī (ca. 770s–858/ca. 1370s–1454): Prophecy, Politics and Historiography in Late Medieval Islamic Historiography' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 2009), pp. 76–174. So far the only study on Barqūq and the Mamluk state under his rule is Tekindağ, *Berkuk*.

Antalya, according to the Mamluk sources) in three and a half days.[23] He stayed there for eight days and then went to Bursa via Konya. Apparently, he had a student called Shaykh Ḥājjī Mu'min in Bursa and, probably through his mediation, went there to attend the court of Bayezid I.[24]

By making Ibn al-Jazarī a party in a financial quagmire, Mamluk sources do not paint a very flattering picture of him, but unfortunately they also do not provide detailed information on the nature of the trouble in which he found himself in Cairo. In the Mamluk Sultanate it was not unusual for a Mamluk scholar to be involved in financial matters which would involve both *amīr*s and other members of the intellectual establishment.[25] Not surprisingly, Ibn al-Jazarī glosses over this issue.

All biographers of Ibn al-Jazarī agree that he was highly regarded in Bursa and lectured widely on the science of Qur'ānic recitation. But the details of his activities, especially his relationships with the Ottoman ruling family, are rather patchy in our sources. As the danger of Timur's invasion loomed larger in the Middle East, Barqūq sent Amīr Ṭūlī (or Ṭūlū) b. ʿAlī Bāshā to Bursa to renew his alliance with Bayezid I. Amīr Ṭūlī met with Ibn al-Jazarī and his companions in Bursa and reported their condition back to Barqūq upon his return to Cairo in Rabī I 799, that is, December 1396.[26] Amīr Ṭūlī's report was noted by the contemporary Mamluk

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[23] The names of these two cities orthographically resemble each other very closely in the Arabic script: *Anṭakya* and *Anṭalya*. The *Jāmiʿ al-asānīd* represents the first-hand account, but since we do not have an autograph manuscript of the text, we cannot be sure if the *Jāmiʿ al-asānīd* is more accurate than the contemporary Mamluk chronicles.

[24] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmiʿ al-asānīd*, fols 16a–16b; Ibn al-Furāt, *Taʾrīkh Ibn al-Furāt*, vol. 9, pp. 434, 457–8; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, *Taʾrīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, pp. 551–2, 579; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-ghumr bi-anbāʾ al-ʿumr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (4 vols, Cairo: Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1969–98), vol. 1, pp. 510, 525; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍawʾ*, vol. 9, p. 256. See also Tekindağ, *Berkuk*, p. 103; Yüksel, *İbn Cezerî ve Tayyibetü'n-neşr*, pp. 159–60. Yüksel lists two more possible reasons for Ibn al-Jazarī's flight. The first is his conflict with Aytmish on his appointment to the judgeship of Damascus and the fear of Timur. This is not probable as he was appointed and then immediately removed from the judgeship of Damascus in 793/1390–91, almost five years before his flight to the Ottoman lands. The alternative is equally improbable, again for chronological reasons. Yüksel refers to a note in the introduction to Ibn al-Jazarī's *Ḥiṣn al-ḥaṣīn*, where he says that he completed his work under the threat of a great enemy on 22 Dhū al-hijjā 791, that is, 12 December 1389. However, Ibn al-Jazarī escaped to the Ottoman lands seven years later. In other words, the danger of Timur cannot have been the reason for his flight.

[25] For a discussion on how intellectual endeavours were not immune to social, economic and political ramifications, see Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and, more pertinent to our case here, see Anne F. Broadbridge, 'Academic Rivalry and the Patronage System in Fifteenth-Century Egypt: al-ʿAynī, al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī', *Mamluk Studies Review*, 3 (1999), pp. 85–107.

[26] Tekindağ, *Berkuk*, p. 103. Based on a reference found in Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, Tekindağ argued that Barqūq was clearly worried about the prestige that Bayezid I gained in the Islamic world after the Battle of Nicopolis. For Ṭūlī b. ʿAlī Bāshā, see al-Sakhāwī,

chroniclers Ibn al-Furāt and Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, who say that Ibn al-Jazarī was rewarded with a substantial daily allowance by Bayezid I.[27] He was accompanied to Bursa by a certain Ibn Taymiyya, and in Bursa he met with one of his old students, Ḥājjī Mu'min, that is, Mu'min al-Rūmī, who had studied with him in Damascus in 783/1381–82.[28]

Ibn al-Jazarī attended Bayezid I's siege of Constantinople. On 6 Shawwāl 798/13 July 1396, he joined the Ottoman forces advancing towards Constantinople. As a supreme sign of self-flattery, Ibn al-Jazarī, in his autobiographical account in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, says that Bayezid I asked him to walk in front of the army. They eventually camped in Galata, outside the city of Constantinople, and stayed there several days, waiting for the arrival of Bayezid I. However, Bayezid I abandoned the siege soon after hearing the news of a massive army of 'infidels' crossing the Danube and entering into the Ottoman territory. According to the news which arrived at the Ottoman army camp, the 'infidel' army had camped at Nicopolis. Ibn al-Jazarī went to Nicopolis together with Bayezid I and witnessed the Battle of Nicopolis on 28 Dhū al-Hijja 798/2 October 1396.[29] A full English translation of Ibn al-Jazarī's account of the battle is provided in the next part of this chapter.

We do not hear much about Ibn al-Jazarī's activities in the Ottoman lands during the following six years. It is probable that he settled in Bursa and continued his studies at the Grand Mosque of Bayezid I. Ahmed Ateş conjectured that Ibn al-Jazarī must have met Süleyman Çelebi (d. 825/1421–22), the author of the *Mevlid*, in Bursa, and the latter modelled his famous *Mevlid* after Ibn al-Jazarī's similar text entitled *'Urf al-ta'rīf bi-mawlid al-sharīf*, which he completed either in Bursa or

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*al-Ḍaw'*, vol. 4, p. 13; Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfī*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (7 vols, Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-'Āmmah lil- Kitāb, 1993), vol. 7, pp. 28–30.

[27] Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh Ibn al-Furāt*, vol. 9, pp. 457–8; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, *Ta'rīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba*, p. 608. The amount that Ibn al-Jazarī received is 150,000 *dirham*, according to Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba. Ibn al-Furāt gives two figures: 100,000 *dirham* and 50 *dirham* worth of gold or silver and 150,000 *dirham*. He also adds that Ibn al-Jazarī was given nine horses, three oxen, three mules, slaves and a place to reside with an adequate salary.

[28] Ḥājjī Mu'min (d. 3 Ṣafar 799/6 November 1396) was the preacher of the Bursa Hüdavendigar Mosque. See Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, vol. 2, pp. 324–5. Like Ibn al-Jazarī, he attended Bayezid I's siege of Constantinople and the Battle of Nicopolis. I could not identify Ibn Taymiyya. He is mentioned neither in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* nor in the *Ghāyat al-nihāya.* Of course, he is certainly not the famous Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya who died in 1328, long before the events that we discuss in this chapter.

[29] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fols 17a–17b. See Yınanç, 'Bayezid I', p. 375. See also: Taşköprüzāde, *Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya fī 'ulamā'al-dawlat al-'Uthmāniyya*, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī Bihbihānī (Tehran: Kitābkhāna, Mūza, va Markaz-i Asnād-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, 1389 H.sh./2010–11), pp. 39–41; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā'*, vol. 1, p. 525; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw'*, vol. 9, p. 257.

just before he had arrived there.[30] Among his students in Bursa were three sons of Bāyezid I, Meḥmed, Muṣṭafā and ʻĪsā.

On 28 Dhū al-Ḥijja 804/29 July 1402, after Bayezid I was defeated by Timur at the Battle of Ankara, Ibn al-Jazarī fell hostage to Timur's grandson Muḥammad-Sulṭān b. Jahāngīr in Bursa. He was first taken to Kütahya and presented to Timur. It appears as though Ibn al-Jazarī adapted to the new political environment quickly and was accepted by Timur as a trustworthy companion. This we can argue based on the fact that Timur sent Ibn al-Jazarī's son Mawlānā Badr al-Dīn Aḥmad to the Mamluk sultan Faraj b. Barqūq, as he himself marched from Kütahya to Denizli. Mawlānā Badr al-Dīn took Timur's *fatḥnāma*, the declaration of victory, to the sultan Faraj in Cairo.[31] We do not have any further information on Ibn al-Jazarī's activities in Anatolia. Following Timur, he first went to Kash, a city also known as Shahr-i Sabz, to the south of Samarqand, where he started teaching at a *madrasa* built by Timur. He was then taken to Samarqand and resided there until Timur launched his Chinese campaign on 23 Jumādā I 807/27 November 1404. Just before setting out for the campaign, Timur established his *ordu* (army camp) in the Kān-i Gil, just north-east of Samarqand, and congregated the *quriltai* (assembly), during which the marriages of several of his sons and grandsons also took place. The person who recited the Qur'ān at this joyous event was none other than Ibn al-Jazarī.[32]

After Timur left with his army, Ibn al-Jazarī returned to Kash and stayed there until Timur's death in 1405.[33] Ibn ʻArabshāh, a fellow Damascene scholar who was also taken to Samarqand by Timur, mentions him as one of the intellectual luminaries

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[30] Süleyman Çelebi, *Vesîletü'n-Necât. Mevlid*, ed. Ahmed Ateş (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954), pp. 13–14. Süleyman Çelebi completed his work in 812/1409, and it is the most famous *mevlid* ever composed in the Ottoman cultural environment. The term *mawlid* (or *mevlid* in Turkish) refers to the poems composed in celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad's birth.

[31] Sharaf al-Dīn ʻAlī Yazdī, *Ẓafarnāma*, ed. Saʻīd Mīr Muḥammad Ṣādiq and ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn Navā'ī (2 vols, Tehran: Kitābkhānah, Mūzih va Markaz-i Asnād-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1387 H.sh./2008), vol. 2, pp. 1157, 1161 and 1164. Ibn al-Jazarī was not the only person to be taken hostage by Timur after the Battle of Ankara. Johannes Schiltberger was a Bavarian aristocrat who fell hostage to Bayezid I after the Battle of Nicopolis and was taken to Samarqand by Timur after the Battle of Ankara. See Johann Schiltberger, *The Bondage and Travels of Johann Schiltberger*, trans. J. Buchan Telfer (London: Hakluyt Society, 1879), p. 21.

[32] Yazdī, *Ẓafarnāma*, vol. 2, pp. 1264–5; Faṣīḥ-i Khvāfī, *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, ed. Sayyid Muḥsin Nājī Naṣrābādī (3 vols, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Asāṭīr, 1386 H.sh./2007), vol. 3, p. 1013. Yazdī names the following Timurid princes who married during the *quriltai*: Ulugh Beg b. Shāhrukh, Ibrāhīm-Sulṭān b. Shāhrukh, Ijil b. Mīrānshāh, Aḥmad b. ʻUmar-Shaykh, Sayyidī Aḥmad b. ʻUmar-Shaykh, and Bayqara b. ʻUmar-Shaykh. This *quriltai* and the wedding were most vividly described by Ruy Gonzales Clavijo in his travelogue. See Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403–1406*, trans. Guy Le Strange (London: Routledge, 1928), pp. 237–56.

[33] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmiʻ al-asānīd*, fols 18b–19a.

of Samarqand, but does not give details of his activities.[34] As Robert McChesney suggested, it is entirely plausible to assume that the young Ibn ʻArabshāh studied with Ibn al-Jazarī during his stay in Samarqand.[35] A slightly later Timurid historian, Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū (d. 833/1430), says that Khvāja ʻAlī Shaṭranjī al-Tabrīzī studied the *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* with Ibn al-Jazarī and received his certificate (*ijāza*) in Prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*) from him. Among the students of Ibn al-Jazarī in Samarqand was Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Isḥaq, the father of the famous Timurid historian ʻAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, who studied the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, that is, the two canonical books on prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*) composed by Muḥammad al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj (d. 875), with him. All four of his sons, including the historian Samarqandī himself, also attended his lectures and received their certificates (*ijāzas*) from him.[36]

Ibn al-Jazarī's career in Transoxiana came to an abrupt end when Timur died in Otrar, en route to China, on 16 Shaʻbān 807/17 February 1405. At that time Ibn al-Jazarī was still in Kash, but immediately departed to Samarqand to obtain Khalīl-Sulṭān b. Mīrānshāh's permission to leave the region.[37] If we are to believe Ibn al-Jazarī, Khalīl-Sulṭān b. Mīrānshāh initially gave him permission to leave the city, but then regretted his decision and called him back. A messenger found Ibn al-Jazarī in Qarshi, to the south-west of Kash, and informed him about the request of Khalīl-Sulṭān. Instead of obliging with Khalīl-Sulṭān's request, however, Ibn al-Jazarī went to Bukhārā, and then turned towards Herat, the capital of Shāhrukh's appanage in Khorasan, arriving there on 17 Ṣafar 808/14 August 1405.[38] We do not know whether he sought Shāhrukh's patronage in Herat, but he tells us that Shāhrukh left the city with his army and the scholars of the city to greet his arrival.[39] Ibn al-Jazarī did not stay very long there, although a much later source, Khvāndamīr's *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, which was written in 905/1499–1500,

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[34] Ibn ʻArabshāh, *ʻAjā'ib al-maqdūr fī nawā'ib Tīmūr*, ed. Aḥmad Fā'iẓ al-Himsī (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah, 1986), pp. 467–8.

[35] Robert McChesney, 'A Note on the Life and Works of Ibn ʻArabshāh', in Judith Pfeiffer and Sholeh Quinn (eds), *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), p. 216.

[36] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Zubdat al-tavārīkh*, ed. Sayyid Kamāl Ḥājj Sayyid Jawādī (4 vols, Tehran: Sāzmān-i Chāp va Intishārāt-i Vizārat-i Farhang va Irshād-i Islāmī, 1380 H.sh./2001), vol. 1, pp. 30–31; ʻAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, *Maṭla'-i Sa'dayn va majma'-i baḥrayn*, ed. ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn Navā'ī (2 vols in 4, Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Ṭahūrī, 1353–1383 H.sh./1974–2004), vol. 2/1, p. 413.

[37] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fol. 19a. According to Ibn al-Jazarī, Timur died on 17 Shaʻbān 807/18 February 1405. Khalīl-Sulṭān b. Mīrānshāh was one of the pretenders to Timur's throne. He enjoyed a short-lived rule in Samarqand until 811/1409. See B.F. Manz, 'Ḵalil Solṭān b. Mirānšāh b. Timur', *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (New York: Columbia University, 2010), vol. 15, pp. 385–6.

[38] Ibn al-Jazarī's itinerary is rather confusing here. It appears to me that he shunned Khalīl-Sulṭān's pleas and did not return to Samarqand at all.

[39] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fols 19a–19b.

suggests that Ibn al-Jazarī was in Herat sometime after 813/1410–11 and attended a sermon delivered at the newly finished Bāgh-i Safīd *madrasa*.[40] Khvāndamīr mentions Ibn al-Jazarī to explain why the sermon was delivered in Arabic. The reason was that, even though Ibn al-Jazarī was living in Herat at the time, he did not know the Persian language. This account creates some chronological problems, as we cannot corroborate this information based on other sources related to Ibn al-Jazarī's life. According to the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* and *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, Ibn al-Jazarī first went to Yazd from Herat, and then moved on to Iṣfahān. He was in Tūn in Khorasan on 16 Jumādā I 808/9 November 1405, and finally he arrived at Shīrāz, a city in Fārs where another Timurid prince, Pīr Muḥammad b. 'Umar-Shaykh (d. 812/1409), was in power, in Jumādā II 809/November–December 1406.[41] Pīr Muḥammad appointed him as the judge (*qāḍī*) of Shīrāz. This was obviously a remarkable distinction, but all our principal sources except the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* agree that Ibn al-Jazarī's stay in Shīrāz was involuntary, and he was in fact forced to stay in Shīrāz by Pīr Muḥammad.[42] However, his stay there is of particular importance for our purposes, because he wrote the *Dhāt al-shifā'* in this city and dedicated it to Pīr Muḥammad. I will return to this issue in the next section, when I discuss the *Dhāt al-shifā'* itself.

Although we roughly know where Ibn al-Jazarī lived between 807/1405, the year in which he left Samarqand, and 833/1429, the year of his death, we do not know exactly how long he lived in each city. We know that he performed the pilgrimage in 811/1408,[43] and we are certain that he was still in Shīrāz in 815/1413, when a group of intellectuals, including Ibn al-Jazarī, offered their services to Mīrzā Iskandar (d. 818/1415) in his struggle against his uncle Shāhrukh after Pīr Muḥammad's death.[44] The letter in question is an important document for the internal politics of the Timurid Empire in the first decades of the fifteenth century, as it is one of the prime sources attesting how informal networks of intellectuals intervened in the political affairs among the Timurid princes. It was sent to Qivām al-Dīn Yazdī, the brother of the famous Timurid historian Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī. In fact, it is highly probable that the historian Yazdī and Ibn al-Jazarī already knew each other in Cairo. Yazdī and his master Ṣā'in al-Dīn Turka went to Cairo to study

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[40] Khvāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, ed. Jalāl al-Dīn Humā'ī (4 vols, Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Khayyām, 1333 H.sh./1954), vol. 4, p. 7. I could not identify the source of this information. Khvāndamīr's main sources, that is, Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's *Zubdat al-tavārīkh* and Samarqandī's *Maṭla'-i sa'dayn*, do not report this incident.

[41] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fol. 21a. According to the *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, he arrived at Shīrāz in Ramaḍān 808/February–March 1406. See Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, p. 250.

[42] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, p. 250; Taşköprüzāde, *Shaqā'iq*, p. 39.

[43] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fol. 21a.

[44] Francis Richard, 'Un témoignage inexploité concernant le Mécénat d'Eskandar Solṭān à Eṣfahān', *Oriente Moderno*, n.s., 15 (1996), p. 68. For the career of Iskandar b. 'Umar Shaykh, see Priscilla P. Soucek, 'Eskandar b. 'Omar Šayx b. Timur: A Biography', *Oriente Moderno*, n.s., 15 (1996), pp. 73–87.

the esoteric sciences with Shaykh Ḥusayn Akhlāṭī (d. 799/1397), who was arguably the most prominent esotericist of the fourteenth-century Islamic world. He was a close companion of Barqūq, and apparently had an immense influence on the occultist networks in the Central Islamic lands.[45] We do not know if Ibn al-Jazarī was acquainted with Akhlāṭī when he was in Cairo, but he was certainly in contact with the circle of Yazdī and Turka in Fārs. However, we should admit that he was not very highly regarded in this circle of intellectuals. In his autobiographical work entitled *Nafthat al-maṣdūr-i duvvum*, which he wrote in order to defend himself after the disastrous assassination attempt against Shāhrukh, son of Timur, in 830/1426, Ṣā'in al-Dīn Turka wrote that Ibn al-Jazarī was a great scholar, but that he did not know anything other than the sciences of the Qur'ān recitation (*'ilm-i qirā'at*) and Prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*).[46]

As I mentioned above, Ibn al-Jazarī's stay in Shīrāz was initially involuntary, but he eventually settled in Shīrāz, even though Pīr Muḥammad died on 6 Muḥarram 812/21 May 1409, some four years after his arrival in the city. He appears to have occupied an important place in the regional administration of the Timurid Empire. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's *Mu'izz al-ansāb* lists one of his sons, Abū al-Khayr Muḥammad al-Jazarī, as a *ṣadr* in the administration of Ibrāhīm-Sulṭān b. Shāhrukh, who was appointed to the governorship of Fārs after the Mīrzā Iskandar b. 'Umar-Shaykh's attempts to carve out a new dispensation for himself had failed in 816/1413.[47] In 823/1420 and in 827/1423, Ibn al-Jazarī performed his fourth and fifth pilgrimages, and in his second travel to Mecca, he was able to visit Cairo and meet with his son Abū Bakr Aḥmad for the first time since 805/1402, when the latter was sent to Cairo by Timur as an ambassador. During his stay in Cairo, Ibn al-Jazarī also visited Yemen for a short period of time. He seems to have stayed in Cairo and returned to Shīrāz via Damascus and Basra in 829/1425. Ibn al-Jazarī died in Shīrāz on 5 Rabī' I 833/2 December 1429 and was buried there.[48] After his death, his influential son Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-Jazarī tried to recover his father's property, which had been confiscated by Barqūq 33 years earlier, by using his position in the administration of Ibrāhīm-Sulṭān in Shīrāz, but we do not know anything about the outcome of his attempts.[49]

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[45] Binbaş, 'Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī', pp. 139–44.

[46] Ṣā'in al-Dīn Turka, 'Nafthat al-maṣdūr-i duvvum', in Sayyid 'Alī Mūsawī Bihbihānī and Sayyid Ibrāhīm Dībājī (eds), *Chahardah risāla-yi fārsī az Ṣā'in al-Dīn 'Alī b. Muḥammad Turka-yi Iṣfahānī* (Tehran: Chāpkhāna-yi Firdawsī, 1351 H.sh./1972), p. 211.

[47] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Mu'izz al-ansāb*, Paris Bibliothèque Nationale Ms. ancien fonds pers. 67, fol 142b [Facsimile reprint = *Istoriia kazakhstana v persidskikh istochnikakh. Mu'izz al-ansāb* (Almaty: Daïk-Press, 2006), fol. 145a (sic)].

[48] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, vol. 2, pp. 250–51; al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw'*, vol. 9, pp. 257–60; Faṣīḥ-i Khvāfī, *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, vol. 3, p. 1120; Taşköprüzāde, *Shaqā'iq*, pp. 40–43. See also Yüksel, *İbn Cezerî ve Tayyibetü'n-neşr*, pp. 165–79.

[49] Ibrāhīm-Sulṭān, the governor of Fārs, wrote a letter to the Mamluk sultan Baybars, requesting the return of confiscated property. The letter was most probably drafted by Sharaf

## The Battle of Nicopolis in the Works of Ibn al-Jazarī

Ibn al-Jazarī discusses the Battle of Nicopolis in two of his works. The first account is embedded in his autobiographical section in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*. I briefly referred to this section above in my discussion on Ibn al-Jazarī's life. The *Jāmi' al-asānīd* is a short work on the importance of the *isnād* (pl. *asānīd*), the chain of scholarly authorities which connects several generations of scholars in the Islamic religious sciences. The work has come down to us in a single manuscript that is held in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul, and the present copy was prepared by Mubārak b. 'Abd Allāh b. Muhtadī on 21 Rajab 842/7 January 1439, that is, nine years after the death of its author.[50] Ibn al-Jazarī must have composed it soon after 811/1408, the last year about which he provides specific information. There are two other pieces of circumstantial evidence which would allow us to estimate the composition date of the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*. When Ibn al-Jazarī lists the sons of Bāyezīd I, he ascribes the title *sulṭān* to Meḥmed I (d. 824/1421). It is tempting to suggest that Ibn al-Jazarī wrote the book sometime after 816/1413, when Meḥmed I became the sole ruler of the entire Ottoman realm after the so-called period of 'interregnum' which lasted from Bayezid's defeat by Timur in 1402 until 1413. However, the title *sulṭān* ascribed to Meḥmed I may well be an interpolation of the copyist, who had an *ex post facto* knowledge of Ottoman history when he copied the text in 842/1439.[51] Secondly, in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* Ibn al-Jazarī does not refer to his stay in Shīrāz as a compulsory one, even though the biographical notice in the *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, which appears to have been written much later since it reports Ibn al-Jazarī's death

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al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, as it is found in the *munsha'āt*, or letter collection, of Yazdī. See Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, *Munsha'āt*, ed. Īraj Afshār (Tehran: Surayyā, 1388 H.sh./2009), pp. 117–18.

[50] In fact, there is another manuscript in Istanbul. The Süleymaniye manuscript was extensively studied and copied by Osman Besim, an early twentieth-century scholar, who seems to have been a specialist on the recitation of the Qur'ān. However, Besim seems to have prepared the copy of the Süleymaniye manuscript for his own use, as he has not published his edition in any format. Besim's manuscript is available to researchers at a public library in Istanbul (Istanbul Emel Esin Kütüphanesi Ms. 415). To the best of my knowledge, Ramazan Şeşen was the first scholar who re-introduced the Süleymaniye manuscript to the scholarly world, and then Ali Osman Yüksel made extensive use of it in his monograph on Ibn al-Jazarī. See: Ramazan Şeşen, *Nawādir makhṭūṭāt al-'arabiyya fī maktabāt Turkiyā* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1975–82), vol. 1, p. 406; Yüksel, *İbn Cezerî ve Tayyibetü'n-neşr*, pp. 204–5. Unless otherwise noted, all my references are to the Süleymaniye manuscript, although I compared my translation with both manuscripts. For the copy that Osman Besim prepared, see Mine Esiner Özen, *Dr. Emel Esin Kütüphanesi Kataloğu (Yazma Eserler)* (Istanbul: TEK-ESIN, 1995), p. 44. The Süleymaniye and the Emel Esin manuscripts are virtually identical, but Besim's meticulous transcription of the original manuscript helps us to read the Süleymaniye manuscript in a more accurate manner.

[51] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, fols 18a, 21a and 73a. For a study of the so-called interregnum, see Dimitris Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

as well, explicitly says that he was made to reside there.[52] This might suggest that when Ibn al-Jazarī wrote the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, Pīr Muḥammad b. 'Umar Shaykh, who appointed him as the judge of the city, was still alive and in power in Shīrāz.

The second text, *Dhāt al-shifā' fī sīrat al-Muṣṭafā wa al-khulafā al-khamsa* (*Essence of the Recuperation in the Life of* [the Prophet Muḥammad] *Mustafa and the Five Caliphs*) is a short *urjūza*, that is, an Islamic history in verse in the rhyme of *rajaz* in 515 lines. Ibn al-Jazarī says that he wrote, or rather improvised, this work in a very summary fashion from dawn to dusk for Pīr Muḥammad, the ruler of Shīrāz.[53] The bulk of the book is devoted to the life of the Prophet Muḥammad and the subsequent caliphs from Abū Bakr to Ḥasan b. 'Alī. A few lines on the Umayyad caliph 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz (d. 101/720), who represents the model of the pious king in Islamic historiography, follow the first part.[54] The second and last part of the book, which is in fact nothing more than 23 verses, is devoted to the just kings in Islamic history, such as Maḥmūd of Ghazna, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ayyūbī and Nūr al-Dīn Zangī.

The composition date of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* is a puzzle to solve. The final part of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* suggests that Ibn al-Jazarī composed, or at least began to compose, his work on 25 Dhū al-Ḥijja 798/29 September 1396, the third day following the victory of Bāyazīd I against a crusader army in Nicopolis on 25–26 September 1396.[55] However, he dedicated his work to Pīr Muḥammad b. 'Umar-Shaykh, who was the governor of Fārs after the death of Timur until his death on 6 Muḥarram 812/21 May 1409.[56] I discussed earlier that Ibn al-Jazarī had arrived at Shīrāz, the capital of Pīr Muḥammad's appanage, soon after 16 Jumādā I 808/9 November 1405. Therefore, Ibn al-Jazarī must have completed his work sometime between late 1405 and early 1409, and the date mentioned in the poem must be the date when he started to compose the *Dhāt al-shifā'*.

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52 Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, vol. 2, p. 251.

53 Ibn al-Jazarī, *Dhāt al-shifā'*, vol. 1, p. 36.

54 Paul M. Cobb, ''Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 10, p. 821.

55 See lines 491 and 492 and nn. 69 and 70 in the translation of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* below.

56 Curiously, the sixteenth-century commentator al-Kurdī takes the same stance and interprets the *Dhāt al-shifā'* as an entirely Ottoman text, so much so that he interprets the line '*Muḥammad ṣāḥib Shīrāz*' as referring to the Ottoman sultan Çelebi Meḥmed I b. Bāyezīd I. See Ibn al-Jazarī, *Dhāt al-shifā'* = Muḥammad al-Kurdī, *Raf' al-khafā sharḥ dhāt al-shifā*, vol. 1, p. 37.

## TRANSLATIONS[57]

### The Battle of Nicopolis in the *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd*[58]

**[16a]** The exalted Lord decreed that I moved to Anatolia (*bilād al-Rūm*), where I escaped because of various tribulations and other things. I left Cairo (*al-diyār al-Miṣriyya*) on Saturday, 12 March 1396,[59] and headed to the port of Alexandria. I stayed there several days until a ship to sail became available.[60] I set sail at the beginning of April in the above-mentioned year[61] with God's permission, and disembarked from the ship at the port of Antioch on 14 April 1396.[62] It so happened[63] that I spent the night at the port, and in the morning all of a sudden there were the judge (*qāḍī*) and the Qur'ān reciters (*jamā'at al-qurrā'*) who came to me, and with them arrived the shaykh of the imams [and] the shaykh of the variant readings (*qirā'āt*)[64] Amīn al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Tabrīzī who was one of the distinguished figures in this science and whose fame reached as far as Anatolia (*al-Rūm*).[65] They said that this man [that is, al-Tabrīzī] had gone to the judge yesterday morning. The judge asked him what he wanted, and he told the judge that he was going to Cairo to study the variations of the Qur'ānic recitation with me [that is, Ibn al-Jazarī], but he heard that I was there at that time. The judge said: 'Ibn al-Jazarī came here yesterday, and we met him.' Al-Tabrīzī believed him **[16b]** only after the other reciters of the city confirmed it. When

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[57] Other than those which are common in English today, all the Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish terms and names are transliterated according to the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Occasionally original Arabic terms are given in parentheses. My own explanations or clarifications are put in square brackets.

[58] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Jāmi‘ al-asānīd*, fols 16a–18b.

[59] *yawm al-sabt ghurrat jumādā al-ākhira sanat thamān wa tis‘īn wa sab‘a mi'a*. This is actually a Sunday.

[60] *ḥattā tayassara al-rukūb fī l-baḥr* = lit. until travelling by sea was possible.

[61] *fī awwal rajab* = lit. at the beginning of Rajab. The month of Rajab in 798 corresponds to 10 April to 9 May 1396.

[62] *fī l-khāmis min al-shahr al-madhkū*[*r*] = lit. on the fifth of the above-mentioned month, Rajab.

[63] *wa min al-ittifāq al-gharīb* = lit. by a strange coincidence.

[64] The *qirā'āt* or the *tajwīd* in Islamic literary cultures refer to the variant readings of the Qur'ān. Conventionally, there are seven, ten or 14 variant readings of the Qur'ān. These variant readings have no effect on the meaning of the Qur'ānic text; they purely deal with the manner and style of recitation. Ibn al-Jazarī often refers to his role in disseminating the ten canonical readings during his travels. See F.M. Denny, 'Tad̲jwīd', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 10, pp. 72–5.

[65] Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Shahriyār b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Iṣbahānī al-Tabrīzī. As his name suggests, his family is from Isfahan in Iran, but he was born in Tabriz. After meeting with Ibn al-Jazarī and getting his diploma from him in Antioch, al-Tabrīzī went to Larende, that is, Karaman in Central Anatolia, and settled there. See Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya*, vol. 2, p. 64.

they informed him about this with certainty, he almost fainted from joy and said: 'I am not going to sit down until we go to him!' They all came together to me and accompanied me for several days. In Antioch, they all studied the Qur'ān with its ten variant readings with me until I granted him [that is, al-Tabrīzī] a certificate. He came to say farewell to me and headed from here [that is, Antioch] to the Land of Qaraman in order to return to his own town, but Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn b. Qaraman detained him and revered him in the city of Konya.[66] I headed to Bursa, the capital of the most just of all the sultans in his own time [that is, Bāyezīd I]. Its shaykh and preacher (*khaṭīb*), the famous al-Khaṭīb 'Abd al-Mu'min, in whom the science of recitation culminates in Anatolia (*bilād al-Rūm*) was also there. He was among my companions who travelled to see me to study the entirety of the Qur'ān with its ten variants in 783/1381–82. He excelled in this science and was the foremost [scholar] among those who [studied this science] righteously and piously, and he taught the science of recitation to the people of Anatolia. I also interceded and taught many of them the ten variant readings of the Qur'ān. Then, I met with the sultan Bāyezīd, whose justice spread far and wide afterwards, son of the King of the Holy Warriors Murād, son of the King of the Holy Warriors Orkhān, son of 'Othmān. He had heard of me before and gave me slaves and concubines from what God had endowed to him from the conquests of the Wallachian people, and exceeded in **[17a]** his benefaction and benevolence. He asked me to stay in his capital [that is, Bursa] and provided for me abundantly. I said to him: 'I did not come here for any purpose other than preparing the holy warriors (*al-ghuzāt*). Use my service so that those who cannot travel to see me can benefit from me, and then I will return.' He told me that 'I prepared an army in order to wage a holy war against Constantinople and its walls, and I will also join them. If you have patience, come with me!' I responded: 'Nay! I will go [there] before you.' He ordered my preparation for this in the best and most complete manner. I headed to Constantinople in July–August 1396 (*Shawwāl* [798]) and alighted in the city of Galata which is right at the border of the land of the infidels neighbouring the city of Constantinople. I stayed there several days until the Sultan Bāyezīd's arrival, and he stayed there several days [too]. Afterwards he heard of the designs of the infidels against his country and of their arrival together with whoever accompanied them from among the soldiers. They had gathered in a number unheard of in this time. He [that is, Bāyezīd] rushed to face them before they devastated his lands. The same [news] reached me [as well], so I followed him and caught up with him two or three days before the incident. The infidels had crossed the Danube, which is a very wide river, with around 2,000 ships, and they shored there for several days. This river is the farthest border of his [the

[66] Sultan 'Alā al-Dīn b. Qaraman is 'Alā' al-Dīn b. Khalīl, the Qaramanid ruler of central Anatolia. See Clifford E. Bosworth, *The New Islamic Dynasties* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 232.

sultan's] realm, which he conquered beyond the Anatolian Sea [that is, the Sea of Marmara] for about a month's [distance]. We reached them at the city of Nicopolis. They had been trying hard to lay siege to it, and all that was left [to do] was taking it. This city was among those which he [that is, Bāyezīd I] had conquered about three years earlier. He stationed there a group of **[17b]** Muslim soldiers. When they heard about the arrival of the sultan, they mounted their horses against him and attacked him fiercely in order to capture him before his arrival. When they arrived I was there with him, talking to him about the merits of holy war (*jihād*) and what God promises to holy warriors and to those of them who die in battle [as martyrs] and to those who have the patience to wait. It was said to him [Bayezid]: 'Those [enemies] have arrived, but they did not stay for the encounter [the battle].' He asked about their numbers and sent them [messengers] so that they investigate their business. According to the first news, their number was 200,000 cavalry, though the highest number that was mentioned was 400,000. The truth is that nobody knows their number other than God most high. However, what I [personally] witnessed is that the vanguards who were preceding them amounted to 30,000 southern Europeans (*al-faranj al-janūbiyya*), of whom it is said that they are the bravest group of all the infidels. In my opinion, the truth is that he seized [or restrained] 12 from among their leaders. It [that is, the battle] occurred on 2 October 1396 (28 Dhū al-Ḥijja 798). I witnessed a fierce battle (*malḥama 'aẓīma*) which had no equal in this time. The astonishing thing is that the above-mentioned son of 'Uthmān (that is, Bāyezīd I) had sent a message to his soldiers so that they come from all his dominions (*sā'ir bilādihi*), and to the appanages of his sons (*jamā'at awlādihi*) to come with their own soldiers, but only one of his sons arrived a day before the battle. With him there were only 12,000 cavalry and foot soldiers. The upshot was **[18a]** that this godforsaken enemy was defeated in no time. [At the end] there remained no honour to them other than their great sultan who was the King of Hungary, who escaped together with approximately 50 souls; they embarked upon a ship which was on the shore of the above-mentioned river and sailed. He [that is, Bāyezīd] kept as prisoners some of those who had escaped the massacre unharmed. The son of 'Uthmān ordered the slaughter of all except for the children who had not yet reached puberty. Among the strangest [things] that I witnessed during my teaching [of the Qur'ān] is that the above-mentioned son of 'Uthmān ordered me to take five of the prisoners. They remained with me until I returned to his capital, Bursa. None of them spoke the other's language, because they had never lived in each other's countries or communities. When God ordained me to return, I was not able to settle in my own country (*bilād*) and started composing the *Kitāb nashr al-qirā'āt al-'ashr* and its versification as an *urjūza* which I called the *Ṭayyibat al-nashr*. Many people memorized it and the people studied its meaning with me. The sultan [that is, Bāyezīd] entrusted his three younger sons, Sultan Meḥmed, Muṣṭafā and Mūsā [to me] even though I did not have any time to study with them. They used to come to me every day at my house [to study]

so that among them Amīr Muṣṭafā and Amīr Mūsā studied Arabic, grammar, much of the law (*fiqh*), and some of the religious sciences (*al-ʻulūm al-dīniyya*), and they started **[18b]** to speak in Arabic better and more correctly than my own Arab children. I stayed in this land (*al-diyār*) about seven years until the calamity of the arrival of Amīr Timur Küregen.

## The Battle of Nicopolis According to the *Dhāt al-shifā'*[67]

[490] The *Essence of the Restoration about the Life of* [the Prophet] *Muṣṭafā and the Five Caliphs* was completed.[68]
[491] Its verses are told as a supplement [to the main text? (*thawānin*)];
they were completed in the proper year of the correct calculation of this sentence,[69]
[492] [On] the twenty-fifth[70] of the venerable month of [Dhū] al-Ḥijja [of that year] on the third day after the incident of the fierce battle.[71]
[493] [By that] I mean [the battle with] the Sons of Esau;[72] when they approached

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[67] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Dhāt al-shifā* = Muḥammad al-Kurdī, *Raf' al-khafā sharḥ dhāt al-shifā*, vol. 2, pp. 300–310; Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Laleli 2040, fols 19b–20b; Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Lala Ismail 375, fols 14b–15a.

[68] The five caliphs meant here appear to be Abū Bakr, ʻUmar, ʻUthmān, ʻAlī and Ḥasan b. ʻAlī, as indicated by the author in his introduction. See Ibn al-Jazarī, *Dhāt al-shifā'* = Muḥammad al-Kurdī, *Raf' al-khafā sharḥ dhāt al-shifā*, vol. 2, p. 280.

[69] This couplet gives the number of lines in the poem and the date of composition isopsephically, hence the word *jummal*, which I rather loosely translated as 'sum'. However, one needs to refer to a manuscript copy in which the important letters were written in red in order to solve the puzzle concealed in this couplet. The couplet reads: *Abyātuhā* ***jā'at thawānin kamalā, ʻāma ḥisābin ṣaḥḥa dhāka*** *jummalā*. The bold letters are written in rubrics in both manuscripts that I consulted. Hence, /j [=3]/, /th [=500]/, and /k [=20]/ gives the number of couplets, that is, 523. However, the two manuscripts that I consulted have 521 lines each and the print edition includes 519 lines. In the second part of the couplet, /ḥ [=8]/, /ṣ [=90]/, and /dh [=700]/ gives the composition date, that is, 798/1395–96, or as I discussed above, the date when Ibn al-Jazarī started to compose his work. See: Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Laleli 2040, fol. 19b; Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Lala Ismail 375, fol. 14b. For the technique of recording dates isopsephically, see G.S. Colin, 'Ḥisāb al-Djummal', in *EI*$^2$, p. 468.

[70] The edited text reads 'fifteenth (*khāmis ʻashar*)', but both manuscripts clearly read 'twenty-fifth (*khāmis ʻasharī*)'.

[71] The word *malḥama*, which I translated as 'fierce battle' here, has eschatological associations in Islamic apocalypticism. The *malḥama* is the final battle that humanity will plunge into before the Apocalypse. It also refers to a genre of texts which are ascribed to the Prophet Daniel. These texts prognosticate the events that will take place at the end of time. See T. Fahd, 'Malḥama', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 6, p. 247.

[72] *Banū al-Aṣfar*, or the Sons of Esau (lit. the Sons of the Yellow One), is the term used for the descendants of Esau, son of Isaac in Islamic prophetology. Usually the *Banū al-Aṣfar*

[the lands of Islam], and arrived under the banners of good faith.
[494] The king of Hungary proceeded at their head
in [the land of] the Alans,[73] [followed by] the Franks and then the Russians,
[495] The Serbs, the Wallachians, and the Bulghars,
and other infidels followed them.
[496] [They] all united with one heart
against the Son of 'Uthmān,[74] the valiant fighter of the Holy War.
[497] All of them [the infidels] said, '[Oh] you assemblage of heroes,
if you do not rise in a manly revolt [against the Muslims],
[498] They will take you, country by country,
They will not leave a single one of you [alive]'.[75]
[499] They included all the Christian kingdoms,
gathered young and old.
[500] They selected every hero and champion;
[each of] who[m] thought he could repel a thousand men.[76]
[501] And they did as such for years,
they reached hundreds of thousands.
[502] The pope beguiled them, and they all came,
so did their armies, their cavalry, and their infantry.
[503] He incited them to fight the Turk,
to destroy Islam, take the land,
[504] Anatolia, Syria, and Jerusalem,[77]
This destruction was what the Hungarians had in mind.

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are used to refer to the Byzantines, but in the Islamic eschatological traditions, they are the ones who will invade the Islamic lands before the Apocalypse. See I. Goldziher, 'Aṣfar', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 1, pp. 687–8.

[73] The editors of the printed version of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* read *fī al-Āṣ* as *fī al-Ārḍ*. Both the eighteenth-century commentator Muḥammad al-Kurdī and the two manuscripts that I consulted for this article read this phrase as *fī al-Āṣ*, i.e. in [the land of] the Alans. Ibn al-Jazarī, *Dhāt al-shifā'*, = Muḥammad al-Kurdī, *Raf' al-khafā sharḥ dhāt al-shifā*, vol. 2, p. 302; Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Laleli 2040, fol. 19b; Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. Lala Ismail 375, fol. 14b. The sentence is not easy to translate, though. The term *Āṣ* or *Ās* refers to the Alans in Islamicate historiographical traditions. It appears to me that Ibn al-Jazarī uses this term in its geographical sense, i.e. the north of the Black Sea and Transcaucasia, where the Alans used to reside. For further references on the Alans in the Islamicate sources, see Agustí Alemany, *Sources on the Alans: A Critical Compilation* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 244–77.

[74] Here the Son of 'Uthmān refers to Bayezid I.

[75] Ibn al-Jazarī, *Dhāt al-shifā'* = Muḥammad al-Kurdī, *Raf' al-khafā sharḥ dhāt al-shifā*, vol. 2, pp. 301–5, 307 and 310.

[76] Ibn al-Jazarī is probably referring to the knights in the crusader army here. For further details, see Nicolle, *Nicopolis 1396*, pp. 33–4.

[77] Lit. *al-Rūm wa al-Shām wa Bayt al-Maqdis*.

[505] But God encompasses them from behind,[78]
And their stratagem will surround their own necks.[79]
[506] They crossed the big river called Danube
In approximately 2,000 boats.
[507] They laid siege to the Fort of Nicopolis
But they were toppled with the expected failure.
[508] They were captured and slaughtered thoroughly,
the all-powerful was treated with an exemplary punishment,[80]
[509] Through the good fortune of Bāyazīd, the most deserving of those who rule
Whom God may support with thousands of angels.
[510] For he was the one who annihilated them by himself,
As he gave them to taste the pain of his might.
[511] None of them returned to report the news
Except for a small number; the like of it is not worth mentioning.
[512] So take this as a good omen for the conquest of Constantinople,
She would not disobey him after this.
[513] Perhaps this is the apocalyptic battle that is mentioned [in many early sources],[81]
God our Lord is the perfecter of his light.
[514] Praise be to God for granting this victory
to his Prophet and to his religion,
[515] May God bless him and grant [him] salvation
And ward off the deceit of those who commit injustice; and [may He] deliver [them unto us].

## Conclusions

The details that Ibn al-Jazarī provides on the Battle of Nicopolis are certainly no match for the information that we find in European sources. However, the fact that he devoted a significant place to an Ottoman victory in two of his works written outside of the Ottoman realms should speak for the immense symbolic importance of the Battle of Nicopolis in late medieval Islamic history. Recently, Michele

[78] This line is a reference to the Qur'ān 2:19 = 'God encompasses the unbelievers (*wa Allāhu muḥīṭun bi al-kāfirīna*)'.

[79] Lit. 'Their strategy in their chest is to encircle'.

[80] In this sentence, the word *al-'Uzzā* (f. 'the most mighty') can also be read as *al-'Uzzā*, who is one of the pre-Islamic Arabian deities. The temple dedicated to *al-Uzzá* in Nakhla between Mecca and Ṭā'if was destroyed by Khālid b. Walīd, one of the commanders of the early Arab invasions, in 630. See M.C.A. Macdonald and Laila Nehmé, 'al-'Uzzā', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 10, pp. 967–8. Obviously Ibn al-Jazarī draws a parallel between the defeat of the crusader army in Nicopolis and the destruction of idols in early Islamic history.

[81] See n. 71 above.

Bernardini suggested that one of the reasons behind Timur's invasion of northern India in 1398 was to counter the political prestige that Bayezid I had gained after his victory in the Battle of Nicopolis.[82] Obviously Bayezid I was also aware of his elevated status after his victory in Nicopolis. In his letter to Sulṭān Aḥmad Jalayir, who had sought his protection after the invasion of Timur, he specifically mentioned the Battle of Nicopolis among his recent military feats.[83]

However, the magnitude of the victory only partially explains Ibn al-Jazarī's eagerness to emphasize his involvement in this event. To be more precise, it explains why he devoted so much space to this event in the autobiographical notice in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, but not why he put this event in the colophon of the *Dhāt al-shifā'*, which was dedicated to Pīr Muḥammad b. 'Umar-Shaykh, one of the grandsons of Timur. Recently, Li Guo discussed the rise of the historical *urjuza*, that is, the poems in *rajaz* rhyme on various subjects, from astronomy to history, in the Mamluk Sultanate, and highlighted several dimensions of this curious historical development in late medieval Islamic history. First of all, poems in *rajaz* rhyme certainly had a didactic purpose. They were easy to memorize, hence useful tools for disseminating knowledge on a particular subject. Guo compared a *rajaz* poem with a paperback 'history-for-dummies' of our time: they are both easily accessible and eminently readable. The rise of the *rajaz* poems was concomitant with the emergence of a new type of audience, a large bureaucratic class which was in dire need of learning the basics of everything that a cultivated and fine gentleman would need to know. However, Guo also underlines the limitations of this genre for historical subjects. It was a useful tool for 'name-dropping', but not suitable for articulating a serious historical discourse.[84]

Guo's conclusion can by and large be applied to Ibn al-Jazarī's *Dhāt al-shifā'* and the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*. Whereas the *Dhāt al-shifā'* exists in numerous manuscripts and was later commented upon, the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* survives in a single manuscript. Further discoveries in manuscript libraries might increase the number of manuscripts of the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, but it is very unlikely that this will ever challenge the popularity of the *Dhāt al-shifā'*. However, we should also note one fundamental difference between the two works of Ibn al-Jazarī. Unlike what he is doing in the *Jāmi' al-asānīd*, Ibn al-Jazarī plays with apocalyptic imagery in the *Dhāt al-shifā'*. He likens the crusader army to the Banū al-Aṣfar, or the 'Blond' or 'Pale Race', which would attack the Muslims at the end of history, and he compares the Battle of Nicopolis to the *malḥama*, that is, the fierce apocalyptic battle. Both Ottoman and Timurid realms were awash with apocalyptic expectations in the fifteenth century,

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[82] Michele Bernardini, *Mémoire et propagande à l'époque timouride* (Paris: Association pour l'avancement des études iraniennes, 2008), p. 151.

[83] 'Abd al-Husayn Navā'ī, *Asnād va mukātabāt-i tārīkhī-yi Īrān* (Tehran: Bungāh-i Tarjuma va Nashr-i Kitāb, 2536 Shāhī/1977), p. 82. In return Timur praised the bravery of French soldiers in his letter to Charles VI of France: ibid., p. 127.

[84] Li Guo, 'Mamluk Historical *Rajaz* Poetry: Ibn Dāniyāl's Judge List and Its Later Adaptations', *Mamluk Studies Review*, 14 (2010), pp. 57–9.

and if there was a conflict between the Muslims and the Blond Race in the late fourteenth century, it was perhaps the Battle of Nicopolis.[85] In this sense, the *Dhāt al-shifā'* indicates the prominence of the apocalyptic discourse among the learned circles of late medieval and early modern Islamic history.

I would like to finish this article with a further note on the intellectual environment in which both the *Jāmi' al-asānīd* and the *Dhāt al-shifā'* were written. In political terms, the apocalyptic discourse represented a form of absolutist ideology in which the sovereign ruler was a reservoir of religious and political authority in late medieval Islamic history.[86] Unfortunately, we do not have any other historical work written for Pīr Muḥammad against which we can compare the discourse of the *Dhāt al-shifā'*. However, there is indirect evidence to suggest that Pīr Muḥammad did *not* subscribe to such a model of absolutist power. In fact, just the opposite was true. Instead of imposing his own authority, he preferred to accept the supremacy of his uncle Shāhrukh, who was, by the time the *Dhāt al-shifā'* was written, pursuing a more conservative policy favouring a decentralized state structure.[87] The question imposes itself: who, then, was the audience of the millenarian evocations in the *Dhāt al-shifā'*, if not Pīr Muḥammad?

The apocalyptic discourse was not adopted by Pīr Muḥammad, but it was heartily subscribed to by his brother Mīrzā Iskandar and those intellectuals who supported him in his quest to become the sole ruler of the Timurid Empire.[88] Mīrzā Iskandar came to power in Fārs after his older brother Pīr Muḥammad was killed on 6 Muḥarram 812/21 May 1409 by one of his own commanders. Mīrzā Iskandar pursued an absolutist policy, in which the apocalyptic discourse figured prominently. Mu'īn al-Dīn Naṭanzī, the chronicler of Mīrzā Iskandar who completed a universal history for him, even depicted Mīrzā Iskandar as the *mahdī-yi ākhir al-zamān*, that is, the apocalyptic saviour whose return to the world is expected at the end

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[85] For the prevalence of the apocalyptic discourse in fifteenth-century Ottoman lands, see Kaya Şahin, 'Constantinople and the End Time: The Ottoman Conquest as a Portent of the Last Hour', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 14 (2010), pp. 317–54. For the importance of apocalypticism in crusading ideology, see Norman Housley, 'The Eschatological Imperative: Messianism and Holy War in Europe, 1260–1566', in Peter Schäfer and Mark Cohen (eds), *Toward the Millennium: Messianic Expectations from the Bible to Waco* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 123–50.

[86] Azfar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 23–55. See also John E. Woods, *The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire*, 2nd edn (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999), pp. 104–6.

[87] John E. Woods, 'Timur's Genealogy', in Michel M. Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen (eds), *Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B. Dickson* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), pp. 115–16.

[88] İlker Evrim Binbaş, 'Timurid Experimentation with Eschatological Absolutism: Mīrzā Iskandar, Shāh Ni'matullāh Walī, and Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī in 815/1412', in Orkhan Mir-Kasimov (ed.), *Unity in Diversity: Mysticism, Messianism and the Construction of Religious Authority in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 277–303.

of time.[89] Given the fact that Ibn al-Jazarī was part of these intellectual circles and even submitted his services to Mīrzā Iskandar, it is plausible to argue that the real audience of the *Dhāt al-shifā'* was Ibn al-Jazarī's peers, or other intellectuals of the region in the early fifteenth century. Following Guo's argument, Ibn al-Jazarī was writing a textbook for those who just wanted to have one or two things to say about the manifestations of apocalyptic clashes in their own time; and all the while he was also trying to appeal to a specific group of intellectuals by addressing the prevailing millenarian political discourse of the time. It is the irony of his life that Ṣā'in al-Dīn Turka, one of the most prominent members of the intellectual circle in which Ibn al-Jazarī was trying to get involved, simply dismissed his work and accused it of lacking sufficient depth.

[89] Muʿīn al-Dīn Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab-i tavārīkh-i Muʿīnī*, ed. Jean Aubin (Tehran: Ḫaiyām, 1336 H.sh./1957), p. 433. Naṭanzī completed his work in 816/1413–14, just before Mīrzā Iskandar was defeated by Shāhrukh. Afterwards, Naṭanzī presented a second recension to Shāhrukh, and famously this second recension does not evoke such an apocalyptic discourse. See John E. Woods, 'The Rise of Tīmūrid Historiography', *Journal of Near Eastern History*, 46 (1987), pp. 89–93.

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# 8
# Bayezid I's Foreign Policy Plans and Priorities: Power Relations, Statecraft, Military Conditions and Diplomatic Practice in Anatolia and the Balkans

*Rhoads Murphey*

The principal aim of this chapter is not to provide a fully reconstructed and rationalized chronology of the events of Bayezid's reign, divided into a review of his activities in the two distinct geographical centres of his empire in Rumelia (Europe) and Anatolia (Asia Minor), but to examine in some detail a few illustrative examples and episodes in each of these spheres that reveal universal characteristics and operating principles governing Ottoman political dynamics of the proto-imperial era. This will, it is hoped, lead to a better understanding of the transitional character of Bayezid's reign and help to capture the essence of the medieval polity that Bayezid led in the 13-year period between 1389 and 1402.

In view of the problematic and sometimes politically charged nature of the contemporary and near-contemporary sources for this period of Ottoman history, in any event, it is perhaps not a realistic aim to attempt a clear reconstruction of the ebb and flow or cause and effect surrounding developments during Bayezid's reign. What this chapter will seek to provide instead is a general context for interpreting how Bayezid's reign sits and fits within the early Ottoman dynastic era and how it related to the general historical conditions that prevailed in both Asia Minor and the Balkans during the second half of the fourteenth century. What must be avoided at all costs is the temptation to view his reign through the distorting lens suggested by anachronistic assessments of the Ottoman state in the late fourteenth century that ascribe to it the same institutional development and concentration of state power that it eventually managed to accumulate at the time of its full maturity towards the end of the following century, after the reign of Mehmed II (1451–81).

The fourteenth-century Ottoman state was different and, for a number of very fundamental reasons, an almost alien world in which the state was weaker, its territory more restricted and its use of and dependence on non-state actors much more prevalent. The logic and mechanisms by which it pursued its *raison d'état* and its dynastic purpose were also different and the personality of the ruler loomed much larger over the affairs of state than in a later imperial age when bureaucratized procedures, de-personalized institutions and elaborate court rituals could provide

or substitute for many of the functions formerly supplied by the ruler and a small coterie of advisers. The ruler, still regarded, especially in military circles, as *primus inter pares* among his warrior chiefs rather than as an autocrat, was at the same time vulnerable, despite his centrality as the foundation stone of the regime's credibility. Consequently the protection of his personal honour – as the sole source of the honour and reputation of the state – remained a constant preoccupation for the ruler and his advisers.

The medieval honour code with regard to monarchs applied universally, regardless of geographical origin or religious confession, which explains in part why the Ottoman state proved so fragile in the aftermath of Bayezid's defeat in the test of strength of arms with his rival Timur at the Battle of Ankara. Other contemporary rulers staked their own dynasty's prestige by accepting similar challenges, among them Sigismund of Luxembourg, who wore the Crown of St Stephen from 1387 to 1437 and risked all by confronting Bayezid at the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396, only to lose face with his allies and vassals following the defeat of his coalition. Barkuk, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt between 1382 and 1399, also suffered the consequences of his ill-timed challenge to Timur when his son and successor Faradj (r. 1399–1404) was subjected to a humiliating defeat and the ravaging of his territories in Syria in 1400–1401 at the hands of Timur, who was determined – for the sake of preserving his own prestige as ruler – to avenge a double diplomatic insult perpetrated against him by the father and then repeated, and therefore compounded, by his son.[1]

All the above-mentioned rulers conformed in their behaviour to the same internationally accepted conventions governing interstate relations in the late medieval period and it made relatively little difference whether the states were emerging states, mature states, small states, territorially extensive empires, Christian states or Muslim states; they all ran their polities on pretty much the same basis. The building of power networks and international alliances needed to achieve regional dominance or, in Timur's case, global dominion was all based on the subordination of vassals and the creation of lasting alliances in which lesser powers offered homage and service to greater powers, whose rulers achieved enhanced status and pre-eminence among their peers by attracting and retaining the support of a wider and more powerful coalition of lesser dynasts, castellans, rulers of petty states, principalities and city-states.

In Bayezid's case it can be said that on balance he had relatively greater success in retaining, at critical junctures of his reign, the loyalty and support of his Greek and Serbian vassals than of his fellow Muslim Turcoman rivals, whose subordination and support for the Ottoman imperial cause proved at worst unachievable (as in the case of the Karamanids) or at best incomplete and impermanent, and whose gradual drift towards and final defection to Timur around the time of the Battle of Ankara played a decisive role in his defeat on the battlefield. In the field of diplomacy and

[1] For further details on these events, see below, pp. 195–7.

cooptation of reliable Muslim allies (whether by persuasion or coercion), it would appear that Bayezid was outmanoeuvred by Timur. Before entering into an account of the political realities that shaped Ottoman activism in the international arena, it is necessary first to outline the limits of the possible by providing a realistic assessment of Ottoman material resources in Bayezid's time.

## Material Resources Available to the Ottomans in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century

To properly assess the level of state power achieved during Bayezid's reign, situated at the crossroads between the waning years of the Ottoman emirate and the birth of the Ottoman sultanate, it is necessary first of all to recollect just how recent and tenuous the Ottomans' grasp on their multi-regional power base straddling both Anatolia and Rumelia was during the 1390s. Their capitals in Asia Minor (at Bursa) and in Europe (at Edirne after 1361) both stood as frontier cities with partially unpacified hinterlands surrounding them, while the connection between them – dependent on a control over the maritime space that separated them – was uncertain and unpredictable. The development of a central state apparatus with an ability to project the ruler's power and authority more widely had begun during the reign of Murad I (1360–89), but this institutional development, which started in earnest only during the latter part of Murad's reign, was far from complete.[2]

### *Institutional Developments During the Latter Part of Murad I's Reign*

We know that the landed timariot class who functioned as a kind of military elite in later centuries, especially after the reign of Murad II (r. 1421–51), existed in embryonic form from the time of his great-grandfather Murad I, but we know relatively little about the proto-history of the institution and its scale at this time. The most that can be said is that it bore a formal resemblance to its later, more developed, state and that it already possessed a hierarchical command structure, with district and county commanders at the lower end and the governors-general of Rumelia and Anatolia at the top of the scale.[3] Writing his synoptic account of the early Ottoman state circa 1649, Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi identified the year 1375/76 (777 AH) as a developmental milestone, since from that date onwards it would seem that the governors-general in Rumelia were able to mobilize and deploy timariot forces in significant numbers independently

[2] For an account stressing the slow pace of Ottoman centralization during the reigns of both Murad I and his son Bayezid I, see Metin Kunt, 'The Rise of the Ottomans', in *NCMH*, vol. 6, pp. 839–63, esp. 861–2.

[3] Halil İnalcık, 'Timar', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 10, pp. 502–7.

from the Lords of the March (*udj begleri*) who until that time had dominated troop mobilization and deployment to suit their own interests and objectives.[4] The date by no means represents a final retreat from active service for the semi-independent warlords of the frontier, on whom Bayezid and his successors still relied to a significant degree, but signifies only a gradual shift in the balance of power, from a force composed of volunteer raiders who offered their services on the eve of campaign, to a more structured and centrally financed military system under direct state control.

In the still transitional age during which Murad's successor Bayezid ruled during the 1390s, the fledgling institutions of the Ottoman timariot army (supplying cavalry forces) and the cash-waged members of the standing regiments at the Porte (composed of both cavalry and infantry, that is, the *ocak erleri*) still battled for precedence with the massive reservoirs of military reserves provided by the frontier warriors. The tensions between the two types of forces (that is, state-supported troops versus independent braves) continued to flare up since, for some time to come, the former remained numerically inferior to the latter.[5]

The centralization and confiscation policies pursued by Bayezid at the beginning of his reign, in order to fill his treasury to pay expanded numbers of salaried and timariot troops and reduce his dependency on the frontier warriors, created a strong reaction and opposition during the years 1390 to 1393. This opposition and its suppression resulted in a negative political fallout that persisted during the remainder of his reign and, despite all his efforts to create an armed force solely obedient to his authority, the limited capacity of his timariot army and of his household troops – consisting of little more than an armed bodyguard – was insufficient to guard the expanding frontiers of the empire, let alone serve as an effective offensive force.

It is clear from the historical record that Bayezid was frequently compelled to redeploy his forces concentrated in one sector of the frontier (for example, against Wallachia) in order to quell a crisis at the other side of his empire along the borders with his Karamanid adversaries in central Anatolia, or conversely to counter an attack in Europe when his forces were fully deployed in Anatolia. We know from the fully documented history of the campaign led by King Sigismund of Hungary against Nicopolis in 1396 that the forces immediately available to Bayezid to counter the attack were limited and that, in order to muster the relatively small army he managed to field on the day of the battle, he had to draw on forces from all sides of the empire, being forced effectively to rob Peter to pay Paul and to cease

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[4] Karaçelebi-zade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzat'ül ebrar* (Cairo: Matbaat Bulak, 1248/1832), p. 347.

[5] For the Ottomans' heavy reliance in the early imperial era on military services provided by irregular forces, including the freelance raiders of the frontier, see Pal Fodor, 'Ottoman Warfare, 1300–1453', in *CHoT*, pp. 192–226 (esp. 192–8, on the pre-institutionalized phase of Ottoman military organization).

military activity on all other fronts, in order to concentrate his maximum strength against the most immediate threat.[6]

As a result of Bayezid's manpower constraints in certain sectors of the expanding frontier, especially in southern Serbia and Macedonia, the sultan continued – as had been the custom and practice during his father's reign – to rely relatively heavily on the forces supplied by frontier lords who, while being transformed by title into Ottoman *emirs* and *beglerbegis* (governors-general), behaved and followed a similar *modus operandi* to that accustomed to the lords of the frontier campaigning at the margins of the empire in former years. For example, at the beginning of his reign Bayezid, being himself fully deployed in Anatolia against the maritime principalities of western Asia Minor in 1390 and against Karaman in 1391, assigned the care and expansion of the north-west frontier to Yighit Pasha, an experienced frontier raider who commanded the loyalty of an extensive body of *akinci* raiders and who operated at an intermediate level somewhere in between freelance military mobilizer and booty-raider on the one hand and loyal officer and servant of the Ottoman state on the other. After the fall of Üsküb (Skopje) in January of 1392, Yighit Pasha, who had led his raiders on campaign since the autumn of 1391 in a wide sweep across various sectors of the Macedonian–Serbian frontier, settled in Üsküb as the first Ottoman 'governor' of a newly established Ottoman 'province', but in real terms the distribution of the spoils of victory belonged largely to himself and his *akinci* troops, while he, as nominal Ottoman governor, remained a virtually independent power broker and troop mobilizer. The real beneficiaries of the attack on Üsküb, at least in the near term, are described in a passage in Ibn Kemal's history where he provides the following vivid account of the agents of this particlar Ottoman campaigning success: 'The faces of the *akinci*s broke into smiles resembling roses in bloom and their hearts were full of the joy [of victory] as their senses and sight overflowed with visions of fields of luxuriant rosebuds and flowering narcissi.'[7]

Soon after its capture, the town of Üsküb was transformed into a base of operations for further raids across a wide region into the northern and north-western parts of the Balkan Peninsula, whose full incorporation under Ottoman rule was still many decades away. Üsküb's own transformation from frontier into *iç-il* or interior lands was likewise delayed, especially since soon after its capture the empire itself underwent a process of temporary dissolution and subsequent reformation over the

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[6] See Doukas, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), p. 84: 'Bayezid who had been informed many days earlier of gathering of the nations from the West, *assembled his entire army from East and West* and, further *augmented by his troops who were laying siege to the City* led them in person' [emphases are mine]. See Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 1, pp. 352–4 for estimates of the roughly equal size of both Sigismund and Bayezid's armies, consisting in both cases of between 10,000 and 20,000 men.

[7] Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, Dördüncü Defter*, ed. Koji Imazawa (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), p. 27.

period 1402 to c. 1430. We know from the earliest detailed tax and population survey for Üsküb dating from 1546 (953 AH), by which time the city population had grown to 1,252 households of which 80 per cent (1004) were Muslim, that the distribution of professions among the city residents then included 166 registered *akinci*s (booty-raiders) and five *esirci*s (slave merchants).[8] In his statement of the true purpose behind the stationing of Yighit Pasha at the frontier by Bayezid in the 1390s, the sixteenth-century historian Saadeddin is quite explicit: 'his brief was not to pacify the frontier, but to carry out further raids'.[9]

Bayezid's delegating of authority to Yighit Pasha, with virtually unrestricted powers of independent decision for military planning as well as local administration, allowed the sultan to turn his own attention to the most pressing matters of the day which included, at this point in his reign, the urgent need to pay careful attention to the rebellions, defections and circles of resistance and insubordination that had emerged in Anatolia, not just among the dynasty's ill-wishers such as the Karamanids, but amongst its former allies, scions of the several independent Turkmen emirates of western Anatolia. As a matter of urgency Bayezid needed to concentrate on the rebuilding of alliances, as well as the consolidation and, if possible, expansion of spheres of influence bequeathed to him by his father, but still not solidly reconfirmed in his own name.[10] In terms of their institutional evolution, these remote frontiers of areas of the empire in north-western Macedonia still lagged, even as late as the sixteenth century, far behind the levels reached in the core provinces of the empire in Anatolia and Rumelia. In the immediate aftermath of their conquest and nominal subordination under Ottoman rule in the 1390s, this developmental gap was, self-evidently, far greater.

*Ottoman Naval Power and Military Conditions in the Late Fourteenth Century*

One of the early Ottoman state's principal vulnerabilities in the period leading up to the capture of Constantinople in 1453 was the inadequacy of its naval fleet. A significant reason for the underdeveloped state of the fleet in the early part of Bayezid's reign was the Ottomans' loss of control over their strategic base at Gallipoli during the years 1366 to 1376, which meant that its redevelopment during the 1380s and 1390s started from very modest foundations.[11] Although

[8] O.L. Barkan, 'Tarihi-Demografi Araştırmaları', *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 10 (1953), p. 26 (table 5).

[9] Mehmed Saadeddin, *Tac ül Tevarih* (Istanbul: Tabhane-yi Âmire, 1279/1862), vol. 1, p. 125.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Peter Charanis, 'The Strife Among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370–1402', *Byzantion*, 16 (1942–43), p. 296. Gallipoli was recovered for the Byzantines by Count Amedeo VI of Savoy; for his expedition, see Eugene Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 204–39.

there is contemporary testimony to the presence in Gallipoli harbour c. 1400 of a fleet of some 40 ships, only a portion of these (17 out of 40, that is, about 40 per cent) were warships (*kadirgas*) capable of confronting a well-armed adversary.[12] Consequently, the range and effectiveness of the Ottoman fleet as a tool in offensive warfare was limited, and while we are informed of Bayezid's ambitions to develop the Ottoman fleet to a point where it could defend its own interests in the Aegean, it seems, in this sphere of operations at least, that Bayezid relied chiefly – much as he did on land with the semi-independent *akincis* – on the cooperation of loosely affiliated freelance Muslim corsairs who managed their own fleets. The corsairs offered their cooperation based on a carefully calculated risk–benefit assessment unaffected by the wishes of the Ottoman high command. The only evidence we have of significant Ottoman naval activity during Bayezid's reign is the brief deployment of a fleet to the Black Sea region in 1392, whose purpose and outcome remains obscure.[13]

Although it is risky to attempt assessment based on the general absence of hard evidence for the 1390s, it is possible to conclude with certainty that by the middle decades of the following century, the Ottomans had put into place gun installations at Anadoluhisari (Güzelcehisar) on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus designed to protect the passage of troops when crossing between the two halves of the empire. But even so, when, in October 1444, Bayezid's successor Murad II was bound for the battlefront at Varna, he made use not of his own naval forces based at Gallipoli, but of escort and transport services supplied by the Genoese colony at Pera. No detailed description of the tactical, practical or logistical obstacles encountered by Bayezid in crossing between continents is provided in the contemporary historical record, but what is beyond doubt is that – given the undeveloped state of the Ottoman naval resources at the time – such crossings between Europe (*beri yaka*) and Asia (*öte yaka*) presented a massive challenge. The need for redeployment of his forces arose repeatedly, starting from the spring of 1390 when he passed from Europe to Anatolia.[14] This was repeated in the reverse direction in late autumn 1391,[15] followed in early spring 1393 by a return to Anatolia to bring a definitive end to the rebellious stance of the ruler of the Candarid principality whose main capital was Kastamonu. On this occasion (in 1393) Ibn Kemal recorded that Bayezid's deployment to Anatolia was on an unprecedented scale and that only a skeleton force was left in place in

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[12] Halil İnalcik, 'Gelibolu', in *EI*$^2$, vol. 2, p. 984.

[13] Halil İnalcik, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329–1451', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 6, pp. 249–50.

[14] Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, p. 55: 'evvel-i baharda Edirne'den göçtü'.

[15] Ibid., p. 107: 'Kastamonu tarafına gidiyorken ... inan-i semend-i cihadı gaza canibine döndürüp, Bursaya uğramadı, Gelibolu'ya doğru gitti'.

Rumelia to guard the frontier.[16] Depending on sudden emergencies and rapidly changing military conditions, the balance of military forces in different sectors of the expanding frontiers of the Ottoman state had to be periodically readjusted. The primitive state of communications often prevented a rapid or fully effective response.

On the overall size of the sultan's household troops we have little detailed knowledge, but given that Doukas estimated the entire size of Bayezid's palace household (*porta* or, in Turkish, *kapu*) as roughly 10,000, which included state administrative personnel and many others serving in non-combatant roles, it may be presumed that in total the *ocak eri* (infantry forces) and the *bölük halkı* (cavalry forces) accompanying the sultan into battle were of the order of about 3,000 foot soldiers and around 1,000 horse.[17]

Considered in the context of the actual military and naval capacity of the Ottoman state in the late medieval period, which seriously restricted Bayezid's options for the exercise of 'hard power', it should come as no surprise that in order to achieve his political and strategic aims, Bayezid had frequent recourse to various kinds of 'soft power'. His soft power options ranged from compromise, cooptation, concessions and accommodation in the internal sphere to vassalization, subordination and neutralization of his actual and potential enemies in the external sphere.[18] No state, regardless of its military capabilities, was able to prosper by the sword and the unrestrained application of force alone, as can be seen in Timur's subtle and nuanced use of techniques of persuasion alongside his periodic application of terror and repression to subject potential opponents to his will.[19] Furthermore, given the still fragile state of Ottoman rule in both Europe and Asia Minor and the difficulty of achieving hegemony simultaneously in both spheres, Bayezid was forced throughout his reign to make difficult choices about where his chief priorities lay. Consequently diplomacy, peace-making and the politics of compromise in one sphere of his empire, while

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[16] Ibid., p. 141: 'Rumili tarafında ve Anadolu geçesinde olan umera ... 'ya ahkam gönderdi. Rumilinde hemin uc beyleri kaldı., bakisi hadem u haşemin tabl u alemin aldı ... göç etdi'.

[17] Doukas, *Decline and Fall*, p. 84. On the role played by Kara Timurtaş Paşa in creating the first two regiments of what later become the six standing regiments of the Porte, see Şehabeddin Tekindag, art. 'Timurtaş', *Islam Ansiklopedisi* (13 vols, Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1950–88), vol. 12, p. 373.

[18] On the tenuous character of Ottoman rule in the Balkans during the second half of the fourteenth century, when the predominant part of the Ottomans' military forces available for deployment were based in Asia Minor, see Rudi Lindner, 'Anatolia, 1300–1451', in *CHoT*, pp. 102–37 (esp. 112).

[19] See: Jean Aubin, 'Comment Tamerlan prenait les villes', *Studia Islamica*, 19 (1963), pp. 83–122; and the example of his treatment of the Artukid ruler of Mardin discussed in detail below, pp. 197–8.

he pursued aggressive expansion and confrontational politics in the other, formed an essential component of Bayezid's statecraft and leadership.

## The External Dimension of Ottoman Politics and a Brief Account of Ottoman Diplomatic Practice

From the moment Murad I's brother, Süleyman Pasha, first set foot on European soil in 1354 the difficulty of maintaining and managing two perpetually active fronts in Europe and Asia had been an ever present concern of Ottoman military planning. While Murad had maintained the balance of campaigning during his reign (1360–89) in favour of the European side of the empire, he was fully conscious that a second front in Anatolia might prevent the full concentration of Ottoman military strength where and when it was most needed. Peace-making, vassalization and other forms of accommodation were frequently resorted to in order to achieve peace on one front while making war on another. His persistent and determined diplomacy with the Byzantine Emperor John V Palaiologos, whose reign (1354–91) coincided closely with his own, was redoubled, especially in the period after 1379, serving as proof that Murad was quite content to expand his influence as a regional power through diplomatic as well as military means.

Solutions involving negotiated terms of submission had the added advantage of contributing substantially to Murad's own resource base through annual tribute paid in cash and the supply of troops for this army. The number of troops supplied varied according to circumstance and it may be supposed that the exceptionally high number of troops supplied by John V in 1379 was intended mostly to help him in reclaiming his throne, with Murad's help, from the hands of his rebellious son Andronikos IV who had seized it in 1376.[20] Under less extreme conditions and over the course of time the numbers of troops provided dwindled to a largely token amount. Of this tendency we are informed (presumably reliably) by the Byzantine historian Doukas that the number of troops being supplied by John V to Bayezid c. 1390 amounted to no more than 'a hundred armed Roman troops'.[21] The level at which tribute and troops were provided by a vassal was subject to fierce and constant renegotiation, accompanied by the swearing and reconfirmation of personal vows of obedience. But whether the numbers and sums supplied were materially significant or merely symbolic did not alter the fact that the willing submission of a potential adversary represented in itself a net gain, as well as a means for avoiding costly and potentially mutually destructive wars.

In the cases referred to above, namely the civil war in Byzantium in the years 1376 to 1379, it seems that when John V gained Murad's backing, the 'rebel'

[20] The number of troops supplied by John V in 1379 is specified as 12,000 in the authoritative study by Charanis, 'The Strife Among the Palaeologi', p. 299.

[21] Doukas, *Decline and Fall*, p. 81.

Andronikos fled in July 1379 with his supporters across the Golden Horn to Galata where, for a period of some 18 months (until April 1381), he carried on a rearguard action seeking to topple his father who now resided with his forces behind the walled city of Constantinople.[22] During this period of contested rule in Byzantium the young prince Bayezid, aged 21, played the role of an intermediary between the warring parties (John V and his son Manuel on one side and the rebel Andronikos IV on the other), entering into a kind of bidding war on his father Murad's behalf to see which side would offer the greater inducement for alliance with the Ottomans. In exchange for the loan of 4,000 horsemen for a period of two months to be used in securing the throne for himself, Andronikos promised to pay the sultan a large annual tribute and to accept the installation of a Turkish 'governor' in Constantinople. His brother Manuel, not to be outdone, proposed the payment of a massive annual tribute, to consist of the sum of 30,000 golden coins, in addition to an agreement to supply an army – maintained and equipped at his own expense – to be deployed wherever the Ottomans ordered it to go.[23]

The lessons in multilateral negotiation learned by Bayezid during his minority were later applied, after he took the throne in 1389, when he was able to threaten Manuel II – after his own coronation as Byzantine Emperor in February 1392 – with the transfer of Ottoman sponsorship and support to Andronikos' son who, as John VII, also had a legitimate claim to the succession. Applying such techniques of *divide et impera* among the political factions and competing power groups within the Palaiologan house proved an effective means of behaviour modification and management of Ottoman imperial interests, thus averting, at least for a time, the need for direct military confrontation. The long and drawn-out power struggles between fathers and sons, and across generations between uncles and nephews, were by no means created by Ottoman intervention in Byzantine dynastic politics, but Ottoman rulers, including Bayezid, were frequently able to exploit such naturally occurring divisions to gain advantage for their own dynasty's interests.

Another means for neutralizing potential enemies and gaining supporters was through the offer of commercial incentives in exchange for either a non-aligned status or a pro-Ottoman stance in diplomatic relations with foreign powers. Bayezid followed in his father's footsteps at the outset of his reign by renewing the treaty entered into with the Genoese and signed by Murad in June 1387. This was renewed by Bayezid on 26 October 1389, a short two months after he occupied the throne. He clearly understood the importance of securing the active support of the maritime powers capable of keeping open the channels of supply and communications since, as already discussed, inadequate control of the sea lanes linking the two halves of

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[22] Nicol, *Last Centuries*, p. 282.

[23] Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Historiarum libri decem*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn: Weber, 1843), pp. 61–3 [= *Laonikos Chalkokondyles: A Translation and Commentary of the 'Demonstrations of Histories' (Books I–III)*, trans. Nikolaos Nikoloudis (Athens: Historical Publications St. D. Basilopoulos, 1996), pp. 180–85].

his empire was Bayezid's main weak point. Feelers were sent out to Dubrovnik in 1392 to secure closer relations timed to coincide with Bayezid's first campaign against Wallachia in the same year. Bayezid's clear purpose here was to weaken Dubrovnik's ties with Hungary to which, from 1358 onwards, Dubrovnik owed formal allegiance.[24] Although it is not possible at this early date to speak of formal treaties, there is clear evidence to suggest that the understandings and agreements secured by Bayezid formed the foundation of the much closer relationship that evolved in the time of Murad II (r. 1421–51) and resulted in the charter of 1442.[25] It would appear that, starting from the mid-1390s, a channel of communications, short of full diplomatic relations, was kept open through the mediation of the Ottomans' Serbian vassals, the Branković and Lazarović families, and assisted by an Ottoman presence in the border region through Bayezid's representative Yighit Pasha, who took control of Üsküb (Skopje) in 1392.[26]

Bayezid's attempts to subordinate Mircea the Elder, who had claimed the succession to the throne of the nominally independent but heavily Hungarian-influenced princedom of Wallachia by the violent overthrow and murder of his brother Dan I, in September 1386, serves as another example of Ottoman diplomatic manoeuvring aimed at securing a constellation of Ottoman-leaning vassals and allies to shield him from Hungary's advance against his possessions in the central Balkans.[27] Mircea's ambitions, supported by Hungary, to secure a bridgehead south of the Danube in lands belonging to the Despotate of Dobrudja in the vicinity of Silistre (Silistra) and incursions against the lands that belonged to the Despotate of Vidin – defined as the territory west of the Olt River – were briefly realized in the period at the very beginning of Bayezid's reign in 1390–91.[28]

Incursions such as those carried out by Mircea constituted deliberate acts of aggression against the Ottoman sphere of influence in a sensitive border zone south of the Danube, and this attack on an Ottoman protégée in the person of Ivanko, son of Dobrotić, was interpreted, according to the accepted conventions of international relations current at the time, as a provocation to war. After deploying his *akinci* forces of the frontier to force Mircea's retreat back across the Danube, it was incumbent

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[24] See Nicolaas H. Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575–1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), p. 25. John Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), p. 427, speaks of 'agreements' signed in 1392 and 1397 brokered by Bayezid's loyal Serb vassal Stephan Lazarevic.

[25] See the documentary study on the negotiations leading up to the 1442 charter by Boško Bojović, 'Dubrovnik et les Ottomans (1430–1472): 20 actes de Murad II et de Mehmed II', *Turcica*, 19 (1987), pp. 119–73.

[26] See above, pp. 181–2. See also Biegman, *Turco-Ragusan Relationship*, p. 25.

[27] Alexandru Dimitrie Xenopol, *Histoire des Roumains* (2 vols, Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), vol. 1, p. 211.

[28] Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, p. 423.

on Bayezid to himself undertake a punitive raid against Mircea's Wallachian capital at Curtea de Arges in the following year, so as to restore order among the allies and vassals that had formerly sworn allegiance to his father Murad. In order to set the tone of his own administration's relations with the Christian frontier lords of the north, among them Ivan (John) Stratsimir of Vidin who was suspected of connivance with Mircea during his brief establishment at Silistria, at the outset of his reign Bayezid pursued an uncompromising policy of repression vis-à-vis his Balkan neighbours. Bayezid was wary of provoking a direct confrontation with Hungary whilst his military position in Anatolia remained so uncertain, but the need to respond to Mircea's attack constituted a matter of priority, both for the security of his northern borders and in order to answer Mircea's gesture of defiance with a rigorous defence of his own personal dignity as ruler and at the same time of Ottoman dynastic honour. It was chiefly the consideration of his reputation as ruler that prompted Bayezid (in late autumn 1391) to abandon his campaign against Kastamonu, which was at the same time a matter of high priority for him, so as to be able to concentrate his forces against Mircea, who had taken the precaution of withdrawing to his home base in Wallachia in anticipation of Bayezid's approach.[29]

Ottoman sources suggest that the outcome of this first encounter with Mircea in the spring of 1392 was Mircea's reluctant agreement to accept Ottoman suzerainty together with a promise to pay tribute. According to the account given in Ibn Kemal's history, Mircea's envoys were received by the sultan in Edirne during the winter of 1392/93 when they offered (on Mircea's behalf) their prince's obedience.[30] When their promises remained unfulfilled, Bayezid was compelled to return to Wallachia to confront Mircea once again in the spring of 1394.

After achieving victory at the Battle of Argesh on 10 October 1394, Bayezid forced Mircea to relinquish his throne and replaced him with a more compliant vassal in the person of Vlad I, who swore to honour the obligation of service and loyalty to his Ottoman overlords with greater consistency. Vlad (known in Romanian sources as Vlad the Usurper – Vlad Uzurpatorul) took over the governance of Wallachia in October 1394 and remained in place a little over two years, until January 1397, at which time Mircea – forced by the defeat of his sponsor and would-be alternative overlord Sigismund at the Battle of Nicopolis in late September 1396 – had no other option but to resubmit his homage to Bayezid.[31]

There were compelling reasons for Bayezid's persistent occupation with the affairs of the Danubian borderlands in the years 1392 to 1396. However, the full absorption of these territories and establishment of centralized Ottoman rule, with all its hallmarks including the timar system, was postponed for several decades

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[29] Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, pp. 117–19: 'suyu geçip, adu ... iline girdiler'.

[30] Ibid., pp. 133–35: 'cadde-yi inkiyad'a girip, haracını verip, sal-be-sal bi-özr u behane hazine-yi amire'ye irsal etmeğe iltizam etdi'.

[31] For the dates of Vlad's term of office, see Constantin Giurescu, *Chronological History of Romania* (Bucharest: Editura enciclopedică română, 1974), p. 449.

after Bayezid's defeat by Timur in 1402. Even without the crisis engendered by the interregnum, it seems that Bayezid's aim was not conquest and annexation so much as the settling of the frontier through the intermediaryship of his vassals, such as Vlad, who could monitor the frontier on behalf of the Ottomans in exchange for a large measure of fiscal and administrative autonomy. Vlad's position as Ottoman protégé, accompanied by both rights and responsibilities, formed the model for the Ottomans' later relations with neighbouring states north of the Danube who would play a vital role in shielding the Ottomans from direct confrontation with the two most powerful Christian states of the north, namely Poland and Hungary.[32] Having defeated Sigismund in September 1396 and restored Mircea to his position as an Ottoman-aligned vassal in January 1397, the underlying causes, as well as the residual need, for further entanglements along the empire's northern front were removed and throughout the remainder of his reign Bayezid was able to concentrate his efforts on reinforcing his position in central Anatolia and along the empire's eastern frontiers. Mircea had been driven into retreat to his Wallachian capital Curtea de Arges in 1391, and then, after his defeat at the Battle of Argesh in 1394, he went into exile at Brasov (Kronstadt) in Hungarian-controlled Transylvania. Finally he was compelled to pay homage once again to Bayezid in the closing months of 1396, thus closing the matter as far as Bayezid was concerned and relieving him of the responsibility for further vigilance.

This matter-of-fact way of relating Bayezid's handling of the crisis in the Danubian theatre is not meant to belittle his achievement or underrate its importance for securing the Ottomans' position in the Balkans, but it should be remembered that at no time did Bayezid aim his sights on direct confrontation with Sigismund, nor was he set on engaging in a battle of the titans in the far north. When Mircea renewed his challenge and was defeated by Bayezid at the Battle of Rovine on 17 May 1395, Bayezid still distanced himself from entanglements that would draw him into the maelstrom of confrontation with the armies of the larger states of Central Europe, which at this time lay far beyond the radius of effective supply and support for his land forces. Overall his strategy was based on the deployment of small-scale forces that carried out intensive but time-limited raids followed by rapid retreat. There was no thought at this time of extending his imperial reach north of the Danube. Bayezid's main concern and preoccupation throughout the period 1392 to 1396 was to force a sincere contrition and restore to obedience a disobedient vassal in the person of Mircea.[33]

It is important to recognize that the power structures of both Christian Europe and Muslim Anatolia were roughly similar in the late medieval period. Moldavia

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[32] For utilization of the term *schützling* (protégé) in relation to Vlad, see Nicolai Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (5 vols, Gotha: F.A. Perthes aktiengsellschaft, 1908–13), vol. 1, p. 277 (bk 2, ch. 5).

[33] For parallels between Bayezid and his arch rival Timur in their treatment of recalcitrant vassals, see below, pp. 197–9.

and Wallachia, with their land-rich boyars and socially as well as militarily dominant families, operated very much on an oligarchic as opposed to autocratic basis in this period. The extent of power-sharing in such polities was in some ways akin to the forms of shared rule, shared sovereignty and division of political authority that were encountered in Anatolia during the same period and against which Bayezid struggled in his attempts to create the unitary state supported by central bureaucratic institutions that could bridge over and dominate such local jurisdictions. But Bayezid was, as previously noted, a transitional leader in a transitional age when the power of the state was as yet insufficient to counter, still less to wield command over, locally based authority and power structures.

*The Context of the Serres Conference: A Re-assessment of the Apparent Shift in Bayezid's Strategic Priorities in the spring of 1394*

Throughout the 13 years of his reign Bayezid found himself in a near continuous battle for regional pre-eminence with all or most of his Muslim neighbours in and at the margins of Asia Minor, whereas most of the serious hostilities between Bayezid and his western neighbours were confined to the relatively brief period between 1394 and 1396. That Bayezid's attack on Thessalonica in April 1394 was a reaction to the naval build-up by Venice in the northern Aegean seems clear, and the intensification of his blockade of Constantinople in the autumn of 1394 seems to have occurred only after he gave a last chance for a negotiated settlement by summoning his Serb and Greek vassals to Serres for a peace summit to renegotiate the terms of their accommodation with the Ottomans. It was only after the failure of negotiation that the road to the confrontation at Nicopolis with Christian Europe in 1396 was finally, and reluctantly, taken by Bayezid. It can be seen that western conquests did not occupy a central place in Bayezid's strategic thinking, even during these crisis-filled years of his reign, from the perception of his 'siege' of Constantinople by contemporary Byzantine observers. They regarded his attacks more as symbolic attempts to rebuke the waywardness of his former vassal and helpmate Manuel – whom Bayezid still hoped to win back into the Ottoman fold by means of persuasion – than as a full-blown expedition with immediate expropriatory intent. They, as well as Bayezid himself, understood only too clearly how a successful siege of Constantinople would unleash a determined international response which he would be ill-equipped to withstand, given his troop commitments and policy priorities in the other parts of his empire, most particularly in Asia Minor. Bayezid hoped to force the city to surrender on terms by starving it out, not – at least in the opinion of the Byzantine historians Doukas and Chalkokondyles – to occupy it permanently. With regard to Bayezid's intentions in 1394, Doukas opines as follows:

> The tyrant [that is, Bayezid] did not actually wage war against the City. He did not set up siege engines to demolish the battlements and walls, nor did he utilize any

> other kind of military engine. He did not order his lightly armed troops to make skirmishes. He deployed instead more than ten thousand men around the City to guard the exits so that nothing could either leave or enter. There was therefore a terrible dearth of grain, wine, oil and other provisions within the City.[34]

As for Chalkokondyles, he seconds this opinion with the added comment that for the Ottomans the only workable solution was to apply gradual pressure on the city through blockade, since capture of the city by force was not a realistic option.[35]

Until the spring of 1394, the policy of mutual accommodation that had characterized relations between Bayezid and the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II had operated relatively smoothly, with no open breaches in the early years of their two nearly coinciding reigns.[36] Instead of speculating about the likely causes for a fundamental shift in Bayezid's attitude towards and relations with his Christian neighbours in the Balkans around the year 1394, it is perhaps more fruitful to evaluate Ottoman policy shifts at this time in the light of threat and response, action and reaction. There is no convincing evidence to suggest a fundamental or permanent reordering of Bayezid's main priorities and military commitments at this particular juncture in his reign intended as a determined confrontation with the West. I would argue that no such change occurred. Instead, it was an unforeseen set of circumstances that prompted a temporary prioritization of the western front in response to particular developments.

What has to be determined first, before we attempt to interpret and understand these developments, is the likely sequence and timing of the chain of events during the first nine months of 1394 that witnessed a significant redeployment of Bayezid's forces and a sudden redirection of his strategic attention to the European theatre. Only then can we address the questions of cause and effect and seek to understand what prompted this change. The traditional dating for the convening of the summit meeting in Serres at which he offered his Balkan vassals a last opportunity for peace is January or February 1394, a dating which would suggest that Bayezid's attack on Thessalonica in spring 1394 and the intensification of his blockade against Constantinople in the autumn months of that same year were already a foregone conclusion in the opening months of the year.[37] Barker based his dating on the knowledge of Ottoman military activity aimed against Thessaly at around this time,

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[34] Doukas, *Decline and Fall*, pp. 83 and 281.

[35] Chalkokondyles, *Historiarum libri decem*, ed. Bekker, pp. 83–4 [= trans. Nikoloudis, pp. 208–11].

[36] It is noteworthy that Manuel had spent the six months prior to his formal coronation as emperor (in February 1392) in the company of Bayezid during the course of his campaigns in Anatolia: Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 296–7. On the general conditions of mutual accommodation between Bayezid and Manuel in the period 1391–94, see John W. Barker, *Manuel II: A Study in Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969), pp. 84–122.

[37] Barker, *Manuel II*, pp. 120–21, n. 47.

without asking the question whether these raids were being led and directed by the ruler or on his behalf by his agents, the *akinci* lords such as Evrenos Beg who were permanently based in the region. While it is possible from Byzantine sources to place the Emperor Manuel in Serres during the winter of 1393/94, there is no solid evidence from any source to suggest that Bayezid held court anywhere else but Bursa during that period, and we are consistently informed by all indications that in fact his mobilization against Thessalonica occurred in the spring of 1394 and that it was launched not from his capital Edirne but from Anatolia.[38]

In view of the fact that Bayezid appears not to have arrived in Thrace before March or April 1394, it would appear that the summit meeting at Serres most likely took place immediately after Bayezid's (re)capture of Thessalonica which is formally dated to 21 April.[39] Bearing this natural sequence of events in mind, it seems probable, in terms of cause and effect, that what prompted the crisis of 1394 was a naval build-up in the Aegean by Venice, which had been in *de facto* possession of Argos since 1388 and was becoming increasingly entrenched there with the tacit approval, if not active connivance, of Manuel and Theodore, the Despot of Mystra and Manuel's brother. In the first instance, because of Bayezid's distant removal from that front and his preoccupation with other matters, including the reprimanding of Candaroğlu Süleyman, he left the response to these developments in the Aegean to his *akinci* lords on the spot. When he was able, in the spring of 1394, to deploy his own forces to the region, he first took Thessalonica, in April, and then convened his peace summit in Serres, in May, where he was in position to consider whether the next step was an escalation of the military activity in Europe or a resumption of the pursuit of peaceful solutions which had been the common practice up until that point in his reign. That Bayezid initially considered the opening up of a new front in the Morea against Venice as an unwanted and unwelcome distraction is indicated in historical sources of the later Ottoman period that refer to the naval threat emanating from the Aegean as a *ga'ile* (calamity, disaster, sudden emergency) which Bayezid was compelled to counter with decisive action.[40]

In actual fact the Ottomans met the challenge posed by Theodore's cementing of formal diplomatic ties and a close military cooperation with Venice in an agreement signed in May 1394, about the time of the Serres gathering, with considerable restraint and delayed their full-scale retaliation to June 1397, when they were less encumbered with other more immediate concerns. This was despite the fact that the Veneto-Byzantine alliance carried the gravest possible implications for a shift in the balance of naval power in the northern Aegean, to the serious detriment of

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[38] See Denis Zakythinos, *Le Despotat grec de Morée: Volume 1 – Histoire Politique* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1932), p. 153.

[39] For the decisive adoption of May as the date for these deliberations, see: Zakythinos, *Le Despotat grec de Morée*, vol. 1, p. 153; and Charanis, 'The Strife Among the Palaeologi', p. 313.

[40] See Karaçelebi-zade Abdülaziz, *Ravzat'ül ebrar*, p. 353.

Ottoman strategic interests.[41] At this juncture in Bayezid's reign he simply could not afford to activate a serious new front in the Morea. It was not until three years later that Bayezid felt himself in a sufficiently secure position to confront Theodore and punish him for his defection to the enemy, which was designed to open up a third anti-Ottoman front in the far south, by his forceful seizure and sack of Argos.[42]

In the short term, Bayezid's way of addressing these untoward developments in his strategic situation in Europe in the spring of 1394 was to intensify his blockade of Constantinople in the immediate aftermath of the failure of negotiations at Serres; contemporary accounts date this intensification with some precision to September 1394.[43] At this time Bayezid set about the construction of the fortress at Anadoluhisarı (Güzelcehisar), with the double purpose of forcing a more concessionary stance on the part of his wayward vassals Manuel and Theodore, while at the same time serving as a precautionary move in that it provided an alternative route of passage in case the transfer of his troops to Europe via the Dardanelles crossing to Gelibolu was disrupted. These changes and adjustments to counter new threats in no way affected his overall commitment to his programme of expansion in the East: the years immediately following saw reactivation of the eastern front for campaigns against both the Karamanids and Kadi Burhaneddin of Sivas, to say nothing of his encounter with Timur at the end of his reign.

On the whole Bayezid's policy and strategic posture, both in the westernmost Balkans and along the Danube frontier in the north, were aimed more at containment than they were at expansion and, in the centuries that followed his reign, his later descendants – despite Süleyman's occupation of central Hungary after 1540 to counter a pressing geostrategic threat – validated his approach. The essence of this approach was that, by the offering of commercial privileges and inducements to cooperation and by the creation of Ottoman protectorates (especially north of the Danube) among the lesser Christian states in the north, the Ottomans would be in a better position to protect their vital interests and to shield their core territories in the southern Balkans than by engaging in brinksmanship or embracing a policy of northern expansion underpinned by commitment to a state of perpetual war against Christendom in general.

The Ottomans' chief strength in balancing the defence of their imperial interests and imperatives between East and West was that they were prepared to pursue a non-dogmatic approach that was based on an acknowledgment of the limits of the

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[41] For the date of this agreement, see: Peter Schreiner, *Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken: 2. Teil – Historischer Kommentar* (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), p. 351; and İnalcik, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades', p. 250, n. 6.

[42] On the sack of Argos, see: Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, p. 472; and Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, pp. 360–61.

[43] Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, p. 352.

possible.[44] That Bayezid overestimated his strength when deciding to confront Timur was a temporary aberration rooted largely in personal hubris, but that he managed to hold the field for as long and as successfully as he did at Ankara in August 1402 was due in large part to the steadfast support offered by his Serb vassals who, contrary to the expectation that their crypto-Christian sympathies would lead them to abandon Bayezid's cause, in fact fought long and hard to forestall defeat for as long as they could.[45]

To better understand the impetus which inexorably drove Bayezid towards his fateful confrontation with the rising power of Timur in the East, it is essential that we turn our attention to two further aspects of Ottoman sovereignty traditions, both of which played a determining role in the shaping of Bayezid's foreign policy choices during his 13 years on the throne: first, the paramount importance to the sovereign of protecting his personal dignity and the honour of the dynasty as the principal mainstays of his authority as ruler; and, secondly, the weight of traditions of service and subservience to the ruler inherited by the Ottomans from their Turkic ancestors and shared with their contemporaries in the Muslim East, the sustaining of which traditions served as the second but equally vital prop supporting his rule.

## The Importance of Etiquette in Interstate Relations in the Medieval East

Among the deliberate acts of provocation that were to be avoided according to the etiquette governing friendly relations with one's neighbours in the medieval period, there were four constants and universals that were commonly regarded as serious offences. The first of these consisted of the detaining, insolent treatment, imprisonment or, still worse, execution of envoys bearing letters, communications or peace proposals from the ruler of a neighbouring state or imperial rival. A second related offence was the capture or detention as hostages of prominent men, close aides or high officials in the employ of the ruler of a rival power.[46] The third

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[44] Heath Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), esp. pp. 131–43, reminds us of the degree to which the Ottomans had to rely in the early, proto-imperial era on coopted Christians to support their military as well as their state administrative endeavours.

[45] In her monograph on the battle of Ankara published in 1942, Alexandrescu-Dersca speculates on the value to the Ottomans of their policies of religious toleration with regard to the 'conquered' peoples in recruiting willing mercenary troops from Serbia, Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans. See, in particular, M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La campagne de Timur en Anatolie [1402]* (Bucharest: Imprimeria Nationalã, 1942), p. 101: 'Le systeme de large tolerance religieuse pratiqué par Murad et Bayezid contribua à établir des raports constants et meme amicaux entre les Grecs et Ottomans'.

[46] On the importance of hostages (*rehin*), protégés, defectors and detainees to the maintenance of kingly honour in the courtly traditions of the medieval East, see Rhoads

unforgiveable lapse of friendly relations was the subversion or attempt to subvert the loyalty of an ally, client or vassal after he had accepted the protection and offered his submission to a rival power. The fourth and final major offence was the offering of hospitality, support and succour or asylum to a fugitive defecting (as ally, vassal or client) from the service of a rival power. Several of the illustrative cases already discussed (for example, Mircea, Candaroğlu Süleyman Pasha and others) revolved around the need for the ruler's vigilance and vengeance in cases involving one or more of these breaches of the rules of polite behaviour in interstate relations.

Before leaving the subject and moving to the consideration of some general conclusions on the character of Ottoman statehood and kingship in Bayezid's time, we should perhaps seek to provide a brief account of the delicate dance of conflict avoidance and confrontation aversion that was pursued by both Timur and Bayezid in the years leading up to the clash at Ankara in 1402 and how, why, when and by whom the limits of the tolerable in friendly interstate relations were exceeded, thus making the fateful battle an irreversible outcome resulting from the escalating tensions which gained intensity over several years. It is important to bear in mind that Timur's sense of aggrievement and his desire to avenge his wounded pride in the years between 1393 and 1400 were directed mostly against the Mamluk Sultan Barkuk until the year of his death in 1399, and transferred thereafter to Barkuk's son Faradj who, like his father, made no effort to make amends, thus precipitating Timur's attack against Syria in the winter of 1400/1401. The details of this period of intensifying mutual disdain and dislike, with each ruler considering himself the greater in stature and prestige and staunchly refusing to defer to the other or show any willingness to compromise, can be neatly summarized in a series of key developments.

The first irritant that affected Timur's relations with Mamluk Egypt emerged in the autumn of 1392 when Baghdad was taken by Timur from the Jalayrid ruler Sultan Ahmad, who had refused to offer his submission to Timur's governor of Azerbaijan to whom, in Timur's view, he owed obedience and deference. When Sultan Ahmad fled Baghdad in October 1393, he was offered, in breach of one of the cardinal rules regulating international relations outlined above, political asylum in Egypt by Barkuk.[47] Timur then dispatched an ambassador to Barkuk seeking the fugitive's immediate return, but when his envoy reached the crossing point over the Euphrates and entered Mamluk territory at Rahbat al-Sham near Deir al-Zor, he was seized by the Mamluk authorities and put to death at the order of Barkuk and upon the instigation of his newly arrived protégé Ahmad Jalayir. In the following

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Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty* (London: Continuum, 2008), pp. 61–6.

[47] Yazdi, *HTB*, Book 3, p. 433. The English translation of the *Zafername* of Sharafaddin Ali was published in two volumes under the title *History of Timur-Bec* (London: Printed for J. Darby, E. Bell, W. Taylor, W. and J. Innys, J. Osborne and T. Payne, 1723) [cited here and afterwards as: Yazdi, *HTB*]. The first volume contains books 1–3 and the second volume contains books 4–6.

six and a half years between Timur's first seizure of Baghdad in the autumn of 1393 and its recapture in late July 1401, the Jalayrid ruler managed to reassert control over his ancestral lands in defiance of Timur's express wishes and demands. This was achieved in the first instance through the backing and support of his Mamluk patrons and overlords but, as we shall later see, they were replaced in the period between 1400 and 1402 by Ottoman sponsorship offered by Bayezid, thereby acting as the first in a series of Ottoman provocations that inevitably provoked Timur into action.[48]

Sultan Ahmad, unable to assert a claim to full sovereignty in the period between 1394 and 1399, was compelled to read the *khutba* (prayer leader's address to the congregation) in Barkuk's name,[49] and we are informed of a failed attempt in 1399 (AH 802) on the part of Timur's son Miran Shah, then serving as Timur's governor in Azerbaijan, to reassert Timurid claims to sovereignty. Miran Shah's attack was undoubtedly conceived to coincide with the perceived opportunity to reassert Timurid control offered by the Mamluk Sultan Barkuk's death in June 1399.[50] At the first sign of Timur's resolve to concentrate and redeploy his troops against Anatolia for the final resolution of his long-standing argument with the Mamluks which became apparent at the time of his siege of Sivas in July 1400 (Zilhicce 802),[51] Sultan Ahmad once again took up the safe option of voluntary exile; however, this time, after escaping captivity in Damascus, he sought out the protection and patronage of Bayezid's court, which proved a dangerous course, not just for the refugee Ahmad, who lost his capital as the result of Timur's onslaught a year later,[52] but also for his host Bayezid, who was compelled to confront the worsening state of his own relations with Timur that resulted from his offer of asylum to the Jalayrid 'rebel'. We are informed by the Ottoman historian Ibn Kemal that the Jalayrid ruler tarried only briefly, for a period of two months over the winter of 1400/1401, but that was time enough for him to receive Bayezid's blessing and offer of Ottoman backing and support before returning to Baghdad.[53] Ahmad's conducting of this kind of shuttle diplomacy between Baghdad, Cairo and Bursa was bound to provoke a response from Timur, as both the guest and his Ottoman hosts knew full well. Bayezid was already, by the early months of 1401, courting disaster and inviting retribution at the hands of Timur and his legions.

Another instructive example of how Mamluk intransigence, this time involving the forced detention and incarceration of one of Timur's favourites at court,

[48] The date of Timur's recapture of Baghdad by force is given in Yazdi, *HTB*, Book 5, p. 215, as 27 Zilhicce 803/23 July 1401.

[49] Henry Howorth, *History of the Mongols from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century: Part Three – The Mongols of Persia* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1880), p. 667.

[50] Miran Shah's ill-fated campaign is described in Yazdi, *HTB*, Book 5, pp. 109–10.

[51] Ibid., Book 5, p. 146.

[52] See above, n. 48.

[53] His appearance at the Ottoman court is recorded by Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, p. 359.

contributed to setting in train the engines of war revolved around the case of Atilmish, one of Timur's closest and most trusted associates. Ka'uchin Atilmish had been taken hostage by the Kara Koyunlu ruler Kara Yusuf in revenge for his loss of the strategic fortress of Avnik which had been captured by Timur after a 43-day siege which ended in August 1394 (Shevval 796).[54] Having been appointed commander and fortress warden by Timur, Atilmish fell into an ambush during a patrol near Erciş on the shores of Lake Van and was taken to Barkuk in Cairo for safe-keeping as a hostage. Here, despite repeated demands sent by Timur to both Barkuk and, after his death, Faradj to secure his release, the high-profile hostage Atilmish was made to languish in detention until, six years later upon his return to Anatolia at the time of the siege of Sivas in July 1400, Timur issued a final ultimatum to Faradj, demanding the immediate release of his prize hostage or else he would face an imminent attack of his realms. When, by repeating and thus compounding the effect of his father's mistake, Faradj ordered the detention of Timur's envoy, he knew that any possibility for a peaceful conclusion to the conflict was effectively removed. He had thus deliberately delivered into Timur's hands a legitimate cause to justify his march on Syria in the autumn of 1400 and early winter of 1401 which had such devastating consequences, both for his countrymen and subjects and for his own imperial prestige.

Timur's sensitivity to the intransigence of Isa, the Artukid ruler of Mardin between 1376 and 1407[55] and a would-be vassal and ally in his bid to overturn Mamluk ascendancy in south-central and south-eastern Anatolia, can be understood in purely strategic terms, but it also bore a strong relation to Timur's overriding concern with the protection of his sovereign dignity and personal reputation. Timur's insistence on the punishment and subjection to a visible and tangible state of submission of Malik Isa bears a striking resemblance to the political context of Bayezid's battles with Mircea between 1392 and 1396.[56] Isa, because of his inconsistency and recalcitrance in submitting to Timur, occasioned two visitations on the part of the conqueror: the first in January 1394 during Timur's whirlwind tour through eastern Anatolia aimed at gathering up agents and allies for a planned-for offensive against the Mamluks, and again in April 1401 upon his return from the long anticipated anti-Mamluk offensive that had finally materialized in the winter months of 1400/1401. What mattered was not the strategic importance of the place for his plans to extend his control into Muslim Anatolia; this was relatively minor. Timur's real concern was rather the need to avenge the insult to his imperial prestige and the desire to make an example of Isa to others in order to discourage similar waywardness or insubordination on their part. Vowing to assist Timur and

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[54] Yazdi, *HTB*, Book 3, pp. 468–77. On the significance of the title *Ka'uchin*, see below, n. 65.

[55] See Clifford E. Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p. 195.

[56] See above, pp. 188–9.

then reneging on his pledge constituted a breach of promise and discipline that Timur could not afford to tolerate and still expect to hold on to his authority as leader. Thus, when the townspeople of Mardin attacked Timur's forces and their ruler resisted Timur's invitations to assist him in his campaigns, in January 1394, Timur decided to humble Isa by taking him captive and forcing him to travel with him in his camp over the following three and a half years, until May 1397.[57] When Timur authorized his release, he granted him 'pardon' for his previous misdeeds but imposed the condition that he 'solemnly swore before the *emirs* who protected him that he would never fail in his obedience to the emperor, but accompany him, in all his wars and on every occasion give marks of his respect and fidelity'.[58] When, upon his return to Mardin in April 1401, Isa again demonstrated his recalcitrance and failed to provide any valid excuse for not having assisted Timur during his campaign into Syria in the closing months of the previous year, Timur responded by setting fire to the lower town lying beneath the citadel.[59]

At the same time, in contrast to the severe punishments meted out to his reluctant and disobedient allies, Timur treated the sultans of Erzincan and Hisn Keyfa with civility, giving each gifts before permitting them to return to their country.[60] From such examples and a number of others reviewed in Aubin's study on Timur's methods of conquest,[61] it can be seen how, as a supplement to the use of compulsion and violence (*anf*) against townspeople and their leaders who resisted his authority, Timur was also inclined to use leniency and even compassion towards those who offered their submission willingly by *sulh* (surrender on terms) and *aman* (voluntary surrender). To gain the support of those who were willing to submit, to accept the reading of the *khutba* in the Friday prayer in his name, he gave considerable leeway to regulate their own affairs, insisting only on a formal declaration of their deference and obedience (*arz-i ubudiyet*) and a willingness to accept the tokens of investiture in office by the donning of the vestments (*hilat*) delivered by his hand, thus signalling their compliance with his imperial will.

Bayezid needed to compete with such methods in attracting vassals and allies to swell the ranks of his own forces when entering into battle against his strongest rivals; but, it may be argued, due to his hard line and sometimes excessively confrontational stance with regard to former Ottoman allies and supporters among the independent emirates of western Anatolia, and his insistence on full annexation instead of compromise solutions allowing a degree of autonomy that had been

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57 For the dates of his capture and release, see Yazdi, *HTB*, Book 3, pp. 454 and 522.

58 Ibid., Book 3, p. 523.

59 Ibid., Book 5, pp. 207–8.

60 Ibid.: '[Timur] used abundance of civility to the sultans of Hisn Keyfa, Azine [that is, Erzincan] and other neighbouring places who had come to pay their devoirs to him at his arrival. He gave each a robe woven with gold, a belt set with precious stones and a sabre with a gold handle and he permitted them to return to their countries.'

61 Aubin, 'Comment Tamerlan prenait les villes'; see above, n. 19.

devised and successfully employed by his father, Bayezid drove many of his potential allies into the enemy camp where they served as willing supporters of Timur's imperial cause.

In a parallel development, Bayezid – by his offer of asylum at his court to the Kara Koyunlu leader Kara Yusuf who had been the instigator, precipitator and primary cause of the Avnik events and the hostage-taking involving Timur's governor, Atilmish – also took on responsibility for the breach of one of the cardinal rules of friendly relations between states, namely the offer of sanctuary and support to a client/vassal or sworn enemy of a neighbouring state. According to the account in Ibn Kemal's history, Kara Yusuf's sojourn at the Ottoman court over the winter of 1400 into the spring of 1401 lasted fully eight months, giving evidence not just of a brief courtesy call on Bayezid but of active preparation for joint participation in an anti-Timurid alliance.[62] Bayezid was thus, again deliberately, placing himself on an inevitable collision course with Timur, showing his open defiance of his imperial rival and, in medieval chivalric terms, throwing down the gauntlet that invited his adversary to a test of valour in armed conflict.

The contention that form and formality in the symbolic display of power mattered more than the underlying imperial interests and served as the prime motivator of sovereign behaviour in interstate relations is of course untenable. Nevertheless it is possible to detect a consistent pattern that spurred Timur's conquests and directed his campaign priorities. He used hard power and made an example of those who defied his will, but was also very adept at finding ways of neutralizing, deflating and disempowering potential rivals and foes by offering alternatives to war. These included compromise and power-sharing, such as demands for token recognition of his suzerainty that amounted to little more than the requirement that those submitting to his authority should agree not to make common cause with his enemies. Inclusion in the Timurid protectorate, with a fair degree of immunity from direct intervention at the local level, was Timur's reward for their compliance. Terms offered by Bayezid to his vassals were based on the same principles but were perhaps marginally more onerous and required greater sacrifices of fiscal and administrative immunity on the part of his prospective clients.

Especially with regard to his Muslim neighbours in Anatolia, Bayezid pursued quite a confrontational and hard-line stance vis-à-vis existing power structures. Having successfully confronted the power of the Germiyanids, the Aydin-Oghullari, the Menteshids, the Teke-Oghullari, the Candarids and – though to a less decisive degree – the Karamanids in his determined and relentless campaigns carried out during the 1390s with the aim of centralization and enhancement of state power, he later paid the price when a significant contingent among his father's former allies and supporters among the Turcoman of Anatolia flocked not to his ranks but to Timur's at the Battle of Ankara in 1402. On the whole Timur's criticism of Bayezid that he neglected the *jihad* in favour of aggression, confrontational politics

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62 Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, p. 359.

and expansion against his Muslim neighbours had an undeniable ring of truth to it. That Timur would interpret his offer of asylum to both Ahmad Jalayir and Kara Yusuf at much the same time in the early months of 1401, immediately following Timur's campaign into Syria, as a hostile gesture was perfectly obvious to Bayezid; and that Timur would have no honourable option in response except war was also well understood, yet Bayezid knowingly crossed this particular Rubicon. Bayezid's decision was taken despite the fact that he was aware that up until this point Timur had shown a relative tolerance and 'live and let live' attitude towards his counterpart in western Anatolia whose polity, still largely dominated by the dynasty's Oghuz tribal following, was not so very far removed, in either its spirit, customs or traditions, from the values that governed Timur's Chagatayid tribal confederation.

## Loyalty and Submission in the Turco-Mongol Tradition and Bayezid's Leadership Claims among his Rivals and Peers in Muslim Anatolia

What medieval rulers sought was compliance with their will, whether internally, from their own governors, servitors and clients, or externally, from their allies and vassals. The conventions which governed subordination and 'faithful service' were largely similar in the two spheres though they were played out and expressed in different ways. Nevertheless it will perhaps be clearest if we consider the internal and the external spheres separately.

One of the key foundations of medieval kingship, especially in the forms and norms that took shape in the East, centred on the obligation of loyalty and steadfastness in service on the part of the ruler's subordinates with respect to their liege lord. The contractual agreement between a liege lord and his servitors was sometimes stated – particularly in the Turco-Mongol tradition based on the customs and conditions of steppe warfare – in egalitarian terms which featured the institutions of 'friendship', comradeship of the contracting parties as opposed to notions of deference, subordination and servility. The egalitarian nature of the ties that bound the two affiliated parties in the nomadic traditions of the steppe is reflected in the register and tone of the vocabulary employed to describe the relationship. The literal meaning of *nökür* (*nöker*) is friend and, by extension, spouse, thus expressing a relationship between 'strangers' entered into willingly with the full consent of both parties and implying equal rights for both participants.[63] Though the term connotes neither biological nor affinitive relation and could be entered into by either a member of the tribe or an 'outsider', the obligations it imposed are expressed in the fact that the *nöker* relationship was considered an

[63] See Antoine Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos* (3 vols, Peking: Catholic University, 1941–44), vol. 2, p. 498: 'ami, époux, épouse'. As a stem in verbal constructs, it conveys the sense of the consolidating of bonds of friendship by one's own choice and volition: Ibid.: 'nouer les relations d'amitié'.

indissoluble bond solemnized and sealed by the drinking of a liquid toast (*and*) containing commingled droplets of blood belonging to both of the contracting parties. This was done to symbolize the fact that the blood brotherhood relationship being entered into carried the same force as kinship ties between biological siblings. In the nomadic tradition the equal shares of mutual devotion, service, loyalty and gratitude that bound such individuals together as two halves of the same united being or partnership as *anda* (sworn blood brothers) is translated in one version of *The Secret History of the Mongols* as 'tally friendship'; this conveys a sense of absolute uniformity and equivalency in the sharing of both the risks and rewards of mutual enterprise that the rough equivalents most commonly used to describe this relationship (that is, comrade, companion, associate) fail to capture.[64]

At the higher levels of the Mongol military hierarchy were elite units whose members formed a dedicated band of the ruler's closest associates who made up the ranks of his personal imperial bodyguard. These men carried the title *ka'uchin* and were entrusted by the ruler with the performance of strategically important and sensitive tasks, such as the guarding and governorship of recently conquered territories or the wardenship of strategically positioned castles that had surrendered to the ruler's authority under the compulsion of intense and unanswerable military force, but whose long-term loyalty to the Mongol *imperium* was, due to the circumstances of their submission, still uncertain.[65] To cast such individuals in the limited role as comrades, commanders or even clients of the ruler understates their key importance as the principal linchpins overseeing the projecting of the ruler's power and the protection of his aura and reputation as leader. This relationship of intimacy with the sovereign ruler emerged out of long periods of shared experience and common service on campaign throughout the ruler's bid for supremacy, both political and military, over the course of his reign. The kind of honorary kinship ties that resulted from their connection served as a fundamental prop of kingship and imperial governance according to the well-established traditions of the steppe that still carried considerable weight and moral authority in medieval Anatolia. This was true not only for Timur, whose empire was founded and extended outwards from his base of operations in the Central Asian steppe itself, but for the Ottomans themselves, whose ancestors and founders were steeped in the self-same traditions based on honour codes that were conceived and constructed in the same mode.

Such arrangements for the creating of power networks and the management of the loyalty of one's servitors based on notions of comradeship and mutual support

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[64] *The Secret History of the Mongols*, trans. Francis Cleaves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), index p. 271, *s.v.* anda.

[65] A thorough account of the lexical and historical origins of this office in the pre-Timurid period is offered in the article by Maria Subtelny, 'The Binding Pledge (*möchalgü*): A Chingisid Practice and Its Survival in Safavid Iran', in Colin P. Mitchell (ed.), *New Perspectives on Safavid Iran: Empire and Society* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 9–29, especially p. 25, n. 58.

were of course not unknown in the sedentary world; it was largely a question of degree and nuance, but on the whole the very notion of a duty of obedience to a hereditary ruler to whom obedience and respect was automatically due was largely absent in the nomadic tradition.[66] It was primarily for this reason that Bayezid, as the inheritor of his father's patrimonial lands by virtue of his progenitor's accidental death at Kosovo in 1389, had to struggle rather hard in the first years of his reign to prove his own worth and earn the loyalty (or force the submission) of his father's former supporters and allies, which included large numbers of individuals who owed their loyalty to Murad through personal bonds of *nöker*ship; the transfer of these bonds to Bayezid proved in some cases problematic and in other cases impossible. The notion of unconditional loyalty owed to a dynasty, regardless of its leader, or to an even more abstract notion such as the 'state' was not just alien to the medieval Anatolian mind-set, but virtually inconceivable under the terms which regulated power relations during the age of chivalry which both Bayezid and his contemporaries in the West inhabited.[67]

The clash of values between the old nomadic warrior class and the new world order with the unitary and dominant state at its centre, the imposition of which the former fiercely resisted, is reflected in a lengthy digression *cum* diatribe incorporated in the Ottoman *Anonymous Chronicles*. This digression occupies fully half of the ten pages of text that are devoted to the first part of Bayezid's reign, culminating with the capture of Sivas by Timur in 1400.[68] The highly partisan viewpoint that informs the narrative in this section of the *Anonymous Chronicles* draws a fundamental distinction between *nökerlik* (comradeship, friendship) and *kulluk* (subordination, clientage). Positioning itself nostalgically in reference to a golden age now past, the chronicle voices the following sentiment:

> [In those days] there were trusted associates (*nökers*) who had given loyal service for many years. These were swaggering resolute men and it was they who [after long service] took up the important offices of state and the incomes associated

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[66] On the absence of inherited worth and automatic right of hereditary succession in the nomadic world, see Halil İnalcik, 'The Ottoman Succession and its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty', in Halil İnalcik, *The Middle East and the Balkans Under the Ottoman Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 37–69.

[67] For the development of the notion of allegiance to a de-personalized and abstract notion called the 'Noble' or 'Exalted' State (*Devlet-i Aliyye*) conceptualized for the purpose of defending the interests as well as the honour of the state in the context of early eighteenth-century diplomatic practice, see Rhoads Murphey, 'Twists and Turns in the Diplomatic Dialogue During the Lead-up to the Passarowitz Peace Conference: A Glimpse at the Politics of Peace-Making in the Early Eighteenth Century', in Charles Ingrao, Jovan Pesalj and Nikola Samardzic (eds), *The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2011), pp. 73–91, in particular pp. 81 and 90 (n. 11).

[68] See *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken [Tawarih-i Al-i Otman]*, ed. Friedrich Giese (Breslau: F.A. Brockhaus, 1922), pp. 27–36.

> with them. […] [In those days] they [that is, the *nökers*] looked upon the members of the inner palace service (*Iç Oğlan*) as no better than lowly curs. The regarding of palace servitors with esteem was an [unfortunate] legacy left from [Chandarlizade] Ali Pasha's time in office [that is, 1387–1407].[69]

Elaborating on the same theme, Mustafa Ali, writing in the late sixteenth century, also identified Ali Pasha's term in office with seismic changes in Ottoman state structures and institutions using the following descriptive terms:

> Up until Ali Pasha's time the training of pages, the precedence and respectful regard given to members of the [Inner] Palace Household [that is, the *Enderun*] and the habit of making a distinction between those in the inner and outer circle of the state administration had not appeared and was as yet unheard of.[70]

Succession struggles at the beginning of each reign represented, in the early Ottoman dynastic age, not an anomaly or a pathologic state of affairs, but a manifestation of the normal and expected state of business as usual.[71] The two main contenders for the succession in 1389 had comrades and associates linked with them and the lands assigned to each as appanages or princely governorates that shared some boundaries in common. Bayezid was based in the former capital of the Germiyanid principality at Kütahya, which had been assigned to him in 1381 upon his marriage to a Germiyanid princess; and Yakub, with his own retainers, servitors and sworn bondsmen, was based in the neighbouring territories of Karasi, which had been fully annexed to the Ottoman state in the time of his grandfather Orkhan. With their main centres at Balikesir and Kütahya, both were nearly equidistant from the main Ottoman capital at Bursa, thus already many years before Murad's death at Kosovo in 1389, the two parties were poised ready to compete for the sole succession to their father's throne. That a major confrontation was avoided was due to the timely intervention of a group of Bayezid's top advisers, led by Chandarli Ali Pasha, who took pre-emptive action and, with the sultan's consent, ordered the extrajudicial murder of Yakub.

The essence of political relations in the internal political sphere consisted of the demonstration of gratitude by a client for the sustenance and support offered to him by his patron and leader. The metaphor for describing the right of the donor/patron to the loyalty of the recipient of his patronage was the right associated with the patron's bestowing of (and conversely the obligation owed by the client for his consumption of) his master's 'bread and salt'. In these terms, filial duty (owed by

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[69] Ibid., p. 31.

[70] This passage is found in Mustafa Ali, *Künh ül ahbar*, ed. Ahmed Uğur et al. (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997), vol. 1, part 1, pp. 123–4.

[71] On the unpredictability of succession to the throne in the early Ottoman dynastic age, see İnalcik, 'The Ottoman Succession'.

birth), affinitive duty (acquired by marriage) and duty owed by an affiliate (that is, duty acquired by choice, adoption or mutual consent) all bore roughly the same characteristics. The allegiance and loyalty of one's retainers and clients was always contingent on the generosity and credibility of the patron's promises of protection and reward. It is clear that throughout his reign Bayezid was in competition with other rulers of the independent Muslim states of Anatolia for the loyalty and cooperation of the widest possible following, particularly among the tribal groups who formed the key to his success as ruler. At the beginning of his reign in particular, the wavering loyalty, incomplete subordination and often open defection of some of the allies, vassals and clients who had sworn allegiance to his father Murad I and contributed to the success of his conquests, but who resisted or were ambivalent towards Bayezid's leadership, remained a cause of brooding disquiet to the young ruler who had acquired his throne, aged 35, more by accident than by acclamation.

The defection from Bayezid's cause of a key figure in the person of Yakub II, heir to the divided Germiyanid state whose cooperation (as Bayezid's brother-in-law and one of Murad I's key allies) was taken for granted, delivered a serious blow to Bayezid's prestige as former Ottoman governor of a portion of the former principality of Germiyan. At the same time, it also undermined the material interests of the Ottoman state which itself had only recently extended its sphere of influence into this region that was the main entry point and staging area for the Ottomans' further penetration eastwards into Anatolia. A second defection which occurred early in his reign that caused Bayezid particular embarrassment was that of Süleyman Pasha, one of the heirs contending for succession to the Candarid principality. Süleyman had taken up refuge in Murad I's court as a political refugee in 1384, during his rebellion against the rule of his father Bayezid the Lame at the very end of his reign, when his imminent demise was apparent. Süleyman had thus both literally and figuratively occupied a position as Ottoman protégé who had eaten the 'bread and salt' of two sultans. He received assistance from Murad when claiming his part of the still-contested throne upon his father's death in 1385. At the same time, he consolidated his relationship with his Ottoman backers by entering into ties of consanguinity (*sıhriyet*) and affinity by marriage with the House of Osman through his marriage to Murad I's niece Sultan Begum.[72] Not only did Süleyman Pasha (also known by his dynastic title Süleyman II Candaroğlu) thereby become a cousin-in-law to Bayezid, but, by virtue of a further marriage (perhaps never consummated) entered into by Murad I in the last years of his life with one of Süleyman Pasha's daughters, Süleyman was entitled to recognition with the honorary title of father-in-law to Bayezid. As a matter of personal prestige for the ruler and an essential element in the defence of his dynasty's material interests, the retention of the loyalty of such high-profile political supporters and allies *cum* vassals was of particular importance.

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[72] See Anthony D. Alderson, *Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 165 (table 22).

Encouragement to disloyalty or promoting the disaffection of such allies of the dynasty on the part of one of the Ottomans' rivals was regarded, according to the conventions of the time, both as a deliberate insult and a legitimate *casus belli*. The insult had to be avenged as a matter of priority, again according to the conventions and shared precepts of the medieval age, to avoid further loss of prestige deriving from breach of faith, breach of promise and deliberate rebellion and 'faithlessness' on the part of the wayward client *cum* vassal who had earlier shared the commensal table with his Ottoman overlord as the consumer of his bread and salt. It is essential to keep the imperative force of such attitudes towards dynastic pride and personal honour in the foreground when attempting to make sense of how Bayezid defined his military and political priorities during the course of his reign.[73]

On the inconstancy of the Ottomans' Turcoman allies, we have the eloquent testimony of Ottoman historical sources produced in the later imperial era which, though divided by time, were close in spirit to the conventions that underpinned the traditions of the early Ottoman state. These later Ottoman sources consistently bemoan the inconsistency and unreliability not so much of the Ottomans' Christian vassals and nominally subordinated vassals – though they too could at times become a major source of headache and preoccupation for rulers of the early Ottoman state – but, most particularly, of the tribal groups referred to under the pejorative rubric of the 'vile and accursed Turkmen' (*Türkmen- i şum*). Historians such as the respected Ibn Kemal (Kemalpaşazade) utilize even less flattering sobriquets such as the *Etrak-i bi-bak* and the *Etrak-i ak*.[74] By employing such labels, the historians meant to convey not the Turks who fight 'fearlessly' (*bi-bak*) for the righteous cause, but the nomadic Turks who lack respect and 'awe' for higher authority and who are undutiful in obedience towards their political leaders. Such sources reveal the political reality that in the late fourteenth century the central problem facing the Ottoman state leadership was not expanding or extending the Ottomans' sway over the Balkan states, but securing order, unanimity and full cooperation and submission among the various tribal groupings of the western and central parts of Anatolia who were both co-religionists and shared a common ethnic origin, but who proved more fickle and stubborn in their resistance to Ottoman governorship and overlordship and less inclined to accept Ottoman 'protection' in deference to their greater military power than did the 'infidel' Greeks, Slavs and others who formed their counterparts in the Balkan lands. It was partly for this reason that the Ottomans found it most beneficial and convenient to pursue the consolidation of their rule in the Balkans through compromise, accommodation, appeasement and other forms of relations based on co-rule or tributary relations, while being compelled to pursue the politics of confrontation and direct annexation in the East

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[73] See above, pp. 194–9, for an account of the ways in which the protection of personal honour and dynastic pride served as prime determinants in the defining of Ottoman foreign policy objectives.

[74] See, for example, Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, p. 201.

where intermediate forms such as co-rule and semi-autonomous tributary relations proved on the whole, at least in this period, unworkable.

The 'faithlessness' and betrayal of former Ottoman allies among their fellow Muslim Turks in Anatolia forms a leitmotif in the dynastic annals covering this period. This sense of betrayal and desertion in the years leading up to the confrontation with Timur in 1402 is also apparent in the more popular folk-inspired histories, such as that written by Ashik Pashazade who refers to the inconstancy of the members of both the Candarid dynasty and the chief figures of other dynasties such as the Menteşe-oğulları, who used the Candarid principality c. 1391 as a starting point and refuge zone for their rebellion against Bayezid before their ultimate defection to Timur's cause c. 1400. Ashik Pashazade refers to such individuals as turncoats, renegades, backsliders and ingrates, while reserving the most spiteful and colourful condemnatory language at his disposal for the lambasting of the political refugee Mehmed Beg Menteşe-oğlu, whom he grouped, along with the other deserters, as:

> tamed bears, paraded about by their new masters [in the Candarid principality and further east in the Timurid realms], and trained monkeys made to dance on a string following in the heels of gypsy organ grinders bearing tin cups to collect their tips and gratuities.[75]

It is worth recalling that, according to the traditions of sovereignty current in many parts of Anatolia in Bayezid's time, the notions of shared sovereignty and of dual-capitalled states – with territories divided between rival sons and would-be successors who vied with one another to secure undisputed claim to the unitary state left by a common ancestor or progenitor – presented no contradiction in terms. With regard to the Menteshid principality itself, for example, we know that the state had been divided for some time into three sub-regions, each vying for absolute control. The territories bequeathed by Ibrahim Beg in 1360 were divided between his three sons, Mehmed, Taceddin Ahmed and Musa, who subsequently died in 1375. Between 1375 and 1391, the date when Bayezid, taking advantage of the disunited state of politics present in Menteshe, put forth his own claim to annex the principality, the territory underwent a decade and a half of indeterminate rule, with some districts falling under the jurisdiction of Menteşe-oğlu Mehmed Beg and others controlled by his brother Taceddin Ahmed.[76] An inter-generational dimension was introduced into the struggle when Mehmed's sons, Giyaseddin Mahmud and Suca al-Din Ilyas Beg, joined the contest. One of these (Ilyas Beg) accompanied

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[75] *Ashik Pashazade Tarihi*, ed. Friedrich Geise (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1929), p. 67 [= ed. Ali Beg (Istanbul: 'Āmire, 1332/1914), p. 74]: 'kaçtılar, ayıcılara maymunculara uyudu. Tımur'a vardı. Menteşeoğlı saçın sakalın yollatı, uşak olup vardı'.

[76] See Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, p. 222; and for a genealogical tree of the Menteshids, see Ismail H. Uzunçarşılı, 'Menteşe-oğulları', in *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7, p. 727.

his father into exile in the Candarid principality in 1391, while Mahmud remained behind and cooperated with Ottoman interim arrangements for the annexation of Menteshe as an Ottoman province.

Shared sovereignty and the periodic fragmentation of authority, followed in some cases at a later stage by reconsolidation of unitary control either in the same or in a later generation, was a commonplace feature of the political landscape of Anatolia in Bayezid's day and he was no more immune to such challenges arising from internal divisions than his contemporary rivals and competitors. His own territory was divided and contested for a prolonged time between 1402 and 1413 amongst his own sons and would-be sole successors, during the so-called *fetret* or interregnum.

The Karamanid dynasty survived intact through a number of internal rifts and minor interregnums interspersed through the two-century span of its history from 1256 to c. 1475. It managed to reinvent and reform itself from surviving elements on numerous occasions, including the crisis period during the ruler Alaeddin Beg's confrontation with Bayezid which culminated in a Karamanid defeat at the Battle of Akçay in the spring of 1393. Single figure authority structures such as the one that Bayezid attempted to construct during his reign, based on the concentration of power in the hands of a single authoritarian ruler and the centralized institutions of the state that supported him, although they later became commonplace features of the Ottoman state after the reign of Mehmed II (r. 1451–81), represented something of an anomaly in the Anatolia of the late fourteenth century. The political values espoused by Bayezid as he pursued his confiscatory expansionist policies against the independent Turkmen principalities of Muslim Anatolia struck a discordant note and seemed out of step, not just among his rivals in neighbouring states, but also amongst the warrior classes whose continuing and consistent support for the ascendancy of his regime was so essential. Bayezid was a transitional leader living in a transitional age, but the character of his reign was more in tune with the political realities of the empire post-1450 than it was with the norms and traditions that characterized Anatolia during the waning of the Middle Ages, traditions that were still alive and active at the close of the fourteenth century.[77]

According to the traditions prevailing in Anatolia at the time of Bayezid's reign, nobility resided not among the servile ranks of state officialdom, but in the freedom and brotherhood of the open range. A passage from Ahmed Shikari's history which reflects these attitudes and the cultural rift that separated the nomadic warriors and the hierarchically organized troops (both timariots and *ocak eri*, that is, members of the permanent standing forces of the imperial household) relates to the case of

[77] For an analysis of notions of shared sovereignty prevalent in the eastern Turkic world that still retained their relevance and vitality among the nomads of western Asia Minor in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, see Joseph Fletcher, 'Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3–4 (1979–80), pp. 236–51 [reprinted in Joseph Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, ed. Beatrice Manz Forbes (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995)].

the Karamanid prince Ibrahim, son of Mehmed Beg Karamanoglu and grandson of Alaeddin Beg who ruled the principality as Bayezid's contemporary. Ibrahim regarded his lineage as the descendant of Karaman Beg (d. 1261), proud founder and defender of a sovereign and independent state, as superior by orders of magnitude to the careerist upstarts represented by the slave recruits and timar holders sent against him in battle by the Ottomans. These Ibrahim regarded with contempt as no better than 'the spawn of donkeys'. Forces led by two 'lackeys' serving the Ottoman dynastic house, whom Ibrahim identifies as Timurtaş Paşa and Kutlu Beg, crossed the Karamanid border and ambushed him while he was returning from a patrol into the countryside from his provincial seat, located at the border town of Akşehir, accompanied by a light force consisting of 600 horsemen.[78] In his view this surprise attack represented a cowardly act unworthy of the true warrior who, as a matter of principle, confronted his adversaries not using the tricks and stratagems of war but on the basis of a level playing field. In relation to these events, Shikari, using the simulated direct speech characteristic of this type of folk literary source grounded in oral traditions, has Ibrahim Beg exclaim as follows:

> I am a *khan* [sovereign ruler in the steppe tradition selected for his military prowess and personal charisma] and son of *khan*s. My opponents [that is, Timurtaş and Kutlu] are no more than the slaves of a *shah* [king in the sedentary Persian tradition viewed by the nomads as representing an autocratic form of government]. Is it not extraordinary that such donkeys as these should have the effrontery to attack me?[79]

Making use of the viewpoints expressed in sources written during Bayezid's own lifetime, even when their principal purpose was to promote and defend the honour of a rival dynastic house, can be an invaluable way of reinserting controversy into our understanding of Ottoman internal affairs, especially on such politically sensitive issues as the dispute over Bayezid's succession with his brother Yakub and other factions at court at the very beginning of his reign. These matters are passed over in almost complete silence or are treated in a very reticent way in the

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[78] The involvement of Timurtaş and Kutlu as principal commanders with responsibility for defending and extending the Ottoman frontier eastwards towards the Karamanid frontier during the latter part of Murad I's reign and at the beginning of Bayezid I's reign is recorded by the historians Müneccimbaşı, author of the *Cami al düvel*, ed. Ahmed Ağırakça (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995), p. 126, and Ali, *Künh ül ahbar*, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 124, 127 and 140.

[79] Ahmed Şikari, *Karaman Tarihi*, edition in Roman letters by Mesud Koyman (Konya: Yeni Kitab Basımevi, 1946), p. 172: 'Ben han oğlu hanım. Bu bir şah kulu. Gayret değilmidir [ki] böyle har benim üstüme gele?' Shikari's text, though it is impossible to use it as a guide to the chronological sequence of events, still represents an invaluable source for exposing the controversy surrounding not just the Ottomans' relations with their rivals among the neighbouring Turkmen states of Anatolia, but also the dynasty's uneasy relations with its own Turcoman warrior class internally.

surviving Ottoman sources, most of which were compiled a century of more after the events they describe.

Another important feature of the political landscape of Anatolia in the period, in addition to the porousness and impreciseness of the political boundaries that notionally separated the various polities and kingdoms who controlled lesser and greater territories, is the inescapable fact that the Ottomans faced not one but four quite credible rival contestants for imperial sway. All four targeted these petty kingdoms for inclusion within their own spheres of influence, namely: (1) the expansionist state of Kadi Burhaneddin Ahmed based at Sivas in the years 1391–98; (2) the well-established though latterly self-divided Mamluk state of Egypt, with territorial extensions into Syria and the upper Euphrates region, led by Barkuk until 1399; (3) the central Anatolian state of Karaman under the dynamic rule of Alaeddin Beg (r. 1361 to c. 1398) and (4) the rising power of Timur whose state included, after 1387, a base in Azerbaijan which (albeit contested with the Kara Koyunlu leader Kara Yusuf) was used effectively as a launching pad for operations to extend his control into Anatolia at the expense of both the petty dynasts of the region and the larger players such as Kadi Burhaneddin and Barkuk. The last of these contestants, Timur, was at the centre of a dangerous shift in the balance of power, to the potential detriment of Bayezid's position in the region that continued, in intermittent phases, throughout the period 1394 to 1402. None of Bayezid's neighbours and competitors bordering his western territories in the Balkans posed anything like the same strategic threat to Bayezid and most were in any case too weak to present a serious challenge. The Hungarian king Sigismund's determination to extend his sphere of influence southwards to and beyond the Danube in the period 1392 to 1396 did not, even with a host of international coalition partners to assist him, threaten to impose a similar negative shift in the balance of power against Ottoman interests. Anatolia continued throughout the period to offer the greatest opportunities, as well as the greatest threats, to Bayezid.

The highly fluid state of international relations affecting the Anatolian sphere in the period is exemplified by the case of the minor dynasty of the Taj al-Din Oghullari, based in the region around Niksar in the north-east Anatolian border region, who became the target of multiple approaches from their more powerful neighbours, both Kadi Burhaneddin and the Ottomans, who each backed opposing sides during succession struggles between rival candidates in order to enhance their positions as powerbrokers and overlords with influence over strategic border districts. In the succession struggle between Alp Arslan ibn Taceddin and his brother Mahmud who maintained an uneasy rule over the principality in the period 1387 to 1398, Kadi Burhaneddin offered his support to the challenger Alp Arslan over an extended period between 1394 and 1396 while, after Alp Arslan's death in 1396 in battle with his brother – followed shortly after by the death of Kadi Burhaneddin in 1398 – the region drifted into the Ottoman orbit where it remained until the next political upheaval caused by Timur's invasion of Anatolia and Bayezid's defeat

in 1402, at which time its independence was again briefly restored.[80] This rapid fluctuation observed in many smaller states, between independence, alliance with greater states, nominal annexation followed by restoration of independence, was by no means uncommon in the 1390s.

The Taj al-Din Oghullari are only one illustration of a far wider pattern. The impermanency of political solutions reached at a particular stage in the battle for regional precedence between the greater powers gave considerable opportunity for the lesser powers and former protégés of the greater powers to escape the grasp of the would-be hegemons at each shift in the regional balance of power caused by the death or defeat of one of the major powers' leaders. Throughout Bayezid's reign, despite his energetic attempts to reverse the trend, the political landscape of Anatolia remained fragmented and highly unstable. It was for this very reason that Bayezid's attention was more often and more persistently drawn to defend Ottoman interests in the eastern rather than in the western parts of his empire. The attacks on Thessalonica in 1394 and against Nicopolis in 1396 were not so much elements in an Ottoman grand strategy for expansion into Europe as episodes of crisis management and counter-attack in the face of serious and imminent naval and military threat. Because the Balkans had proven for the most part easy enough to manage by means of vassalization and diplomatic compromise, as well as the pragmatic solution of rule by proxy, Bayezid had been able to avoid the temptation as well as the risk of attempting the full-scale incorporation of the western and northern Balkans while he concentrated his military resources on the serious and continuous challenges that arose in the east.

Another characteristic of the political landscape of Anatolia in the later part of the fourteenth century was the reality that only a few solutions attempted by Bayezid and designed to consolidate the Ottomans' position in Anatolia proved either lasting or final. Most provided at best partial and incomplete solutions to larger problems that needed later readjustment or revisiting after an initial campaign. Others consisted of little more than evanescent shows of strength that led to no substantial imposition of Ottoman rule at the levels where it mattered most, namely among the non-coopted elites in both towns and cities and most particularly in the still largely pastoral and nomadic expanses of Anatolia that formed their hinterlands.[81]

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[80] Details of Kadi Burhaneddin's diplomatic overtures to Alp Arslan are provided in Asterabadi's *Bezm u Rezm*, ed. Fuat Köprülü (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1928) p. 432. On the longer-term fate of the dynasty, see Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, p. 236.

[81] On the Ottoman 'practice' of unigeniture as an exception to the prevailing rule in fourteenth-century Muslim Anatolia, see Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 120 and 136–8. The degree to which and the parameters within which this 'practice' achieved consistent success in the period before 1453 is open to question. The survival of segmentary communities and identities in the Balkans of a much later imperial era is explored in the work of Trian Stoianovich. See in particular his study: 'The Segmentary State and *La Grande Nation*', in Eugene D. Genovese and Leonard Hochberg (eds), *Geographic Perspectives in History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 256–80.

In relation to Bayezid's solution of the Karamanid 'problem', the first confrontation of his reign in 1391 ended in an ostensibly amicable way with an armistice which followed the decision of the townspeople of Konya to offer their voluntary surrender around the time of the harvest in late July or early August. A reactivation of the military front by the Karamanids in contravention of the peace terms during Bayezid's absence for his campaign against Prince Mircea of Wallachia in 1392 led inevitably to a second Karamanid campaign in early spring 1393.[82] The revisiting of Karaman in successive campaigns repeated a pattern from earlier in his reign when other parts of the region to the south-west in Teke-ili and the Antalya region – having been forced to give nominal recognition to Ottoman suzerainty during Bayezid's blitzkrieg of 1390 – were subjected to a second campaign in 1393 before offering their full compliance with Ottoman demands for submission. Only then did they, in the words of the chroniclers, submit to the imposition of the tokens of Ottoman sovereignty such as the reading of the Friday prayer (*khutba*) in the name of the Ottoman ruler and the striking of coins (*sikke*) in his name.[83]

In broader terms, one should not lose sight of the fact that a number of Bayezid's 'conquests' were in fact re-conquests and re-submissions of vassals and subordinated dynasts who had previously submitted to his father Murad in the 1370s and 1380s. In general, agreements and oaths were cemented and sworn between two individuals on behalf of their respective polities. Therefore Bayezid's first task as ruler was to reaffirm and re-solemnize all the hard-won concessions gained through his father's own skilful application of a combination of persuasion and compulsion with respect to the allies, vassals, determined opponents and sovereign counterparts of his own day.

## Ottoman–Candarid Relations Examined in the Light of the Submission/ Clientship and Later Defection of Candaroğlu Süleyman Pasha

Reference has already been made to the fallout from Süleyman Pasha's offer of asylum to the Menteshid ruler Mehmed and his son Ilyas in 1390, shortly after Süleyman's own defection from the Ottoman camp.[84] Because of the coincidence of these events, Bayezid regarded Süleyman as not just a traitor but a double traitor and his compounded treachery constituted in Bayezid's eyes the gravest possible insult to his imperial pride, providing sufficient cause and provocation for two determined campaigns: one, a late-season attempt initiated in the autumn of 1391, but abandoned

[82] This campaign is the subject of some considerable chronological confusion in the Ottoman chronicles which all state that it occurred in response to an attack while Bayezid was on 'campaign in Nicopolis'. This could be understood to refer to any of the four campaigns conducted against Mircea which took place in 1392, 1394, 1395 and finally in 1396.

[83] Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, p. 209.

[84] On Mehmed Beg's flight from Menteshe, see Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Omsan*, p. 81; and on the harbouring of the 'rebel' in Kastamonu by an unnamed host, see ibid., p. 102.

shortly after its commencement; and the second, a full-scale campaign launched in spring 1393 with the aim of punishing and humbling the rebel(s).

It is noteworthy that the Ottoman chronicle tradition displays a noticeable reluctance to refer to the rebels by name, a tactic they used as a form of literary revenge to diminish the importance of the unnamed individuals and – by removing all reference to their agency in such reprehensible acts – to erase their names from the record of history. Such belittling of the persons and their actions was deliberate. After all it was the historians' job to praise virtuous action and consign the 'sowers of sedition' to permanent oblivion. Consequently it was considered in no way incongruous that acts – known from reliable contemporary sources such as the *Bezm u Rezm* to have been instigated by Süleyman in 1390 – should be ascribed by historians to Süleyman's father Bayezid the Lame who had been dead since 1385. Such distortion of events and confusion of historical causation was introduced by the historians deliberately in order to deliver a calculated slight to the name and reputation of the perpetrator of acts that they regarded as reprehensible. Even to mention the name was, in some way, to dignify it with a consideration that it did not deserve.

The story, so far as it can be reliably retrieved from the imperfect and often highly partisan historical record, seems to be that Mehmed and his son Ilyas carried on a determined resistance against Bayezid's plans for the annexation of the principality of Menteşe in 1390, before being forced into exile in the Candarid principality. The principality was divided at this time into a northern enclave, controlled by Sülyeman's brother Isfendiyar ibn Bayezid based in Sinope, and the southern districts, controlled by the 'rebel' Sülyeman based in Kastamonu. Isfendiyar (despite his later flight to Timur and participation in the ranks of his army at the Battle of Ankara) was at this time courting Bayezid, posing as a compliant vassal and willing supporter of the Ottoman cause in order to gain a tactical advantage against his brother, with whom he still disputed the succession to Bayezid the Lame's throne. From circumstances such as these it can be easily seen why Bayezid's hegemonic designs for the incorporation of the Turkmen states and principalities of Asia Minor under Ottoman rule was neither so simple nor straightforward as he had hoped. The rapid transformation of ally and vassal into opponent and foe, and the sudden reversals of these roles even within the frame of so limited a cast of characters as Bayezid the Lame and his two sons, Ilyas and Süleyman, would serve to baffle even the most careful of contingency planners.

Despite the circumspect treatment of the subject afforded in the Ottoman chronicles, we know that the blame for the breach with the Candarids rested squarely with Süleyman Pasha. Süleyman had started his political career as a refugee at Murad I's court in 1384 after falling out with his brother Ilyas and their father over the disposition of his estate. Murad gave his backing to Süleyman's candidacy for succession in exchange for military cooperation and an acknowledgement of Ottoman suzerainty, thus becoming in effect an Ottoman protégé. He performed this role with some enthusiasm and consistency

throughout the remainder of Murad's reign and into the beginning of Bayezid's reign when, upon seeing the handwriting on the wall following the high-handed treatment afforded by Bayezid to his former Germiyanid allies, Süleyman began to contemplate an escape from the tutelage of his patron and protector, the young Bayezid, whose own leadership status was still being tested and proven.

Regarding the precipitating causes behind Süleyman's defection we are informed by the sources that a prominent scion of another Turcoman dynasty of western Anatolia, the Germiyanid prince Yakub II, had availed himself of the opportunity of Murad's sudden death at Kosovo to announce his intention to reclaim the lands ceded to the Ottomans as a dowry on the occasion of Bayezid' marriage to a Germiyanid princess in 1381. Bayezid's reaction to what was regarded in the Ottomans' eyes as *naks -i ahd* or *khulf-i ahd* (reneging on a sworn promise or oath-breaking) was to seize Yakub's lands and deport him to a place of captivity on the Rumelian borders of the empire, at the fortress of Ipsala.[85] Such acts of open insubordination could not be allowed by Bayezid to go unnoticed or unpunished for fear of sustaining irreparable damage to his personal as well as his dynastic honour. The retribution for his betrayal at the hands of Süleyman was doubly important for the protection of his reputation at the Ottoman court because Süleyman was the very man who had played, according to the account provided in the *Bezm u Rezm*, such a key role in supporting and advising Bayezid during his bid to secure the throne in the months following Murad's death on the battlefield in 1389.

The words employed by Asterabadi to describe the relationship of mutual trust, as well as mutual dependency, that existed between Bayezid and his adviser *cum* mentor are reminiscent of the close ties that linked the ruler and his *nökers* described in an earlier part of this chapter.[86] Whatever the true nature of their relationship, a key passage in the *Bezm u Rezm* makes it clear that Süleyman Pasha, if not an actual kingmaker, was in possession of political acuity and astuteness that unquestionably helped Bayezid in his bid to consolidate his leadership at the outset of his reign. The passage in question provides the following account of Süleyman Pasha's skilful manipulation of public opinion in Bayezid's favour as follows:

> All of his father's clients and retainers who had risen up in opposition to Bayezid's succession and declared their separation and independence [from the Ottomans] were reconciled to his rule and willingly accepted their confinement within the [iron] bands of compliance while binding up their waists with the girdle of submission.[87]

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[85] See Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Omsan*, pp. 89–91.

[86] See above, pp. 200–203.

[87] Asterabadi, *Bezm u Rezm*, p. 388: 'Jami az hawass-i pedereş [that is, Murad I] ki az o [that is, Bayezid] takhalluf kerde budend ve istiklal ve infirad nemude, ta'iyan ragiben kerden der çanber-i mutavaat averdend, ve kemer-yi inkiyad ber miyan bastand'.

Another factor that contributed to the focusing of attention by Bayezid on the affairs of Anatolia at the beginning of his reign was the uncertain outcome of the internal struggle within the Mamluk sultanate following the collapse of the Bahri line of succession c. 1382 and the uncertain installation of Burji authority in its stead.[88] The transplantation of such uncertainties at the centre in Cairo to the periphery of the Mamluk state in northern Syria and the upper Euphrates caused the Ottomans concern because of the uncertainty as to whose benefit any resulting power vacuum might redound. Part of the reason for positioning themselves in Teke, one of the gateways to Anatolia from the south, was to ensure that they were in a position to defend their regional and strategic interests in the event of a sudden Mamluk collapse. This was a situation that required careful monitoring as well as forward planning and preparation. By comparison, the Ottomans' strategic position in the Balkans was relatively straightforward and manageable. Byzantium was both self-divided and weak, and it is a commonly acknowledged fact that in the early part of Manuel's emperorship in the years 1391 to 1394, neither side was particularly interested in provoking a confrontation. In fact, despite the periodic occurrence of flashpoints of conflict, in general, it cannot be said that the confrontation between opposing religions or spheres of religious influence was very characteristic of Ottoman diplomatic and military relations with their Balkan neighbours during the 1390s.

## Conclusions

The finite nature of Ottoman naval and military resources evaluated and described at the beginning of the chapter served as the main determinant limiting Bayezid's options in planning the scope and direction of his foreign policy. Yet, within these general constraints, it is also instructive to explore the force of custom, the expectations of his subjects and followers, and the general climate of politics and traditions of kingship in the late medieval period which all played a significant role in shaping Bayezid's decisions about the scale and timing of his military ventures, as well as the prioritizing and implementation of his administrative vision. It is beyond doubt that in the first four years of Bayezid's reign, which overlapped with the first three years of Manuel II's reign between February 1391 and the early months of 1394, practical, pragmatic and material, as well as symbolic and sentimental, reasons all dictated that a course of mutual accommodation between the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires should be jointly pursued.[89] From his point of view Bayezid sought accommodation with most

[88] Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, p. 77.

[89] This assessment is seconded, from the Byzantine point of view, by Charanis who expresses the following opinion (Charanis, 'The Strife Among the Palaeologi', p. 307): 'For three years following his accession to the throne as sole emperor, Manuel's policy towards Bayezid was that of appeasement not antagonism.'

of the states and principalities of the Balkans, in effect rolling over his father Murad's policies of vassalization as an alternative to annexation.

The exception to this general rule of preferring accommodation to confrontation was the subduing of the southern Bulgarian czardom of John (Ivan) Shishman whose capital, Trnovo, succumbed in July 1393 after a three-month siege. This brought to a definitive end the semi-independent position situated somewhere in between vassalage and full Ottoman sovereignty which Shishman had been able to negotiate with his Ottoman overlords during the earlier part of his reign, in the years 1371–93.[90] That the abrupt end to Shishman's rule coincided closely with the failed Serres summit meeting convened between Bayezid and his other Balkan vassals in the early summer of 1394 is by no means accidental. The symbolic as well as strategic reasons for Bayezid's campaigns (raids) against his Wallachian vassal Mircea in 1392, 1394 and 1395 have been discussed in an earlier part of this chapter.[91]

With some exceptions, it was on the whole characteristic of the political age in which Bayezid lived that accommodation with lesser Christian powers such as the Branković and Lazarović families of Serbia was not based on religious compatibility or even common interest but rather, from the standpoint of the lesser powers who were structurally incapable of resisting the greater military strength of the Ottomans, on the unanswerable logic of the axiom: 'If you can't beat them, join them.' The solution of accommodation also favoured Ottoman imperial priorities since it created stabilized frontiers in the Balkans which did not require heavy defending, thus allowing Bayezid to concentrate his forces on what always remained his highest priority: the expansion and pacification of the empire's borders in the East. While Bayezid was able to make a realistic assessment of the military capabilities of his western adversaries and to use diplomacy and compromise to create alliances and pro-Ottoman alignments in the West, his fatal miscalculation (overestimation) of his own military capacity, compounded by a serious underestimation of his adversary Timur's power base, led him first to create enmity where it was not necessary to make an enemy, and then to confront his adversary relying on alliances that both were uncertain and, in the end, provided unreliable support to his imperial ambitions. Bayezid's failure at the Battle of Ankara was rooted not so much in military and tactical errors or miscalculations as it was in his diplomatic, managerial and leadership shortcomings.

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[90] On the fall of Trnovo and the circumstances which prompted the Ottoman attack, see Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, p. 423.

[91] See above, pp. 187–90.

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# Conclusion

*Bernard Hamilton*

As the editors mention in their Introduction, this volume arose out of a one-day conference held at the Institute of Historical Research in London on 9 July 2010, which proved to be the hottest day of the summer. As President of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, which co-sponsored the event, I wish to put on record that the conference theme, the academic programme, the organization of funding, the publicity and the practical arrangements of that event were the work of Nikolaos Chrissis and Mike Carr alone. The same is true of the commissioning, editing and publication arrangements of this volume. It is extremely encouraging to me and to the other members of my committee that the SSCLE has young members with the capacity for that degree of effective initiative.

* * *

The present volume is a study of the interaction between Byzantines, Latins and Turks in the eastern Mediterranean in the later Middle Ages. The editors' claim that this collection is almost unique in bringing together the fruits of research by western medievalists, Byzantinists and Ottomanists is accurate, and the contributions show that this is a fruitful approach to this complex field of study. Crusading is a recurrent theme in this work, though not a dominant one. The political fragmentation of the Aegean world, Greece, Thrace and western Anatolia was brought about by the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople in 1204 and its aftermath. The fragile Latin Empire of Constantinople and its vassal states, together with the independent Venetian dominions, needed military help from the West to defend their territories, particularly against the resurgent Byzantine states of Nicaea and Epiros, and this led to the preaching of crusades against the Greeks by Innocent III and Honorius III. The early thirteenth century witnessed a diversification of crusading, because the popes had no armies of their own, and the advantages of using the crusade as a means of supporting what the curia discerned as Catholic interests were obvious, since the methods of recruiting and financing such expeditions were already well established. Yet as Nikolaos Chrissis rightly observes in the first essay in this collection, the preaching of the crusade against Orthodox Byzantines was not a straightforward matter. For a crusade, by definition, was waged against enemies of the faith, and consequently the Orthodox Byzantines came to be seen not simply as political enemies of the Latin Empire, but as 'schismatic Greeks' who were destroying the unity of the Church. Yet, as Chrissis observes, these

crusades were not launched against the Byzantines because they were enemies of the faith; rather, they were 'designated enemies of the faith because the crusade was deployed against them'. This is an important distinction, which has not been made by previous crusade historians.

The papal crusades in support of the Latin Empire were not very effective, but the rhetoric which they inspired, in which the Byzantines were labelled 'schismatics', had long-term consequences. Previously, although there had been disputes between the popes and the Byzantine Church, the Orthodox, including the members of the daughter-churches of Constantinople in the Balkans and Russia, had always been considered part of the same Catholic and Apostolic Church to which the popes themselves belonged. This had been the assumption which had informed the Church settlements introduced with papal consent by Latin rulers in the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and in the Crusader States, both of which had substantial groups of Orthodox Christians among their subjects.[1] Once the Orthodox had been defined as schismatics by the Holy See, religious unity could only be restored by requiring them to make a profession of full dogmatic agreement with the Latin Church. Some Byzantine rulers, particularly after Michael VIII had recaptured Constantinople in 1261, recognized the political potential of this situation: that if they made their submission to Rome, the papacy would be bound to withdraw its support from hostile western rulers, and, indeed, to dissuade them from attacking the Byzantine Empire which had been restored to Catholic unity and was therefore under the special protection of the pope. Yet this was a dangerous policy, because a substantial majority of Orthodox clergy and laity were unwilling to accept that they were schismatic and Byzantine society was divided by these acts of union. Although Michael VIII and representatives of the Byzantine clergy entered into union with the Western Church at the Council of Lyons in 1274, and John VIII and members of the hierarchy did the same at the Council of Florence in 1439, they did not carry the majority of their people with them, and a schism persisted between the Latin Church and the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, which has not yet been fully healed.[2]

Nevertheless, the recognition by many members of both confessions that they shared a common faith persisted. Teresa Shawcross, in her chapter on 'Golden Athens', gives evidence of this. The Parthenon had been converted into a basilica dedicated to the *Theotokos*, and this shrine had become important as a cult centre for the entire Byzantine world after Emperor Basil II came there in 1018 to offer thanks for his success in his long war against Bulgaria. The walled city of Athens

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[1] Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States* (London: Variorum Publications, 1980), pp. 1–18, 159–87; G.A. Loud, *The Latin Church in Norman Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 494–520.

[2] Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1979), pp. 120–41; idem, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 180–304, 349–415.

was placed under the jurisdiction of the archbishop and was granted tax-exemption by the Byzantine state in honour of the Mother of God. When the Franks captured the city in 1205 the situation did not change, for devotion to the Blessed Virgin was also very strong in the Western Church.[3] The Greek clergy were expelled and replaced by Latins, but the Frankish archbishops ruled the city as guardians of the shrine of Our Lady, and Athens preserved its tax-exempt status under Latin rule. The shrine became a focus of pilgrimage for Byzantine Orthodox and western Catholics alike. One consequence of this was, as Teresa Shawcross points out, that the way of life of the people of Athens did not change very much under Latin rule, because the Marian shrine was the chief reason for the economic prosperity as well as the spiritual importance of the city, both before and after the Frankish conquest.

This is a specific example of the way in which the Frankish settlers in the former Byzantine lands became assimilated to the predominant Greek culture. The male descendants of these men remained Latin Catholics and were ruled by law codes based on western traditions, but many of them married Greek wives. There was no religious impediment to such marriages, nor was there any social impediment, because the Byzantines had a landowning aristocracy into which members of the new western ruling class could marry without disparagement. This was a very different situation from that in the Crusader States, where the indigenous Christian population, with the exception of the Armenians, had mostly been of lower social status, and members of the Frankish aristocracy had had to choose their wives from western European noble families. In the Latin Empire, by contrast, the Frankish nobility became Greek-speaking after a few generations, so that a Greek translation had to be made of the *Chronicle of the Morea*, the epic of the Frankish conquest of the Peloponnese, because the descendants of the conquerors could no longer understand the Old French text.[4]

This cultural assimilation was not a one-sided phenomenon. Prolonged contact with the descendants of the first Frankish settlers led some Byzantines to form a more sympathetic opinion of the Latin West. A notable example of this was Demetrius Kydones, chief minister to John VI Kantakouzenos, who was favourably impressed by the learned Dominicans he met in Constantinople, and who translated the works of St Thomas Aquinas into Greek. This was not a totally new development

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[3] A great deal has been written on this subject; the most concise, scholarly treatment remains Hilda Graef, *Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion* (2 vols, London: Sheed and Ward, 1963–65), vol. 1, pp. 210–321.

[4] I find the conclusion of David Jacoby, that the Greek text is translated from an Old French original, persuasive: David Jacoby, 'Quelques considérations sur les versions de la Chronique de Morée', *Journal des Savants* (1968), pp. 133–89; but a different view, which deserves the reader's serious attention, proposing the existence of a common ancestor of all surviving versions (most probably, but not certainly, in Greek) has been put forward in the most recent examination of the Chronicle by Teresa Shawcross, *The Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 22–6, 31–52.

in the Byzantine world. The Emperor Manuel I Komnenos had appointed the Pisan theologian, Hugh Eteriano, as his adviser in Western Church affairs, because Manuel was interested in the new scholastic theology of the western schools.[5] The foundation of Dominican communities in Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century made Byzantine scholars aware of the intellectual vitality of the West in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the growth there of theological study grounded in Aristotelian logic. Arguably the most important Dominican scholar active in Frankish Greece was William of Moerbeke (d. 1286), who lived there in 1260–67, and then, after serving in the Roman curia for some years, returned as Latin Archbishop of Corinth in 1278. He made translations from the Greek of some of the works of Aristotle, including the *Poetics*, of Proclus' commentary on the *Parmenides*, and also of Plato's *Timaeus*.[6]

Judith Ryder examines Kydones' writings about the crusades, which were inspired by the crusade led by Count Amadeo of Savoy in 1366, which succeeded in recovering Gallipoli from the Ottoman Turks and restoring the fortress to Byzantine rule. What impressed Kydones when he considered the crusading movement was that the western participants had sometimes borne the costs and given their lives in a spirit of altruism in campaigns which had benefited Byzantium rather than themselves. He drew attention to the work of the First Crusaders, who successfully besieged Nicaea and subsequently defeated the field army of the Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum, actions which involved them in great loss of life, yet who made no attempt to take over any territories in Anatolia for themselves, but advanced into Syria to liberate the Holy Places. In the wake of these crusader victories, Alexios I Komnenos was able to restore imperial rule in western Anatolia and the coastal areas of northern and southern Asia Minor, and to confine the Seljuk sultan to the central plateau. The recovery of these provinces gave the Byzantine Empire economic and military stability and enabled it to remain a dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans throughout most of the twelfth century. Yet the First Crusade received no credit for this in Komnenian historiography, which focused on the failure of its leaders to restore Antioch to Byzantine rule. It may be added that few modern historians of the crusades pay very much attention to this important consequence of the First Crusade either. Kydones discusses other crusade ventures which had proved beneficial to Byzantium, but does not mention the Fourth Crusade. Judith Ryder comments about this, and her observation is persuasive: 'the legacy of 1204 had paled into insignificance in the face of present dangers'.

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[5] Bernard Hamilton, Janet Hamilton and Sarah Hamilton, *Hugh Eteriano: 'Contra Patarenos'* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 109–48.

[6] Jozef Brams and Willy Vanhamel (eds), *Guillaume de Moerbeke: Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Wulf-Manison Centre), 1st ser., vol. 7 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989), pp. 301–83; Walter Berschin, *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Jerold C. Frakes (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp. 259–60.

The 'present danger' was, of course, the growth of Ottoman power. When the Fourth Crusade took Constantinople in 1204, western Anatolia was still in Byzantine hands and formed the nucleus of the Byzantine Empire of Nicaea. The Seljuk Turks of Iconium took advantage of the ensuing wars between the Franks and the Byzantines to annex territories on the northern and southern coastlands of Anatolia, but the political situation changed radically when a Mongol army defeated the Seljuks at Köse Dagh in 1243 and became the dominant power in Anatolia.[7] The Christian powers in Anatolia with lands bordering on the Seljuk sultanate all made their peace with the Great Khans: John III Vatatzes at Nicaea negotiated an alliance, while Manuel I of Trebizond (1238–63) and Hethum I of Cilicia acknowledged Mongol overlordship.[8] Mongol suzerainty produced political stability in Anatolia, since the Mongol authorities restrained the Seljuks from attacking the Christian states which were under the protection of the Great Khans. This came to an end in the early fourteenth century, when the weakening of Mongol control led to the growth of autonomous Turkish beyliks, whose rulers carved out territories in the former provinces of the Nicene Empire, two of which, the beyliks of Aydin and Menteshe, established themselves on the Aegean coast where their emirs constructed fleets and began to threaten the security of Christian shipping and of the Greek islands.[9]

The maritime cities of Italy had had strong interests in eastern Mediterranean trade, which in the case of Venice and Amalfi dated back to the tenth century, and in that of Pisa and Genoa to the twelfth. The Venetians played a major part in the Fourth Crusade, and were the chief commercial beneficiaries of it. The foundation of the Latin Empire opened the Black Sea to western shipping, which the Byzantine rulers had always refused to do. Although at first western merchants showed no interest in the Crimea, and no attempt seems to have been made by the Latin emperors to establish political control there over the former Byzantine theme of Cherson, this changed after 1240 when the Mongols extended their power to the south Russian steppes. This presence proved to be permanent, and the Golden Horde established their capital at Old Serai on the lower Volga. The Crimea then became the western terminus for trade with northern Asia and the Far East, and the western maritime powers established fortified cities there. I have examined the consequences of this in my contribution to the volume. The city of Caffa in the Crimea was founded by

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[7] Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1968), pp. 268–360; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), pp. 74–5.

[8] Jean Richard, 'Byzance et les Mongols', *BF*, 25 (1999), pp. 86–7; Sirarpie Der Nersessian, 'The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia', in Setton, *Crusades*, vol. 2, pp. 652–3; Donald M. Nicol, 'The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires', in J.M. Hussey (ed.), *The Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 4, part I: Byzantium and its Neighbours* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 315–16 (on the submission of Trebizond); Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, pp. 103, 112, nn. 135–6.

[9] Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 303–14.

the Genoese, who supported the Nicene Emperor, Michael VIII, in his successful attempt to recapture Constantinople in 1261, and who therefore came to occupy a favoured position in his state. Among the privileges conferred on the republic was the lease of the alum mines at Phokaia, to the north of Smyrna, in western Anatolia. Alum was an essential ingredient in the manufacture of woollen cloth, which occupied a major place in the western economy, and before the discovery of alum mines at Tolfa in the Papal States in the reign of Pius II (1458–64), Phokaia was the major source of supply to the western world.[10] The lease was granted by the Genoese to the Zaccaria family, and it made their fortune. Then in c. 1305 the Emperor Andronikos II granted the island of Chios to the Zaccaria brothers on a ten-year lease. Their possession of Phokaia brought them into conflict with the Turkish beylik of Aydin, which had developed to the south.

In his chapter, Mike Carr examines the way in which the Zaccaria of Chios combined their trading interests with the work of crusading, defending the Christian island of Chios against Turkish attack. This article is a masterclass in how to write clearly but briefly about an extremely complex period of history. The Zaccaria rulers not only defeated the fleet of Aydin with the help of the Knights of St John at Rhodes, but also used the fact that they had done so to persuade Pope John XXII to dispense them from the embargo on trading with Mamluk Egypt, because, as they explained, they needed the profits which such trade would bring in order to continue to fight the holy war in defence of Christian Chios.

The Venetians remained the dominant western naval power in the eastern Mediterranean in the later Middle Ages. They are represented in this collection by Peter Lock's essay on how the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello viewed the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. Acre had fallen in 1291 and between 1301 and 1321 Sanudo wrote his *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*. This was one of a number of treatises written at that time about the measures which the West needed to take to recover the Holy Land. It is by far the longest of them and the reader may wonder how wise Sanudo was to give such very detailed estimates of the forces and armaments needed by a successful new crusade, including a detailed breakdown of the commissariat of men and horses, all of which were carefully costed by the author. Any pope who read the work would surely have reacted by considering the plans unaffordable. Sanudo wrote it when the Zaccaria were ruling Chios, and indeed he listed them among the rulers in the Aegean who could be relied upon to support the Christian cause. Sanudo knew the Aegean and Frankish Greece at first hand. He had visited much of the region, and he was related to the Venetian triarchs of Euboea and the Venetian rulers of Naxos and Paros, the Duchy of the Archipelago. Yet in this treatise he did not consider the Aegean a potential war-zone, or view the new Turkish beyliks as a potential threat to Christian settlements there. His opinion was that Mamluk Egypt, which

[10] R.J. Mitchell, *The Laurels and the Tiara: Pope Pius II 1458–1464* (London: Harvill Press, 1962), pp. 192–3.

ruled the territories of the former Crusader States, was the chief enemy, and that an essential preparation for a successful crusade to recover Jerusalem was for the western powers to impose a strict economic blockade on the Mamluks. He also argued that, in the meantime, priority should be given to sending aid to the two surviving Christian states in the Levant, the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia and the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus, which were subject to Mamluk attack.

Peter Lock has also examined the 42 letters written by Sanudo, dating from before 1243 (the year of his death is not known, but his will is dated in that year). These show that he changed his mind about the danger posed by the Turkish beyliks in western Anatolia, and tried to suggest ways of limiting their power. For example, he pointed out that a high proportion of the subjects of these Turkish emirs were Orthodox Christians, whose support might prove valuable to Christian forces sent against them.

In fact the most dangerous of the Turkish emirates proved to be that of the Ottomans. They had originally entered Asia Minor in the mid-thirteenth century as refugees from the Mongol advance in central Asia, and had sought refuge with the Seljuk rulers who had granted them a small fief on the borders of the Byzantine Empire in Bithynia. That was the Asiatic province which Michael VIII and his successors were most concerned to defend, and it was not until 1337, when they occupied Nicomedia, that the Ottomans completed their annexation of those lands. Unlike some of the other Turkish emirates, the Ottomans did not have a fleet and their westward advance was halted at the Bosphorus until 1354, when they captured Gallipoli on the western shore of the Hellespont. From that centre they were able to expand into Thrace and the Balkans.

In 1389 the Ottomans defeated the Serbian army at Kosovo, and made that kingdom tributary. The Sultan Murad was killed in the battle and was succeeded by his son Bayezid I, who is the subject of the chapter by Rhoads Murphey. This is an important contribution to our understanding of early Ottoman history. Murphey emphasizes that the Ottoman Empire in Bayezid's reign lacked those structures of government which made that state so powerful in the sixteenth century. This is a timely reminder of a fact which is too easily forgotten. Moreover, although the Sultan Murad had introduced the system of timars, the granting by the sultan of fiefs in newly conquered territory in return for military service, it was not sufficiently well developed in Bayezid's reign to provide the sultan with an adequate standing army. Consequently he relied on forming a network of alliances with the Turkish warlords who controlled the frontier provinces both in the Balkans and in Anatolia, where Murad had succeeded in imposing his suzerainty on many of the independent Turkish emirates. Murphey makes the important observation that in the fourteenth century it was the Turkish tradition that loyalty was professed to a ruler, not to a dynasty, so that a new sultan such as Bayezid had to renegotiate the alliances which his father had made and did not start his reign from a position of inherited strength. Bayezid's hold on power was also complicated by the fact that, although his dominions spanned the Balkans and Anatolia, he did not have a

fleet, and therefore depended on reaching agreements with maritime powers such as Genoa to facilitate troop movements from Anatolia to Europe or the reverse. By 1393 Bayezid's authority in theory extended to the Danube in the Balkans, while he also claimed suzerainty over much of Anatolia, yet, Murphey argues, his control of the European provinces was very insecure. That was the reason why he never tried to follow up his victory over the crusaders at Nicopolis in 1396 with an attack on Catholic central Europe. Throughout his reign he concentrated on gaining recognition of his overlordship from the Turkish emirs of Anatolia, and initially he appeared successful, but this did not save him from defeat by Timur i-leng.

Timur was a Mongol prince – though not a member of the family of Genghis Khan – who endeavoured to reconstruct the Mongol Empire from the seat of his power at Samarkand. In 1400/1401 he came into conflict with Bayezid, and in 1402 he defeated the Ottoman army at the Battle of Ankara and took the sultan prisoner. Murphey argues that Timur's victory was not simply a matter of military superiority, but also reflected the fact that he was more skilled at treating with the emirs of Anatolia, many of whom were discontented with Ottoman suzerainty, than Bayezid was. He concludes: 'Bayezid's failure at the Battle of Ankara was rooted not so much in military and tactical errors, or miscalculation, as it was in his diplomatic managerial and leadership shortcomings.'

Bayezid's greatest victory had been his defeat of the Crusade of Nicopolis. Western Europe was troubled by the speed and extent of Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, and was not aware of the weaknesses in the sultan's control of those provinces, which Murphey has analysed. In 1394 Bayezid laid siege to Constantinople, because the new emperor, Manuel II, had refused to renew the homage which his father John V had paid to the Ottomans. This was not a military campaign, since no siege engines were used, but an attempt to blockade the city by land and to prevent supplies from reaching it. This led Manuel II to appeal to the West for help. It was a difficult time at which to attempt to launch a new crusade, because the Western Church was divided by the Great Schism, the presence of rival claimants to the Holy See at Rome and at Avignon, which had divided Latin Christendom since the disputed papal election of 1378.[11] Nevertheless, when the rulers of the West decided that a new crusade was necessary, both the Avignon pope, Benedict XIII, and the Roman pope, Boniface IX, gave the enterprise their blessing.[12] This was a unique example of cooperation between the rival popes during the Great Schism. The crusade received support from Charles VI of France, Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, and John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, although none of them accompanied it in person, and it also received contingents of men from most western countries. The crusaders assembled at Buda in July 1396, where they were joined by the army of King Sigismund of Hungary. It is estimated that some 15,000 to 20,000 men took part. On 25 September they were totally defeated by the

11 John Holland Smith, *The Great Schism, 1378* (London: Hamilton, 1970).

12 Aziz Suryal Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London: Methuen, 1934), pp. 33–4.

army of the Sultan Bayezid at Nicopolis on the Danube, before they had penetrated deeply into Ottoman territory.

This crusade is well documented in western sources and much has been written about it, but Evrim Binbaş in his essay has made available the account of a Muslim eyewitness of the battle. Shams al-Dīn Ibn al-Jazarī was a scholar from Damascus who had recently come to Bayezid's court and accompanied him on the Nicopolis campaign. He was not a combatant, but a member of the sultan's entourage. After Bayezid's defeat at Ankara in 1402, Ibn al-Jazarī was taken captive by the forces of Timur, and although he was well treated, because he was a religious scholar who wrote commentaries on the Qur'ān, he spent the rest of his life at Shiraz in Persia. It was there that he wrote two works which record his presence at Nicopolis: one survives only in a single manuscript and clearly did not circulate very widely; but the other, a verse history of Islam, is known in many copies and was very popular. Evrim Binbaş has translated both passages about Nicopolis into English, the first time that this has been done. They are, of course, of interest in their own right as evidence supplied by a Muslim eyewitness of the battle, but as Evrim points out, they are also evidence of the prestige which this victory conferred on Bayezid in the Turkish world, a prestige which was not diminished by his later defeat at Ankara. This conclusion is of particular interest in the light of Rhoads Murphey's analysis of the tenuous nature of the sultan's control of the western provinces where the victory took place, because it exemplifies the gulf between the perceived power and the real power of Bayezid.

It is also perhaps relevant that the Crusade of Nicopolis was intended not only to meet the threat posed by the Ottomans to Catholic central Europe, but also to lift the siege of Constantinople. Some of the French promoters of the crusade, of whom Philip de Mézières is the most important, stated that they wished to use it to restore the Latin Empire of Constantinople, but that appears to have been a rhetorical rather than a practical objective. For after the crusade had failed, and while the Ottoman blockade of Constantinople was continuing, Manuel II Palaiologos came to western Europe in person and visited the courts of Charles VI at Paris and Henry IV in London. The West received him as the lawful ruler of Byzantium. The western imperative had become to join with the Byzantines in checking the further growth of Ottoman power.

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Although each of these contributions is a specialist study of one aspect of the history of Frankish Greece and the Aegean, there is a considerable degree of interconnection between them. Nikolaos Chrissis' essay, for example, enables one to understand more fully Peter Lock's observation that Sanudo considered the 'schismatic' Greeks unsuited to take part in a new crusade to recover the Holy Land. Similarly, Judith Ryder's work on Kydones' favourable assessment of crusading has close links with Mike Carr's study of cooperation between the Genoese and the Byzantines in the early fourteenth-century Aegean; while

Evrim Binbaş' study not only complements the work of Rhoads Murphey on Bayezid I, but also gives a more positive account of the policies of Timur than I do in my chapter, and thus helps the reader to form a more balanced view of his achievements. I do not doubt that when the index to this collection is compiled, many more examples of interconnectedness will be evident.

The editors cannot have foreseen how the contributions would complement each other when they commissioned these essays, but in the event they have produced a volume which is not a collection of isolated studies, but one which provides a coherent approach to key areas of the history of the Balkans and the Levant at this critical period. They deserve our congratulations on so successfully achieving their stated aim of 'bringing together research by [western] medievalists, Byzantinists and Ottomanists in order to explore relations between Greeks, Latins and Turks over the entire period from 1204 to 1453'. The resulting collection may justly be considered a very fruitful academic enterprise.

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